Which was the best night fighter?

[Erich]

P :

why hard to understand or discuss ? you will have to be more specific to me on those........

E ~ sadly still not much written in the way of operations by both sides and how they co-incided with each other, but this will change in the fall of 08 with Dr. Boitens massive work RAF vs the Nachtjagd

[kool kitty89]

I found the thing about the wooden nose cone for the Ju 88's radar antena:

Late 1944 the Morgenstern (Morning-star) antenna, consisting of three sets of two, 90º crossed dipole elements per set, on a central, forward projecting mast, was developed and this was small enough to be fitted into the nose (of a Ju 88 ) covered with a wooden cone.

[parsifal]

Hi Erich

Its difficult for me to understand, because ther is so little written material about it. Perhaps I will need to wait for this book you mention.

I was mostly intersted to hear your opinion on the main elements that makes for a good Night Fighter. Earlier I made a post that suggested a tentative shortlist for these qualities. I would be very interested to see what shortlist you would suggest...

[pbfoot]

I worked for ten years handing off interceptors to GCI , to get a fighter into position so he can make an attack with consideration to speed and altitude is the biggest factor. Radar was in it's infancy ground clutter , weather and the poor servicability of the radar all made the fighter cop (gci controller) the biggest key to the puzzle

[Erich]

Par let me think about this for a few days - too much on my mind right now I need some clarity of thought

[parsifal]

PB

Seems reasonable enough, but how can youo explain, or give proportional importance to the british NFs who were operating without the benfit of GCI whilst over Germany. Or did it? AFAIK the Brit NFs were pretty much on their own whilst over enemy territory. So perhaps it has greater importance than I have given it, but it does not apply to every situation, and perhaps therefore, should lose marks on that because it is not universally applicable???

[pbfoot]

Originally Posted by parsifal

PB

Seems reasonable enough, but how can youo explain, or give proportional importance to the british NFs who were operating without the benfit of GCI whilst over Germany. Or did it? AFAIK the Brit NFs were pretty much on their own whilst over enemy territory. So perhaps it has greater importance than I have given it, but it does not apply to every situation, and perhaps therefore, should lose marks on that because it is not universally applicable???

Most of the kills by Comonwealth nightfighters from what I've read is they lurked near airfields hoping to catch one but more often then not they nailed em in the circuit when the rwy lights were turned on

[brickhistory]

First, let me recommend an outstanding book on the RAF night fighter/Serrate effort, besides those already mentioned in this thread.

"Pursuit Through Darkened Skies" by Micheal Allen, DFC**. He was the R/O for a very successful crew and flew Turbinlite Havocs, Beaus on both Home Defense and Intruder missions, then finished up on Mosquitos in the latter role.

He goes into great detail on the various methods of offensive ops.

However, getting back to the topic of 'best night fighter' and quantifying it, I stick to GCI and good comms being the key to effective night fighting. As the vast majority of victories on both sides at night were on the defensive end of it, GCI had the major role in that.

I also dispute the figures given for the MK VIII - perhaps with absolutely perfect conditions, but the norm was well inside 10 miles. You have to account for atmospheric conditions of both the fighter and the target, the quality of maintenance of the airborne set, the skills of the average R/O, etc, etc. With the MK IV, the range was essentially halved and pretty much forget about low flyers (with exceptions, I'll admit).

By the way, a good controller could/can bring the fighter into a tactically advantageous intercept position. Even in WWII, those British LW sets could discriminate to within 1/2 mile thus the controller could get the fighter within 1/2 mile without the two blips on the scope merging into one blob. A big hassle, however, was the roughly 60 mile wide area a single GCI station could 'see.' Fighters had to constantly be handed off to a series of stations as a fight progressed.

GCI stations were set up on ships for various invasions, then came ashore very quickly and followed the advancing troops pretty closely to the front line so GCI was on the continent for the Allies as well as in the UK. Not to mention the Pacific.

Controlling is also an art as well as a science. A intuitive controller could get the fighter in even closer to where the fighter could make a visual. Again, perfect conditions, but it happened.

Modern equipment is amazing and can let the controller see very close action.

PB, I too was a GCI guy, both ground and then on E-3s.

[pbfoot]

Originally Posted by brickhistory

First, let me recommend an outstanding book on the RAF night fighter/Serrate effort, besides those already mentioned in this thread.

"Pursuit Through Darkened Skies" by Micheal Allen, DFC**. He was the R/O for a very successful crew and flew Turbinlite Havocs, Beaus on both Home Defense and Intruder missions, then finished up on Mosquitos in the latter role.

He goes into great detail on the various methods of offensive ops.

