Blackburn Skua was it that bad?

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by tomo pauk

Why was RAF desperately needed Beaufighters in late 1940?

EDIT: I see, you probably mean the night-fighter variant. Well, the Merlin XX with 1300HP was ready in summer 1940, so that would do for Beau.

Actually the need for a long range twin was more extensive than that. Beaifighters were needed to protect convoys from Condors, there was of course the need for night fighter defences. Beaifighters were also needed as strike fighters, providing long range escort, and a very effective ground attack and sea interdiction role.

About the only thing the beau did not do, and this is not as a result of any design shortcoming, was use as an air superiority fighter.

In my opinion the beau was a success where the Me 110 was a failure, it was a far superior design in every respect

[riacrato]

How so. It performed well when not engaged by single engine fighters (just like the 110) and was in big trouble whenever that happened. Pretty similar.

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by tomo pauk

Actually, Skua was a late 1930s design, contemporary of 109, or Hurricane. It was a good dive bomber, but FAA realy needed a better fighter. Moreso since their planes were fighting in Norway & France too.
The Italian air threat was more in shape of bombers (eg. SM-79 was faster then Skua/Roc/Fulmar trio) , while MC-200 was the main fighter back in 1940.

In Norway the Skua was still effective, even when faced with the prospect of an Me 109 equipped force. You are looking at the problem in an essentially continental fashion, that is that the fleet defence fighter has to take and hold control of the skies in which it operates. this is a fundamentally flawed appraisal of the the fleet defence role. All that had to be done in fact was for the fighter to survive the enemy escorting fighters, and to engage the attacking bombers so as to break up or disrupt their attacks. This was done time and again by the FAA most famously during the pedestal convoys, but it happened all the time. and while a better fleet defence fighter would have been a "nice to have" option, it was never essential to the completion of the RNs task, and infact would have been a distraction to the development of land based air fighhters, which did have the responsibility for air superiority

The fighters you deride were actually very effective in this capacity. Fulmars sucesfully carried out this mission against Me 109 escorted attacks in the med, for example, losing very few aircraft, and very effectively protecting the ships they were attached to.

it never ceases to amaze me just how ignorant people from non-maritme nations are as to the role and significance naval power has on European affairs throughout history. By extension carrier based air power is the miodern day extension of that influence.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by tomo pauk

Actually, Skua was a late 1930s design, contemporary of 109, or Hurricane. It was a good dive bomber, but FAA realy needed a better fighter.

Sure, but even with some modern fighters, because of the small capacity of RN carriers, the FAA still needed multi-role aircraft for bombing, that could still be used as fighter defence against bombers

Originally Posted by tomo pauk

Moreso since their planes were fighting in Norway & France too.

Fighting in France? The FAA was never designed for extended fights near land, but to provide air superiority away from land, or raids against ports & ships

Originally Posted by tomo pauk

The Italian air threat was more in shape of bombers (eg. SM-79 was faster then Skua/Roc/Fulmar trio) ,

The bomber was of very limited danger to capital ships unless using torpedoes, in which case the Skua was perfectly able to match the Italian or Japanese bombers in 1940.

The Fulmar was as fast as a SM 79, and while the Skua was slower, it was optimised for a much lower altitude, I don't think the SM 79 was faster at sea level. Does anyone have a speed comparison of a Skua vs a Nell or SM 79 at sea level?

And further, a squadron of Skua's defending a fleet against bombers on a Torp attack could stay at altitude, and dive down on the TB's as they closed in for the attack.

Originally Posted by tomo pauk

while MC-200 was the main fighter back in 1940.

And out of range for operations in the central Med

[buffnut453]

Originally Posted by freebird

If the British had the Hermes with a dozen Skuas available to sail with the Repulse/PoW, it is unlikely in the extreme that the Japanese would have been able to sink them.

Alternatively, if Adm Phillips had woken up when he sighted the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft shadowing Force Z and asked for air support from Singapore, where a whole squadron of Buffalos was on immediate readiness with 2 more standing-by, the ships wouldn't have been sunk...at least not on 10 December 1941.

