German aces-post 1944

[drgondog]

Udet - you have perhaps the most compelling Avatar -it guarantees that someone (including me ) will look at your post

"As to the allied point of view, what could i tell you?? That i´ve read several but they do not vary much on their approach to the issue. It would even appear like they did not bother that much in researching further and simply resorted to either copy the opinions of previous authors or simply join the victor´s drunkness."

Udet - Gee, THAT about sums it up doesn't it?


You said to the statement- "Only a handful of the new pilots of 1944 survived the war."

"Once again, that is plain flat bullshit."

"That the casualty rate was high, reaching 50-55% is true. A casualty rate certainly higher than the one the western allies were experiencing. Though telling only a few "survived" is another allied lie."

Agreed - fortunately the LW was generally jumping ship over their own territory. Being shot down is a casualty figure, being KIA is a different. What are your figures on the numbers of LW shot down per combat engagement?

You said -"What of the Kassel raid of Sept 27, 1944? Read the month: SEPTEMBER, the ninth month of the year."

I would add - what about 24 and 29 April, or 7 July or 26 November - but pressed to name another example. The LW managed to get local superiority in several major encounters in 1944 after Mustangs fully operational - and shoot down a lot of B-24s and B-17s in the process. April 24, 29 and July 7 and Septemner 27, and November 26. What other actions do you want to illustrate as heavy casualites inflicted versus heavy casualties incurred" Would you say that it is a lie that the Allies achieved air supremacy from April 1944 forward? If not what?

You said "Could a band of kinds hardly capable of making it airborne have ever achieved such a masterful level of destruction?"

Actually no. Anyone that would say the LW was either cowardly or 'ineffectual" is just silly. But anybody who would say that the LW scored at will and wreaked havoc on any more than a few isolated days after April is perhaps blinded to loyalty to the Luftwaffe - and equally non -objective??

You said "That is just an isolated case of course; still it helps contradicting the allied fairy tale."

How many Fairy Tales do you want to debunk.

Let's see, from April 1 1944 there were approximately 290 days of airborne combat ops over Germany. How many days would you propose as victories for the Luftwaffe in that period?

I am not trying to be unkind but I am curious regarding the fact base you carry to support your proposition that proponents of Allied Air superiority in that span of time are drunkards and liars?

Regards,

Bill

[Erich]

let me give a brief reply, my last installment was in 2005 more than 2 years ago, alot of new info has been researched and stuck in my data files .........

let us not forget Sept. 11, 12, 1944
October 6 and 7th 1944
November 2nd 1944

and even in December 23, 44 the mysterious and not known aerial battle with Fw 190A-8's of I./JG 11 and A-8's A-8/R8's of IV.Sturm/JG 3 that took out 38 B-26's with which the B-26 groups are reluctant to share ..........182 B-26's were damaged

December 24, 44 when the 487th bg was assailed by SturmFw's of JG 3 while still over Belgium, General Castle going down with his B-17.

yes the LW was still effective and not quite a broken unit although overwhelmed they could not stem the tide of the Allied might ..........

[drgondog]

I grant say 5 or 6 more days, Erich, w/o debating what he balance was - still leaves 280 days to discuss. For example neither 2 November or 6 October were great days for the LW even if they inflicted numbers on the USAAF.

I just remain cautiously judgemental that the LW was largely downhill fast after March 1944.. willing to be convinced I/m wrong

Bodenplatte should have been big time reversal if only for a month - but it wasn't

High Regards,

Bill

[Erich]

Bill :

I truly believe it was Normandie. If you could look at the losses by so many of the Luftwaffe day fighter gruppen during the months of June-August end it is almost knumbing. Literally a/c and pilots were gone and the whole system had to be revamped, time for another staffel to be added per gruppe with fresh raw pilots to be killed, wounded and or maimed.

Just wanted to point out that there were other late dates that the LW struck back and did. But they were a shambles and the end for them was drawing near .........

[Njaco]

I have to agree with Erich and others but LW wasn't that far downhill after March 44.

From Dr. Price - Last Year of The Luftwaffe - pg 121

10 January 1945

"At this time the total number of servicable aircraft deployed in combat units 4,566, was slightly greater than at the end of May 1944. However during the previous seven months the composition of the LW had changed greatly."

They had the machines, personnel were still coming into the units - but - shortage of fuel, overwhelming numbers, loss of airfields and radar stations along with basic training and/or training on new types was curtailing operations. 400 fighters would've done well in 1940 but by 1945 when your up against 1,000 bombers with 800 fighters even "old heads" sometimes come out on the losing end.

