BRITAIN 1939 – 1945: THE ECONOMIC COST OF STRATEGIC BOMBING

[kettbo]

the original estimations....AAA guns used at night against the British and Canadians and other Allies work just as well in the day against the Americans. So the math needs to be adjusted, 'cost' reduced as not a night-only asset

[parsifal]

the original estimations....AAA guns used at night against the British and Canadians and other Allies work just as well in the day against the Americans. So the math needs to be adjusted, 'cost' reduced as not a night-only asset

I agree, but the force was established principally prewar through to the end of 1942. thereafter there was a further expansion but a proportion of the guns manufactured were needed to replace worn or failing guns. for example, by 1944, there were an average of 300 gun failures per month in the LW.

The other issue is ammunition manufacture. When the british offensive kicked off, which really wasnt until the latter part of 1941, the germans found their prewar estimates on ammunition required was badly underestimated. throughout 1941 and '42 they spent a lot of manpower and cash rectifying that by expanding their munitions production (some for regular field weapons, some for AA). That required for AA arose all because of the british efforts.....US did not really kick off their bomber offensive until 2nd quarter of 1943.

So while true that AA costs can be spread, there needs to be a bias, a big one, towards the need driven by the RAF

[Siegfried]

Re Coventry; Yes, I have no doubt the Luftwaffe used the explosives and incendiaries on target and broadened the aimpoint enough around the target to ensure the area was broader than their overall accuracy and they exploited the flammable nature of the target area. No doubt they knew this would kill civilians. This still isn't 'area bombardment' which literally was aiming at the CBD of a city rather than specific areas where there was a target even if the area was broad. The attack on Coventry wasn't like the a decison to flatten 80 of Germanies biggest cities. (The Baedecker raids most be viewed in that light and the light of them being revenge for BS Lubeck raid) The Luftwaffe at the time were using X-geraet, which was about as accurate as oboe. Interestingly there were proposed amendments to the Hague conventions that would've precluded bombing had there been housing in the area: it was felt however that housing would literally be built there as 'human shielding'. The problem with area bombardment is you give up on not properly developing more accurate and 'decent' alternatives; which I think is what happened. I believe that when bomber command did specifically target areas in cities (railway stations) they hit less than with area bombardment but its likely that collateral damage was less and the expenditure of resources less.

The Lancaster was twaddle for instance from this perspective; romanised, vulnerable articulated lorry with poor escape systems. It was a system which could give accuracy only in unique circumstances and safety to its crews only at night and in large opperations. Its definciencies compelled the area bombardment campaign in many ways.

Yes, the V1 V2 campaign was terror, seen as counter terror. It's use against Antwerp was an act of pointless post invasion desperation in the hopes that it would slow port movements down. Using missiles now too far from Britain to reach it and to inaccurate to have the effect on the port facilities desired.

Re B-29's. Again another ill conceived bomber whose conception preceded any ww2 combat experience. A proper bomber design is dimensioned to achieve the same speed as friendly and enemy fighters not 20%-40% less. This does not cover the B-29. A faster B-29 can come in lower, faster and more accuratly.

The ultimate expression of 'cost effectiveness' were bombs like Fritz-X (a 1942/42 weapon) and azon.

I'd like to add that what I was getting at that if parties stop showing that they are exercising restraint then a cycle of escalation starts. Had bomber command given some indication that it was exercising restraint or prepared to then it may just have been that the V weapons campaign would have been delayed until it also produced more accurate results since the Germans also would then not wish to escalate. The V weapons didn't have too much effect but only because they came too late to reach numerical and technical maturity. The potential for 4000-5000 V2 month combined with similar numbers of V1 existed.

From what I can see greater use of precision daylight raids should have been possible with the right bombers.

It would also have been possible to improve the night bombing campaign to one of accuracy throught the reich.

