The Do-335

[parsifal]

Murray is only considered one of the foremost experts in the world on the Luftwaffe

He is supported by Hayward in his work, "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers defeat in the East", in which he also shows the The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics. Hayward reports that the operational readiness rate for the Luftwaffe reached a peak in June 1942, on the southern front, of 70%, but this had plunged to less than 31% by the time of Stalingrad. By March it had staged a partial recovery to 45%, and some further improvement again by the time of Kursk (IIRC it had climbed to something over 50%), From there on, the readiness rate continued to drop, until by the end of the war, almost the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had become non-operational (not due to spares, mostly to the fuel situation by then).

Ellis reports that by the end of June 1941, the readiness rate of the frontline aircraft had fallen to about 1000 A/C, or around 44%

Finally there are some interviews of actual veterans, the following of which is an example

The interview has been made possible by the kind assistance and enthusiasm of his son, Uwe Wiedemann, who relayed my questions to his father and conducted the actual interview.
The subject, Hans Wiedemann, served in the Luftwaffe, primarily with 4./ Ln.Rgt. Afrika, III./Stuka Geschw. 3 and Stab StG3. He also served for a time with Stuka Geschwader 2.
Hans attained the the rank of Obergefreiter in North Africa, later Corporal, and saw active service with the RAD and Luftwaffe for the full duration of the war (1939-45). He served in North Africa between March 1941 and May 1943 as a radio (wireless) operator.
Hans was stationed at various airfields within Libya, Egypt and Tunisia such as Tmimi, Martuba, Derna, Barce, En Nofilia, Agedabia, El Daba, Bir el Abd, El Quasaba, Gabes and Tunis.
In May 1943 he was one of the few lucky ones to be evacuated by air from Tunisia to Sicily. From here he participated in the gradual retreat movements northward through Italy until he finally surrendered to US Infantry in the Dolomites, Northern Italy in May 1945.

Which units did you serve with in North Africa?

Well, with the III./StG 3, II./StG 2, I./ StG 3 Ju 88 Aufklarer (Reconnaisance). With the Ju 88 we had first tries of some night-fighter training, leading the aircraft from ground by radio. My Stamm- Einheit (basic-unit) still was the 4./ Ln.Abt. Afrika until the end of 1942, when I was with the Ln.Rgt. Tunis ( 9./ Horch (reconnaisance)). On the 2nd May 1943 I was put under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring and could escape to Marsala/Sicily with a "Siebel-Fahre" (a special armoured type of pontoon ferry).

Was the supply of fuel and spare parts a major problem?

Supply of spare parts and fuel really was a major problem!


Producing whole units instead of producing adequate spares is a most innefficient way of maintaining readiness. aircraft, like any complex machine, will have certain pieces of equipment that fail more regularly than others. usually these areas of systemic failure will occur in the engine. Producing an entire airframe, so that you can have a spare engine is a most innefficient way of repairing an airframe. The best and most production efficient way to manage this problem is to maintain a relatively high reserve of engines (so as to return the airframe to service quickly), and then further, to maintain a higher than average stock of engine parts that are shown the most likley to fail. Say, for example the crankshafts are shown to need replacement after say 50 hours, but that the average engine life is 500 hours. It would make sense to produce 10 crankshafts for every one engine, rather than produce 10 separate engines, or worse, produce 10 complete airframes , just so the crankshaft can be replaced every 50 hours. Effectively, under the latter scenario, you will have 10 airframes sitting around, doing nothing, in order to keep just one airframe flying. That is hardly good management, and very likely to lead to a low operational readiness rate. And yet, this is precisely how the Luftwaffe was managed throughout most of the war.


Are all of these people unreliable as well???

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
there is one significant omission in Your analyse, the SGs, which were very significant user of FW 190s and in May 44 LW had something like 1050 serviceable sinle-engined fighters and some 550 serviceable ground-attack planes, almost all of the latter were FW 190s.

Juha

[drgondog]

kurfurst - I really don't have a problem with your primary points as the LW did, prior to D-Day ship a/c back to central locations for upgrades and repairs.

That strategy became less successful as more fighters were leaving the bombers following relief from escort and shooting up rail and barge traffic on the way home. This same tactic placed strains on Speers very sound decentralization of his a/c industry to lessen effect of strategic bombing.