[freebird]

Originally Posted by buffnut453

Alternatively, if Adm Phillips had woken up when he sighted the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft shadowing Force Z and asked for air support from Singapore, where a whole squadron of Buffalos was on immediate readiness with 2 more standing-by, the ships wouldn't have been sunk...at least not on 10 December 1941.

No argument here - the whole mission was a fiasco, from Churchill overruling the Admiralty to send 2 capital ships on a mission without proper escort, or the ridiculous adherance of the RN to radio silence even after sighting IJN aircraft.


Nonetheless, the Skua would have been more useful on the Force Z mission than just straight fighters

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by riacrato

How so. It performed well when not engaged by single engine fighters (just like the 110) and was in big trouble whenever that happened. Pretty similar.

Similar, but not the same, and sufficiently differnt to label the 110 a failure and the Beafighter a success. everything about the Beau was "better" when compered to its german counterpart. It was more heavily armed, a better climber, could turn better, seemed to absorb punishment better. The differences are not that great, i admit, and the Beau was never going to do well in a single engined environment, but my opinion is that it could complete its mission better than the 110.

[riacrato]

Calling the 110 a failure is just wrong considering what it did as a nightfighter. And in that role I would actually take it over a Beau. Not to say the beau is a bad plane, it wasn't, but it performed so similar to the 110 that you just can't call one a success and the other a failure.

[tomo pauk]

Originally Posted by parsifal

...

it never ceases to amaze me just how ignorant people from non-maritme nations are as to the role and significance naval power has on European affairs throughout history. By extension carrier based air power is the miodern day extension of that influence.

It never ceases to amaze me just how arrogant people can be.

[tomo pauk]

Originally Posted by freebird

Sure, but even with some modern fighters, because of the small capacity of RN carriers, the FAA still needed multi-role aircraft for bombing, that could still be used as fighter defence against bombers

Agree. Skua with Hercules on board would be even more suited for both tasks.



Fighting in France? The FAA was never designed for extended fights near land, but to provide air superiority away from land, or raids against ports & ships

Surely not designed, but it was tasked. Eg. covering Dunkirk.



The bomber was of very limited danger to capital ships unless using torpedoes, in which case the Skua was perfectly able to match the Italian or Japanese bombers in 1940.

FAA was tasked to provide cover for merchant ships in Med, so something with better performance & armament would come in handy.

The Fulmar was as fast as a SM 79, and while the Skua was slower, it was optimised for a much lower altitude, I don't think the SM 79 was faster at sea level. Does anyone have a speed comparison of a Skua vs a Nell or SM 79 at sea level?

And further, a squadron of Skua's defending a fleet against bombers on a Torp attack could stay at altitude, and dive down on the TB's as they closed in for the attack.

Works fine in theory, but SM-79s still managed to sink & damage UK ships in Med, despite protection. And then we need to account in the Ju-88s doing anti-shipping work in (but not only) Med.

(about MC-200)

And out of range for operations in the central Med

Since you stated CR-32 & -42 as possible opposition, there is no reason to discount MC-200 from our assessment

If the

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by tomo pauk

It never ceases to amaze me just how arrogant people can be.

Your right TP, I shouldnt have said that, i do apologize

[Juha]

hello
IIRC Eric Brown didn’t have altogether positive opinion on Skua, but I cannot remember much from his article in one old Air International, only that Skua tended to drop hard on its main wheel when throttle was cut during carrier landing. I don’t have time now to try to dig out the article.

And IIRC Sea Gladiator was developed when RN found out in late 39 that the prewar idea to fight out bombing attacks using only naval AA wasn’t very good idea after all. because Skua was underpowered and poor climber they needed something better for interceptor role and Sea Gladiator was developed as a stop gap measure while Sea Hurricane and Seafire were developed.

Juha

[tomo pauk]

Originally Posted by parsifal

Your right TP, I shouldnt have said that, i do apologize

No problem.