[Hop]

The attack on Coventry would have effected the British psyche deeply. However it was not an attack on “working class people” though the collateral effect was that. It was an attack on machine tools and engine production plants. Old cities had houses abutting the walls of factories. Had the factories of Coventry been in separate industrial estates I doubt the Luftwaffe would have been inclined to spread their attacks to those areas.

The Luftwaffe orders for Coventry stated that worker's housing was a deliberate target because it would hinder reconstruction. This was deliberate area bombing of exactly the sort Bomber Command later adopted.

In fact, nearly everything BC did was an adaption of techniques the Luftwaffe practiced against Britain.

It must be remembered that the Coventry attack itself was seen as a response to what appeared to be indiscriminate attacks on German towns.

Hardly. British bombing at the time consisted of small numbers of bombers trying to hit specific military and industrial targets. In other words, exactly the same tactics the Luftwaffe had been carrying out in the west since the night of 9/10 May 1940.

The only differences in British and German bombing at the time were that the Luftwaffe were operating on a much larger scale, and the Luftwaffe had already carried out area bombing attacks, starting with Rotterdam, moving on to London, Southampton and other British cities.

In the whole of 1940 Bomber Command killed about 350 civilians in Germany.

The Luftwaffe killed 257 British civilians in July, over 1,000 in August, 6,954 in September, 6,334 in October, 4,588 in November and 3,793 in December.

It wasn't until mid December that Bomber Command carried out their first area attack, on Mannheim.

Re Coventry; Yes, I have no doubt the Luftwaffe used the explosives and incendiaries on target and broadened the aimpoint enough around the target to ensure the area was broader than their overall accuracy and they exploited the flammable nature of the target area. No doubt they knew this would kill civilians. This still isn't 'area bombardment'

It is exactly area bombardment. It taught the RAF the technique. Everything they did later in the war, electronic navigation, pathfinders, blast bombs, incendiaries, the focus on housing, were all features of the Luftwaffe attack on Coventry. The first RAF area attack, on Mannheim, was planned as a direct response to Coventry.

The problem with area bombardment is you give up on not properly developing more accurate and 'decent' alternatives; which I think is what happened.

But BC didn't give up on accuracy. They turned themselves in to the most accurate heavy bomber force of the war. They developed all the electronic aids the US adopted.

The Lancaster was twaddle for instance from this perspective; romanised, vulnerable articulated lorry with poor escape systems. It was a system which could give accuracy only in unique circumstances and safety to its crews only at night and in large opperations. Its definciencies compelled the area bombardment campaign in many ways.

The Lancaster was an aircraft focused on what bombing was about: dropping bombs. No bomber was safe in daylight without heavy escort. No bomber was particularly accurate. Indeed, darkness enabled Lancasters to bomb from lower altitude which made them more accurate than the US heavies.

I'd like to add that what I was getting at that if parties stop showing that they are exercising restraint then a cycle of escalation starts.

Definitely. Bomber Command started the war with a ban on attacking any targets in Germany in case of civilian casualties. They were allowed to bomb in the immediate rear of the German advance following Luftwaffe raids on France, Belgium and the Netherlands. They were allowed to bomb military targets elsewhere in Germany after Rotterdam. They were first allowed to attack targets of opportunity following the beginning of the Blitz on London, and they carried out their first area attack after Coventry.

There weren't really any more gloves to come off after that, other than gas, and thankfully that's one tactic the Germans chose not to pioneer.

From what I can see greater use of precision daylight raids should have been possible with the right bombers.

It would also have been possible to improve the night bombing campaign to one of accuracy throught the reich.

Bomber Command did improve accuracy to a point where they were more accurate than the USAAF. I don't think the technology of the day allowed anything better.

[rochie]

well congrats davebender, you got what i belive you were after, that is a debate about how all who served in bomber command were war criminals and all other who area bombed were not because they had a good reason for it, well done.

there is zero difference between what BC did to German cities and to what the LW di to British and other european ones or what the US did to japenese cities
and i believe the USAF in Europe were hardly more accurate in daylight than BC were at night, they were not only dropping bombs within factory walls or railway staitons etc

this is what i thought would happen to this thread

[michaelmaltby]

"..... From what I can see greater use of precision daylight raids should have been possible with the right bombers."

