Defeat of the Luftwaffe

[Jenisch]

Yeah, it's not a very realistic scenario, but it is realistic argue about a scenario were Germany defeats the Soviet Union, and the Allies are certainly hopeless because Stalin was defeated? (e.g Richard Overy in Why the Allies Won).

Today, we know that Hitler's war machine was far less effective than usually decipted, and a stalemate against the Soviets was as good as Pyrrhic victory for the Nazis to save their country, and for a simple reason: Western Allies.

What I really don't like is the view of the Russians "saving the world from Nazism". What happened, was a simple opportunistic alliance for both sides to defeat Hitler (a common enemy, and an announced enemy for Russia since Mein Kampf).

Let's think about some possibilities with and without the Grand Alliance:

*Britain signs peace in 1940: Hitler has a realistic chance of survival.

*Without the Western Allies, Hitler fights the Soviet Union: with a victory or stalemate, Hitler has realistic chances of survival.

*Hitler fights the historical Allied coalition: Hitler's chances are greatly reduced, and the rest is history.

So, I think it's fair to claim that the USSR was the main military responsable for the defeat of the most powerful Axis country, but drawn comparisons such as the one from Overy is not the best way to depict this, because they are needlessly provocative for a still very sensitive subject in the West. The Western freedom was not necessarily "saved" by the Communism (which, by it's part, destroyed the freedom of Eastern Europe), but was certainly much more easily obtained by the alliance sealed with the Communists against the common enemy, and those Soviet contributions that certainly deserve much needed recognition in the West, while the Russians and other ex-Soviet peoples need to learn about the contributions from their allies as well.

 

[Siegfried]

I just don't see a relistic scenario where Germany and Russia can be at war without the western powers being involved. To get to Russia, how else can Germany get there but thru Poland? That will bring in France and Britain.
If Britain and France had been spineless, and ignored their treaties. Germany would have never had the excuse for invading France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc.. He wouldn't have access to the resources he stole after he invaded them. These countries might sell them to Germany, but at a much higher price than what Germany paid in the real world.
So both sides of the conflict is going to be short of some of the resources they had in the real world. So it's still not a easy win for Germany.

Britain and France's treaties arguably might have caused the war. Germany had serious territorial disputes with Poland and Czechoslovakia caused by the Versailes Treaty which was designed to reduce Germany's population and land area. Moreover she had serious concerns with the protection of German minorities within these nations at times; The discrimination that ethnic Germans and Austrians suffered is well documented under the league of nations (land seizures, exclusion from pulbic service, threats of expulsions, Eduard Bennes threstened to expell all the Suddeten Germans should Austria and Germany unite.) Forcing 3 million Germans to remain part of Czechoslovakia was morally rather difficult to justify (not even the Slovaks wanted to be part of it) so it is no suprise that the allies let it slip back out.

The situation with Poland is more difficult, however Britain and France's carte blanche backing meant that Negotiation between Poland and Germany were more protracracted. Hitler had offered an anti-soviet pact to Poland in return for rail and road access to Danzig. Poland didn't compromise, so Hitler negotiated with someone who would: the Soviets. I have read that the Polish government had shown signs of comming around but by then it was to late.

One scenario has Poland AND Germany attacking the Soviet Union together. Given terrible history between the two nations this might sound inconceivable but the terrible history did not yet exist.

The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway could reasonably be considered a strategic necessity as part of defensive measures to France and Britain's declaration of war.

 

[Erich]

more spider webing on the posts guys

 

[drgondog]

Back to the thesis. Which power carved the heart out of the experienced LW Fighter Arm? It wasn't the USSR. They gradually reached parity in quality aircraft in late 1942/early 1943. They reached parity in quality of airmen in late 1943.

By that time however, the LW had transferred/stripped and otherwise removed so many experienced leaders and pilots to the west - and it was in the West that RAF and USAAF steadily ground out the experienced Experten and wingmen - with the real attrition beginning in late 1943 and early 1944.