[JoeB]

The concept of a/c like the Skua and Fulmar was overtaken by events. It was a basically mistaken concept by the time of WWII. I don't see the reason to deny this obvious fact, just to support the 'underdog' a/c all the time. Carrier operation in early WWII had to avoid, or just skirt as shallowly as possible, the range envelope of single engine fighters based on large land masses. That was actually true in the Pacific too, not just in Europe, untill carriers became vastly more numerous later in the war. Only small island bases with limited complements of fighters, and limited means to protect or disperse the a/c on the ground, could be attacked by carriers at reasonable risk until the much larger carrier forces of 1944.

But, the actual nature of carrier ops, even avoiding large forces of landbased singles, and with the introduction of radar, proved that the Skua/Fulmar type two seater was not optimal, but rather a higher performance single like the Sea Hurricane or Wildcat (Martlet). The Skua in particular had serious issues intercepting even various bomber types though it sometimes succeeed. I'm mystified by the claim that a few of them would have saved the POW and Repulse; those were numerous bombers coming in at varied altitudes, challenging intercepts for a Skua. Even a Hermes worth of higher performance planes, say Wildcats, would have inflicted heavier losses on the attacking a/c but probably not saved the ships. Lexington's larger complement of F4F's shredded an unescorted attack by Japanese Type 1's (Betty) v Lexington in 1942 near Rabaul (where Butch O'Hare won the Medal of Honor), but that was a much smaller force of level bombers only, the attacking 4th Air Group had no torpedoes at Rabaul, and near misses and near suicide crashes were scored as it was.

Joe

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by JoeB

The concept of a/c like the Skua and Fulmar was overtaken by events. It was a basically mistaken concept by the time of WWII. I don't see the reason to deny this obvious fact, just to support the 'underdog' a/c all the time. Carrier operation in early WWII had to avoid, or just skirt as shallowly as possible, the range envelope of single engine fighters based on large land masses. That was actually true in the Pacific too, not just in Europe, untill carriers became vastly more numerous later in the war. Only small island bases with limited complements of fighters, and limited means to protect or disperse the a/c on the ground, could be attacked by carriers at reasonable risk until the much larger carrier forces of 1944.

But, the actual nature of carrier ops, even avoiding large forces of landbased singles, and with the introduction of radar, proved that the Skua/Fulmar type two seater was not optimal, but rather a higher performance single like the Sea Hurricane or Wildcat (Martlet). The Skua in particular had serious issues intercepting even various bomber types though it sometimes succeeed. I'm mystified by the claim that a few of them would have saved the POW and Repulse; those were numerous bombers coming in at varied altitudes, challenging intercepts for a Skua. Even a Hermes worth of higher performance planes, say Wildcats, would have inflicted heavier losses on the attacking a/c but probably not saved the ships. Lexington's larger complement of F4F's shredded an unescorted attack by Japanese Type 1's (Betty) v Lexington in 1942 near Rabaul (where Butch O'Hare won the Medal of Honor), but that was a much smaller force of level bombers only, the attacking 4th Air Group had no torpedoes at Rabaul, and near misses and near suicide crashes were scored as it was.

Joe

Joe

98% of the time I agree with your positions, but this is one time i will have to respectfully disagree. Whilst the low performance of the FAA aircraft was a definite disadvantage, your assertion that British Carriers were not in the "thick of it" from the beginning is just not supported by the facts. British carriers were able to enter enemy controlled airspace, particularly in the central basin, time and again, with relative impunity. The paucity of numbers was what prevented them from achieving air superiority, but this did not generally stop them from completing the crucial mission of achieving sea control of any area the RN needed to control (possible exceptions being the closed seas like the Adriatic and Baltic). This was a direct result of the carriers contribution to the RN force capability. They had an effect on all manner of operations, to a very significant degree. I would say that without the British carrier operations of 1940-41, the outcome of the war would have changed completely

I would suggest your comparisons of RN operations to those that occurred in the Pacific by the USN is not a valid comparison, The mission profiles were fundamentally different, as were the conditions under which the two navies were operating......