OK, I'll bite. Bombers such as .....?

"..... A proper bomber design is dimensioned to achieve the same speed as friendly and enemy fighters not 20%-40% less."

Beyond the Mosquito, Arado and Me-262 jet bombers .... do any examples of your thesis actually exist in WW2 (or Korea) ..? By Viet Nam the USAF has the F-105 Thunderchief, a successful heavy bomber (by WW2 payload standards) but which incurred tremendous losses despite the parity you extol, Siegfried.

MM

[Kryten]

[QUOTE=Siegfried;834854]@michaelmaltby

Britain never suffered successful V weapons reprisals because the entire V weapons program would need to have started 6-9 months earlier or sometime before the d-day landings to be effective. For instance a V1 campaign starting December 43 instead of late June 44 after the d-day landings. That would mean the V1's could be fired from multiple locations and prevent concentration of Allied defences (AAA, Barrage Balloons). Within 5 months of the V1 offensive beginning Argus/Fiesler had managed to get V1 Speed to 480mph and a month latter 495mph; they were beyond the ability of even the P80A and Meteor III to intercept. The Ewald II/Sauerkirsche II mid-course guidance system was also being built at the close of the campaign to improve accuracy (to about 1km) while long range versions (400 miles) were also on their way.]]]quote

Bear in mind the whole programme was delayed by several months by the RAF raid on Peenemunde!

without that the V weapons would have been available earlier!

[michaelmaltby]

"... Bear in mind the whole programme was delayed by several months by the RAF raid on Peenemunde! without that the V weapons would have been available earlier!"

Agreed.

MM

[nuuumannn]

"... Bear in mind the whole programme was delayed by several months by the RAF raid on Peenemunde! without that the V weapons would have been available earlier!"

Agreed.

MM

Yep, me too. From reading your posts Siegfried, you have a very subjective and simplistic point of view on many things. Firstly, the Germans chose direct attacks on British cities at night in an attempt to break British morale since their daylight bombing campaign during the Battle of Britain was falling short of what they hoped to achieve. Sure, it is widely publicised that the LW were bombing London because the RAF bombed Berlin, but there is ample evidence that supports the notion that direct attacks on British cities by the LW were to be made in support of the German invasion of Britain. This does not support claims of tit for tat, also...

Had bomber command given some indication that it was exercising restraint or prepared to then it may just have been that the V weapons campaign would have been delayed until it also produced more accurate results since the Germans also would then not wish to escalate.

...is utter nonsense. Hitler had a particular fancy for exotic weaponry and he would not have failed to use them at any time of the war had they become available sooner.

Another thing; H2S was was a ground mapping radar; it aided the bombers finding their way to the enemy cities. We've been over this in another thread. Sure, it had its faults, but for its time it was effective enough to improve BC's ability to reach the target area over their previous efforts. I'm sure the scientists who developed it thought it was the best they could do with the technology of the day. Unfortunately for you, your enormous knowledge of electronics gives you a better idea of how more advanced systems might have or should have worked, but this means you disregard contemporary efforts out of hindsight rather than based on what was considered advanced and effective for the time. Have you read "Bomber Command" by Max Hastings as I suggested in the Game Changers forum? I suspect not.

Parsifal; Intellectually challenging, supremely accurate and thoroughly enjoyable reading as always.

Too tired tonight, but enjoying very much.

[Tante Ju]

The Luftwaffe orders for Coventry stated that worker's housing was a deliberate target because it would hinder reconstruction.

Do you has this orders? A link maybe?

[Timppa]

..the Germans are expending close to 50% of their war potential (before bombing) on countering the british Bombers.

IMHO this is incredible. Sources behind the percentages ?

[Siegfried]

The Luftwaffe orders for Coventry stated that worker's housing was a deliberate target because it would hinder reconstruction. This was deliberate area bombing of exactly the sort Bomber Command later adopted.
.