The LW was basically ineffective in the most important battle they had to win - namely control of the skies over their oil/chemical plants and the Invasion front. Had Hitler turned the Normandy Invasion it is entirely possible they could have sued for peace terms favorably (in contrast to total surrender) with the West.

The VVS had nothing to do with the destruction of German industry or LuftFlotte Reich, Sud or 3 - which from mid 1943 through mid 1944 had 2/3+ of all their fighter strength facing westward. On the other hand Lend Lease supplies had an enormous positive effect toward the ability of VVS to gain parity versus LW while Soviet industry concentrated on prosecuting the ground war as well as introducing new and better fighters to support air ops over each critical land battle.

 

[Erich]

my point Bill. one reason why the T/E's were brought back up to rearm with heavy cannon the experimentation of S/E and T/E and the useage of the Br 21 rocket launchers-the new wave of aerial warfare for one besides the silly use of aerial bombing, none of this was to be used on the Ost front in similar situations.

 

[parsifal]

I havent read all the posts, so apologies if I missed something, or repeat something. The Luftwaffes defeat was comprehensive. It wasnt just a case of being outnumbered. It was defeated qualitatively, militarily, and because superior resources were brought to bear against it. its defeat was utter and total.

What caused this happen. in 1939-40, the LW was all powerful a force unstoppable and much feared. By 1945 it was a shadow of itself, on every front at best able to engage hit and run tactics and inflict pinpricks on its opponents.

It is impiossible to separate or promote one power as being decisive, or critical to that victory. In the West, the emphasis was in gaining air superiority and in the destruction wreaked on Germany indfrastructure. this process began with the battle of britain and reached its climax in the battle for Germany. That was a crucial battle. equally critical were the battles on the eastern front. Here the VVS objective was never to win air superiority outright. Even post war the Soviet airpower theories never sought that. they considered the effort needed to gain air superiority on a front wide basis to be not worth the effort for the type of war they needed to fight. Instead they aimed to select a section of the front and saturate it with strike aircraft, as an adjunct to the ground battles. fighters were there simply to keep the LW off the backs of their sturmoviks until the job was done. They succeeded in doing that from the end of kursk on. LW was never able to thwart Soviet airpower from that point on though it tried repeatedly.

East front is also significant because of the crippling attrition rates due to non-combat causes, particulalry for the LW. The LW suffered around twice the attrition rate (to non-combat causes) on the EF compared to the west. Many LW aircraft became unserviceable, and then had to be burnt because they were going to be overrun (there were other reasons as well).

Much criticism has been made regarding both the day and night bomber offensives. Yet both were critical in the defeat of the LW. mostly because they forced the germans down a strategic blind ally. Aircraft losses in defence remained pretty constant throughout the war....the only way to win air superiorty was to get your bombers to the target, whatever the target. Germans had shown a marked reluctance to put aircraft up unless they had the advantage, or unless a critical target was being threatened. the long hard years of 41-42 over france and the low countries had shown that in spades. over Germany, they couldnt ignore the Allied offensives. once the Allies were able to escort properly, it was game over for the germans. its that simple. at night losses were much more modest, mostly because of harris' intransigence, still large amounts of resources were needed to counter BC campaign , and LW losses were still substantial, particularly from June 44 on. Moreover, whilst BC losses late 43 through to about April 44 were crippling, after that loss rates steadily declined

 

[bobbysocks]

i dont think we appreciate how much of a true chess game this was. it seemed it was all about pinning certain axis assessets at specific times to employ a strategy. stalin in meetings with us officials kept vehemently demanding the western allies open a second front. in order to do this the western allies ran operations like the frantic missions in an attempt to fool germany into thinking they were going to commence long range bombing missions from within the SU....thus fixing LW units away from the invasion point. D-day was a saving grace to the ussr...it took or kept german forces out of the eastern front. as for the ussr going it alone it...i cannot find it but have read the speach or interview of zhukov about the lend lease aspect...i tried to find it but cant at the moment. basically his opinion was the ussr would have been dead in the water with out it. it was the reason for their success. it gave them the steel for the tanks, planes, guns....gave them the ammo and powder...gave them food and medicine....gave them machinery to boost their industrial output. basically the ussr supplied the manpower which it was more than willing to send into the meat grinder....what some 20 million soviets died!! germany was already unable to keep up its production to meet its logistical demands....especially trucks and supply vehicles....when the westeran allies began their massive deep bombing raids that was a huge nail in the coffin.

