The Do-335

[KrazyKraut]

So in essence you just switched your point from "Germany had too many designs to produce" to "Germany produced too many planes" Really it's you who's kidding himself.

If you got detailed information about servicability rates, or more specifically: how often LW pilots found themselves grounded because of too few servicable planes (lack of fuel excluded), please post that.

Then of course you take post-war, partially civil programs which have absolutely nothing to do with the "total war" time production of the planes and the period in question, but you generalize them over the whole war anyway. Totally baseless of course.

And you continue by making nil points about how production for future fighter designs had to be set up... despite the fact that none of them made it past prototype stage and most not even that far. So there was no production set up for them in any way and their influence ,positive or negative, is NONEXISTANT. But hey let's take everything to push an agenda.

Yes, producing planes without spares, without fuel, and without pilots is an eminently sensible management of resources.......Even without too much allied interference the Germans managed to back themselves into a complete muddle, and sorry state of mismanagement. The Germans produced in excess of 40000 fighters in 1944, from memory, and just 8500 pilots to fly them. Even without allied interference with their petro chemical industry, there was an upper limit of about 5000 fighters that could be kept fueled and ready in 1944. In the Allied air forces, a P-51 had an average shelf life of 9 months (without combat attrition). So for the Germans, without combat attrition, if they have a similar shelf life, one could expect to maintain that force structure of 5000 with no more than 7000 fighters from the factories. On top of that, there is of course combat attrition, which for the Germans was running at about 1500 aircraft per month. That means to replace losses from combat, and maintain your maximum 5000 strong they would need another 15000 aircraft, roughly. All up, the Germans would have needed about 22000 aircraft to maintain their 5000 aircraft. They cant go past the 5000 mark, unless they find a way to increase pilot output, and fuel outputs. Neither of these were contemplated in the 1944 economic plans. So the result of this impressive production effort, was a whole bunch of useless airframes, sitting around airfields, waiting to be destroyed by the allies. Good management...yeah right.

My numbers are very different (Christer Bergstroem):

7500 Fw 190s
13,000 Me 109s
~5000 further fighters (incl. prototypes, night fighters and jet fighters)

So all in all ~25500 or, in other words, only ~16% more than the number you assume needed. A number which is very questionable since it didn't include night fighters nor the fact that German non-combat attrition was probably worse than that of Western Allies in '44.

Which does nothing to explain why there were at least two jet designs, and four prop designs that I know of, other than to create procurement madness and confusion

Already explained like three times now. You on the other hand have yet to provide any explanation why Allied countries also had two or more jet fighters in the pipes as well as two or more piston fighters, if that was what was so wrong about RLM procurement.

[parsifal]

So in essence you just switched your point from "Germany had too many designs to produce" to "Germany produced too many planes" Really it's you who's kidding himself.

If you got detailed information about servicability rates, or more specifically: how often LW pilots found themselves grounded because of too few servicable planes (lack of fuel excluded), please post that.

Then of course you take post-war, partially civil programs which have absolutely nothing to do with the "total war" time production of the planes and the period in question, but you generalize them over the whole war anyway. Totally baseless of course.

And you continue by making nil points about how production for future fighter designs had to be set up... despite the fact that none of them made it past prototype stage and most not even that far. So there was no production set up for them in any way and their influence ,positive or negative, is NONEXISTANT. But hey let's take everything to push an agenda.
7500 Fw 190s
13,000 Me 109s
~5000 further fighters (incl. prototypes, night fighters and jet fighters)

So all in all ~25500 or, in other words, only ~16% more than the number you assume needed. A number which is very questionable since it didn't include night fighters nor the fact that German non-combat attrition was probably worse than that of Western Allies in '44.

I did actually check properly, after your reply, and found the actual production of Fighters was 24654 in total. So I have over-estimated the total fighter production. However, it seems that the force structure they were supporting was also over-estimated

In January the Luftwaffe possessed 3400 a/c in their frontline formations, of which approximately 2200 were fighters or fighter bombers. In late 1944, the frontline LW was 4700 a/c, of which just under 3000 were in the fighter. So the LW fighter forces hovered in that period from between 2000 to 3000 in that period

