B-29 REMOTE CONTROL GUNNERY SYSTEM

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by Udet

Flyboy, hello.

Yes, i recall that previous older discussion. But see what we discussed that time, even if they did not face anything comparable to the Reich´s air defence system their losses were nonetheless significant over Japan.

As we commented that time, and also rereading the table you posted there, losses of B-29s if completely bearable were not necessarily low; being more expensive and difficult to produce than B-17s and B-24s is that we know there were not too many B-29s operating over Japan, so it is not daring to affirm an indentical number of B-29s deployed over Europe, facing both Kammhuber line high altitude guns, himmelbett, search lights and Luftwaffe fighter groups, would have endured significantly higher losses.

Please note that my arguments will not dispute the defensive guns of B-29s brought down a number of Japanese interceptors; rather my point will argue on the alleged qualities of the computer controlled system on board the super-fortress.

I would want to assume that if such system had been so wonderful, as it is oftenly depicted, their losses should have been certainly lower than they were, considering both the number of B-29s available and the type of enemy defence confronted; we should not forget that in addition to this defensive system the B-29s had long range escort support commencing during the first days of April, 1945 until the virtual end of the war in the PTO, even if losses of B-29s to Japanese fighters were rare during the last 4-5 months of the war.

Again, look at the table from the other thread Flyboy: 149 B-29s lost ("combat and accident") between May-December 1944. Even if the war could have been already decided for both ETO and PTO by late 1944, i think we will agree Japan was in a far more terrible condition than Germany during the same period, even if i can not tell how many of those 149 were lost to Japanese fighters.

So, again, if the same number of B-29s were to fly over Germany and central/east Europe between May-December 1944, i think of higher losses for sure.

My reasons.

Points well taken, but also remember, most B-29 combat losses were due to flak - it took a lot to bring down a B-29 (as we know). There is no doubt in my mind the Luftwaffe would of dealt with the B-29, but it "would of" been a lot tougher...

Also keep in mind had the B-29 been operated in the capacity of the B-17 or B-24, you "would of" had an aircraft carrying twice the bomb load of both mentioned aircraft (points already discussed).

[HoHun]

Hi Stitch,

>If I remember correctly, I believe I read somewhere (don't remember where) that it's a rudimentary (i.e.: first-generation) RWR (Radar Warning Receiver).

Hm, I think these would have to have some kind of dipole antenna since Japanese radar would probably have used relatively long wavelengths. I admit that I'm not sure if the Japanese actually had any radar-equipped night fighters ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Udet]

flyboy, i can agree.

Say, is that you on the photo with helmet and oxygen mask?

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by Udet

flyboy, i can agree.

Say, is that you on the photo with helmet and oxygen mask?

Yes, flying a Provost in April...

[syscom3]

There is also the fact that B29's that were damaged over Japan still had to fly several hundred miles to Iwo Jima or Okinawa. Sometimes they made it back. Sometimes they didnt. Now if they only had to fly 300-400 miles like that in Europe, many damaged B29's would have made it back, for statistically lower losses.

[HoHun]

Hi Flyboyj,

>I believe that was a formation light.

Thanks! The photograph you linked again looks different than those I have seen before - it has a bulb-type cover, while all other photographs only show a flat reflective (and probably transparant) panel. So there seem to have been variations (or development steps) - highly interesting but also somewhat confusing

Do you think the upper or the lower "suspect" is the formation light?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by syscom3

There is also the fact that B29's that were damaged over Japan still had to fly several hundred miles to Iwo Jima or Okinawa. Sometimes they made it back. Sometimes they didnt. Now if they only had to fly 300-400 miles like that in Europe, many damaged B29's would have made it back, for statistically lower losses.

AGREE!

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by HoHun

Hi Flyboyj,

>I believe that was a formation light.

Thanks! The photograph you linked again looks different than those I have seen before - it has a bulb-type cover, while all other photographs only show a flat reflective (and probably transparant) panel. So there seem to have been variations (or development steps) - highly interesting but also somewhat confusing

Do you think the upper or the lower "suspect" is the formation light?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

I actually believe both of them are -I even seen a drawing somewhere that shows 3 lights right above the tail gunner's windshield.

[SoD Stitch]

Originally Posted by FLYBOYJ

Definitely not even close to being true!

It would seem you are correct; like I said, I can't remember where I read that (old age does that to you!), but after doing some research, apparently B-29 gunners were only credited with 27 air-to-air kills. I'm guessing the total number of enemy aircraft shot down by all other types far exceeds that total. I'll have to try and find that misleading reference again.

I found this; that circle above the gunners position is, indeed, a formation light:



P.S. Found a pretty good site for B-29 details (if y'all don't already know about it, that is!): The 330th Bomb Group

[CRASHGATE3]

Originally Posted by FLYBOYJ

Yes, flying a Provost in April...

Hi Flyboyj...
Do you have the serial number of that Provost ?
sorry this is off topic,but I might have a photo of it or have seen it..

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by CRASHGATE3

Hi Flyboyj...
Do you have the serial number of that Provost ?
sorry this is off topic,but I might have a photo of it or have seen it..

XW435, registered here in the states as N4XW.

[CRASHGATE3]

Thanx....
I will look through my pix....

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by SoD Stitch

It would seem you are correct; like I said, I can't remember where I read that (old age does that to you!), but after doing some research, apparently B-29 gunners were only credited with 27 air-to-air kills. I'm guessing the total number of enemy aircraft shot down by all other types far exceeds that total. I'll have to try and find that misleading reference again.

