Batttle of Britain reversed?

[Twitch]

Yeah that is what most people feel cost Hitler a decisive win in the BoB. When he changed to targets from airfields and radar to civilian urban targets it gave the RAF a reprieve that bolstered them tremendously. As replacement aircraft arrived from factories their airdromes were no longer the targets of marauding Luftwaffe planes. The RAF was able to somewhat recover and carry on. Hitler's meddling in strategy cost him the BoB.

[plan_D]

I don't believe the change of targets was the winning factor for the RAF in the BoB. The Luftwaffe were still being shot out of the sky in larger numbers than their RAF counter-parts when attacking the military targets, and they were losing their pilots without a shadow of a doubt either by death or capture.

The Luftwaffe sortie rate over Britain actually fell before they turned on the cities. To me this indicates that the RAF had, in fact, given the Luftwaffe a bloody-nose enough for them to turn away. Unlike on the Continent the RAF were still going up to meet the Luftwaffe at every raid, British cities are important to the RAF. French cities aren't important to the Luftwaffe.

While I agree the turning on cities gave the RAF a massive boost, I don't believe that alone cost the Luftwaffe the Battle of Britain. I think it was lost anyway.

[wmaxt]

I think two things affected the outcome: first the short range of the German fighters, second the switch to the cities from the airfields/radar. Every study I've seen have called the switch critical to the British in the BoB, there just weren't any British reserves left. The Germans had the resources to continue the bombing of the cities, had they kept at the strategic targets they could have won air superiority at least for the short term.

The landing would have been interesting, the Germans didn't have the proper equipment for a massed landing. On the other hand the British had lost most of their equipment at Dunkirk so they weren't in a position to repell an invasion, how it would have turned out is anyones guess. Air superiority, at least in lower Britain and the invasion area, was an absolute requirement for any invasion attempt.

Longer range fighters could have made a great impact in both arenas and could have made a great impact in the air battle, and might have made the difference in success or loss in any attempted invasion.

wmaxt

[plan_D]

The RAF had no reserves? Your study of the Battle of Britain must not be very extensive. The RAF in Southern England still had several squadrons ready for action, and then there were plenty of the RAF left north of the combat zone.

The sortie rate of the Luftwaffe fell before they began attacking bombers. It's simple, the Luftwaffe were losing too many pilots - not too many planes. The Luftwaffe was on the losing side of the battle, this should be credited to radar and lack of German range.

[Jabberwocky]

Dowding used the Group system during the Battle of Britain to create quite a large reserve of squadrons. Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commanding Fighter Command 12 Group, actually complained that his squadrons didn't see enough action in the Battle of Britain, that No 11 Group took most of the glory for itself and that No 12 Group was badly under-utilised. No 10 Groups 4 Spitfire and 3 Hurricane squadrons didn't see nearly the combat that they could of and Number 13 Groups fighters were rotated in and out of southern England to relieve pressure on No 11 Groups squadrons.

Apart from squadron operations, there were actually fairly significant physical British fighter reserves for the battle period. At the lowest point of readiness in mid to late August, there were always more than 700 fighters available for operations, which translates to at least 35 squadrons worth of fighters. There were also at least 80 Hurricanes and 40 Spitfires held in operational storage units ready for immediate dispersal to units to replace losses, or another 6 squadrons worth of fighters. In addition to this, they were usually around 20 Hurricanes and 20 Spitfires in storage units that were assesed as 'Equipment in Sight', which meant they were undergoing preparation and would be ready for operations in within 4 days.

Fighter command actually GREW in strength during the battle period. In early July there were 640 fighters available for operations at a squadron level. At the end of October there were 750 fighters available for operations, an increase of about 15%. There were also over 200 Hurricanes and Spitfires in storage units read for dispersal and a further 120 under preparation for issue to squadrons.

[Hop]

Yeah that is what most people feel cost Hitler a decisive win in the BoB. When he changed to targets from airfields and radar to civilian urban targets it gave the RAF a reprieve that bolstered them tremendously. As replacement aircraft arrived from factories their airdromes were no longer the targets of marauding Luftwaffe planes. The RAF was able to somewhat recover and carry on. Hitler's meddling in strategy cost him the BoB.

Hitler didn't meddle in strategy. The Luftwaffe commanders requested permission to attack London, which had been their plan for the end game all along. Hitler granted it. In particular, Kesselring had been pushing for the attack to switch to London for some time, Goering was also anxious to do so because his repeated boasts that the RAF would be destroyed in the next few days had all proven false.

I think two things affected the outcome: first the short range of the German fighters, second the switch to the cities from the airfields/radar. Every study I've seen have called the switch critical to the British in the BoB, there just weren't any British reserves left.