And the table of losses supports my earlier contention, that the LW concentrated too much on the production of whole units, at the expense of serviceability. In 1944, the Jagdwaffe lost 13854 aircraft from all sources, but received 24654 new airframes. There was never a shortage of aircraft, but the reserve of aircraft could neve be used, because the pilots received, just 8500, and the fuel received, (total receipt in 1943 were 7.9 million tons, in 1944 it was projected that Germany would receive something like 8.1 million tons, but in the end, as a result of the losses of Ploesti, and the US bombing campaign, the Germans only received about 5.5 million tons). Luftwaffe oil receipts were in proportion to the total amounts received, so on that basis, the maximum expansion for the Jagdgruppen could have been from 2200 to just 2250 planes in the force structure. Instead, the Jagdgruppen were receiving enough fighters to support a force structure of over 3900. They failed however, to provide either the pilots, the fuel, or the spares to support such a change in the force structure. This is a clear and unrefutable indictment of LW management. They failed to manage their expansion in a way that would maximise the number of aircraft in the air. If they had produced less airframes, and spent the saved resources on increased fuel production, spare parts and pilot training, they would have achieved a higher sortie rate and possed a higher frontline fighter force than they actually did. Instead, they ended up with a whoile lot of unlflyable airframes on the ground, that were never able to contribut materially to the Reichs defences.

With regard to Operational rates, well it was abysmal, to put it mildly.

According to Murray, who quotes the war diary of JG 53, the following is typical of the serviceability of the LW Fighters over the Reich in 1944

The laconic reports of II Gruppe/JG 53 indicate what happened to that unit in the months of May and August. In the former month the unit reported:

(A) Operations took place on thirteen days. Twenty-one scrambles, fifteen of which resulted in combats.

(B) Average aircraft strength thirty-four; average serviceability twenty.

(C) Fifty-three aircraft lost or damaged. Of these: (1) extent: thirty-four 100%, three over 60%, nine over 35%, seven under 35%, (2) reason: thirty-three through Allied action, four [through] technical faults, sixteen owing [to] servicing faults. . . .

(D) Personnel losses—Killed or injured: seven killed, five missing, three wounded (two bailed out), seven injured (of whom five bailed out). Two more injured not through Allied action. Seventeen parachute jumps, two jumped with wounds, two jumped twice without injury.29

Quote:
Which does nothing to explain why there were at least two jet designs, and four prop designs that I know of, other than to create procurement madness and confusion

Already explained like three times now.

And people have pointed out to you, including myself, the false economy and poor logic behind your explanation. The luftwaffe would have vastly improved its operational rates (which were appalling, incidentally, by 1944 they were down to an average daily availability of about 50-65% of total force structure. This was in part, because of the fuel situation, in part because of previous battle damage, but also because of a shortage of spare parts (I dont think cannabilzing the spare airframes was permitted either)). Planes were grounded because ther were too many different types in service, and too few spare available to keep them airworthy).

You on the other hand have yet to provide any explanation why Allied countries also had two or more jet fighters in the pipes as well as two or more piston fighters, if that was what was so wrong about RLM


We can discuss that a bit later, and compare the allied sortie rates, operational status etc, but for now I thought we were commenting on the Luftwaffe, and it overall poor level of management, of which the decision to produce the Do-335 is a part

[KrazyKraut]

And the table of losses supports my earlier contention, that the LW concentrated too much on the production of whole units, at the expense of serviceability. In 1944, the Jagdwaffe lost 13854 aircraft from all sources, but received 24654 new airframes. There was never a shortage of aircraft, but the reserve of aircraft could neve be used, because the pilots received, just 8500, and the fuel received, (total receipt in 1943 were 7.9 million tons, in 1944 it was projected that Germany would receive something like 8.1 million tons, but in the end, as a result of the losses of Ploesti, and the US bombing campaign, the Germans only received about 5.5 million tons). Luftwaffe oil receipts were in proportion to the total amounts received, so on that basis, the maximum expansion for the Jagdgruppen could have been from 2200 to just 2250 planes in the force structure. Instead, the Jagdgruppen were receiving enough fighters to support a force structure of over 3900. They failed however, to provide either the pilots, the fuel, or the spares to support such a change in the force structure. This is a clear and unrefutable indictment of LW management. They failed to manage their expansion in a way that would maximise the number of aircraft in the air. If they had produced less airframes, and spent the saved resources on increased fuel production, spare parts and pilot training, they would have achieved a higher sortie rate and possed a higher frontline fighter force than they actually did. Instead, they ended up with a whoile lot of unlflyable airframes on the ground, that were never able to contribut materially to the Reichs defences.