However, getting back to the topic of 'best night fighter' and quantifying it, I stick to GCI and good comms being the key to effective night fighting. As the vast majority of victories on both sides at night were on the defensive end of it, GCI had the major role in that.

I also dispute the figures given for the MK VIII - perhaps with absolutely perfect conditions, but the norm was well inside 10 miles. You have to account for atmospheric conditions of both the fighter and the target, the quality of maintenance of the airborne set, the skills of the average R/O, etc, etc. With the MK IV, the range was essentially halved and pretty much forget about low flyers (with exceptions, I'll admit).

By the way, a good controller could/can bring the fighter into a tactically advantageous intercept position. Even in WWII, those British LW sets could discriminate to within 1/2 mile thus the controller could get the fighter within 1/2 mile without the two blips on the scope merging into one blob. A big hassle, however, was the roughly 60 mile wide area a single GCI station could 'see.' Fighters had to constantly be handed off to a series of stations as a fight progressed.

GCI stations were set up on ships for various invasions, then came ashore very quickly and followed the advancing troops pretty closely to the front line so GCI was on the continent for the Allies as well as in the UK. Not to mention the Pacific.

Controlling is also an art as well as a science. A intuitive controller could get the fighter in even closer to where the fighter could make a visual. Again, perfect conditions, but it happened.

Modern equipment is amazing and can let the controller see very close action.

PB, I too was a GCI guy, both ground and then on E-3s.

I just handed them off worked tower at ADG base

[parsifal]

B]However, getting back to the topic of 'best night fighter' and quantifying it, I stick to GCI and good comms being the key to effective night fighting. As the vast majority of victories on both sides at night were on the defensive end of it, GCI had the major role in that. [/b]

Not sure that that is a true statement for the RAF. The german blitz ended in May 1941, with roughly 140 aerial victories to their (ie the RAFs) credit (very, very rough figures). Thereafter there were some intruder raids over england, and of course the "Baby blitz" of 1944. Notwithstanding this continued activity, I seriously doubt that the numbers of german losses over England, would exceed the numbers of german losses (due to RAF NFs) over germany. Quite the opposite actually.

I also dispute the figures given for the MK VIII - perhaps with absolutely perfect conditions, but the norm was well inside 10 miles. You have to account for atmospheric conditions of both the fighter and the target, the quality of maintenance of the airborne set, the skills of the average R/O, etc, etc. With the MK IV, the range was essentially halved and pretty much forget about low flyers (with exceptions, I'll admit).


Again what you are saying does not correlate to what either Gunston says, or some of the other bits and pieces that I have lying around. This is something I downloaded some months ago

AI MK X AIRCRAFT INTERCEPTION RADAR

The AI MK X is a modified version of the American SCR 720 Radar. It required a two man crew, the operator giving instructions to the pilot over the intercom. It was used in aircraft like the Mosquito for nightfighter operations. The system radiates 0.75 microsecond pulses in the centimetric band at 9.1 cms. The peak power being approximately 70 KW. The aerial system, housed in a Perspex dome on the nose of the aircraft, consists of a small vertical dipole at the centre of a parabolic dish, the dipole being used for both transmission and reception.

The first British designed centimetric AI radar was the AI MK VII /MK VIII, this had a similar performance to the MK X although the scanning and display methods differ considerably. A British MK IX system was also developed that was more sophisticated, as it had ‘lock and follow’ capabilities, but problems in meeting production quantities and timescales required, prevented it from being adopted and the American MK X was used instead.

The MK VIII scanning system was what is termed a 'spiral scan'. In this system the dish is rotated about it axis and gradually deflected sideways, tracing out a spiral in the sky, out to an angle of about 45 degrees, The deflection then returns slowly to the zero position when the process is repeated.

In the MK X, the parabolic dish is rotated continually about its vertical axis. It is also slowly tilted up and down which effectively traces out a helix in the sky, much like looking out from the centre of a coil spring. The rear half of the scan, some 210 degrees, is blanked off, as its field of view is interrupted by the structure of the aircraft. The presentation of the information displayed to the operator is also different. In the MK VIII, a single tube with a circular display was used. The target range is measured from the centre of the tube with the target appearing as a segment of a circle, its angular position defining the azimuth and elevation and the length of the segment showing how much the target is off axis. As the target approached the axis of the aircraft, the segment gradually extended to a full circle.

