Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge

[Juha]

... Really, an Me 109G with a 66 gallon drop tank could ferry about the same distance, a result of fuel efficiency in the DB605 I believe.

I still wonder why Germans didn't use that claimed ferry range, at least not often. In all 109 pilot memoirs I can recall, when they ferrier 109s to the east they did it by rather short stages. Same to Finns when they ferried 109s to Finland. And when 11./JG 2 with its 109G-1s were transferred from Normandy to Tunisia via Sicily in early Nov 42, it didn't flew to Southern France and then across the Med to Sicily, not even via Sardinia to Sicily. No, it first went to Mannheim and even that was impossible without a refilling stop at Rheims. From Mannheim to München, then to Treviso-Jesi-Bari-Reggio di Calabria-Trapani-Comiso-Pantelleria. It departed on 4 Nov 42 and arrived to Sicily on 8 Nov. To me that didn't show specially good ferry range.

... The 5 hour endurance of the Spitfire is also almost totally useless in combat situation. It was a supermarine publicity stunt by Mutt Sommers.

Now Mk VIIs flew a few long range escort missions in ETO, the longest I'm aware took 3h 50min and Mk VIIIs flew long range escort missions in Pacific, the longest I'm aware was 4h 30min long, so it had some practical use.

Juha

[pbfoot]

Good idea about attacking the radars. Not just that a wrecked radar net gives a hard time for defenders to scramble, it also hampers the Flak units. Any radar that is on-line is something akin to a flashlight in the moonless night if the attacker is properly equipped, and RAF & other interested in the UK certainly were by 1942 on.

I'm not aware of any such attacks on LW radar , the Allies must have been aware of the value of such targets so why were they neglected .

[tomo pauk]

Never said the major-scale were conducted, not even the minor-scale ones. Just agreed that I like th idea.
As for why allies did not bothered to destroy the radars & supporting infrastructure, well, the whole target policy deserves it's own thread, if not the site about that.

[stona]

If BC could organize the Dams raids, Amiens , Copenhagen and other precision raids why were they unable to organize more precision raids rather then massacres like the Nueremberg fiasco and the Battle of Berlin which if given a close look appears to be very near a defeat . IIRC was there not a lo level daylight raid using Lancs in 42 into Germany that was close to being caualty free. Out of curiosity I`ve heard that very few Aussies were leaders of Squadrons why is that

Way back in this thread I made the point that low penetration light,specialised raids like Amiens and Copenhagen are utterly irrelevant to the conduct of a bombing campaign designrd to destroy and dislocate an enemies production capability.
As for the dams raid,delivering a few mines to destroy two dams for a minimum return at an enormous cost was,sadly, a propaganda victory and nothing more.That's why the photo reconnaissance photos of one of the destroyed dams (Mohne?) appeared in the British press so rapidly. No air force could sustain that level of loss on regular operations.
Bennet of pathfinder fame should be an Australian well known to anybody interested in the bombing campaign and he was not the only prominent Australian airman.
Cheers
Steve

[pbfoot]

Way back in this thread I made the point that low penetration light,specialised raids like Amiens and Copenhagen are utterly irrelevant to the conduct of a bombing campaign designrd to destroy and dislocate an enemies production capability.
As for the dams raid,delivering a few mines to destroy two dams for a minimum return at an enormous cost was,sadly, a propaganda victory and nothing more.That's why the photo reconnaissance photos of one of the destroyed dams (Mohne?) appeared in the British press so rapidly. No air force could sustain that level of loss on regular operations.
Bennet of pathfinder fame should be an Australian well known to anybody interested in the bombing campaign and he was not the only prominent Australian airman.
Cheers
Steve

Mr Bennett deserves far more credit for his pioneering of Ferry Command , as for losses was the Battle of Belin sustainable no not by a long shot nor were the results worth it . Why not go after the snakes head of the LW attack where they are , if you seriously bombed the snot out of the airfields you would at least impare the ability to fly the aircraft simply by knocking off the skilled trades that kept them airborne rather then fake victories like the Battle of Berlin. IIRC no Aussies other then Bennett were in charge of either Wings or Groups

[Hop]

I'm not aware of any such attacks on LW radar , the Allies must have been aware of the value of such targets so why were they neglected .