Operational fighter losses on westerm front in '44 were ~11,000 alone iirc (don't have the book present now but will check later this evening) and the rest of your numbers... well I have no source ready and I'm not going to take your word for it after the 40,000 stuff before. You are also completely ignoring that a large number of your new planes are in fact rebuilds.
As for operational aircraft. You are not suggesting that 1944 Germany had any chance of reaching operational rates comparable to that of e.g. USAAF, are you? There are a lot of influence factors in this equation that IMO are so apparent: Fighter sweeps by P-47s and P-51s or bombing runs, inexperienced LW pilots, lack of personnel. Yet you assume it was all due to lack of spare parts due to too much fighter production (not too little, that was your argumentation before ), but you fail to show any evidence of this actually being the case here.

The laconic reports of II Gruppe/JG 53 indicate what happened to that unit in the months of May and August. In the former month the unit reported:

(A) Operations took place on thirteen days. Twenty-one scrambles, fifteen of which resulted in combats.

(B) Average aircraft strength thirty-four; average serviceability twenty.

(C) Fifty-three aircraft lost or damaged. Of these: (1) extent: thirty-four 100%, three over 60%, nine over 35%, seven under 35%, (2) reason: thirty-three through Allied action, four [through] technical faults, sixteen owing [to] servicing faults. . . .

(D) Personnel losses—Killed or injured: seven killed, five missing, three wounded (two bailed out), seven injured (of whom five bailed out). Two more injured not through Allied action. Seventeen parachute jumps, two jumped with wounds, two jumped twice without injury.29

So where did it say it was due to lack of spare parts? Especially interesting how only four losses were attributed to technical faults.
Also you should adjust the non-combat attrition in your equation if this is representative of overall LW losses.

And people have pointed out to you, including myself, the false economy and poor logic behind your explanation. The luftwaffe would have vastly improved its operational rates (which were appalling, incidentally, by 1944 they were down to an average daily availability of about 50-65% of total force structure. This was in part, because of the fuel situation, in part because of previous battle damage, but also because of a shortage of spare parts (I dont think cannabilzing the spare airframes was permitted either)). Planes were grounded because ther were too many different types in service, and too few spare available to keep them airworthy).

So many adjectives... and your proof that this is attributable to the He-162 is where? In your mind.

We can discuss that a bit later, and compare the allied sortie rates, operational status etc, but for now I thought we were commenting on the Luftwaffe, and it overall poor level of management, of which the decision to produce the Do-335 is a part

Yeah, when it comes to facts instead of wild guesses and missing links in the chain of reasoning we can of course discuss that a bit later.

[parsifal]

Operational fighter losses on westerm front in '44 were ~11,000 alone iirc (don't have the book present now but will check later this evening) and the rest of your numbers... well I have no source ready and I'm not going to take your word for it after the 40,000 stuff before. You are also completely ignoring that a large number of your new planes are in fact rebuilds.

You recall wrong. You may wish to have a look at the following

http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Attrition and the Luetwaffe


As for operational aircraft. You are not suggesting that 1944 Germany had any chance of reaching operational rates comparable to that of e.g. USAAF, are you? There are a lot of influence factors in this equation that IMO are so apparent: Fighter sweeps by P-47s and P-51s or bombing runs, inexperienced LW pilots, lack of personnel. Yet you assume it was all due to lack of spare parts due to too much fighter production (not too little, that was your argumentation before ), but you fail to show any evidence of this actually being the case here.

Actually, my argument was that the Luftwaffe suffered poor management, not just that it suffered from a lack of spares. I never said, or implied that it produced too few fighters....It overproduced fighters, that would never fly because of a lack of fuel, and a lack of pilots, and suffered a very low sortie rate, partly because of a lack of spares. The lack of fuel would have occurred, even if a single bomb had not been dropped on the german oil refineries. The average fighter availability for the day fighter force was 1364 in 1944, over the reich, yet the germans , with only 2% more fuel were producing aircraft that envisaged a near 200% increase in the force structure. mathematically, this is impossible, as is getting 8500 pilots to fly 25000 airframes, given that an average pilot is only going to survive 1.7 shoot downs.

So where did it say it was due to lack of spare parts? Especially interesting how only four losses were attributed to technical faults.
Also you should adjust the non-combat attrition in your equation if this is representative of overall LW losses.

Try reading the article again. Actually its 20 lost, due to technical and servicing faults. What do you think a servicing fault might be????