 

[Jenisch]

i dont think we appreciate how much of a true chess game this was. it seemed it was all about pinning certain axis assessets at specific times to employ a strategy. stalin in meetings with us officials kept vehemently demanding the western allies open a second front. in order to do this the western allies ran operations like the frantic missions in an attempt to fool germany into thinking they were going to commence long range bombing missions from within the SU....thus fixing LW units away from the invasion point. D-day was a saving grace to the ussr...it took or kept german forces out of the eastern front. as for the ussr going it alone it...i cannot find it but have read the speach or interview of zhukov about the lend lease aspect...i tried to find it but cant at the moment. basically his opinion was the ussr would have been dead in the water with out it. it was the reason for their success. it gave them the steel for the tanks, planes, guns....gave them the ammo and powder...gave them food and medicine....gave them machinery to boost their industrial output. basically the ussr supplied the manpower which it was more than willing to send into the meat grinder....what some 20 million soviets died!! germany was already unable to keep up its production to meet its logistical demands....especially trucks and supply vehicles....when the westeran allies began their massive deep bombing raids that was a huge nail in the coffin.

Yeah, I tend to trust a lot in those first hand statements. This Lend-Lease claim was also supported by Nikita Kruschev, who also said that no one less than Joseph Stalin also said the same. The Lend-Lease stuff is still controversy, and there are still closed arquives. Even so, new evidence by the Russian historian Boris Sokolov shows that in fact the LL was even more important than it was perceived until few years ago. This, together with what Zhukov and Stalin said, makes me think it's higly likely that when everything be open, we not gonna have a surprise.

I also think the D-Day comparison is not the best one. D-Day, and preparations for it (including the bombing) certainly reduced considerably the capability of the Germans to respond to the Soviets offensives. This was specially true due to the fact that by 1944, the German industry achived it's peak of production, with thousands of modern weapons arriving for the troops. The Allied bombing and subsequent invasion of Normandy were certainly behind the mediocre number of German tanks and planes in the Eastern Front in 1944, even with much shorter supply lines for the Germans. The attacks in the oil fields in Romania and in the syntetic petroleum plants in Germany were also very responsible for the total defeat of the Luftwaffe and decrased quality of the Panzer crews training.

Make not mistake, for the Nazis the West was a more serious treat than the Soviets in 1944. The Anglo-Americans not only would split the German Army, but they also were much more closer to the Ruhr Valley, and this was like a dagger pointed at Germany's heart.

 

[Jenisch]

Parsifal, I also think the air campaign was a critical one. Even if the Germans defeated Russia, it would be by no means easy for them to overcome the Allied air power, which would be greatly expanded in such a scenario. First, the Allies would certainly target the Caucasus oil fields, and probably the Russians would trown fire on them before were captured and made them useless for many months before the bombing started. So, Germany would still suffer with lack of oil.

Another thing is the Western Front and air power. Many people say that the Germans would be able to avoid the success of the D-Day just because they would have much more men if they had defeated Russia. I simple don't know how the Germans would put so many men in Normandy, if the transport infraestructure for their logistics would be destroyed by the Allied air power to proceed with the invasion, like it was historically. In the West, it was very easy to sature the air space, and maintein patrols with the long range Allied fighters was also easy. You have air control, have naval control, and the adequate number of troops with supplies, you have all the elements for a succesfull amphibious assault (although with much higher casualities certainly).