Having said that a casual look at LufFlotte 3 on the Kanal front shows 357 on hand and 209 available S/E and T/E fighters for JG2, JG26, ZG1,NJG4,NJG5 and NJG6 - also about 58% at the end of May 31. A casual look at LF4 shows a much higher percentage 'availability' than the England facing JG's, ditto LF5 and 6.

I would speculate that the LW did not have the eqivalent Service Groups located close to airfields - which did the wing changes, major sheet metal or assembly replacements, etc. But I do not know.

Implication is a lot of sheet metal repair, new wings etc, not spark plugs, radios and engines... as well as a shortage of pilots to fly perfectly good ships.

BTW as I look at 8th AF strength in fighters I frequently see 60-70% available, sometimes less, between Feb and end of April, as the Mustang was ironing out issues with radios, mags, coolant leaks, etc.

In June there were severe strains on the ground crews because of Invasion activity but the availability was high (>70%) and pilots often flew two and sometimes three sorties per day in Area Patrols and Fighter Bomber missions.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by parsifal

Murray is only considered one of the foremost experts in the world on the Luftwaffe

By whom...?

I would certainly not call someone so who

a, had done zero research in Germany and had appearantly very little understanding or willingness to understand how the Luftwaffe would operate during the war, instead he dispays the typical Anglo-Saxon reasoning that since we did it this way, and they did it in another way, they must be wrong. We`ve seen this nonsene with the four-engined bomber thing how many times exactly..? Well HELLO THERE, they were not the ones flying from Britain to Germany over France, so where is exactly the same pressing need?

b, uses demagogue arguements like 'the Luftwaffe lost the equivalents of two air forces by 1942' etc., then going into how this eroded the quality, somehow forgetting about the fact that all the other air forces went through this as well. An equivalent of the RAF`s Fighter Command was, for example, wiped out during the mere four months in the Battle of Britain - but of course it received replacements, and maintained the numbers. Yet somehow, Murray speaks of losses that if it would be some kind of demagogue 'proof' of the loss of quality, and naturally, it only effected the Luftwaffe... bah!

From what I`ve seen, Murray is very popular in certain circles, because he lends authority to bashing agendas.

Originally Posted by parsifal

He is supported by Hayward in his work, "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers defeat in the East", in which he also shows the The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics.

Having problems with logistics (which is fairly normal IMHO in any army of the size on campaign), and being run by retards is not quite the same thing.

Originally Posted by parsifal

Hayward reports that the operational readiness rate for the Luftwaffe reached a peak in June 1942, on the southern front, of 70%, but this had plunged to less than 31% by the time of Stalingrad. By March it had staged a partial recovery to 45%, and some further improvement again by the time of Kursk (IIRC it had climbed to something over 50%),

Hayward apparently picks certain periods of low serviceability rates, at certain times and certain locations to support his conception, instead of providing an overall picture how serviceability went through the war.

Cherry picking, however, is not convincing. To make some use of such figures, we would need to at least how many of these were non-operational because of

a, lack of spares
b, lack of maintenance personnel capacity
c, lack of transportation capacity
d, what was the duration of serviceability (ie. unserviceable for the duration of a night is fairly normal, the crew simply needs time to make the repairs)
e, what was the cause, heavy enemy action that naturally creates bottlenecks in the servicing chain or natural wear?

Without knowledge of the reasons, especially if we do not know the duration of serviceability and the cause, no valid conclusions can be drawn.

Guesses can be made with a high probability of error.

From there on, the readiness rate continued to drop, until by the end of the war, almost the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had become non-operational (not due to spares, mostly to the fuel situation by then).

That`s a remarkable funny fiction, in view of the reported sorties flew over the Eastern front by Luftwaffe`s non-operational phantom planes. IIRC 10 000 or so fighter sorties were flown in the East in February 1945 alone. Over Berlin in April, a very high number of sorties (a few thousend a day, from memory) were flown.

I guess *IF* Hayward makes such a blatantly stupid claim that towards the wars end the Luftwaffe was non-operational on the East, I guess his book can go straight onto the lower shelf of the 'Fiction' shelf in remote book stores.

Originally Posted by parsifal

Ellis reports that by the end of June 1941, the readiness rate of the frontline aircraft had fallen to about 1000 A/C, or around 44%

Oh well I can cherry pick low serviceability rates too.

