Kill Totals

[Lightning Guy]

Immediately following the war Caiden was a historian for the 5th AF so I think he would be fairly accurate in most matters. I would trust him more than most on this site, no offense intended to anyone.

[the lancaster kicks ass]

none taken

[R Leonard]

I need to back up a minute here.

Though my Bachelor’s is in History, my Master’s is in Business and I am, by trade, a statistician. I spend the day working my way through performance statistics for my organization or those reported by other organizations to try to paint a clearly understandable picture of trends. So, for me, looking at performance statistics from WWII is an entertaining application of the everyday. In my particular case, I tend to look at the data as presented by the service in question, usually from official post-war compilations, and sometimes from the actual reports from which those compilations are drawn. I find the presentation of the data without the filter of intervening scholarship to be of historical interest in and of itself. Further, I specialize in USN statistics.

There is a basic concept that must be applied when looking at statistics and making statements about statistics, in order to draw a conclusion (at that is the purpose of the study of statistics, to draw conclusions or inferences from available data) from the mounds of available information, you must apply some pretty rigorous rules with regard to the reliability of the data. In the case of air-to-air credits it is best follow a pretty straight forward convention, that is, credits should be verifiable, witnessed by another or captured on film.

In USN service, much of the early discrepancies in the war between claims, probables, and actual victories, in my opinion and from discussions over the years with folks on the scene, resulted from a lack of an institutionalized air intelligence assessment program. Early intelligence officers went so far as to warn pilots to expect, since it was “well known” that the Japanese really did not have any decent fighter planes, to see Me-109’s as adversaries. Small wonder that even Lieutenant Commander Paul Ramsey, CO of VF-2 at Coral Sea, reported even shooting down an Me-109 in that battle. Lieutenant Noel Gayler also reported seeing them, mentioning his observation in an interview conducted at BuAir on 17 Jun 42 while discussion the Lexington Air Group attack on the Shokaku for which he flew strike escort:

“After about two minutes in this clear space, we were jumped by fighters from the Jap carriers. I should say there were probably four or five Jap fighters. At first they were all air–cooled type Zeros or some modification – it was the first I’d seen of them. Then, after a minute or two of fighting, more fighters appeared on the scene that were liquid–cooled jobs that looked very similar to the ME–109F. I can’t say definitely what they were, but they were planes similar to them.”

A month later, at Midway, Ensign Albert Earnest of VT-8 reported being attacked by Japanese fighters that appeared to be Me-109s. He once told me, with a smile, that he had been briefed by the intelligence types to expect to see 109’s so that was what he saw.

It would appear that this sort of identification error in the early days stemmed from an exposure to intelligence briefings prior to deployment. Yorktown’s VF-42 pilots never received any briefing as to what to expect to see the Japanese flying and never reported seeing 109’s, even though they were in the thick of the early fighting up through Midway.

The fighter action over the Japanese carriers at Midway is an example of the confusion one encounters in air-to-air combat. The action surrounding Lieutenant Commander John “Jimmy” Thach’s six VF-3 F4F's must have been fast and furious for the surviving Japanese CAP pilots later reported they had encountered some eighteen Grumman type fighters. The Hiryu CAP reported downing nine Grummans, the Akagi CAP reported shooting down two and damaging one. Overall though, the Japanese CAP lost some 14 aircraft out of 41 engaged, 11 shot down and 3 ditched (two from battle damage). Certainly, though the only US fighters engaged over the Japanese fleet, not all the Japanese CAP losses could be credited to Thach's VF-3 escort. One of the escort pilots, Machinist Tom Cheek for one, saw one Zero go down from defensive fire from VT-3. At least one Zero is known to be lost from friendly fire. The Japanese CAP losses correlate with the VF-3 claims enough to conclude that the claims and credits for Thach's pilots were pretty much on the mark, six Zeros shot down and 2 damaged against one F4F shot down.

There is little doubt that a goodly percentage of probables claimed in air-to-air combat resulted from the same aircraft being shot at by several pilots over a brief period of time, yet in separate, discrete actions. Discrepancies between claims and actuals are not hard to understand in an aerial melee. Shooting and trying to keep from being shot ... a pilot fires on an opponent and he falls away into a cloud . . . "got that one . . . no time to watch him go in!" Meanwhile, a section fighting 3000 feet below latches on to the same opponent as he recovers and pops out of the cloud and the leader hoses him down . . . he falls away smoking (could that be exhaust?) again and that's one more claim. Someone else gives him a snap burst or two about 30 seconds later and there's another claim . . . "I'm sure I nailed that SOB, I saw smoke!" . . . (more exhaust? crappy fuel? oil leak?) . . . meanwhile, the poor sap's guns have been jammed all this time and he's just trying to get the hell out of there. Finally, he manages to clear the area and is headed for home when he's bounced by a roving section that makes a run at him as he is landing. He goes in with a great blast of flame and smoke and he is well and truly shot down. So, who gets the credit?

