Best Tank Killer of WW2 continued

[renrich]

I don't know of another fighter that was purpose designed to use the landing gear as dive brakes before the F4U. Of course, the portion of the door which hung down in front of the main strut of the gear was the primary influence on dive speed. The Corsair was found to be able to dive at 85 degrees and was almost as accurate as the SBD which I believe made it slightly more accurate than the SB2C. I wonder how effective a dive bomber could be if a tank was moving at say 15 mph. Dive bombers had a difficult time hitting small ships(much larger than a tank) traveling at speeds of around 15 mph.

[Tony Williams]

Originally Posted by JoeB

A lot of the foregoing stuff on WWII is very well gone over, though doesn't hurt to bring it up again. In the same somewhat redundant vein though, it doesn't seem as if there was the same level of operational analysis about the effectiveness of mainly gun-armed tank killing planes on Eastern Front, the type of analysis according to which we can fairly accurately criticize the real accomplishments of western Allied fb's as pure tank killers. A lot more of the German/Soviet accounts seem to come from claims of pilots. OK their heavier guns may been more capable of hitting tanks than rockets or of penetrating them than .50cal/20mm but doesn't mean they didn't also vastly overclaim (perhaps) fooled by the dust stirred up by near misses or by decoy smoke, or attack already dead tanks multiple times (that was clearly a big factor in UN v NK tanks case in Korea).

I have no doubt that some overclaiming occurred. However, guns were inherently far more accurate than RPs or bombs, and didn't suffer from the same aiming difficulties either. Accounts of Hurricane IIDs do indicate that their attacks were devastatingly accurate and effective, against those tanks they were capable of penetrating.

[kool kitty89]

renrich, I meant which was the first model of the F4U to have the dive brake setting for the gear. Did all the production models have them?

And I was inclusing napalm for the dive bombing attacks too.

(diving attacks with brakes, firing HVAR's is something to consider too)

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Tony Williams

I have no doubt that some overclaiming occurred. However, guns were inherently far more accurate than RPs or bombs, and didn't suffer from the same aiming difficulties either. Accounts of Hurricane IIDs do indicate that their attacks were devastatingly accurate and effective, against those tanks they were capable of penetrating.

Slightly off topic - but I just saw the A-10 at Gila Range 3. That is one very impressive gun with both the inert AT loads on a T-80 and the HEI..I have seen a lot of firepower demos but I am a Hog convert.

[kool kitty89]

Oh and another interesting note:
Republic P-47D Thunderbolt

Underwing zero-length launching stubs for a total of ten five-inch HVAR rockets were fitted to Thunderbolts from production blocks P-47D-30-RA onward.

[renrich]

KK, reviewing my sources, it appears that all production models of the F4U had the dive brake capability.

[kool kitty89]

Ok, thanks.

[buzzard]

Deciding that as a P-47 advocate, I was in dire need of a little more education on the subject of WWII tank-busters, I did a little research, esp as it relates to over-claiming...

One of the popular exemplars of the lethality of the Hs 129 as a tank buster is Major Bruno Meyer's report of his 60+ Hs 129B-2s inflicting a devastating attack on Russian armor on July 8/43 during the battle of Kursk.*

The 26th Guards Tank Brigade were heavily engaged with the panzers. antitank guns, and infantry of the SS LAH, when the Hs 129s (with Fw-190s in support)came to the rescue. 40+ Soviet tanks were claimed as destroyed, for the loss of 2 Hs129s. A smashing success...or it would be if it was only true.

Soviet 11 Guard Corps records show the 26th actually lost 8 T-34s, and 3 T-70s on that date. This while also fighting the elite SS Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler division. It's unlikely that the Hs 129 actually killed even six tanks, some of which were the relatively weakly armored T-70s. So it looks like the degree of German overclaiming (the Luftwaffe claimed the destruction of 1100 tanks during Operation Citadel) is on par with that of the Allies. Not even Rudel's claims should be accepted without a degree of skepticism.

