1944 -You are in charge!

[syscom3]

Dont forget the Germans were also honing their skills in Spain with their assistance to Franco.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Yeap that is where they tested all there new aircraft with the Condor Legion.

[ndicki]

Which means, as I mentioned above, that all the best, most promising people, were off "on holiday in the sun" - and not available to the Luftwaffe at short notice. Don't forget that in order to come home, they would have to go round France - not an easy task in a Bf109.

[wmaxt]

I think POL would be the priority. Cracking plants cannot be subdivided in a "Cottage industry" fashon and is vital to a war. All other efforts would be adjusted to maximise confusion and to occupy the German war effort.

Hindsite shows that the attack on POL had the biggest single strategic effect on the German war effort.

wmaxt

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Alright as the Commander of the American and British air force, I would concentrate my heavy bombers on Germany industry. I would use my medium bombers such as the B-26 for attacks on costal defences in prepartion for normandy, and for destruction of enemy forces inland. Or I would use all my air power on one point in the atlantic wall.

[syscom3]

The USSBS report had ample proof that the POL industry and electrical generating plants were the weak point of the German war machine.

Knocking the POL plants offline for days or weeks paid plenty of dividends. No fuel, nothing moves.

I would have every heavy bomber mission to target the POL and the railroad marshalling yards.

For the medium bombers, going after the lines of communications and known German depots would suffice.

[Udet]

If i, on the other hand, would have been in charge of commanding the Luftwaffe´s war effort by January 1944, then i see myself implementing the following urgent measures:

(i) In view of the USAAF build-up as observed during 1943, except for maintaining an adequate fighter force for the NJGs, I order the prompt and definitive ceasing of production of twin engined fighters to equip dayfighting units; ZG 26 and ZG 76 are disbanded, their pilots and ground personnel sent to the several Jagdgeschwardern fighting the USAAF and RAF.

I´d rather lose 10 Bf 109s or Fw190s on a single engagement, than 10 Bf-110s or Me 410s. Very simple, every twin engined fighter lost in action implies a 100% casualty rate when compared with the loss of single engined toy.

(Not that I agree with the classical account affirming the Me 410 was "uncapable" of dealing with the allied single engined fighters, but that is material for another discussion; it is just that Germany was fighting against all odds and simply could not afford losing so many men).

(ii) Except for maintaining lonf range aircraft for maritime co-operation with the U-boat force and for some very specific long range bombing missions, the production of all bombers is promptly terminated; the pilots and ground perssonel of all Kampfgruppen in service in 1944 are too sent for training as single engined pilots.

If losing both men manning a twin engined fighter in 1944 was a foolish thing to swallow, what of losing the 4 or 5 men manning a He 111, Ju 88, Ju 188, Do 217 or He 177 in such a critical year? You are spilling your valuable and scarce drinking water while you have not yet gotten across the desert. Thirst will likely kill you.

(iii) I would definetly not go for the so called "Baby Blitz" that achieved very little and implied high costs for the Germans.

The adequate implementation of the measures pointed in (i) and (ii) would imply a significant overall improvement of the German capabilities to wage the war in the air. Reichsverteidigung would bring even more horrific memories to the veterans of both USAAF and RAF.

Losses for the USAAF in 1944 were horrible; we are kind of acquainted with this common song "...the germans could not replace their losses while the USAAF could replace its losses easily...". Now wait a minute there. While the assertion might be correct (partially), the willingness to accept a high casualty toll for Uncle Sam has been completely overhyped.

Unlike the soviet ally, the U.S.A. was not a tyranny where the lives of hundreds of thousands of men could be just put in the toilet; so yes, while the USAers could replace their dead easily than the Germans, a better planned and more concentrated German jagdwaffe could have pushed the guys in the USAAF into some filthy dark alley.

Many pilots of the sturmgruppen of JG 3 and JG 300 reported well performances from their mates providing top cover flying Bf 109 G-6 (although their numbers would not be sufficient), try to imagine what the number of available Bf 109s could have been if you cancel all production of bombers and twin engined fighters (and the availability of more single engined fighter pilots).

All the raw materials, engines, spare parts, ammo, fuel, weaponry, workforce and pilots will be devoted for producing mainly single engined fighters and the Me 262: Bf 109 G-6/AS and Fw 190 A-8s and A-9s for the first half of 1944
Bf 109 G-14/AS and G-10 for the second half of 1944 alongside the Fw 190 D and the Ta-152.

But most importantly, a better planned fighter force would help the entrance of the Me 262 in more respectable numbers.

Cheers!

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by Udet

I´d rather lose 10 Bf 109s or Fw190s on a single engagement, than 10 Bf-110s or Me 410s. Very simple, every twin engined fighter lost in action implies a 100% casualty rate when compared with the loss of single engined toy.

Ummm not sure what to think about that. I am still trying to fathom it. I certainly understand what you are saying but I am having a hard time agreeing with it.

[syscom3]

I think hes trying to say that losing a twin engined fighter means the loss of twice the ammount of material.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Yeah I know, but I think I would still rather have 10 Fw-190s than 10 Bf-109s.

[ndicki]

I think what he's trying to say is you'd lose twice as many men and twice as many aero-engines for a lesser result. Or something. It's Friday evening, and my brain has ceased to function.