 

[drgondog]

in order to do this the western allies ran operations like the frantic missions in an attempt to fool germany into thinking they were going to commence long range bombing missions from within the SU....thus fixing LW units away from the invasion point. germany was already unable to keep up its production to meet its logistical demands....especially trucks and supply vehicles....when the westeran allies began their massive deep bombing raids that was a huge nail in the coffin.

Actually Bobbysocks, the Frantic missions didn't start from England until after D-Day and the were a serious strategic initiative. The actual first Frantic I was flown June 2 from Italy to Ukraine and back - and had zero effect on the mobilization of fighters from Germany, nor did any of the subsequent Frantic missions.

The Soviets were very interested but consistently tried for operational control of the bomb groups which would be stationed at Poltava and Myhrorod.

Stailin stopped them after Frantic VII - September 19-22 when the 8th AF dropped supplies to the Polish underground which Stalin wanted exterminated. He was furious that the USAAF failed to alert him to the purpose of the mission.

 

[iron man]

The one salient point that I tried to make in that "other post", on that "other board" was that there is a whole lot more to the "Luftwaffe" than it's fighter arm (Jagdwaffe)...and especially so in the period 1941-43. Irrevocable losses in the East during this period (to all types) dwarf those on other fronts...and by a significant margin.
I have no "Commie" axe to grind here...the facts are the facts.

The reminant core of the KG's experienced crews died over the USSR (and to a far lesser extent, over the Med) during this period.
These are conditioned crews of men that had been fighting together as an homogenous unit for as much as five contiguous years by this point.
You don't replace this stuff easily.

Same as to all of the crews they lost flying transport missions.

Many of these guys had thousands of hours of IFR time under their belts; the kind of crews that could find some little shithole grid reference (on an outdated map) in 10/10 overcast and put a heavily laden aircraft down on a marginal airfield.

This is what the "Luftwaffe" lost in the east...this is what it means to "cut the guts" out of an airforce.

Fighter jocks (of the period) operated in mostly VFR conditions, at a short distance from their airfield.

The skillsets involved are not even remotely comparable.

A fighter jock either "gets it" (quickly) or he dies.

An experienced multi-engined IFR crew takes years to become so...

And when they're mostly all gone?

See "Steinbock"...

Just sayin'

 

[Tante Ju]

An experienced multi-engined IFR crew takes years to become so... And when they're mostly all gone?

See "Steinbock"...

Just sayin'

I do not think it is true.. Steinbock problem was Germans was exactly lack of experienced bomber crews, which often saw difficulty finding targets. Not always but generic bomber crew quality was not high. Besides Steinbock losses were not severe at all, especially compared to monthly losses on EF for years..

 

[Milosh]

With some 329 a/c lost out of 522 participating in Steinbock, I would say the losses in Steinbock were severe (63%).

 

[Jenisch]

The one salient point that I tried to make in that "other post", on that "other board" was that there is a whole lot more to the "Luftwaffe" than it's fighter arm (Jagdwaffe)...and especially so in the period 1941-43. Irrevocable losses in the East during this period (to all types) dwarf those on other fronts...and by a significant margin.
I have no "Commie" axe to grind here...the facts are the facts.

I think you fail to considerate that bomber/attack plane losses were to an appreciable degree caused by the lack of the fighter arm to protect them. The Germans also couldn't reduce the losses of ground attack planes by the lack of modern attack aircraft in proper numbers. The ground attack models of the Fw 190, were much superior to the Stuka for example. If there was not an Western Front to take most of the 190 production, make no mistake that the Luftwaffe would equip much more units with Fw 190 and reduce the losses considerably (not to mention other luxuries, like development of specific aircraft models for the war in Russia, speed up development of improvements for existing aircraft and far superior designs like the jets). Another thing is that the bombing campaign made the Germans focus on fighter production, rather than in attack aircraft vital to the East. Other was the night fighters, that the crews needed extra training. If all the night fighter aircraft and their pilots could be ground attack pilots in the East, certainly the situation for the Russians would be worse.