In the Navy and Marine Corps the advent of the Air Combat Intelligence Officer program in late 1942 seems to have been substantially controlled, over time, over-claiming by shifting the questionable (questionable meaning no witnesses, no film) claims to the probable category. The Navy was able to keep some pretty meticulous records, especially in the last 20 months of the war and more especially in the last 8 months. The close questioning, and later examination of gun camera films for verification tended to eliminate, in my opinion, a substantial portion of the error . . . if nothing else moving a number of shoot down claims to the damaged or probable category as opposed to confirmed. So, rather than some enthusiastic squadron yeoman recording the experiences of a keyed up pilot returning from a mission there were some rather steely-eyed and trained to be skeptical folks sitting on the other side of the table. The USN was very, very hot on accurate reporting and the ACIOs were the tip of the spear to achieve the highest level of accuracy possible. I know ACIOs from the 1944-1945 period who served in CV based squadrons who wouldn’t award a claim if it wasn’t on film . . . no picture, no credit. The same applied for credit for the destruction of ground targets, especially defuelled aircraft. By the end of the war it was not uncommon, in the absence of some spectacular explosion or obvious fire, for ACIOs to be the guys who decided whether a gunnery run on a parked airplane resulted in its destruction or just damage. Gun cameras eventually became the great leveler of claims for the USN.

The ACIOs (a disproportionate number of whom were lawyers and stockbrokers) were trained to question and evaluate with cool detachment. Pilot accounts were made in one-on-one sessions with a non-aviator, skeptical by nature and training, interrogator. It was the ACIOs who decided who got credit for what. The presence of these party poopers tended to keep things in line. With a knowledge of the program, and long association with a few of the ACIOs from the period, and discussions with them on this exact subject, I'd say, especially from 1943 on, USN/USMC credits were probably much closer to the reality than anyone else’s.

The point, here, is that the USN, and I believe if you were to look into it, the USAAF were by far more interested in reporting accurate numbers than making an individual, squadron, or command look good. This is an intelligence/order of battle deal where it is important to be able to draw a picture of an enemy force, usually based on an initial intelligence estimate and compare that to what you believe your forces are actually doing to them. It does not pay to overestimate the damage you believe you are inflicting. The most effective way to do this is to establish the rules and stick to them . . . no witnesses, no film, no credit. The USN went to great lengths to enforce such rules and make sure everyone understood.

All that being said, as I read some of these posts, some are complaining that someone was not credited with actual victories for probables. Well, I’d ask where do you want to draw the line . . . just this one guy? 1LT William D. Sells, AC, USA (AO00337325) was killed when his plane crashed on landing due to battle damage on 12 April 1943. He was credited with two victories, one on 16 December 1942 and the other on 28 March 1943. Any other probables for which he may have submitted claims were and are just that, probables, and probables means maybe, not verifiable. But because someone finds a report that addresses these probables we should give him credit now? And what is the basis for that credit? Has some verification come to light or is this just wishful thinking.

Is the 5730 number some wish to credit P-38 drivers in the Pacific a combination of actual credited victories and their probables? Frankly that’s what it sounds like. If so, well, what about everyone else? By that standard my father goes from a six victory ace to a seven . . . not that he’d go along with it, and I can tell you he wouldn’t. So do we credit all the probables by fighter type as well? You realize that that would mean everyone else’s scores would go up proportionally, right? Where would that leave the P-38 in the overall ranking? Why don’t we just add the destroyed on the ground as well? Where do you stop? Enthusiasm for the subject is fine. Having a favorite aircraft is fine. But all that needs to be tempered with a healthy appreciation of reality. I’ve been searching with diligence; I can’t find a single source that credits P-38s in the Pacific with 5730 credited victories.

Regards,

Rich

[wmaxt]

Rich, In the PTO ground kills were not counted.

If I've offended you sensibilities I'm sorry. I have seen that number in several places - though I admitt I've not been able to find it again, possibly because I've been skimming to find it.

The phrase (in many versions) "The P-38 shot down more Japanese aircraft than ANY other Allied aircraft" is common though it's short on details. i'm in a wheelchair with limited recourses and found 4 references/national publications including the Smithsonian and 1 book in just a couple of hours, I've posted them before. The only time it had a qualification is in the book "Air War Pacific" by Christy Campbell where the word 'claimed' was added.

I have too much respect for the people on this forum to make something up. At the same time I'm not going to get into a big fight over it. As for reality A P-38 shot down it's first plane in December '41 and flew the last mission of the war, if nothing else it had the most opportunity. I'm sorry if that upsets your world.

[R Leonard]

In the PTO ground kills were not counted

I know aircraft destroyed on the ground were not counted. It was a facetious question on my part. I regret if it was taken seriously, my apologies.

Upset? Not I. Offended sensibilities? None here. It's the internet, not life and death. Conversation with long, long, pauses.

I've been doing a little more checking around, too. Decided to punt and check with the numbers developed by Frank Olynyk. Olynyk, if you are not familiar with his work, is generally recognized as the leading authority on USAAF and USN/USMC aerial victories. His work is based on meticulous research over many years, back into the 1970's at least, with the survivors of those days and comparison of the original US reports (not summaries) with the information from the opposition. His 668 page tour-de-force reporting on US aces Stars and Bars is generally regarded in serious aviation historian circles, and the American Fighter Aces Association, as the definitive work in the subject. Anyway, enough marketing . . .