27 destroyed credits to B-29's in Korea, right v. almost 800 credited to F-86's. B-29's were credited with more than any plane *besides* the F-86. But as we discussed on 'gunner kills' thread, victory credits to bombers typically exceeded enemy losses by much more than fighter credits of the same air arm at the same time. It was more difficult to weed out duplications, and the bomber couldn't follow its fighter target to destruction so more estimating was needed; but morale was a factor weighing against being too strict about crediting gunners with victories. Anyway I studied B-29 v MiG-15 engagements closely, found the 'MiG' and US accounts of pretty much all of them (almos all v Soviet AF MiG's), and B-29's seem to have really downed 3 or 4 MiG's, and strangely 2 of the sure kills were *not* credited at the time. That's a much lower accuracy rate than fighter claims so B-29's didn't even actually shoot down the second most enemy a/c in Korea, F-80's did. MiG-15's destroyed 20 B-29/RB-29 in Korea counting planes written off from MiG damage, possibly one other writeoff and another RB-29 of the 91st SRS, which lost a/c over Korea, also lost one near the USSR to MiG-15's in 1952. The B-29's gun system, state of art in 1945, could not cope with swept wing jet targets.

In WWII 74 B-29 losses were attributed to fighters, 54 to AAA, and 19 to a combination. The reason losses were considered barely sustainable as of early 1945, was heavy operational losses in addition: long range with no emergency field until Iwo Jima was captured, and the B-29 was still a buggy airplane. B-29's were credited with 914 Japanese fighters destroyed. The accuracy ratio of those credits appears to be somewhat higher than in Korea, perhaps 1/4-1/3 that many enemy planes were actually downed. More than a few rammed, so those 'kills' are without doubt, though usually resulted in the B-29's loss as well.

The ratio of credited victories to losses due to fighters in WWII was much (around 3 times) higher for the B-29 than the B-17/24 in ETO.

Joe

[Screaming Eagle]

Originally Posted by FLYBOYJ

Here's some more...

A Day in the Life of a Tail Gunner- by Andy Doty

Thanks for that FBJ, it was a very fascinating read

[delcyros]

I am personally not convinced that experiences from the PTO service of B-29 can be extrapolated to europe, particularely the latter part, say from feb. 45 to august 45.

Tactics were simply to different there. In order to allow precise bombardement, the B-29 had to fly comparably low for most of the mission, something which was eased by the airspace condition (approach to and return from destiny was over empty ocean and not enemy (better: contested) airspace. The remote gunnery system usually was removed from the B-29 A and -B during this period, leaving the tail guns only. Another important tactical difference lies in the formation flying. Over Japan, there wasn´t exactly any kind of a tight formation flying with single or pairs of B-29 operating independently, this was forced by the long range requirement (air assembly of large formations is a long lasting and fuel gulping task).

Things in europe would differ greatly:

1.) It is not reasonable that B-29 would operate at low altitude as they did in Japan. That would be negative here over contested airspace (lots of Flak, too.) and it isn´t necessary due to the generally shorter ranges.

2.) It is not reasonable with the tight AAA concentration and the proposed Luftwaffe interceptor capabilities (both night and day) that the B-29 would remove their remote gunnery system.

3.) The higher range tolerances would allow the assembly of large formations prior to entering contested airspace at least in daylight operations (open formations would remain in night sorties).

These differences will have both, tactical and logistical consequences:

A1.) The formations, flying higher and equipped better will become increasingly difficult to attack with means of conventional airplanes, esspeccially LW nightfighters (barring the few Ju-388J) and old 8.8cm AAA, thus the number of losses should be expected to proportionally reduce compared to B-17/B-24 raids.

A2.) As a direct reaction to A1.) - we would have to admit the possibility that the Luftwaffe transformes it´s bomber hunter Fw-190 groups into bomber hunter Me-262 groups more rapidly than historically. It is also reasonable that the AAA concentrates their advanced 8.8cm Flak 41 over key targets as we would expect means to extend their effective AAA ceiling. I even wouldn´t rule out that the high altitude mission profile of the B-29 would force the mass production of SAM, which was rejected in exactly this timeframe. None of these countermeasures would develop a notable effect until april 45 but they would give an uncomfortable prospect to future operations.

B1.) The number of B-29 accidents would increase substantially compared to B-17/B-24 raids (conditions comparable to the early, say 1944 period of the B-29 operations vs. Japan), mostly due to engine overheating problems.

B2.) As a direct result to B1.) adaequate cooling techniques would be developed as they were historically.

C1.) The high altitude mission envelope would confront the bombing crews with the jet stream, making navigational issues more problematic and precise bombardements more a matter of luck than anything else (this problem was encountered over Japan, too and was adressed with the low altitude mission profile, which followed from feb. 45 onwards).

C2.) As a direct result of C1.) the altitude mission profile would have been lowered somehow, but not as deep as it was done over japan. A normal high altitude mission profile (at around 20.000-25.000 ft.) would have been accepted for the bombing run.


It can go different ways but I suspect that fractionally more B-29 would return than B-24/B-17 for each given mission.
The Luftwaffe interceptor capabilities for the timeframe in question are a bit overstated - little would change. The Fw-190 Sturmgruppen are to slow and couldn´t operate high enough to play a role while the Me-262 could still get in for the shot. I expect that most high altitude interceptions indeed would result from the jets say from mid feb. 45 onwards with little change to historical loss ratios which were low for the bombers and high for the interceptors in this timeframe!