I cited some factors which are intangibles, but certainly any reader will agree with me that they would be relevant to analyze the problem if the VVS would overcome the Luftwaffe regardless of the Western Allies. In my view, if alone the Lufwaffe would have the conditions to at least avoid the Russians from arrive at the borders of the Reich if the war happened like historically in all the other aspects. The main problems for the Germans in the two-front war were lack of fuel and need to split their air force and it's resources - neither of those factors existing if that was the case.

 

[drgondog]

The one salient point that I tried to make in that "other post", on that "other board" was that there is a whole lot more to the "Luftwaffe" than it's fighter arm (Jagdwaffe)...and especially so in the period 1941-43. Irrevocable losses in the East during this period (to all types) dwarf those on other fronts...and by a significant margin.
I have no "Commie" axe to grind here...the facts are the facts.

a.) define 'dwarf', b.) define irrevocable, c.) define signifcant margin

The reminant core of the KG's experienced crews died over the USSR (and to a far lesser extent, over the Med) during this period.
These are conditioned crews of men that had been fighting together as an homogenous unit for as much as five contiguous years by this point.
You don't replace this stuff easily.

True - having said that you must have control of the airspace for the bomber crews to operate and achieve the tactical results to justify existance. Out of curiosity, what would you cite as very important achievements for the Luftwaffe multi engine bomber force from 1941-1943 in the East?

Same as to all of the crews they lost flying transport missions.

Many of these guys had thousands of hours of IFR time under their belts; the kind of crews that could find some little shithole grid reference (on an outdated map) in 10/10 overcast and put a heavily laden aircraft down on a marginal airfield.

This is what the "Luftwaffe" lost in the east...this is what it means to "cut the guts" out of an airforce.

If the 'part' you lose is the only capability you have to deny the enemy complete control of the air - then all the bomber crew and trabsport staffing available to you is irrelevant. They simply don't survive. The US with all its resources were confronted with that fact in summer/fall 1943. If you do not have the ability to control the air, you give the initiative to your opponent.

Strategic and tactical airpower are a necessary team - but in WWII one side (West) gained complete air superiority over the other and from that point forward there were no important critical targets 'unavailable' to the West and the bomber part of the LW became increasingly unimportant tactically and strategically. Losing air superiority over the continent gave a crucial advantage to the West, particularly for the invasion - as it denied flexible movement and logistics to Germany while adding force multipliers to Allied Infantry, Armor, Artillary and Naval forces. The Soviets could not even effectivey attack key transport nexus/marshalling yards in East Germany in the last two months of the war - that was left to the Allies which could do so with impunity

Fighter jocks (of the period) operated in mostly VFR conditions, at a short distance from their airfield.

With all due respect 100 miles in IFR conditions with needle and ball and compass are nearly as bad as IFR for longer distances - whether in Northern Europe or USSR. LW Fighter Jocks flew in miserable conditions on both fronts - as did the Allies - NO question that bomber crews were better in both navigation and IFR flight. Equally important is that in general the fighter pilots were the top graduates from flight school in context of stick and rudder talent.

The skillsets involved are not even remotely comparable.

A fighter jock either "gets it" (quickly) or he dies.

How is that different from a multi engine jock? In most cases a 2nd in command has both less time and the span of time between tranquility and terror is often so short that a second pilot is useless.

Bomber pilots had a difficult time in general transitioning to fighters. The Scout Forces organized by 8th AF was designed to transition bomber pilots to long range fighter (P-51) to take advantage of nav/IFR skills to perform weather reporting along the routes as well as BDA - but it was found that fighter pilots needed to be integrated to provide fighter-fighter protection as a general rule. The only Scout Force ace was Bill Whelen - former 4th and 355th FG pilot.

An experienced multi-engined IFR crew takes years to become so...

