Interwar examples where a heavy presence might have made a difference?

[Admiral Beez]

Before the Pacific war, Churchill suggested that the USN send a battlefleet to Singapore, as a deterrence to the Japanese. Obviously, given his sending of Force Z, Churchill thought a lot about deterrence. Are there examples where a heavy prewar deployment might have made a difference in Axis war plans? For example, in March 1936 when Germany moved to remilitarize the Rhineland, what if the French and British marched armies into the territory? AIUI, Germany planned to quickly withdraw if challenged.

What other reasonably feasible prewar opportunities are there for a large intervention having an impact on Axis plans?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Before the Pacific war, Churchill suggested that the USN send a battlefleet to Singapore, as a deterrence to the Japanese. Obviously, given his sending of Force Z, Churchill thought a lot about deterrence. Are there examples where a heavy prewar deployment might have made a difference in Axis war plans? For example, in March 1936 when Germany moved to remilitarize the Rhineland, what if the French and British marched armies into the territory? AIUI, Germany planned to quickly withdraw if challenged.

What other reasonably feasible prewar opportunities are there for a large intervention having an impact on Axis plans?

Closing Gibraltar and the Suez Canal to the Italians in response to its invasion of Abyssinia.

 

[Snautzer01]

Churchill's gun boat diplomacy. For what a legend he was, he was not a strategic genius.
Try to get a nation involved in problems they not have.
As the UK was a kinda bankrupt, good plan for the Brits, not for USA.
Its a good plan sending a few boats to make your point onto an enemy wich is fighting with sticks.
Different ball game as they have an iron fist navy hanging around.
Britain only saw that, when defeated as what happened in the region.
I think USA planners knew they could not sustain a war in ww1 surplus and did not bite.

 

[EwenS]

While the USN resisted efforts to base a fleet at Singapore, they did agree to take on an increased burden of convoy escort in the Atlantic in 1941, finally escorting convoys to the MOMP. That allowed the withdrawal of RN ships from the Atlantic to refit for redeployment to the IO to build a stronger Eastern Fleet to serve as a deterrent.

Unfortunately the Japanese struck before these plans could be fully implemented. The first signs of it were in the movements of the Repulse & 4 R class battleships, which went out as escort to various WS convoys in late 1941 / early 1942.

 

[Snautzer01]

That is later in the time line i think. Much cockyness had eveporated at end 1940. For all arms. Hanging on by finger nails for the motherland will get a clear view of what is possible.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

That is later in the time line i think. Much cockyness had eveporated at end 1940. For all arms. Hanging on by finger nails for the motherland will get a clear view of what is possible.

Yeah, I think Beezy's question was more about pre-war. Shirer makes a good case that aside from the Rhineland, there were a couple of other moments when Allied firmness might have put paid to Hitlerian ambitions.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Yeah, I think Beezy's question was more about pre-war.

Correct, and thanks. Perhaps greater US assistance to China pre-1937 would be an example.

Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian

history.state.gov 3.0 shell

history.state.gov

"At the outset, U.S. officials viewed developments in China with ambivalence. On the one hand, they opposed Japanese incursions into northeast China and the rise of Japanese militarism in the area, in part because of their sense of a longstanding friendship with China. On the other hand, most U.S. officials believed that it had no vital interests in China worth going to war over with Japan. Moreover, the domestic conflict between Chinese Nationalists and Communists left U.S. policymakers uncertain of success in aiding such an internally divided nation. As a result, few U.S. officials recommended taking a strong stance prior to 1937, and so the United States did little to help China for fear of provoking Japan. U.S. likelihood of providing aid to China increased after July 7, 1937, when Chinese and Japanese forces clashed on the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, throwing the two nations into a full-scale war. As the United States watched Japanese forces sweep down the coast and then into the capital of Nanjing, popular opinion swung firmly in favor of the Chinese. Tensions with Japan rose when the Japanese Army bombed the U.S.S. Panay as it evacuated American citizens from Nanjing, killing three. The U.S. Government, however, continued to avoid conflict and accepted an apology and indemnity from the Japanese. "

 

[Shortround6]

I am not at all sure what sending a US force to Singapore would do for the US.

Even for the British. The US had a base in the Philippines. It is around 720-750 miles from Manila to Hong Kong. It is over 1600 miles from Singapore to Hong Kong.