[drgondog]

I printed a letter in my book, from Galland dated March 1984, and have another that I received from him in September,1985 in reply to the question. "what reall effect did the introduction of the Mustang have on Luftwaffe operations?"

I will summarize his words (Some direct quotes, some combined) to the second letter because they largely compliment the first. BTW the letter in Angels, Bulldogs and Dragons was a very thoughtful collaboration between Toliver and Galland on my behalf (Letter written to Toliver to answer my question regarding effect of combining long range with high performance escort fighter and enabling them to break away from the bombers to aggressively attack the LW).

Summary
"They (Mustangs and Thunderbolts) cut the heart out of the experienced fighter pilot arm - not just single engine but also the twins that we pressed into service hurting our effectiveness against RAF. We lost far too many old hands in the winter and spring of 1944 to ever be able to achieve air superiority again".

"The American AF attacks on our petroleum industry were the fatal blow making it impossible to train fighter pilots sufficiently to prepare them for the onslaught - presuming we could train them unmolested by Mustangs far enough away from England and Italy bases.

"The unshackling of the 8th AF fighters, particularly the Mustang, from close support, effectively created nighmares for us in planning, assembling and climbing to sufficient altitude to at least enable diving attacks in sufficient force to overwhelm local escorts. The roaming fighters shot up our airfields, killed our pilots taking off and landing, killed our students and caused frequent shortages of aircraft for local units. The effect was decreasing morale. The time to Split S and dive down (Abschwung) was present.We increasingly moved our units further North and South - which made it difficult to form and attack in large numbers anywhere."

"The best answer and countermeasure would have been to have the Me262 flown by only our best fighters we had at the time"

I intend to publish both letters in the revision.

All of the above dialogues because I wanted to better understand from a well respected LW Officer, the contribution of P-51s roaming at will east of Berlin, south of Munich. A lot of 355th FG pilots died strafing German airfields - incented by duty but also by 'acedom' because 8th AF decided to accord a German aircraft destroyed on the ground the same as in the air.

One man's opinion, even Galland's is not enough to make the case about the effectiveness of the LW after April (or May or Pick One) but he did have a responsibility and ultimately fired from his job by Der Fuhrer for not solving the problem. Make your own judgement - I respect your point of view

Regards,

Bill

[FLYBOYJ]

Great info - and hearing it from Galland.

My judgement made.....

[lesofprimus]

My judgement was decided many many years ago... Those same words that Galland spoke of to Bill are facts that have been around for decades.... Nice to have it in his handwriting of course...

No matter how good a pilot was, when being attacked by 4 Mustangs, if u dont have ur wingman on ur @ss, ur done, and even sometimes that wasnt enough...

The other thing to keep in mind when talking about under-trained replacement pilots are the former bomber pilots and twinners that were re-trained as single engine fighter pilots....

"OK Heinz, this is ur first mission in a Focke Wulf... Stay with ur element leader and attack the bombers when he does..."

"What happens if the Mustangs bounce us??"

"Ever use ur parachute before???"

Many many formerally trained pilots were blotted from the sky in those waning months of 44, including some RK winners from their bomber days......

[Erich]

hmmmmmmmmm bomber boys to fighter boys, sounds like JG 301 to me and the jet units KG(J) 51 and 54 with the 262 which were slaughtered with ease

[drgondog]

Dan - you are right of course... I went into a long winded discussion about this very topic just now in the Mustang vs 109/190 thread. It lays out all the reasons I think Jan1 1944 through April, 1944 was the most crucial in the air battles and changing Luftwaffe from the hunter to the hunted..

My premise (and not novel but also not universally agreed either) is that few Mustangs defeated many 109/190/110/410's over the targets that were being attacked by 8th BC but not protected over target until 51s.

the 354(9th) started it with cantakerous 51's on 11 Jan, the the 357 in mid Feb and the 4th in late Feb and then the 355th in early March and finally the 352Fg in early April. They, plus the 20th, 55th and 364th in 38's were all the 8th had for Target support to three bomb divisions. Very few to support very many - against many over the target area.

The 47s could only play when the LW was bold about attacking on the Dutch/German border through the Munster and Dummer Lake area - after that they had to turn back while those nasty 51 jocks had all the fun

So, until so many were shot down in the Target area, heretofore a protected but dangerous hunting preserve (think of B-17s as a Cape), there were plenty of experienced Hans and Fritz' that were great hunters and lions among Buffs.