From the Australian archives:

The weakness of German aerial reconnaissance gave the Allies great
freedom in preparing for their cross-Channel invasion, but it was appre-
ciated that tactical surprise could not be gained unless the impressiv e
enemy radar network was seriously damaged . Accordingly air attack was
ordered against all radar installations which could not be jammed b y
electronic counter-measures, all those capable of clear detection of ship-
ping, those used for controlling coastal batteries, and any likely to threate n
airborne operations . To mislead the enemy, two targets outside the assaul t
area were attacked for every one inside, so that this campaign, whic h
began on 10th May, in fact ranged from Ostend to the Channel Islands .
The first targets were long-range aircraft reporting stations, followed o n
18th May by radar installations for night-fighter and gun defences . On
25th May, 42 sites holding 106 installations were detailed for attack ,
and by 3rd June, the destruction of 14 of the sites had been confirmed .
To conserve effort it was then necessary to concentrate on 12 of th e
remaining 28 sites, the choice lying equally between air and naval autho-
rities, and these were repeatedly battered in the remaining three days o f
the preparatory period .
Before 6th June aircraft of A.E.A .F. flew 1,668 sorties against German
radar stations ; 694 by rocket-firing Typhoons, 759 by Spitfire and Typhoo n
dive bombers, and 215 by light bombers . Low-level attack on these
exceptionally well-defended installations demanded great skill and daring .
Casualties were often high, as on 5th June when 25 Typhoons made a
most successful attack on the "Hoarding" equipment used for long-range
aircraft reporting, at Cap de la Hague, firing rocket-projectiles after a
power dive down to 2,000 feet . Warrant Officer Pugh 8 and two other
pilots were shot down. Pilot Officer McGovern9 of No. 181 Squadron
R.A.F. and Flying Officer Roberts" of No . 164 with six and five attacks
respectively were prominent among the R.A.A.F. pilots engaged in these
attacks as well as in missions against railways and airfields . No. 453
itself made four attacks . On 30th May, Smith led 12 Spitfires to dive-
bomb the radar station at Cap D'Antifer, and the same afternoon, in
company with No . 602, direct hits were gained on the "Wurzburg" ap-
paratus at Arromanches. Flight Lieutenant P. V. McDade led the Aus-
tralians on 2nd June against the "Hoarding " at Cap Gris Nez and
although this was a failure, much better results were obtained two days
later at Cap de la Heve near Le Havre .
During the first week in June, R.A.F. Bomber Command joined in
this campaign against enemy early-warning equipment by attacks on two
navigational stations and four W-T stations important in the general
defence of the assault area . Stations at Sortesville, south of Cherbourg,
Lanmeur and Mont Couple were put out of action by forces containing
only a few Australians, but on 2nd-3rd June No . 460 contributed 2 3
Lancasters to a raid by 107 aircraft against the W-T station at Berneval-
le-Grand near Dieppe . A concentrated attack demolished all seven aerial
masts, obtained direct hits on several of the main buildings protected
by blast walls and badly shattered some of the unprotected minor build-
ings . The previous night 16 Halifaxes of No . 466 had been in a similar
force attacking Ferm d'Urville, near Cherbourg, the headquarters of th e
German signals Intelligence service in north-west France, but the targe t
had been completely shrouded in cloud and no great optimism was shown
by pilots returning after bombing on sky markers . The second attempt to
destroy Ferm d'Urville on 3rd-4th June was made by No. 5 Group, Nos .
463 and 467 each dispatching 13 Lancasters in a total force of 100 . Flight
Lieutenant van Raalte 2 of No. 97 headed the Pathfinders, and dropped
the spot marker in the centre of the target . The crews of the R.A.A.F.
aircraft which then pressed in to drop 148 of the total 509 tons wer e
confident of success from their own observation of the bombing . Wing
Commander W. L. Brill of No. 467 reported that he circled the target
during the whole attack and had never seen such a close concentratio n
of bomb-bursts . The subsequent photographic interpretation report stated :
"The station is completely useless . The site itself is rendered unsuitabl e
for rebuilding the installation without much effort being expended in
levelling and filling in the craters . "
The success of all these preparatory attacks went a long way toward s
blinding the enemy 's early-warning system. The commitment of air power
in this respect had been well fulfilled, for although many radar installa-
tions remained untouched these were to be nullified by other means .