So many adjectives... and your proof that this is attributable to the He-162 is where? In your mind.

Ah, we are yet to see a single shred of supporting evidence for your case, so it does seem a bit rich to say my posts are full of adjectives. If you check back on the posts, you will find not a single statistic to support your own assertions. its all lights and mirrors. I dont know what they teach in germany, but it certainly does not look much like brains to me.

Introducing additinal types only adds to the servicing difficulties of a force already suffering from a poor sercicieability record. It should be obvious that having more than one type is poor practice. Perhaps we should ask the question in reverse, what evidence is there for you to make the claim that adding to the number of types was a good thing. Conventional wisdom says that it is not, but you seem to have a theory that it is (beneficial) to operational serviceability. I am intersted to know how you can show that.....


Yeah, when it comes to facts instead of wild guesses and missing links in the chain of reasoning we can of course discuss that a bit later.[/quote]

I am more than happy to discuss the allied efforts, but can you explain to me, what connection this might have to the thread??? We are supposed to be arguing the benefits of the Do-335. I say it was an example of poor LW management, you then want to argue the failures of the allies, how does that relate to the Do-335?????

[KrazyKraut]

I'm well aware of Murphy's article. You forgot to mention btw, that he nowhere in his article mentions a lack of spares and any mentionable impact of that on overall fighter availability. Since his article is directly aimed at attrition and serviceability that makes you wonder, no? Servicing faults have a wide range of causes. And damaged due to servicing faults does not sound like grounded due to lack of spares to me.

Once again all you show is circumstantial evidence, which can be attributed to a wide range of reasons.
Ah, we are yet to see a single shred of supporting evidence for your case, so it does seem a bit rich to say my posts are full of adjectives. If you check back on the posts, you will find not a single statistic to support your own assertions. its all lights and mirrors. I dont know what they teach in germany, but it certainly does not look much like brains to me. Certainly manners, unlike in Australia apparently. So what kind of statistic do you want to have?
Introducing additinal types only adds to the servicing difficulties of a force already suffering from a poor sercicieability record. It should be obvious that having more than one type is poor practice. Perhaps we should ask the question in reverse, what evidence is there for you to make the claim that adding to the number of types was a good thing. Conventional wisdom says that it is not, but you seem to have a theory that it is (beneficial) to operational serviceability. I am intersted to know how you can show that.....
The evidence is obviously that a pilot in a jet fighter will be more capable than one in a Bf-109 G-6.

I am more than happy to discuss the allied efforts, but can you explain to me, what connection this might have to the thread??? We are supposed to be arguing the benefits of the Do-335. I say it was an example of poor LW management, you then want to argue the failures of the allies, how does that relate to the Do-335?????Very easy: You accuse the LW of gross mismanagement while Allied practice was very comparable. What little is left can be attributed to a certain degree of desperation from late '44 on. Much more so than by a overall faulty procurement program like you constantly accuse.

[Milos Sijacki]

I think that it would have been a really good interceptor.

[KrazyKraut]

It might have finally given the LW a good long range escort, but it came way to late for that. As an interceptor the Me-262 offered more imo.

[Soren]

The Ta-152H-1 already had the range needed for escort missions and was on top of that the best piston engined fighter in the air.

The Do-335 probably would've been an excellent nightfighter, fighter-bomber and bomber destroyer, but as a fighter its use was limited as Germany already possessed the two best figher a/c in the world at that point, both of which were far more capable in the role (The best no less).

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Soren

The Ta-152H-1 already had the range needed for escort missions and was on top of that the best piston engined fighter in the air.

The Do-335 probably would've been an excellent nightfighter, fighter-bomber and bomber destroyer, but as a fighter its use was limited as Germany already possessed the two best figher a/c in the world at that point, both of which were far more capable in the role (The best no less).

I agree. Period.

The Do 335 in my opinion was a waste of further development $$, used two engines instead of one and worst of all, had no value I can think of approaching the Me 262 in any of those roles.

It was faster than a 51B/D, Tempest, Spit XIV and P-47M - but a lot of 262s were shot down by those allied fighters and the Do 335 was only marginally faster - which does not much good if you are spotted entering a high density escort zone.

As good as the Ta 152 was, I see no reason that even it was produced in competition w/262. From my perspective the LW should have settled on the Fw 190 series and Me 262 from early 1944, forward. The Fw 190D-19 and D-12 were sufficently close to the Ta 152.. If you think about it, there was no significant value in a piston engine fighter with such great performance at 35-45,000 feet. The battles were at 28-15,000 feet.