[Udet]

Adler:

Mr. Ndicki got it; the assertion is very correct. If after a melee with P-51s or P-47s the Luftwaffe losses 10 Bf109s or 10 Fw 190s, or 10 single engined fighters -an assortment of both types- they lost 10 pilots, not forgetting a number of them might bale out succesfully later returning to combat duty.

On the other hand, if the losses we are referring to are twin engined fighters (either Bf 110s or Me 410s) the Germans lost 20 men, even if a number of them too bale out succesfully.

So it is 10 vs. 20, a 100% casualty rate for the men manning the twin engined items.

I was strictly referring to human losses in that particular line, even if we acknowledge the following material facts that further illustrate what a foolish thing was to maintain the zerstörer in service during 1944 -and throughout the entire duration of the war-:

Internal Fuel Capacity:

TWIN ENGINED FIGHTERS: SINGLE ENGINED FIGHTERS:

Bf 110 (G version): 1,270 liters Fw 190 A-8: 524 liters.
Me 410 : 2,500 liters Bf 109 G-6, G-14, G-10: 400 liters

So, the fuel used to load the internal tank feeding the DB engines of a Bf 110 could have served the tanks of 3 Bf 109 G-6s. for the same mission. The outcome is even more terrible when comparing fuel consumption in the case of the Me 410.

Fuel became more critical than the "lack" of pilots during 1944. Fuel economy was not adequately considered.

Whatever approach we might give to the matter will result in a gruesome mistake by Luftwaffe planners to face the definitive aerial battle against the western allies. More men and more material could have served the daytime jagdwaffe.

A total of ~1,150 Me 410s were produced meaning ~2,300 DB engines...see those being produced and fitted to the fuselages of Bf 109s in the 1943-1944 period.

If more than 14,000 Bf 109s of the G series rolled off production lines in 1944 alone (mainly G-6s), try to think what the actual number could have been if all the material and human resources devoted to produce twin engined fighters and bombers in 1944 had been used to produce only single engined fighters.

~2,300 bombers of all types -mainly twin engined planes- were produced by the Germans in 1944, unbelievable. Bombers cost more in terms of both material and workforce. The fuel consumption issue...terrible mistake again.

In all Germany could have had some 8,000 extra engines and the sufficient pilots to equip the jadgeschwadern between the second half of 1943 and the end of 1944.

While i do not have the paper at hand, no less than 4,000 pilots and airmen served in the Zerstörergruppen and Kampfgruppen during 1944 alone. Again, see those as single engined fighters.

Hope this clarifies my previous idea.

Cheers.

[syscom3]

I might be mistaken, but I do not think the Luftwaffe was ever had a shortage of engines in all of 1944.

I also dont think the Me109 in any of its variants in 1944 was a major threat to the allied fighters and bombers.

I would say that the Fw190 was a threat. Therefore Adler is correct in saying that it would be better to have 10 -190's than 10 -109's.

[ndicki]

They may not have had a shortage of engines in theory, but the ones they did have were crap. Not on paper, but in reality.

An example - the place just up the road rebuilt a Fiesler Storch a couple of years ago, and they wanted to change the engine. As luck would have it, they had a new one, still in its crate, so they banged it in. At the first turn of the starter handle, there was a horrid grinding and crunching noise, and though the engine started, it stopped again quite quickly. It was full of sand. The resistance in whichever country the engine had been built in, had poured a handful of sand into each cylinder before crating the engine. Of course, the clowns up the road hadn't bothered to check, had they!

It depends how you define a shortage of engines.

[delcyros]

Originally Posted by DerAdlerIstGelandet

Yeah I know, but I think I would still rather have 10 Fw-190s than 10 Bf-109s.

By 1944 and for central europe in high altitude dogfights, I surely would like to have 10 Bf-109 instead of 10 Fw-190A.
The BMW engine controll box suffered in high altitude because of an error caused by division through zero. Not so the DB engines. The Focke Wulfs were good for hunting bombers up there above 6000m but little else.
The Bf-109 G6 in clean configuration was at least competetive to the US fighters. Few Bf-109G were in clean configuration.
Since this thread scenario is high altitude bomber interception, You need both.

From the allied point of view I note that the concentration on POL would cause a significant war impact but also is going to increase the losses above the historic figure. Problem lies in the concentration. This makes concentrated defense a highly probable countermeasure. AAA does not rely on fuel. POL covered by massive AA traps is a scenario to deal with. Deployment of proximity fuzes (which began in late 1944) would be accelerated as would the techn. development of radar and related FC and of SAM.
The jets probably would enter service at around the historic date or later, altough in higher numbers due to less dispersed production lines and the ability to use low grade fuel.
General dispersal of industry could be delayed or never happen for such an concentration on POL, thus increasing the output of german military equipment, ammo, etc.
Fuel will still be avaiable, altough in much fewer quantities than historical. This may cause significant reduction of mobility for the army in the east, easening their demise in 1944 and causing a rapidly accelerating soviet advance. At the end of 1944 there would probably not enough fuel left for the Ardennen-operation, thus accelerating wars end in europe.
I see the Luftwaffe bomber groups (fuel hogs), which rely on high grade fuel (as do the fighters) to be grounded early in 1944 fue to fuel shortage. The same is true for the Nightfightergruppen to mid 1944. The single engined day fighters may still continue to operate until late 1944.
The navy would not be affected that much, since it may rely on low grade fuel as well. Introduction of advanced submarines will happen months earlier and may cause some additional losses altough not enough to change things substantially.