Not true. Back to the above statement - whether Jolly Old England or miserable Russia - mistakes made are often the last made - and IFR OJT was brutal in both places - PARTICULARLY for the fighter jocks where there were zero dual control learning opportunities and the LINK trainer was as good as it got.

Most 'experienced' 8th/9th AF crews were comprised of First Lieutenants, arriving in England, with most crew training from bases in CA, NV, AZ and Texas. They became 'proficient' (Not Masters) IFR pilots within 5-10 missions of first officer pilot in right seat, before transitioning to left seat. Remember the USAAF had a very small cadre of pilots when the LW had built a powerful capability - these guys were coming off campus and arriving in England with 250-300 hours in a B-17 or B-24 or B-26, etc before 'hello Minimums' and off to Brunswick.

And when they're mostly all gone?

See "Steinbock"...

Just sayin'

You are entirely welcome for your opinion. The facts will show that the LW Fighter losses were far greater in the West than East - and when that capability shrunk to the point of being ineffective the Allies had their way with targets that benefited both the East and West when they were destroyed.

The bomber force in the East did diddly relative to the USSR's ability to mobilize, integrate their own manufacturing as well as Lend Lease, maintain strategic resources above the levels required to grind the German forces into submission. The transport forces did not achieve any appropriate level of supply in the East - they were way under capacity to even supply the troopers at Stalingrad with the resources allocated, as a major important example.

Even with reduced resources the Fighter arm of the LW maintained parity over the battlefields in the East while they were being stripped of experienced pilots and aircraft to attempt to turn back the West's strength in the air in mid 1943.

Regards,

Bill

 

[Jenisch]

About Lend-Lease aircraft, something interesting in the text I posted earlier:

Robert Huhn Jones, in his study of Lend-Lease, tabulates 1663 Allied aircraft delivered to the Soviets by 1 November 1942—which he notes exceeded the number of modern Soviet-built aircraft used at Stalingrad.2 One of the greatest difficulties in assessing the Lend-Lease contributions to Russia is the lack of information about the Soviet employment of these aircraft. However, German sources have stated that after the spring of 1942 American and British aircraft were particularly noticeable on the Leningrad and Kuban fronts and that, on the latter, Allied aircraft sometimes outnumbered those built by the Soviets.3 It should also be remembered that as early as 1942, when the war was still undecided, Stalin was offered an Anglo-American bomber force that would operate from the Caucasus beginning in 1943, but for political reasons he rejected the proposal, desiring only the aircraft.4 The $11 billion of Lend-Lease also provided raw materials, foodstuffs, and technical assistance vital to Soviet sustenance and production.

Soviet Air Power and Victory in World War II

In bold we have a slap in the face from those who say the Western Allies were not determined to help Stalin. Not only they were engaged in the Pacific, Africa, Mediterranean, in the Battle of the tlantic and in the air front over Germany - scenarios with significant logistical and hardware costs - but were also willing to provide direct help for the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front.

 

[Tante Ju]

True - having said that you must have control of the airspace for the bomber crews to operate and achieve the tactical results to justify existance. Out of curiosity, what would you cite as very important achievements for the Luftwaffe multi engine bomber force from 1941-1943 in the East?

The Luftwaffe dropped more bombs in the East in 1941-1943 than the USAAF and the RAF BCcombined. In this context, what would you cite as very important achievements for the RAF and USAAF multi engine bomber force from 1941-1943 in the West - since you seem imply that somehow there weren't any such in East?

Luftwaffe bombers were bombing exactly the same targets which you consider very important prior to the Normandy landings - they paralyzed Soviet marshalling yards, railways, and communication lines. They dropped far more bombs and did more damage to it than the USAAF and RAF did in Normandy - the difference being that the effect was much more feelable in Normady, since its smaller area, firepower was concentrated into a small space. But in the East, neither Soviets or German had the chance fighting a luxury war like in the West. The fighting involved incomparable bigger scale, bigger operation area - an area larger than Europe in classical sense. You can't deny movement on the Steppe by air.