[Hop]

And from the official history of the RAF:

It was, of course, essential to paralyse the radar cover on the western front which the enemy had, with great thoroughness, established from Norway to the Spanish border. The closest concentration of radar stations was in north-west France and in the Low Countries. The system he followed was similar to that brought to so high a state of efficiency in Great Britain and was made up of a coastal chain supported by a number of inland stations. Between Dunkirk and Brest there were sixty-six radar stations of various kinds. To attack them all, even with the formidable air strength available to the Allies, was hardly possible and it was therefore decided to combine assault by air with radio counter-measures. The staff for this purpose was set up on 15th May under the direction of Air Vice-Marshal V. H. Tait, Director of Signals in the Air Ministry. They gave advice to the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief on everything connected with radio counter-measures and one of their chief duties was the choice of targets most suitable for direct air attack. Installations able to report on the movement of shipping or used to control the fire of batteries, or set up in areas where they might interfere with the landing of our airborne forces, were the most suitable targets. As a further precaution, for every radar post attacked in the lodgment areas two were attacked outside them. The attacks were postponed as long as possible so that the enemy should not be able to improvise equipment to cover the gaps in the radar chain which might be created. They did not, therefore, begin until 10th May, when the aircraft reporting stations were bombed. These installations if hit, could not be easily repaired, and because of the narrowness of their beam were hard to jam. A week later the attacks on night fighter control stations and on the stations controlling the fire of coastal batteries were begun. During the week before 'D Day', a series of attacks on forty-two radar sites, most of them provided with more than one type of equipment, was carried out, and in the last three days, six sites chosen by the Navy and six by the Air Force were given special attention.

The assaults were delivered for the most part by the Typhoon and Spitfire Squadrons of Nos. 83 and 84 Groups. The targets were very heavily defended by light flak and to attack them 'demanded great skill and daring'. The losses in aircraft and pilots were very heavy. Of the many assaults made, Leigh-Mallory in his despatch selected three as worthy of special mention. There was that of 2nd June carried out by eighteen rocket firing Typhoons of Nos. 198 and 609 Squadrons on the Dieppe/Caudecôte station, used for night fighter control and the control of coastal batteries. For the loss of one Typhoon, the station was put out of action. There was the attack on the 4th June on the station at Cap d'Antifer by twenty-three Spitfires of Nos. 441, 442 and 443 Squadrons Royal Canadian Air Force. They secured nine direct hits with 500 pound bombs and destroyed the 'chimney' and the giant Würzburg installations. There was finally the attack on the day before 'D Day' on the Jobourg station near the Cap de la Hague, attacked by Typhoons of Nos. 174, 175 and 245 Squadrons, firing rockets. It was equally successful.

Of the enemy's radar navigational stations, the two most important, one at Sortosville south of Cherbourg and the other at Lanmeur near Morlaix, were attacked, the first being destroyed, the second rendered temporarily unserviceable. Four wireless telephone stations of great importance were dealt with by Bomber Command. That at Mount Couple near Boulogne, made up of some sixty transmitters, was almost wiped out on the night of 31st May/1st June, seventy heavy bombs hitting the target, which was only 300 yards long and 150 yards wide. To make sure of this decisive result required the dropping of 474 tons of bombs by 105 Lancasters. That night, too, the station at Au-Fevre near Beaumont-Hague was rendered unserviceable, and two nights later the station at Berneval-le-Grand, close to Dieppe, was almost wiped out by 541 tons of bombs. The most important achievement, however, was the destruction by ninety-nine heavy bombers, dropping 509 tons of bombs, of the station at Urville-Hague near Cherbourg. This was the headquarters of the German Signals Intelligence Service in north-western France. The photographic interpretation report, afterwards found to be singularly accurate, stated that the station was completely useless, and the site itself rendered unsuitable for rebuilding. The destruction of this intelligence station had a powerful influence on the battle which began two days later, and was certainly one of the main reasons why the enemy's reaction in the air on 'D Day' and afterwards was so slight.