For example, Typhoon Squadrons can be showed at a service rate of 5 to 10 (five to ten) percent in late 1944 at 1-2-3 serviceable Typhoons per Squadron.

Do you think it was lack of spares, too...?

Originally Posted by parsifal

Finally there are some interviews of actual veterans, the following of which is an example

[i]The interview has been made possible by the kind assistance and enthusiasm of his son, Uwe Wiedemann, who relayed my questions to his father and conducted the actual interview.
The subject, Hans Wiedemann, served in the Luftwaffe, primarily with 4./ Ln.Rgt. Afrika, III./Stuka Geschw. 3 and Stab StG3. He also served for a time with Stuka Geschwader 2.

[...]

- Was the supply of fuel and spare parts a major problem?
- Supply of spare parts and fuel really was a major problem!

I don`t think I need to detail why I find this a lame sweaty attempt. Keywords: lack of source, lack of details, lack of insight onto the whole picture we are discussion (the Luftwaffe, not the well-being 4th Staffel of Stukageschwader 3 in Africa).

Yet I still have to wonder how the Luftwaffe, despite your claims, maneged to keep up on avarage 60-70% servicibility with its fighter units late in the war, despite the railways, roads being regularly attack by medium bombers and fighter bombers, the airfields strafed by escorts and bombed by heavies.

Originally Posted by parsifal

Producing whole units instead of producing adequate spares...

PROVE first there were no adequate spares before you try to present it as a fact.

Originally Posted by parsifal

is a most innefficient way of maintaining readiness. aircraft, like any complex machine, will have certain pieces of equipment that fail more regularly than others. usually these areas of systemic failure will occur in the engine. Producing an entire airframe, so that you can have a spare engine is a most innefficient way of repairing an airframe. The best and most production efficient way to manage this problem is to maintain a relatively high reserve of engines (so as to return the airframe to service quickly), and then further, to maintain a higher than average stock of engine parts that are shown the most likley to fail. Say, for example the crankshafts are shown to need replacement after say 50 hours, but that the average engine life is 500 hours. It would make sense to produce 10 crankshafts for every one engine, rather than produce 10 separate engines, or worse, produce 10 complete airframes , just so the crankshaft can be replaced every 50 hours. Effectively, under the latter scenario, you will have 10 airframes sitting around, doing nothing, in order to keep just one airframe flying.

That is all well, but what does it have to do with the subject?

Originally Posted by parsifal

That is hardly good management, and very likely to lead to a low operational readiness rate.
And yet, this is precisely how the Luftwaffe was managed throughout most of the war.

Oh I see now. You describe a fiction, born a few minutes ago in your mind, and then say that this is how exactly it happened 60 years ago. No supportive evidence, nothing.

Because you want it to have been happening that way, because you argued earlier it did, then it must have happened that way.

Is that it?

PROVE first there was low operational readiness rate through the war before you try to present it as a fact.
of evidence offered.

Produce the evidence. This means numbers on spares, verifiable sources behind your claims.

Are all of these people unreliable as well???

You do know the analogue between opinions and a-holes, that everyone has them, these people included? The problem being, until proven, it just that, an opinion. So prove them. The burden of proof is on you, you make the claims here.

[Kurfürst]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Kurfürst
there is one significant omission in Your analyse, the SGs, which were very significant user of FW 190s and in May 44 LW had something like 1050 serviceable sinle-engined fighters and some 550 serviceable ground-attack planes, almost all of the latter were FW 190s.

Juha

The reason being I did not take a look at the SGs, being not my particular interest; HoHun`s XLS table can be used to gather such data, but I noticed some - IT/excell related - errors in it and I do not trust if the details of losses, shipments etc. is reported correctly.

However, I have no reason to believe the trend was different with 190s than with 109s; in the case of the latters, simply a lot more 109 were built every month than issued. Thus I see no problem with spares/reserves.

It might be interesting to do a detailed study on 190s as well, but, I am not inclined to do so because of ill-supported theories that emerge every now and then, especially if they appear to be dogmatic; and, my available time is not endless either.

Besides anyone can do it in his free time if he is interested, and then share the results. All the material is available on the internet (USSBS and ww2.dk). It only needs processed.