Actually there were British reserves left, although they had dwindled since the start of the BoB. But front line strength, ie the number of aircraft in active squadrons, had actually increased.

The total number of serviceable Spits and Hurris in reserve went from 329 on 12th July to 224 on 6th September (the BoB in British terms began on 10th July, the Luftwaffe switched to attacking London on 7th September)

However, front line strength went from 736 Spits and Hurris on 12th July to 816 on 6th September (these are strength figures, not all would be immediately serviceable, although serviceability was high, and this doesn't include aircraft needing more than minor repair). In other words, over the most intense period of the battle, the total number of Spits and Hurricanes available declined by 25, out of more than 1,000 aircraft.

In contrast, the Luftwaffe expended their reserves very quickly, by September they had no aircraft in reserve, and front line strength had begun to decline sharply. The Luftwaffe had about 1120 109s at the end of June, by the end of September that had reduced to about 920.

As to range, the vast majority of the battle was fought within a hundred miles of the 109 bases. Indeed, the complaint that 109s only had 15 minutes combat time over London should be viewed with two things in mind. First, that the USAAF typically allowed 15 - 20 minutes combat time for their escorts over Germany (the USN allowed 20 minutes, iirc) and second, that by the time the battle reached London, the Luftwaffe had already lost. They'd lost by failing to protect the bombers, and suffering far too high a casualty rate, in battles against the RAF at very short range, typically 50 - 75 miles.

Longer range fighters could have made a great impact in both arenas and could have made a great impact in the air battle, and might have made the difference in success or loss in any attempted invasion.

The Luftwaffe didn't lose because they couldn't bomb targets in the Midlands. Their goal was to defeat the RAF, and they attempted to do so with an all out assault on 11 Group. Longer ranged fighters would have meant a diversion of effort, and brought 10 and 12 Groups into the battle as well.

If you can't win when you concentrate all your force against a small portion of the enemy force, then you won't do better by spreading your attack out. That would have given 11 Group a respite, meant deeper penetration raids for the Luftwaffe, which would have given the RAF more chances to intercept.

The only way longer ranged fighters for the Luftwaffe would have helped would have been if the RAF had withdrawn it's fighters north of London (in the event they won anyway, and didn't need to withdraw) or if the British didn't have vital targets in the SE they needed to defend. As it was, the SE contained the most vital targets in Britain.

It's simple, the Luftwaffe were losing too many pilots - not too many planes.

It was actually losing too many of both. Milch did a tour of Luftwaffe bases in France in late August and early September, at the height of the battle. He found that the gruppen were seriously under strength, with many having only half the aircraft they were supposed to have, and half as many fit pilots.

Hop- The Luftwaffe airfields in France would have been the targets as were RAF fields in England

Why does the Luftwaffe have to defend airfields in France? The RAF had to defend fields in Britain because they had to defend British airspace, and needed the airfields to do so. The Luftwaffe have no need to defend French airspace, so no need of airfields. Even though they historically kept fighters in France, there were far fewer fighters spread out over a much larger area, making attacks on airfields much harder for the RAF in 1941 than for the Luftwaffe in 1940.

[Twitch]

Everything I have researched says Hitler had a personal hand in the BoB.

When off-course bombers dropped their ordnance on London on August 24th it rallied the RAF to send their level bombers at night against Berlin. Up to that point only military targets and munitions factories were attacked. Even Hitler played by a warped set of chivalrous rules. But the retaliatory RAF raids galvanized his resolve and he forced a change of focus of the Battle yet again to concentrate on London at night with 350 bombers and 650 other aircraft on September 7th.

Galland describes Hitler’s distaste for the fight with the British he admired as coloring his decisions about the development of long-range bombers. He wanted the Battle to finish and all else was secondary.

But back to the original scenario- How would the RAF had faired if they'd sent Blenheims and Wellingtons against Luftwaffe airdromes in France? How well would the Bf 109s have defended on home turf with plenty of fuel and bailing out or ditching meant return to the field instead of a POW status? How tedious would the Spit and Hurrincane pilots felt as their fuel ran low over enemy territory?

[Bullockracing]

Originally Posted by Twitch

Everything I have researched says Hitler had a personal hand in the BoB.

When off-course bombers dropped their ordnance on London on August 24th it rallied the RAF to send their level bombers at night against Berlin. Up to that point only military targets and munitions factories were attacked. Even Hitler played by a warped set of chivalrous rules. But the retaliatory RAF raids galvanized his resolve and he forced a change of focus of the Battle yet again to concentrate on London at night with 350 bombers and 650 other aircraft on September 7th.

Twitch is right. Churchill actually ordered the retalitory raid on Berlin, and Hitler just returned the favor. Of course, both thought the other started it and don't have our blessing of hindsight.