This is interesting: can you provide a source or link for these orders? Do you know of records of actual targeting?

Bomber Command did improve accuracy to a point where they were more accurate than the USAAF. I don't think the technology of the day allowed anything better.

I've heard that, I doubt it was anything but a transient effect from comparing a seasonal periods of USAAF opperation in high cloud cover with Bomber Command opperation in situations when Oboe could be used.

The USAAF started using Oboe and its own implementation Micro-H and in addition H2X. While H2X/H2S was completely ineffective on 80% (thereabouts) cloudy days it did work well in conjunction with visual bombing on circa 50% obscured days presumably because the bomb aimer and his assistant H2X opperator where able to correlate visuals of the ground wth their radar 'images' and then ofset bomb if the target was obscured.

[parsifal]

IMHO this is incredible. Sources behind the percentages ?

There is not a single source that contains all of the information behind this. and some of it is estimation, but not significantly so. The main sources I rely on are

Overy, Richard “Germany, ‘Domestic Crisis’ and War in 1939” from The Third Reich edited by Christian Leitz Blackwell: Oxford, 1999

Hans-Joachim Braun, "The German Economy in the Twentieth Century", Routledge, 1990

From these sources it was possible for me to determine German Gross National Income, pegged to 1936 prices. Then I had another source that looks at the amounts spent on the Lufwaffe overall. This is photocopy that I have, and can scan if you want to see it, but its nearly 30 years old. I dont have the book title but I recall it was dealing with the economic costs of establishing and maintaining the Lufwaffe

The contained in this appendix are the cost of aircraft development, design and production. No figures were given on manning and training costs, this was extra.

So, from the source material we can produce a list, on a year by year basis that lists: Total income(in Billions)/Total expenditure on R&D and aircraft production/ and a percentage of gross Income. Just note that this costing is for aircraft design and developm,ent. It does not include manning costs, the costs of establishing the ground organizations, the costs of establishing or maintaining the flak arm ( have figure3s for this last item however), the costs of flak artillery ammunition (have figures for this as well).

Putting what I do have to hand we find the following:

1936:6.5/0.9/13.9%
1937:7.5/0.9/12.0%
1938:9.0/1.0/11.1%
1939:8.5/2.5/29.4%
1940:11.0/3.5/31.8%
1941:10.0/5.0/50%
1942:10/6.5/65%
1943/9.0/?

There are complications after 1941, because of Soviet involvement, and after 1943, the USAAC is also being shot at

Flak and flak expenditures I will post later tonite...want to go for a ride right now. I dont have figures on manning costs.

Also the above figures represent the total aircraft expenditures.....for evrything the Germans were building. However in 1936-40, before they were engaged in defending their own skies, they were spending a maximum of 30% of their national income on aircraft procurement. From 1941 when the continuous offensive began along with the invasion of Russia, expenditures on aircraft development and procurement shot to, and beyond 50%, and from the production figures its clear even at that early date they were concentrating on fighters and nightfighters...fighter production in 1941 shot up nearly 50%, whilst other categories moved much more modestly. its clear that this added effort on aircraft design and production was mostly being directed into the fighter arm.


its going to quite easy to at least give ggod indication that a huge slice of the german pie was being ploughed into defending their skies from British Bombers

[Siegfried]

Yep, me too. From reading your posts Siegfried, you have a very subjective and simplistic point of view on many things. Firstly, the Germans chose direct attacks on British cities at night in an attempt to break British morale since their daylight bombing campaign during the Battle of Britain was falling short of what they hoped to achieve. Sure, it is widely publicised that the LW were bombing London because the RAF bombed Berlin, but there is ample evidence that supports the notion that direct attacks on British cities by the LW were to be made in support of the German invasion of Britain. This does not support claims of tit for tat, also...

The debate over area bombardment included such as R.V.Jones and others insisting that better bombing aids could be developed that would be more effective than the area bombardment directive.