[Soren]

Bill,

AFAIK all Gene's comparisons were at a height of 10,000 ft, not at SL.

But when do you reckon we'll be ready to compare a/c ?

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Soren

Bill,

AFAIK all Gene's comparisons were at a height of 10,000 ft, not at SL.

Nope - there is no calc for EAS=TAS*Sqrt(RHOalt/RHOsl). Gene assumed for simplicity that the ratio was =1 ----> RHOalt=RHOsl

But when do you reckon we'll be ready to compare a/c ?

No earlier than a.) first of next week, and b.) when we have reliable Bhp as f(altitude).. Williams has such for the 51B/D and for the 51B both for 1650-3 and 1650-7 as well as 75" and 67" Hg for several critical altitudes - but not a single chart.

We will need to same data as input to develop the Thrust Hp at each of those altitudes.

[Soren]

Roger. I've got the charts for the Jumo 213A & E and the Jumo 004B-1 if you can add jet fighters to the chart ? I think Kurfürst has the charts for the DB605 versions.

Do you have charts for the RR Merlin and the PW R-2800 ? I think I have the BMW-801 charts needed, or Gene has them.

[Juha]

Kurfürst
Quote: "To switch to 1944, during March the Germans 859 new production fighters (FW 190, Bf 109 etc), and 387 from repair centres to the Tagjagd; in the same month, 804 new Bf 109s and 573 FW 190s were produced."


my point was, that IIRC monthly production figures I have seen on Fw190 didn't separated ground attack and fighter versions, so without knowing how many of FWs went to SGs one cannot say was there any significant increase on reserve a/c. Secondly, at least almost all of those 109G6s which arrived to Finland in 1944 had some substandard parts which had to be replaced in VL (State Aircraft Factory) before they could be passed to combat units. That indicates bottlenecs in production at least from mid-44 onwards, some planes even lacked radios etc fundamental parts for a combat plane.

Juha

[parsifal]

Joel S A Hayward
(Source Wiki)

Joel S.A. Hayward (born 1964), is a New Zealand military historian and analyst who has worked in the United Kingdom since 2004. He is best known for his published works on the use of air power by the German military during World War II, his 2003 biography of Horatio Lord Nelson, and a controversy over his 1993 M.A. thesis on the historiography of Holocaust denial in which it was charged that he was a Holocaust denier. Hayward is Head of Air Power Studies at King's College London and, as of 1 April 2007, is Dean of the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell. In August 2007 the Royal Air Force appointed him a Director of the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies.[1][2] He holds fellowships from the United States Air Force and the Federal Government of Germany.[1]

Hayward went on to pursue a Ph.D. degree, also at University of Canterbury, again under the supervision of Dr. Vincent Orange.[11] He initially considered to enroll for the Ph.D. with a biography of well-known Holocaust denier David Irving as a dissertion topic, apparently at Irving's suggestion,[12] but instead embarked on a study of German air operations during World War II.[11] In 1994, the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, located within the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, awarded him a research scholarship to conduct research for his dissertation in its archives; he subsequently received a research fellowship from the Federal Government of Germany which enabled him to conduct doctoral research in the German Military Archives in Freiburg, Germany.[13]

Hayward was awarded a Ph.D. in 1996. His thesis, Seeking the Philosopher's Stone: Luftwaffe Operations during Hitler's Drive to the East, 1942–1943[14] became the basis for his first book,[11] Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-1943.,[15] which was published in 1998.


Academic and professional career

Massey University
In June 1996 Hayward joined the History Department at Massey University (Palmerston North Campus) as a Lecturer in Defence and Strategic Studies,[16] receiving promotion to Senior Lecturer in August 1999.[4] He specialized in the theoretical and conceptual aspects of modern warfare, airpower, joint doctrines, and manoeuvre warfare.[16] He continued in that position until June 2002.[2]

While at Massey, Hayward in 1999 was organizer of New Zealand's largest defence conference, held 21-22 August at Massey University's Turitea campus. The conference, entitled "Coalitions and Conflict — The Transition of Warfare 1899 to 1999 and Beyond," focused on coalition warfare and was jointly hosted by Massey University and the New Zealand Army's Military Studies Institute.[17] Hayward was conference convenor of Massey's third annual defence conference in August 2000, again co-hosted by the New Zealand Army, with discussion focusing on the trend towards integrating the three armed services (army, air force, and navy) under unified command.[18] Hayward also acted as editor of the conference proceedings, which took its title from the conference's theme, Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and Its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force.[19]