The claim that guns are inherently more accurate than bombs, rockets, napalm, etc, is a valid one but it begs the question of whether that makes them more effective. That the 3 cm Mk 103 and BK 3.7 cannons were not up to the task of efficiently 'knacking' the better Soviet tanks is demonstrated by the increasingly desperate attempts to up-gun the Hs 129, culminating in the Hs 129B-3.

Burdening an already over-weight and underpowered a/c with a viciously recoiling 1500+ Lb 75 mm cannon may make it look ferocious, but it probably posed more danger to the hapless pilot than to Soviet armor. Esp if any fighters chanced upon it. And with pilot losses approaching 20% /sortie, I'm sure the few survivors of the Schlachtgeschwaders were more than happy to trade in their big guns for the Fw 190. The Hs 129 was a dog. It may be appealingly similar in concept to the redoubtable A-10, but in execution...

That the Jug is a more capable combat a/c than the Hs 129 and Ju 87 is indisputable. That it was not more effective as a tank-killer is more a reflection of the lack of specialized anti-tank training, and the inadequate supply of napalm in the ETO. While napalm is a danger when used in close proximity to friendly troops, it is devastating when used against concentrated armor, esp on congested roads.

Tony Williams says,

"One source estimates that probably no more than about 100 tanks were lost due to hits from air weapons during the entire Normandy campaign. In contrast, the RAF's 2nd TAF (including elements of the Air Defence of Britain which took part in the campaign) and the USAAF's 9th Air Force lost over 1,700 aircraft between them."

This lame effort to tie the overall losses (from all causes) of Allied tactical a/c to the relative efficiency of Allied tank-busters is specious to the extreme for reasons that are obvious to anyone, ill-educated in the subject or otherwise. It doesn't even name the 'one source'...

When you get right down to it, NONE of the combatants had a truly effective anti-tank a/c. So I'll cheerfully concede that the P-47 wasn't the 'Best Tank Killer of WWII"'. None of them were good enough to merit such a singular title. The Jug was the better combat a/c, tho.

JL

* Partially derived from: Tank Busting Aircraft at Kursk - The Dupuy Institute Forum

[kool kitty89]

The Germans could have also used some more powerful anti tank guns, that were still suitable for aircraft to carry. (a higher velocity 30mm gun, or Better 37 mm gun, like the US M9 or soviet NS-37, both lighter weapons with higher muzzel velocity and heavier projectiles, and the soviet gun had a 60-70% higher RoF than the BK-37 or M9)


But I agree fighter-bombers are probably the best. Not as accurate as dedicated a/c, or as individually effective against the tanks, but they can tangle with enemy fighters and come home. And using HVAR, bombs/napalm, or the panzerblitz II (anti-tank R4M) they had some decent weapons that presented little or no performance penalty once expended/dropped. (the pylons, "zero-length" railless launchers, and R4M racks would add some drag, but very littly weight nothing like rocket rails or externally mounted cannon)

[Tony Williams]

Originally Posted by buzzard

Deciding that as a P-47 advocate, I was in dire need of a little more education on the subject of WWII tank-busters, I did a little research, esp as it relates to over-claiming...

I have not the slightest doubt that there was considerable overclaiming in all circumstances where aircraft were involved, simply because the pilots were in no position to confirm the results by direct examination (U-boats suffered from a similar problem). The Germans falsely claimed more than once that the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal had been sunk, which you would think would be hard to get wrong

I also agree that there was no such thing as an ideal WW2 anti-tank aircraft. nobody managed to put together a good combination of aircraft, gun and ammunition: all had some significant disadvantages in terms of their performance or weapon effectiveness in the role. I summarised this in this article: TANKBUSTERS: AIRBORNE ANTI-TANK GUNS IN WW2

Having said that, it is clear from the available evidence concerning the relative accuracy of guns compared with bombs and rockets, that if you wanted to hit a tank-sized object with any kind of reliability, you needed to use guns. The hit rate they achieved in combat was many times greater than with other weapons. And if you wanted to knock the tanks out, you had to use a gun and ammunition combination reliably capable of penetrating at least the side and rear armour of the principal enemy tanks.