Opperation Sea Lion never got anywhere near being implemented, I fail to see then how it can then be blamed for instigating a terror bombing of British cities as a prepatory invasion effort.

My 'thesis' is that the area bombardment directive 'tunneled' efforts down one path.

The Luftwaffe had in anycase rejected Douhets theories (Luftwaffe Directive 16). You will note a dive bombing obsession even on Bomber A and Bomber B (Ju 88 and He 177)

...is utter nonsense. Hitler had a particular fancy for exotic weaponry and he would not have failed to use them at any time of the war had they become available sooner.

Hitler did not initially like the V2, he disparaged it as fantastic parquetry that could not be walked upon because it would explode, he had a nightmare that it was destroying the earths protective mantle. Nazis were pagan nature whoreshippers at heart. Speer kept it going as a matter of national pride and interest in space travel. Hitler only changed his mind when he saw film of succesfull launches and authorised production in October 1942.

To put that in context: The first 1,000 bomber raid by the RAF was codenamed Operation Millennium, Cologne was chosen as the target and the raid took place on the night of 30/31 May 1942.

I do not see that he was irrantional about 'exotic weapons'. The outsize Artillery was designed for deep earth penetration of fortifications such as the Maginot line. It was of unprecedented capabillity as results in Sevestapol show, only matched by latter weapons such as tallboy (1944) and grand slam (1945). He many have induged fantasies of monumentally large architecture and super H class battleships but he knew they were impractical and saw them (the battleships) as some post war symbol.

Re the V2. Its original accuracy objectives, that von Braun 'promised' was about 1 mil (milliradian) ie 1m at 1000m and 300m at 300km: about the same as the best artillery.

The system to achieve this was to use beam riding with 0.05 degree accuracy, a doppler speed measure, a range measure to ensure perfect cuttof equation about 65 seconds after launch. This system, which used a 50cm frequency and a 7m Wurzburg dish, got into trouble with ground wave interferance. Interim systems were used instead but development continued. A fequency increase to 27cm was not enough so efforts continued. They were apparently succesfull because they were being built as the war closed.

Basic system:
1 LEV-3 a pair of gyros with potentiometers and one accelerometer. Best accuracy CEP 4.5km.
2 Alternative beam system Viktoria-Hawaii, a single dimensional beam which could use doppler instead of accelerometer cutoff. Halves lateral dispersion, takes 10% of down range dispersion if used with doppler. This was used in 25% of launches though doppler on few or none.

Advanced system.
1 SG-66 (to be productionised as SG-70) 3 gyros on a stable platform, two accelerometers: one for lateral control the other for down range and slant range control.
Was test flown a few times. Probably incorporated more advanced cuttof equation: speed plus down range.
2 Vollzirkel. Columated beam riding, dopper velocity and transponder range. Expected accuracy at about 500m at full range from desired re-entry point; re-entry wind drift excluded.
A few other things, air bearing gyros were planed but only being used experimentally in a u-boat INS.

The first oders on V2 were at RM38500 or RM40,000, about half the cost of a single engined fighter with engine.

Assembly hours were
1 First 1000 about 10,000 hours
2 After first 1000 times drop to 7500
3 After 10,000 cost to be less than 4000 hours each.

IE a workforce of 25,000 could in theory produce 1000 missiles/month
.

The point is this: von Braun begged for another year of development to get the production costs down and the accuracy up. It was rushed into production precisely because it was a reprisal weapon.

A missile with 1 mil accuracy (potentially 100m at short range) is a tactically usefull weapon. The abillity to land 1000 missiles of about 1000 missile lauched within 1km of target also makes it strategically usefull and likely cost effectve.

Hence its premature introduction was heavily motivated by it being seen as a reprisal terror weapon. It made more sense to wait another 6-12 months for the more accurate versions.

[parsifal]

IMHO this is incredible. Sources behind the percentages ?

Looking at the flak arm, main source for me is Edward B westermann, "Flak - German Antiaircraft Defences" Kansas University Press 2001.