You seem to think that losses of the LW bombers in the East in are not a major point in the big picture of events, especially compared to fighters losses of the Luftwaffe, which you concentrate on and see decisive. In view how much support LW bombers gave to the army in the east it seems very questionalbe to me.

Losing air superiority over the continent gave a crucial advantage to the West, particularly for the invasion - as it denied flexible movement and logistics to Germany while adding force multipliers to Allied Infantry, Armor, Artillary and Naval forces. The Soviets could not even effectivey attack key transport nexus/marshalling yards in East Germany in the last two months of the war - that was left to the Allies which could do so with impunity.

Look at size of Western Front and Eastern front - I don't think comparison or parallel can be made.

The facts will show that the LW Fighter losses were far greater in the West than East - and when that capability shrunk to the point of being ineffective the Allies had their way with targets that benefited both the East and West when they were destroyed.

And what significance LW fighter losses have? The war was decided on the East. On the ground. Ground battles were influenced by bombers, not fighters.

LW fighters losses did not have that much of an effect on Allies having their way, as you put it. The German had increasing amount of fighters, and flew increasing amount of intercept mission - but become ineffective as a defense for by the end of 1944, when the LW fighters could no longer give enough resistance to hordes of USAAF bombers, number were built up in 1944.

This was not achieved by destroying the Luftwaffe, but simply by the growing numbers of USAAF. USAAF had so many planes that it was virtually impossible to oppose them everywhere with chance of success.

That's one point. Indeed USAAF by the end of 1944 was in position to make the strategic air war effective, it could attack key points, with effective, that Germans felt badly. By this time however, the war was effectively concluded in the East with Bagratyion, mid-1944, before strategic air war could effect the German ability to fight.

The bomber force in the East did diddly relative to the USSR's ability to mobilize, integrate their own manufacturing as well as Lend Lease, maintain strategic resources above the levels required to grind the German forces into submission. The transport forces did not achieve any appropriate level of supply in the East - they were way under capacity to even supply the troopers at Stalingrad with the resources allocated, as a major important example.

So, I question, what did all those shot down German fighters achieved..? Allowing bombers to wage a stragegic war effectively in the end - to what point? It would make sense if it happened in say 1942 - but not so much importance in 1944, when the German army itself was repeatadly defeated, regardless of the air campaign.

 

[stona]

So, I question, what did all those shot down German fighters achieved..?

They allowed the Western allies to conduct "Overlord" without which several people contributing here might be typing in Russian rather than English.
Steve

 

[Erich]

if the war had been decided in the east as mentioned in above posting why the critical order to remove 3/4's of the LW fighter force in July of 1943 - pull it back for the defense of the Reich ? and then why so many living LW pilots have stated the air war in the west broke the LW back both day and the often overlooked Nachtjagd force................

 

[drgondog]

The Luftwaffe dropped more bombs in the East in 1941-1943 than the USAAF and the RAF BCcombined. In this context, what would you cite as very important achievements for the RAF and USAAF multi engine bomber force from 1941-1943 in the West - since you seem imply that somehow there weren't any such in East?

I didn't imply - I simply asked. As to USAAF in 1941-1943 multi engine, the results weren't very impressive either but to be fair the USAAF mult engine strike capability only started in the UK and North Africa in late 1942 at squadron level force. I would be the last to over glorify bombing results for ANY nation on a strategic level - until summer 1943 at the earliest

Luftwaffe bombers were bombing exactly the same targets which you consider very important prior to the Normandy landings - they paralyzed Soviet marshalling yards, railways, and communication lines. They dropped far more bombs and did more damage to it than the USAAF and RAF did in Normandy - the difference being that the effect was much more feelable in Normady, since its smaller area, firepower was concentrated into a small space. But in the East, neither Soviets or German had the chance fighting a luxury war like in the West. The fighting involved incomparable bigger scale, bigger operation area - an area larger than Europe in classical sense. You can't deny movement on the Steppe by air.