As Parsifal pointed out, once Speer shifted production priorities to fighters in early 1944, German industry produced far more fighters than they had pilots to fly them, and the pilots were getting shot down in droves because of bad leadership/tactics and their a/c were not at or sufficiently greater performance levels than the escort fighters.

IMO - There was only one hope of defeating daylight strategic ops in time and that was a bomber destroyer with far greater performance than the P-51B in March/April 1944 before the Oil campaign started and before the Invasion.

[Soren]

It was faster than a 51B/D, Tempest, Spit XIV and P-47M - but a lot of 262s were shot down by those allied fighters and the Do 335 was only marginally faster

Remember that (IIRC) some ~90% of all Me-262's shot to pieces by Allied fighters were so when either trying to land or take off, or whilst just sitting still on the ground, VERY few were shot down in actual combat. And the few 262's which did get shot down in combat were so when entering a shallow turn to get back at the bombers, allowing diving escorts to get that vital split second burst needed. However once the Me-262 got airborne it was pretty much unbeatable, and when used purely as a fighter it demonstrated this in a big fashion, acquiring itself probably the highest Kill/loss ratio against other fighters of any a/c of WW2.


Now the Do-335 wouldn't have had the same weaknesses as the Me-262 and would've to the contrary been more vulnerable in the air and not so much when trying to land or take off, which isn't a plus btw.

Also as you rightly point out the Do-335 was only marginally faster than the fastest Allied fighters, and again like you said in a high density escort zone that would've meant only one thing, a lot of Do-335's shot down. The Do-335 simply didn't feature the performance advantage needed to gain an edge over the overwhelming numbers of escorts present.

The Do-335 is to me as-well a waste of funds, but only because there already were aircraft a lot better in all of its possible roles, and not because it was bad design of any sort. In short it was outdated the moment it left the drawing board...

[parsifal]

I agree. The LW had two very potent fighters in the 262 and the Ta 152. Other companies should have been used to manufacture components of these two planes rather than complicate the logustic network, by introducing yet another model to the inventory, and one not as good as those already in the works

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Soren

Remember that (IIRC) some ~90% of all Me-262's shot to pieces by Allied fighters were so when either trying to land or take off, or whilst just sitting still on the ground, VERY few were shot down in actual combat.

Soren - I'm not sure that is true with respect to all air to air scores. Of the 6-1-2 air shot down by 355th/2SF none were downed in the pattern, although one damaged at altitude blew up at low altitude. No Mustang losses to 262's in the 355th or 2SF.

I would be interested in you data on air to air scores for the 262, particularly with respect to categories of fighters, bombers and recon. This is an interesting research item since the LW records are so poor for the last 6 months of the war. As near as I can tell the 8th AF FC had about 105 Me 262Awards plus 15 more Ar 234's and Me 163's - no He 162's.

I am still researching the month by month breakout of 8th FC losses but the 8th AF FC lost ~ 638 fighters air to air and very few proportionately after September 1944. Even if the number of Allied fighters downed is low, that is a reflection again of 'evade the fighters and go after the bomber' philosophy not the Me 262 superiority.

I do know a lot of the 262's were shot down close to an airfield - either after being chased or while gaining speed and altitude after take off, so I'm not disputing the vulnerability in that mode - nor am I debating the clear superiority of the 262. Nor am I debating that it should have the best ratios even in contrast to the Ta 152 - which is statitistically insignificant.


And the few 262's which did get shot down in combat were so when entering a shallow turn to get back at the bombers, allowing diving escorts to get that vital split second burst needed.

This is true for 4 of the six cited above. Two were caused by engaging the Mustangs and not capitalizing on its advantages ('pilot stupidity' not inferior performance). The 4 were nailed in one engine from long range and chased to closure

However once the Me-262 got airborne it was pretty much unbeatable, and when used purely as a fighter it demonstrated this in a big fashion, acquiring itself probably the highest Kill/loss ratio against other fighters of any a/c of WW2.


Now the Do-335 wouldn't have had the same weaknesses as the Me-262 and would've to the contrary been more vulnerable in the air and not so much when trying to land or take off, which isn't a plus btw.

Also as you rightly point out the Do-335 was only marginally faster than the fastest Allied fighters, and again like you said in a high density escort zone that would've meant only one thing, a lot of Do-335's shot down. The Do-335 simply didn't feature the performance advantage needed to gain an edge over the overwhelming numbers of escorts present.