From 1997 to 2004 he was also lecturer at the Officer Cadet School of the New Zealand Army[2], where he taught general military history from Alexander the Great to the Balkan War,[16] and at the Command and Staff College of the Royal New Zealand Air Force,[2] where he taught airpower history and doctrine and supervised advanced research in military history.[16] During the same period he also taught strategic thought at the Royal New Zealand Naval College.[16][2] He also wrote academic articles for general military and military history publications.[16]

This is a selected bibliography of peer-reviewed articles.

(1995). "Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941–42." The Journal of Strategic Studies 18(4): 94-135. December 1995. Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 441–482.
(1997). "Stalingrad: An Examination of Hitler’s Decision to Airlift." Airpower Journal 11(1): 21–37. Spring 1997. Also published by the U.S. Air Force in a Portuguese translation as "Estalingrado: Um Exame da Decisão de Hitler a Respeito do Transporte Aéreo."
(1997). "The German Use of Airpower at Kharkov, May 1942." Air Power History 44(2): 18–29. Summer 1997.
(1997). "Von Richthofen's 'giant fire-magic': The Luftwaffe's Contribution to the Battle of Kerch, 1942." The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10(2): 97–124. June 1997.
(199. "A Case Study in Effective Command: An Analysis of Field Marshal Richthofen's Character and Career." New Zealand Army Journal 18: 7–18. January 1998.
(1999). "NATO's War in the Balkans: A Preliminary Analysis." New Zealand Army Journal 21: 1–17. July 1999.
(1999). "A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean Campaign of 1942." The Journal of Strategic Studies 22(4): 103–130. December 1999. Also in German translation as "Eine Fallstudie früher integrierter Kriegführung: Eine Analyse des Krimfeldzuges der Wehrmacht im Jahre 1942." Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 483–510.
(2000). "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production." The Journal of Military History 64(3): 769–794. July 2000. Also in Spanish translation as "Demasiado Poco, Demasiado Tarde: Un Análisis del Fracaso de Hitler en Agos-to de 1942 de Dañar la Producción Pe-trolífera Soviética." Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 511–536.
(2001). "Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm." Defence Studies 1(2): 15–37. Summer 2001.
(2002). "Prayers Before Battle: The Spiritual Utterances of Three Great Commanders." US Army Chaplaincy Journal (Winter-Spring 2002), pp. 32-40.
(2002). "Current and Future Command Challenges for New Zealand Defence Force Personnel." Australian Defence Force Journal 155: 39–45. July/August 2002.

Monographs
(2000). Adolf Hitler and Joint Warfare. Military Studies Institute Working Papers Series No. 2/2000. Military Studies Institute, New Zealand Defence Force. (44 pp.)

Books

Military history
(199. Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-1943. Modern War Studies series. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700611460.
(2000). (edited). A Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force. Massey University, Centre for Defence Studies.
(2003). For God and Glory: Lord Nelson and His Way of War. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591143519.
(2003). (edited with Glyn Harper). Born to Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders. Auckland: Exisle Publishing. ISBN 0908988338.
(2006). Stalingrad. Pen & Sword Battleground series. London: Millennium. ISBN 1844154742

[parsifal]

Dr W Murray

Source
(Dr. Williamson Murray - Strategic Studies Institute)

Dr. Williamson Murray

Position: External Researcher WILLIAMSON MURRAY is currently professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University. He has served as the Harold Johnson Professor of Military History at the United States Army War College. Dr. Murray is also the author and editor of a number of major works, the most recent of which is A War to Be Won, Fighting the Second World War, published by Harvard University Press.