Japanese have to pass by the Philippines to get to SE Asia or the Dutch East Indies.
The US was prohibited by treaty from strengthening the Manila defenses from 1922-23 until 1936.

The politics of putting more forces (money) into the Philippines in 1930s when there was a movement to make the Philippines independent is subject to question but with the Philippines heading for independence the US interests in the whole area gets smaller.

 

[EwenS]

I am not at all sure what sending a US force to Singapore would do for the US.

Even for the British. The US had a base in the Philippines. It is around 720-750 miles from Manila to Hong Kong. It is over 1600 miles from Singapore to Hong Kong.

Japanese have to pass by the Philippines to get to SE Asia or the Dutch East Indies.
The US was prohibited by treaty from strengthening the Manila defenses from 1922-23 until 1936.

The politics of putting more forces (money) into the Philippines in 1930s when there was a movement to make the Philippines independent is subject to question but with the Philippines heading for independence the US interests in the whole area gets smaller.

PI independence
The intention was to move towards full independence during the period 1935 to 1946, with gradual changes to the PI Constitution during that period. But would a US Govt really have been prepared to simply abandon the PI even after full independence with a rampant Japan still in place?

Naval facilities
Cavite naval base, the main USN facility in the PI for its Asiatic Fleet, could support nothing larger than a cruiser, and it proved no deterrence.

For that reason, the furthest West in the Pacific that the US could base its main force of battleships and carriers was PH. Still 4,800 miles away from the scene of any likely action. And it had virtually no fleet train in 1940/41 that would allow it to swiftly cross that ocean to intervene in any action by the Japanese.

Singapore
The RN dockyard there had the facilities to support a significant fleet. The largest dry dock in the world at the time IIRC. The 3rd largest floating dry dock in the world, AFD.IX capable of lifting vessels of 50,000 tons. Plus another smaller AFD. Massive oil storage facilities. Plenty of store sheds for naval stores.

Those are the kinds of facilities that the battleships and carriers of the US Pacific Fleet needed in the western part of the Pacific region if it was to be a serious deterrent to Japanese expansion southwestward.

Inter war Singapore was chosen as the main fleet base location for the RN because Hong Kong was seen as too exposed and the developed parts of Australia (on the east coast) were too far away. Darwin had zero to commend it in those days, other than a large stretch of water, and was virtually unconnected to civilisation! The battle against the IJN was expected to occur initially around Formosa/ Taiwan, to be followed by an advance to blockade Japan, probably seizing an advance base near Okinawa.

If the policy really was to be one of deterrence then the threat to Japan had to be credible. A sizeable fleet, USN or RN at Singapore might have been seen as a bigger threat to their ambitions than a USN fleet sitting at PH virtually able to go anywhere. Cavite could then have acted as a refuelling / restoring station for any TF deployed northwards.

As part of a deterrence strategy it has some merit. The downside of course is that it would leave the defences of the US West Coast vulnerable. But how much if a concern was that? It was a major operation to get the KB to PH logistically. Would it ever have been able to reach the West Coast? Such a move leaves Japan itself vulnerable to attack from the fleet at Singapore.

We know how the US did balance the risks. FDR moved the fleet base forward to PH. It proved to be no deterrent.

 

[Shortround6]

Naval facilities
Cavite naval base, the main USN facility in the PI for its Asiatic Fleet, could support nothing larger than a cruiser, and it proved no deterrence.

For that reason, the furthest West in the Pacific that the US could base its main force of battleships and carriers was PH. Still 4,800 miles away from the scene of any likely action. And it had virtually no fleet train in 1940/41 that would allow it to swiftly cross that ocean to intervene in any action by the Japanese.

We are covering an time span of 4-6 years, I think?
IF, big IF, the US had decided to beef up things in Asia in 1936-37 perhaps Cavite could have been enlarged, dredged, built up, what ever. Manila had at least the 2nd strongest shore batteries among the Allies. 8 14in guns, 8 12in guns, 4 10in guns, 24 12in mortars and assorted smaller. Although maybe needing new fire control.
It might be better than the US basing out of Singapore, in 1936-38. But if nothing is done quickly then basing the big US ships out of Cavite becomes a non-starter. It would take all the time available. But basing major US fleet units out of Singapore is also pretty much a non-starter in 1936-39. Paying to improve a British base in peace time (even warehouses) might not have been popular politicly. Once war starts in Europe things may change but putting a large part of the US fleet in area it has no hope of getting back from if things go bad is tough sell.