But faster stronger lions came forth and slew many of the weaker lions even though the weaker lions were many, soon to be few... I know I am going overboard on this subject - but the Mustang over Target would have been an endangered species if it was the 'weaker' lion.

Erich could be right that maybe June/July is a better barometer - but Galland was sure he lost way too many experienced guys in the West before May and forced to pull from Ost Front, South, Bomber pilots, and transport pilot pools to put butts in the seat - and reduce hours in training.

The graveyard spiral got deeper because the 51s weren't just meeting the LW at 26,000 feet - they were everywhere and busy eating all the women and children so that weaker lions were the future product even though Hans Jr and son of Fritz got better 109s and 190s.

By the time this happened the nasty, ugly hybrid Cape Buffalo (ugly and fat and mean but fast - kind of like you) called the P-47 could now also hunt on the preserve and eating their fair share of the women and kids and cousins and grandpas - and it was truly over - when ever you want to say it was over

Thus the fable of the wily Mustang as told by the winners.. magnanimous in historical perspective but cocky to the end -

Regards as Always

Bill

[lesofprimus]

the nasty, ugly hybrid Cape Buffalo (ugly and fat and mean but fast - kind of like you) called the P-47 could now also hunt on the preserve

Hey now, fat I am not... Im 6'6" tall and weigh in at a ripped 225 lbs... I can rip a mans throat out in one grasp, paralyze ur entire left side with 2 fingers and run 10 miles with 75 pounds on my back...

And I have it on good accord that I am one handsome sexy bastardo....

[Njaco]

Excellent post drgondog, but could it be possible that there might be something to what both you and Erich are discussing?

As Galland stated from your post..."The unshackling of the 8th AF fighters, particularly the Mustang, from close support, effectively created nighmares for us in planning, assembling and climbing to sufficient altitude to at least enable diving attacks in sufficient force to overwhelm local escorts. The roaming fighters shot up our airfields, killed our pilots taking off and landing, killed our students and caused frequent shortages of aircraft for local units. The effect was decreasing morale. The time to Split S and dive down (Abschwung) was present.We increasingly moved our units further North and South - which made it difficult to form and attack in large numbers anywhere"

Ok, so now you've got a fairly decent fighter force to go against the heavies, but with the 51s, free from escort and working over the continent like a pack of bees, you're losing the new men and machines and resources.

But once up and able to form, you become that terrible force that can do some damage, as Erich outlined in some attacks in Sept. to Dec. 1944.

I don't think the LW was done in by the summer of 44 but it sure as hell was being slashed at and by the time of the new year 45, you could kindof say, it gave up from exhaustion.

Which may be the point of your opinion. I think the LW was still aforce to be dealt with at least into early 1945 before it became totally spent and wasted.

[drgondog]

I have on good authority that SEALs were considered inadequate wrt lovers and that PIR tpes were preferred. Are you telling me thsi is Untrune?Oh heart be still

I just csnt't believe this. BTW` my jumpmaster in 64 wa the Bragg NCO that that intercepted the collect call from that pitiful SEAL team at Granada when the poor miserable squid called to Bragg (collect) and asked for a fire control mission.

That miserable POS could do 600 squat jumps

Regards,

Bill

[lesofprimus]

To use the word pitiful is not appropriate....

This mission, part of Operation Urgent Fury, is often given a bad rap for the lack of communication and the SEALs using the telephone to call air support from Bragg.... What it was, though, was a poorly conceived operation (senior, non-special operations types planned most of these goat-ropes) conducted during daylight with inadequate intelligence on the enemy forces..... The communications by land-line showed the ingenuity and flexibility of the SEALs, and their ingrained training to do whatever the heck it takes to get the job done - even if it means unusual or unconventional tactics or actions..... SEALs are not designed to fight sustained battles.... Get in, get out quickly without alerting anyone and get out of Dodge....

They held that mansion for over 24 hours....

Also, their close air support Cobras were shot down by AA fire.... What would u do Bill, call ur Mommy and say goodbye I love u??? 3 Marines died in those Cobras....

And Dont forget about the 4 SEALs who died during the Salinas beacon placement mission, MM1 Kenny Butcher, QM1 Kevin Lundbergh, HT1 Stephen Morris and ENCS Robert Schamberger....

[drgondog]

Whoa Dan.. I meant no disrespect to the team. Period.

And apologies to you for my (not well thought out) use of the phrase 'pitiful' which was ONLY in refernce to fouled up communications - not the ability or the courage of anybody there.

This was teasing in a no tease zone!