The MK X has two tubes, the left one or the ‘C’ scope displaying the target as a spot on an azimuth/ elevation grid. The right one or the‘B’ tube has again an azimuth calibration on the horizontal axis but the vertical axis shows the range of the target. A range marker line, adjustable by the operator, can be moved up and down the trace to select a particular target. The control used to adjust the marker is calibrated in range, giving a more accurate reading from that obtained from the graticule markings. Only when this marker line overlays the target does the target appear on the left hand ‘C’ tube. The amount of vertical scanning or tilt can be selected by the operator and has 5 switched ranges. The maximum scan is +40 degrees to -20 degrees down to -5 degrees to +10 degrees. A fixed -5 degrees is used when homing onto a beacon. The range can also be selected from 2 miles, 5 miles, 10 miles up to 100 miles for use with a homing beacon.

I dont accept all the claims made by this guy, however, he is basically right to assert that the quality of British radar was far superiior to that of the germans. You are right to assert that in poor conditions, radar effectiveness will be downgraded, but wouldnt that also apply to the germans, who were relying on far weaker pulse signals in their AI than the centiemtric radars that made up the British inventory.

So it is a furphy to assert a typical range for radar, but an effective range is probably not so much of a heresy. If the accepted "effective range" of german AI was say six miles, the effective range for AI mk Viii has to be rated as at least 12 miles, and probably closer to 15 miles, in a given atmospheric state. Hard to accept, but the allies were just years ahead of the germans when it came to active detection systems (well, until the very end of the war, when it didnt matter any more).

By the way, a good controller could/can bring the fighter into a tactically advantageous intercept position. Even in WWII, those British LW sets could discriminate to within 1/2 mile thus the controller could get the fighter within 1/2 mile without the two blips on the scope merging into one blob. A big hassle, however, was the roughly 60 mile wide area a single GCI station could 'see.' Fighters had to constantly be handed off to a series of stations as a fight progressed.

He cant if he is being spoofed and jammed by various means, including (but not just) window. This was what was happening to the NJG units with increasing effectiveness throughout 1944

GCI stations were set up on ships for various invasions, then came ashore very quickly and followed the advancing troops pretty closely to the front line so GCI was on the continent for the Allies as well as in the UK. Not to mention the Pacific.


Dont have any information on this, but what you say sounds reasonable, except that the allies did not reach Germany until the end of 1944. There would be many that would argue that it was all over by that stage. Perhaps that is overdsimplyfying things, but for most of the battle for germany, Allied GCI was out of range

Controlling is also an art as well as a science. A intuitive controller could get the fighter in even closer to where the fighter could make a visual. Again, perfect conditions, but it happened.

Less and less as the war progressed and the allies got the upper hand in ECM and other measures

Modern equipment is amazing and can let the controller see very close action.

PB, I too was a GCI guy, both ground and then on E-3s.[/

I acknowlwdgww your skill, but I have a background in radar operations as well, although not airborne as suchQUOTE]

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by pbfoot

Most of the kills by Comonwealth nightfighters from what I've read is they lurked near airfields hoping to catch one but more often then not they nailed em in the circuit when the rwy lights were turned on

PB referring to your comment about most losses to NFs occuring near german airfields, I have to disagree, at least to the extent of saying that a significant number of shoot downs occurred near the bomber streams themsleves. this is certainly asserted by Gunston. I cant emphatically say, because I dont have figures to back the statements up (which is one of the reasons I say constantly that it is a hard subject), but from the one person who was there (Gunston. he was a RAF NF pilot that post war became an aviation writer...I think he is still alive actually), the suggestion is that the majority of the action was around the bomber streams themselves.

[pbfoot]

This is the combat diary of 410 intruders its interesting reading , 418 sqn the highest scoring RCAF unit used to stalk the airfields maybe thats why they were sucessful
The History of 410 Cougar Squadron - Introduction
The History of the 418 Squadron

[parsifal]

Hi PB

I had a quick look at these sites, and to be honest dont see any conflict with what either of us were saying.

418 sqn flew Flower Missions whilst attached to Bomber Command which are not actually escort missions. they are intruder missions, giving the NFs much greater freedom, and not tying the unit to bomber escort. Also from August 44 on they were attached to the tactical Air force, and so passed out of the main focus of this debate. there is a twofold reason for me saying this, firstly, in tactical operations the allies flew comparatively few night bomber missions. Secondly, it appears the sqn was mostly employed in daylight ops, which is reflected in their kill stats, over 75% of their kills were in daylight

Regarding 410 squadron, the sqn does not appear to have ever been part of the bomber offensive. It too appears to have operated mostly by day, in various tactical ops

I will stand quickly corrected if you think i have misread these unit histories

[pbfoot]

Reading 410 sqn stuff I found almost all ref was to nightwork

[parsifal]

Having looked again, i think you are right, but do you agree that this unit was mostly employed on tactical operations, i havent studied tactical operations at night very much, but i suspect that the tactics and methods may well be quite different to those used in the strategic campaign.