The Do-335 is to me as-well a waste of funds, but only because there already were aircraft a lot better in all of its possible roles, and not because it was bad design of any sort. In short it was outdated the moment it left the drawing board...

Soren - I agree all your points except the one I can't find reliable data on - namely those shot down in landing pattern versus 'other conditions' - as 90%.

Many of the other 262 awards I have researched were a result of the 262 entering a heavy escort 'density' and one or more fighters got a medium to long range burst taking out an engine - then chasing and closing.

[parsifal]

B]I'm well aware of Murphy's article. You forgot to mention btw, that he nowhere in his article mentions a lack of spares and any mentionable impact of that on overall fighter availability. Since his article is directly aimed at attrition and serviceability that makes you wonder, no? Servicing faults have a wide range of causes. And damaged due to servicing faults does not sound like grounded due to lack of spares to me.[/b]

Suggest that you read his book, along with with Joel Haywards "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers Defeat In the East". These will make very clear the poor showing of the LW in the logistics area


Once again all you show is circumstantial evidence, which can be attributed to a wide range of reasons.

I disgree that its circumstantial. These guys clearly demonstrate some really basic and fundamental errors in the LW procurement machine, which are not palatable for you. If you have evidence that proives superior leaderships, or superior management, than bring it forward.

For the record, the failure of the LW was multi dimensional. They produced too many fighters, not enough fuel, not enough pilots, and not enough sparea. This was not a late war phenomena. It was the reult of decisions and usage of the LW stretching right back to the beginning of the war

Certainly manners, unlike in Australia apparently. So what kind of statistic do you want to have?
Manners are given to those that deserve it. You try a little civility, yourself, and you will be quite surprised.

Now the statistics i want to see from you are those that establish that having more operational types is a good management decision. It would also not go astray for you to be able to show that there were not too many fighters produced, that the german petro-chemical industry was going to keep the increased output of fighters being built airborne, and that the numbers of pilots were adequate, and properly trained. In other words, all the ingredients that go into making a workable air force operating at peak efficiency were there, in just the right balance. If you can produce evidence to prove that, then maybe you will be given the respect you are now demanding

The evidence is obviously that a pilot in a jet fighter will be more capable than one in a Bf-109 G-6.

That is true, but only if he can get airborne, and if there are enough of the jets to make a differnce. If there are a lot of jets grounded because of developmental problems (which the 262 had experienced in spades, and which were just about ironed out by 1945, By comparison, the teething troubles of the He 162 were only just getting started, because the 162 was a design that was 2 years behind the 262). And all of these problems are made worse by introducing an additional type(s) rather than concentrating on more well developed, and basically proven designs like the 262.

Very easy: You accuse the LW of gross mismanagement while Allied practice was very comparable. What little is left can be attributed to a certain degree of desperation from late '44 on. Much more so than by a overall faulty procurement program like you constantly accuse.


The allied model has nothing to do with the thread, however, for the record, the allies had plenty of problems and managerial issues. The worst one I can think of are the unescorted deep penetration raids into Germany in 1943.

But the difference between the allies and the germans is that the allied structure worked well enough to ensure victory. And this did not come automatically. Germany was not outfought, but it was very convincingly outmanaged especially in the air war

[Soren]

Bill,

I can't be specific about the Me262's kill/loss ratio for the same reason (Incomplete LW records), but I'm relying mostly on what vets and the books tell me. According to my research by far the majority of Me-262's were shot down while trying to land, and Galland wanted to form a protective squadron for that very reason. There really were VERY few incidents of Me-262'a shot down in combat, and of the few who were, most were when trying to turn on back to attack the bombers for a second attack run, allowing diving escorts to get a split second burst.

As for the two Me-262's who challenged the P-51's you talk about, well the most common mistake by rookie 262 pilots was to think that the Me-262 could dogfight the piston engined fighters at low speeds on equal terms - it couldn't, the jet engines didn't provide enough acceleration at slow speeds. Experienced pilots however knew that maintaining speed was the key, and that high G turns, zoom climbs and dives was the effective way of tackling the piston engined fighters. Esp. a high G turn with the nose pointing slightly down was effective, as this enhanced the Me-262's already large advantage in speed retention in tight turns. But in short the key was to stay fast and take advantage of the Me-262's superior handling and acceleration at high speeds.