The way the information is presented in this book makes it incompatible to the way Overy and Braun and my photocopied appendix present their information. Main problem is Westermann does not use dollar values for his costs just percentages of military budgets. So its not entirely possible to give a dollar figure, but it is possible to determine the proportion of German military effort that was going into the flak defences.

Westermann examines a lot of things about flak that are absolutely eye opening, and i should say his general position is as an ardent supporter of the flak arm, not as a detractor. But with respect to the conoiomic costs ogf flak he looks at the costs of equipment procurement (new guns and detection equipment mostly), as one part of his analysis. in the second part he looks at the cost of ammunition expenditure by the flak arm.

As far as I can tell he does not examine as a budgetry analysis, the cost of the manpower used to man the flak batteries, but he does provide some information on the amount of manpower needed to man the flak batteries....suffice it to say it was enormous....I will look at this part of the problem in subsequent posts.

Staring with 1940, Westermann notes that the Germans expended 15% of their military budget on Flak artillery, and associated gizmos as well as ammunition. For each of the quarters of the year, they flak ammunition production as a percentage of the military budget had been 8, 11, 8 and 14%. The last quarter is significant, because that was the first time that BC made a significant effort over germany. Prior to that, the ammunition expended outside the Reich had been roughly equal to that expended inside the Reich, but in the last quarter, when ammunition expeniture started to rise, over 80% of ammunition expenditure was expended within germany. So at least 80% of ammunition expended in that last quarter had to be directed against BC, and the total proportion of the budget used as flak ammunition amounted to 14% of the budget. Thats 11.2% of the german military budget being shot at BC already. Not a bad return for 12.19% of the british Budget IMO....Of the new equipment acqired, some was captured, but the germans found this to be of only a limited saving. They still had to provide transport and directors for a lot of these guns.

Westermnn says that 74% of flak guns were deployed into the Reich itself.

In 1941, Germans began to introduce gun laying radar for their flak on a large scale, which had a profound effect on its effectiveness. Still, deployment of radar was incomplete by a wide margin, and ammunition expenditure per kill remained very high. about 8250 rounds of heavy and 18232 of Light. total flak ammunition expenditure for just January to April had been just under a million rounds of heavy flak and 1.9 million rounds of light.

For the whole of 1941, about 80% of flak ammunition and deployment remained in either occupied france or Germany. The relatively small effort in the east had paid very big dividends, however. The average ammunition expenditure per kill on the eastern front had been only 1320 rounds per kill.

Looking at the whole year, flak as a percentage of the military budget absorbed 15%, in the first quarter, 17% in the second quarter, 19% in the third quarter and 24% of the overall military budget in the fourth quarter. According to Westermann, fully 1/3 of the German budget for ammunition had been used for flak, and of this more than 70% was expended in Western Europe. Admittedly, however there was a trend to send equipment to the east, though still less than 50% of overall production.

1942 was the peak year of efficiency for the Flak arm. With the introduction of gun laying radars, the average heavy flak expenditiure per kill droped to 4000 rounds per kill. However, manpower shortages forced a number of expedients that in the end cost the flak arm its efficiency. From 1942, and incresing percentage of the home based flak batteries were manned by workers....part timers (heimatflak-artillierien), which had the unfortunate effect of pushing up the average rounds per kill to more than 16000 heavy flak rounds. Burst guns incidents also shot up markedly from 1942 (I think as a direct result of using home guardsmen in the flak, as well as excessive barrel wear that started to affect the flak park from 1942) ) to around 300 incidents per month in 1944.

A budget breakdown isnt given as it is for 1940 and 1941, for the chapter dealing with 1943, he gives actual figures (in RM) for military spending. The budget for 1943 for weapons and ammunition amounted to RM 132 million, and envisaged RM 34 million for the flak arm. However the Flak budget blew out, they spent 29% on weapons and 14% on flak ammunition....I expect that 1942 was somewhere between 1941 and 1943.