Apart from the Hurricane IID and IV (whose 40mm guns lost effectiveness against the later German tanks) and the Tsetse (which was reallocated to Coastal Command duties when the RAF changed its mind) the Allies in NW Europe never had a plane + gun combination capable of knocking out tanks with any reliability. The Luftwaffe and the Russian AF did have such combinations, although they were all flawed one way or another so their performance was not as good as it could have been.

Now if we had had the ground attack version of this plane, the results may well have been different BRITISH WW2 MULTI

[parsifal]

I see it this way, though i am the first to admit I have not researched the subject properly. Killing things by direct close support was not the primary objective of such aircraft. rather it was to cause the enemy to seek cover at the same time as the land forces being attacked should be doing other things, like counterattacking. in this way the airpower is acting as a "force multiplier" for the ground forces. It does not do a lot of killing itself, but it either makes the job of killing the enemy ground forces by ones wn ground forces easier, or vice versa.

So the question ceases to be a direct argument of which aircraft was the best at direct killing, rather which aircraft was the best at keeping the enmy's heads down. At the beginning of the war, the stukas were very effective at this, especially with their sirens wailing. however, by 1944, both the allies and the despised IL-2s were also forcing the axis to keep their heads down, and the Germans always placed the allied air support aircraft as high on the list of reasons for their defeats.

[Kruska]

Originally Posted by parsifal

I see it this way, though i am the first to admit I have not researched the subject properly. Killing things by direct close support was not the primary objective of such aircraft.........

Hello parsifal,

Well for the Hs129 it was actually designed and used sucessfully in exactly this role; off course it also took its share in strafing or general ground attack missions.

Since the tread title is best tank killer, and not best ground attack or strafer a/c I guess we have to admit to the Hs129 being the best at this specific role.

Regards
Kruska

[renrich]

Overclaiming by aviators was a universal trait. It is not difficult to understand why. Poor visibility, excitement, wishful thinking and short view times led all of the participants in the war to overclaim. In rereading Lundstrom's "The First Team," the US Navy pilots consistently in the first 6 months of the war overclaimed by at least 100 %. However, the Japanese pilots were even more enthusiastic in their overclaiming. When you think about it, the time you have to see the damage inflicted on a tank is even less than you have when engaging a ship or airplane, plus you have to be concerned about making your own hole in the ground.

[JoeB]

As always with overclaiming, the point is to go beyond 'everybody did it' to try to figure *how much* of it there was in given cases. This is my point about tank killing a/c. The overclaims of Allied fb's in Normandy especially are better quantified than those of the Soviets and Germans. The post about about Kursk is interesting and informative. It seems to cast at least potential doubt on whether those gun-type tank killers in that circumstance really *were* much more effective, as opposed to *should have been*.

Also, thinking of wreck surveys and tests in Korea, it's not 100% clear to me napalm was a lot less effective than big guns in knocking out tanks. Napalm cannisters didn't have to hit as close as bombs, because the blob of viscous liquid could roll along the ground, IOW a sizeable variable range error ('short') was acceptable as long as azimuth error was fairly small, and it's easier to get a small azimuth error.

Finally, air combat survivability of the tank-killer aircraft can really matter, and that's a potentially big advantage of the non-specialized fighter bomber when it does matter. Ironically in Korea perhaps the UN air force might have been better off with a specialized tank killer, like an up gunned Il-10 perhaps, because there was little to fear from enemy fighters over the front lines (there no MiG-15's in the period when there was any serious Communist armored ops and they hardly ever appeared over the front anyway; just a marginal NK prop fighter threat early in the war when there any NK tanks to speak of). Whereas at the other extreme as already mentioned Il-10's were almost completely useless to the North Koreans because they couldn't survive against US fighters at all.