Olynyk reports USAAF aerial victories (which I show rounded here) in the Pacific (not including CBI) as:

P-38: 1,700
P-47: 697
P-40: 661
P-51/F-6: 297
P-39/P-400: 288
P-61: 64
P-36: 3
P-70: 2
P-26: 2
P-35: 1
Total: 3,712
Source: Olynyk, Victory List No.3 USAAF (Pacific Theater) Credits For the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft In Air to Air Combat World War 2

Certainly the P-38 leads the way, but there's not even 5,730 total victories much less 5,730 for just the P-38. Olynyk's total is obviously more than the totals one can derive from the either the USAAF Statistical Digest or the USAF 1957 credits listing when factoring out the CBI data (+602 and +35, respectively).

In any case, here we have three numbers, one USAAF (3,113), one USAF (3,680), and one from modern, and well respected, scholarship (3,715), representing an accounting of ALL fighter victories in the SWPA, POA and Alaska. None even approach the number, 5,730, that's been cited just for P-38s in the same area. And neither the USAAFSD total of 847 victories nor the 1957 Review total of 1,117 victories for the CBI come close to pushing the total over the top. The best I can at this point get is somewhere in the neighborhood of 4,832 if I add the higher of the two CBI numbers I have to Olynyk’s higher PTO number . . . still about 898 short of 5,730 and again that’s all victories for all fighter/pursuit types.

and flew the last mission of the war

Just to satisfy my curiosity, just what last mission was that? Date, location, time? Lots of folks have that claim, I’d like to see how the P-38 claim stacks up. The last P-38 combat action I can find appears on 13 August 1945 with P-38s (unit unidentified) striking shipping in the Singapore area (The Army Air Forces In World War II: Combat Chronology, 1941-1945). Eric Hammel, in his Pacific Air War Chronology, reports that these strikes were carried out by XIII Fighter Command and also lists no subsequent P-38 combat actions in his book. The Japanese indicated a willingness to surrender on 15 August. USN fighters and bombers were in action over Japan at the time of the recall and were in combat even after the recall as Japanese diehards attempted localized attacks.

Regards,

Rich

[R Leonard]

A P-38 shot down it's first plane in December '41

Also, quoting directly from U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II, Combat Chronology, 1941 - 1945, page 37:

"8/4/42 Eleventh AF
1 LB-30 flies a photo mission and 2 B-17’s and 3 B-24’s covered by 8 P-38’s escort Navy tenders to Nazan Bay. 2 4-engine seaplane bmrs and a possible third are downed near Atka by 2 of the P-38’s, in their first aerial combat in any theater. Weather cancels bombing mission to Kiska."

Italics and bold are mine.

Regards,

Rich

[wmaxt]

Originally Posted by R Leonard

Also, quoting directly from U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II, Combat Chronology, 1941 - 1945, page 37:

"8/4/42 Eleventh AF
1 LB-30 flies a photo mission and 2 B-17’s and 3 B-24’s covered by 8 P-38’s escort Navy tenders to Nazan Bay. 2 4-engine seaplane bmrs and a possible third are downed near Atka by 2 of the P-38’s, in their first aerial combat in any theater. Weather cancels bombing mission to Kiska."

Italics and bold are mine.

Regards,

Rich

I'm only as good as my sources and I'm not familar with some of the ones cited by you. One of my sources stated the last offical mission of the war was the day of 15, Aug. 45, I've also seen that near the end of the month two P-38s (on a mission) landed on Japan "low on gas" at the end of Aug 45 (29th?) so I don't have an answer for you.

There is a tremendous amount of info out there both official and not that is bogus. I don't know anyone who knows where to draw the line, I do know the men who flew and fought with them are far more positive about the aircraft, it's capabilities and it's exploits than the official versions.

As for kills, I never knew the lower numbers until I came here. I don't know why there is a difference and you have some hard numbers - I will look into it more. I have no desire to credit it with more than it deserves.

[R Leonard]

My personal library tends to run to naval titles, with heavy emphasis on aviation. USAAF stuff I just sort of dabble in. A lot of what I’ve used here is available on the net . . .

For the USAAF Statistical Digest this is a nice easy to read format
http://www.usaaf.net/digest/

If you prefer the feel of the original, it's in downloadable PDF format at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroo...orld_war2.html
My version is in Excel files somewhat laboriously created about five years ago from PDFs of the original, but it allows me to extract data of interest I want into sub-tables of my own design for further analysis.

USAAF victories from 1957 Analysis
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/w...wii_index.html

USAAF Chronology and other interesting documents
http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil...titleindex.htm
(but you can only download the ones noted as PDF files)

Jack McKillop has done a lot of cleaning up and adding to the original USAAF Chronology. You can look at his work at various places, among which are:
http://www.altus.af.mil/History/historycombat.htm
but I prefer the feel of the original.

Regards,

Rich