Source 2
( Source watch)


Williamson Murray
From SourceWatch
Dr. Williamson Murray (Wick Murray) is Professor Emeritus (History) at Ohio State University (Retired) and Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).[1]


U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century / Hart-Rudman Commission Study Group Member[2]: "Dr. Williamson Murray, Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History, Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College

EDUCATION

B.A. Yale University, (1963)
M.A. Yale University, (1971)
Ph.D. Yale University, (1975)
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - HIGHLIGHTS

Charles Lindbergh Professor, Air and Space Museum, 1997-1998
Horner Professor of Military Theory, Marine Corps University, 1995-1997
Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics, 1994-1995
Professor Emeritus, Ohio State University, 1995
Secretary of the Navy Fellow, Naval War College, 1991-1992
Professor of History, Ohio State University, 1977-1995
Maintenance Officer, 314th TAL Wing, South East Asia, 1968-1969
HONORS AND AFFILIATIONS

Long Committee on Professional Military Education, 1989-1990
Second Andrew D. White Prize in European History, Yale University, 1963

From the Naval War College Review, Spring 2001: "Dr. Murray received his Ph.D. (after service in the U.S. Air Force) in military-diplomatic history at Yale University. He has taught at Yale, at the Air, Army, and Naval War Colleges, the U.S. Military Academy, Marine Corps University, the London School of Economics, the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, and Ohio State University, of which he is a professor emeritus. He is currently a consultant at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Arlington, Virginia. His numerous books include Air War, 1914-1945 (1999) and a number of works in collaboration with Allan Millett, including, most recently, A War to Be Won: Fighting World War II (1999)."

(Note: Professor Emeritus means One who is retired but retains an honorary title corresponding to that held immediately before retirement). It is usually reserved for academics who are held in particulalry high esteem or regard by his peers

[parsifal]

John Ellis

Could not find a concise biography on this author, however here is an intersting link on his general outlook. In summary he has been criticised as being far too pro-Axis in his outlook, but obviously not enough for some

Anyway, here is the link
Military History Online

[parsifal]

From the above three posts, I believe that the sources I have relied upon are fair and balanced. It is not up to me to provide further proof at this stage. It is incumbent on people to accept, or reject the information contained in those sources, as they see fit. If they wish to totally reject the information presented it is incumbent up[on them to present better source material, and not throw a neo-nazi style hysterical fit on line, just because that information challenges their pre-conceived ideas. Neither is it incumbent upon me to provide additional information to further support my case. Quite the opposite. I amintain that my sources are credible, and conclusive, despite being secondary, and historical, rather than primary, and scientific, in their presentation. The authors all have credible qualifications to comment. It is now up to their opponents to prepre,a ns present their counter arguments, backed up by whatever information they can scrape together, or see fit

[Kurfürst]

After 3 pages of parroting the same dogma, we still do not have any evidence presented about the alleged lack of spares and mismanagement etc., instead we got two wiki-level quotes applying to our respect for authority instead of reason, bizarrely followed by the almost standard, but universally applicable, retarded accusation with Nazism, then some odd argument why the one making the dogmatic claim does not have to prove it at all.

The matter has been concluded IMHO. It appears neither the original poster nor the two unquestionable authorities he calls upon to support to dogma has anything to offer as evidence.

It is of course also possible that Hayward, with whom I am not familiar with, is only used selectively to support the dogma, and the way he is being quoted here by some is not representing Hayward`s actual opinions.

'All of that would not be surprising, considering that earlier the same poster made the following ridiculous statements'

'The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements.'

The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans.

'Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later.'

Statements for which verifiable source was asked for, and just like in the case of claims about lack of spares, none were given. Instead, a jump was made to the next claim at lightspeed.

If nothing else, the agenda is clearly identifiable.

[parsifal]

May I ask what your credentials are? You have managed to denigrate a professor Emeritus, a professor specializing in military and who currently works, in part for the german Government, and an eminent author, in the space of less than a paragraph, and provided not a single shred of evidence to support your own outrageous claims. Your arrogance approaches, perhaps even exceeds that of the original peacocks that call themselves nazis. I cansee it as entirely credible that you would support the burning of books, the disenfranchisement of anyone who opposed you, and blaming and persecuting innocent minorities to support your position.

Let it be known that I have plenty of evidence to support my claims, and have supported some of them already, with quotes and observations by peoiple who have been acknowledged as experts almost univerally. Your dismisal of them is laughable, as are your outrageous claims, unles you have anything plausoible, and verifiable to back them up. I am not going to produce any evidence for you to so arrogantly an in such an aryan manner dismiss them without feeling the need to justify your own laughable and outrageous position yourself.

In other words, either put up, shut up, or expect the very worst