The results, then, of the air attacks on the radar stations were highly satisfactory. All six of the long-range reporting stations south of Boulogne were destroyed before 'D Day' and fifteen others in the area were made unserviceable. Thus large stretches of the Channel coast, as the vital day approached, were desolate of radar cover. By 'D Day', not more than eighteen per cent. of the enemy radar apparatus in north-west France was in operation, and for long periods of the fateful previous night, only five per cent.

The result was summed up by Leigh-Mallory in his despatch. 'The enemy did not obtain', he said, 'the early warning of our approach that his radar coverage should have made possible. There is, moreover, reason to suppose that radar-controlled gunfire was interfered with. No fighter aircraft hindered our airborne operations; the enemy was confused and his troop movements delayed'. Evidence subsequently discovered fully endorses this statement.

The RAF also introduced a radar receiver fitted to Typhoon aircraft to enable them to locate enemy radar stations. The programme was called "Abdullah" but it doesn't seem to have been a great success, probably because of the technical limitations.

The preferred way of dealing with enemy radar seems to have been jamming. That's probably because radar stations were small targets, very numerous, and fairly easy to replace.

[pbfoot]

Ok so they attacked it for D Day prep why not earlier , say 43 and keep on hitting them , if they spent one day a month attacking all the radars , could the Germanns keep up repairs particulaly if while the radar was degraded they attacked POL and Transport

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for the contribution, Hop.
I guess jamming involves far less risk, but on the other hand the destroyed radar site cannot be replaced/rebuilt so easily. As said in the excerpt:

Thus large stretches of the Channel coast, as the vital day approached, were desolate of radar cover. By 'D Day', not more than eighteen per cent. of the enemy radar apparatus in north-west France was in operation, and for long periods of the fateful previous night, only five per cent.

IIRC Germans themselves were in dire straits as far as electronic production was case, for second half of war, maybe someone could shed some light on that? Even the copper was in short supply?

To continue, with radar sites (those in N. France and Low countries) properly 'visited' in early 1943, both by RAF and USAAF, would've made LW defenders, both Flak, day and night fighters far less of a threat for the 'invaders'.

[pbfoot]

It seems that the heavies with their "precision capability" could and did knock down radars . I can invision visiting all the radar sites known in a one day Bodenplatte
to me its seems a natural thing to do kind of like using a capapult in days gone by to breech castle walls . There is no way that the LW could counter all the raids

[Hop]

Between Dunkirk and Brest there were sixty-six radar stations. To attack them all, even with the formidable air strength available to the Allies, was hardly possible and it was therefore decided to combine assault by air with radio counter-measures.

My take on it is that they didn't attack the radar stations until just before D Day because they could be replaced too easily. According to Wiki, the Germans produced more than 1,000 Freya sets and more than 4,000 Würzburgs.

[tomo pauk]

The 1000 Freyas (early warning type) means that it took 3 days to produce 2 sets, give or take. IMO that number can be hardly enough to replace the destroyed ones, once the dedicated campaign starts. Without Freyas, Wurzburgs (fire control type) lack the early warning, same thing for fighter units. With heavy bombers dropping heavy bombs, trained radar crews are also in jeopardy. The radar aerials are far better targets for day attacks than tanks or guns.
The allies were in much better position to replace their bombers than Germans their radars, ratio being perhaps 10:1.

[pbfoot]

If you took out even a couple of Freyas you would cause grief I imagine there were only so many teams with skills to survey and place units , it not just a matter of plopping them down on a piece of dirt . You'd need a well prepared surface with lots of surveying a nice level pad not even including commuications to what ever was central command . I'm sure they required APU's etc , testing labs etc . IMHO it 2was a missed opportunity

[Hop]

At the time the RAF and USAAF decided jamming and spoofing was the main way to combat German radar. They couldn't have committed to that effort without at least considering simply bombing German radar sites. I think it's difficult for us to second guess them with far less information than they had available.

[tomo pauk]

There is no need for second guesses, since both Brits & Yanks knew, rather early in the war, that radars are the key part for any air force defending something. Particularly Brits had the 1st hand experience from BoB.
A spoofed and jammed radar needs such a treatment for every aerial attack vs. German held Europe, maybe 3 times within 24 hours (one for night bombers, other for USAAF, 3rd for RAF's Typhoons & Spits)? A destroyed radar does not. Since the Ultra was reading many of the German messages, the big, radiating radar aerials were not that secret.