Joe

[Tony Williams]

The Hurricane IID had some supporting data concerning its accuracy and effectiveness. Some more quotes from Flying Guns – World War 2: Development of Aircraft Guns, Ammunition and Installations 1933-45:

The Hurricane IID saw most of its use with No.6 Squadron in North Africa between May 1942 and May 1943, although it was also used by Nos. 5, 20 and 184 and by No.7 Squadron South African Air Force, and about three hundred were built. It proved both accurate and effective, attacking with devastating effect whenever tanks were caught in the open, away from FlaK cover. To give one example, on March 10th 1943, 19 aircraft were used to attack a strong German column of tanks, armoured cars and supply vehicles advancing on General Leclerc's position near Lake Chad. The column was effectively destroyed by the Hurricanes. Their effectiveness was also acknowledged by the Germans, who became demoralised by the sight of the planes. One prisoner reported the loss of six out of twelve tanks to 40 mm cannon fire in one attack, although it should be noted that the other six were also hit and penetrated but survived the experience (the crews had taken cover away from the tanks so were not injured by the steel fragments flying around inside).

and:

This is not the end of the S gun story as some Hurricane IIDs were transferred to Burma, where they entered the fray in December 1943 with No.20 Squadron. At first no Japanese armour was encountered so they were mainly used for attacking road and river transport, for which HE shells were used. A detachment was sent to operate from the besieged Imphal area and in June 1944 a few Japanese tanks were encountered. All twelve tanks seen were put out of action for the loss of one Hurricane. By the end of the month No.20 had accounted for many other targets, including 501 sampans and 348 dugouts. By February 1945 the squadron was also operating a flight of Hurricane IVs equipped with rocket rails, but the RPs were in short supply so some were fitted with the Class S gun. On February 19th thirteen Japanese tanks were attacked and all destroyed, primarily by the 40 mm guns (confirmed by subsequent examination of the wrecks). When operations ceased in June 1945, No. 20 Squadron was the last RAF Hurricane unit operational in the world.

and:

After the raising of the Imphal siege, firing tests were carried out against captured Japanese tanks, using both Hurricane IIDs and IICs equipped with four 20 mm Hispanos. The IICs had been in Burma since 1942 and following the arrival of Spitfires in the theatre had been tasked with ground-attack duties. The tanks consisted of three medium Type 97 improved (Shinhoto Chi-Ha), and two light tanks, either Light Tank Type 95 (Ha-Go) or Tankette Type 97 (Te-Ke). The test consisted of the IIDs firing both AP and HE ammunition and the IICs firing the usual equal mix of SAP/I and HE/I in a 2x2 sequence. Firing took place against the front, side and rear of the tanks, with attacks launched at angles varying from level flight to a 45º dive.

The IIDs fired 64 rounds of AP scoring 11 hits (17%) and the same number of HE scoring 22 hits (34%), all of them at the medium tanks. Five of the 11 AP hits and seven or eight of the 22 HE hits were assessed as probably putting the tanks out of action. A total of 340 rounds of 20 mm were fired against the medium tanks for 10 hits (2.9%) and a similar number against the light tanks for 9 hits (2.6%). However, most of the HE/I hits were not counted as they were ineffective, so the percentage strike rate was about double that stated. The SAP/I rounds were effective against both medium and light tanks, penetrating the turrets several times.

The trial concluded that diving attacks were more effective, but there was little to choose between the 40 mm AP and HE projectiles as their effect depended on where they hit rather than the type of projectile (this of course would not necessarily be true against more heavily armoured tanks – the medium tanks had a maximum armour thickness of only 25 mm). It seems possible that the higher hit percentage with the HE shells may have been due to the use of the .303" sighting guns; the HE shell muzzle velocity and trajectory were more similar to the .303"'s. The relatively poor hit rate for the 20 mm might have been due to the practice of "walking" the shell strikes up to the target to ensure that hits were scored.