[KrazyKraut]

Originally Posted by parsifal

I disgree that its circumstantial.

"Circumstantial evidence is a collection of facts that, when considered together, can be used to infer a conclusion about something unknown."
Sounds very fitting to me.

These guys clearly demonstrate some really basic and fundamental errors in the LW procurement machine, which are not palatable for you. If you have evidence that proives superior leaderships, or superior management, than bring it forward.

For example the industry and the RLM actually managed to have every 4th Bf-109 be of the latest K-model when the war ended, an achievement considering the type flew for the first time in late '44.

On the other side of the channel the RAF struggled two times to get the latest Spitfire into widespread service. How often is it said that the introduction of the Mk.IX eliminated the advantage of the Fw-190, but a lot of squadrons still operated on outdated Mk.Vs for a long time afterwards. The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter. And not to even mention the various subtypes of high-mid-low altitude engines and clipped-long-50cal-cannon-303cal wings throughout the Spitfires history: a logistical nightmare. Then there's the Bristol Centaurus. Arguably one of the worst cases of a missed opportunity in fighter development: The engine was mature by late 1942, yet it never powered any operational WW2 fighter. The Tempest II was seen as superior to the V but a very faulty planning with manufacturers switching back and forth doomed what could've been the best radial-engined fighter of WWII to a footnote. All this is directly attributable to a mismanaged fighter procurement.

I say directly attributable because regarding Germany you like to ignore a few things:

Germany fought on three high intensity theatres, one of them being very dynamical in the sense switching back and forth between various airfields. German squadrons had to fly several times the number of sorties per day than the Western Allies had to. Germany was on the defense in the West thus had to react, whereas the Western Allies had the initiative and could plan and forecast their replacements much easier. Not to mention that their major fighter force was conveniently placed within a radius of a few hundred miles and not scattered throughout entire Europe.

All these things contribute to the logistical situation a lot more than the He-162 ever could.

Now the statistics i want to see from you are those that establish that having more operational types is a good management decision.

According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100. So a roughly 4-5:1 ratio. Every other German plane of that period (all props) PROBABLY had a ratio of 1:1 or worse. So every prop plane replaced by a jet meant statistically a steep increase in effectiveness and efficiency.

It would also not go astray for you to be able to show that there were not too many fighters produced, that the german petro-chemical industry was going to keep the increased output of fighters being built airborne, and that the numbers of pilots were adequate, and properly trained.

None of this was within reach of the aircraft producing industry. You might aswell argue the RLM was responsible for starting the war altogether. Since we are talking about production capacity, what would you suggest would've been a better project to spend this capacity on except fighters? More wonder weapons?

That is true, but only if he can get airborne, and if there are enough of the jets to make a differnce. If there are a lot of jets grounded because of developmental problems (which the 262 had experienced in spades, and which were just about ironed out by 1945, By comparison, the teething troubles of the He 162 were only just getting started, because the 162 was a design that was 2 years behind the 262). And all of these problems are made worse by introducing an additional type(s) rather than concentrating on more well developed, and basically proven designs like the 262.

Source? The problems of the He-162 were largely solved and the plane was ready for war. Not only the German pilots say so, this is also mirrored by Eric Brown for example.

The Me-262 serial production was ~1200 from january (?) '44 until april '45. Meaning 75 aircraft per month. Despite the worst possible conditions under which an aircraft could've ever been designed and developed, around 330 He-162s were completed from february to april 1945: or around 110 per month.

German metal manufacturing capacity was absolutely exhausted, the wood industry wasn't. The He-162 used one BMW 003, the Me-262 used two Jumo 004. I want to see the author who seriously claims ditching the He-162 would've increased Me-262 production significantly.

The allied model has nothing to do with the thread,

Oh yes it does. Because "poor management" is relative. So without a relation that statement is useless. We've been argueing this back and forth for several pages now and you still haven't provided any answer to the two most significant, objective and undisputable facts regarding the whole procurement subject:

Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in production?
Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in serious development?

But the difference between the allies and the germans is that the allied structure worked well enough to ensure victory. And this did not come automatically. Germany was not outfought, but it was very convincingly outmanaged especially in the air war

The difference between the Allies and Germany is that Germany had brought himself into an impossible strategical situation when it declared war on the two largest industrial nations in the world. For the Luftwaffe this meant it had to fight against at least 2,5 times its own capacity. THAT determined the outcome.