We need to disagree here. The Wermacht was paralyzed at Normandy with respect to mobility in daylight - in contrast to the Steppe. And yes, if you have air superiority, you can deny movement where forces are concentrated. While the LW lost air superiority in 1942-1943 in East, they did not lose parity nor were they denied ability to be successful in limited scope against the Soviet armor and tactical targets. The LW over Normandy was completely neutraized in contrast to Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Crete, Malta.

You seem to think that losses of the LW bombers in the East in are not a major point in the big picture of events, especially compared to fighters losses of the Luftwaffe, which you concentrate on and see decisive. In view how much support LW bombers gave to the army in the east it seems very questionalbe to me.

It is certainly ok to disagree but I ask the question again. Where did LW airpower make The difference in any tactical or strategic capability in the East?

Look at size of Western Front and Eastern front - I don't think comparison or parallel can be made.

My arguments are focused on the LW losing control of the air in Europe, and therby losing the ability to protect vital industrial, transfortation and vital resource (oil/chemicals) assets. The Soviets never threatened any such assets via airpower.


And what significance LW fighter losses have? The war was decided on the East. On the ground. Ground battles were influenced by bombers, not fighters.

See above.

LW fighters losses did not have that much of an effect on Allies having their way, as you put it. The German had increasing amount of fighters, and flew increasing amount of intercept mission - but become ineffective as a defense for by the end of 1944, when the LW fighters could no longer give enough resistance to hordes of USAAF bombers, number were built up in 1944.

This was not achieved by destroying the Luftwaffe, but simply by the growing numbers of USAAF. USAAF had so many planes that it was virtually impossible to oppose them everywhere with chance of success.

It was achieved by total control of the air over German assets - while the industrial base was always able, via re-prioritizing, to build fighter aircraft - Germany could not build enough tanks, light armor and trucks (to replace horse transportation), keep enough rolling stock intact or fuel their war machines and pilot training - and not one of those factors was influenced by the Soviets in the East.

The German Air Force lost the ability to effectively oppose ANY attack after April 1944 and it went down from there. The primary difference between October 1943 when the LW gained air supremacy over Germany - despite the USAAF having thousands more strategic capable bomber than the LW - and the air situation at the beginning of the Oil campaign in May 1944 was the inability of the LW to break through the USAAF long range escorts.

That's one point. Indeed USAAF by the end of 1944 was in position to make the strategic air war effective, it could attack key points, with effective, that Germans felt badly. By this time however, the war was effectively concluded in the East with Bagratyion, mid-1944, before strategic air war could effect the German ability to fight.

Look to the first Ploesti (major) raids beginning in August 1943 as the beginning of 'effective strategic bombing', the move to May 1944 when the 8th and 15th AF began the dismantling of the entire petrochemical industry, then the RAF joined to effective eliminate 'effective' mobility and mobilization of German air and armor assets in the East.

So, I question, what did all those shot down German fighters achieved..? Allowing bombers to wage a stragegic war effectively in the end - to what point? It would make sense if it happened in say 1942 - but not so much importance in 1944, when the German army itself was repeatadly defeated, regardless of the air campaign.

The thesis of this thread is "What Defeated the Luftwaffe". That is what shooting down German fighters achieved. To the point of strangling German war capability via elimination of sufficient fuel supplies... which affected EVERYTHING Germany required to stop either the East or the West ground offensives.

I might add that the withdrawal of thosands of 88mm and 120mm artillary from the front to be redeployed around critical industrial assets, plus the re-deployment of troops to man them, plus the massive re-deployment of desparately needed armor from the East in fall of 1944 - to launch the surprise attack in the Ardennes probably prevented the Allies from not only taking Berlin, but also much of Czechoslovakia and East Germany before the Soviets. To the question of the Ardennes campaign, it would have been stopped dead in its tracks had good weather prevailed at the beginning of the attack.

What you could say is that Germany was not capable of stopping either the East or the West in 1944.