wiking85
Staff Sergeant
What would the German economy be able to produce without being at war with the Western Allies (no blockade, bombing, or Uboat war)? Let's say that Germany is only at war with the USSR, so can trade with the rest of the world after conquering France and cutting a deal with Britain. Let's assume that Japan still attacks Britain and the US, so that these powers are distracted and aren't involved in undermining the Germans via supporting the Soviets.
So German (and Axis Europe) vs. the USSR. What would production look like from 1941 on assuming German and Britain end their war by March 1941? I've read that historically the Germans were spending as much a 40-50% of the their defense spending on air defense by 1944, though this seems really high to me. From 1942 on the Germans built 1000+ Uboats, while also spending huge resources on the V-1, 2, and 3 programs. By 1943 over 50% of the Luftwaffe was fighting the Western Allies, which left the Soviets with a rapidly diminishing aerial threat before Kursk. Large resources were spent on defenses against Britain and the US in the Atlantic Wall and in Africa/Italy. Also Albert Speer estimated that Allied bombing cost Germany at least 33% of its output in 1944, which I'm not sure if he's counting the penalties caused by dispersal of production, cost of under ground factory construction, and transportation disruption.
Even just the material losses of the bombing campaign were severe for the Germans:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_the_Reich
Even singular campaigns were pretty brutal:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Hamburg_in_World_War_II#Aftermath
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_(RAF_campaign)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flak_tower
Flak-Turm - Weapons and Warfare
Without all of these expenses, what could they have produced to fight just the USSR? Could they equip their allies in Europe better? Could they have developed enough of an aerial threat to force Russia to divert resources to aerial defense? What does 1000 less Uboats mean in terms of other weapons production? How about tens of thousands of less AAA weapons? Does this mean the Axis could gain fire superiority in terms of increased artillery output?
So German (and Axis Europe) vs. the USSR. What would production look like from 1941 on assuming German and Britain end their war by March 1941? I've read that historically the Germans were spending as much a 40-50% of the their defense spending on air defense by 1944, though this seems really high to me. From 1942 on the Germans built 1000+ Uboats, while also spending huge resources on the V-1, 2, and 3 programs. By 1943 over 50% of the Luftwaffe was fighting the Western Allies, which left the Soviets with a rapidly diminishing aerial threat before Kursk. Large resources were spent on defenses against Britain and the US in the Atlantic Wall and in Africa/Italy. Also Albert Speer estimated that Allied bombing cost Germany at least 33% of its output in 1944, which I'm not sure if he's counting the penalties caused by dispersal of production, cost of under ground factory construction, and transportation disruption.
Even just the material losses of the bombing campaign were severe for the Germans:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_the_Reich
Casualties and losses
at least 15,430 aircraft in combat[Note 2]
Est. 18,000 aircraft through bombing[3]
97 submarines[4]
at least 23,000 motor vehicles[5]
At least 700-800 tanks[6]
500,000 civilians[2]
at least 450 locomotives (1943 only)[7]
at least 4,500 passenger wagons (1943 only)[7]
at least 6,500 goods wagons (1943 only)[7]
Even singular campaigns were pretty brutal:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Hamburg_in_World_War_II#Aftermath
Operation Gomorrah killed 42,600 people, left 37,000 wounded and caused some one million German civilians to flee the city.[3] The city's labour force was reduced permanently by ten percent.[3] Approximately 3,000 aircraft were deployed, 9,000 tons of bombs were dropped and over 250,000 homes and houses were destroyed. No subsequent city raid shook Germany as did that on Hamburg; documents show that German officials were thoroughly alarmed and there is some indication from later Allied interrogations of Nazi officials that Hitler stated that further raids of similar weight would force Germany out of the war. The industrial losses were severe, Hamburg never recovered to full production, only doing so in essential armaments industries (in which maximum effort was made).[11] Figures given by German sources indicate that 183 large factories were destroyed out of 524 in the city and 4,118 smaller factories out of 9,068 were destroyed. Other losses included damage to or destruction of 580 industrial concerns and armaments works, 299 of which were important enough to be listed by name. Local transport systems were completely disrupted and did not return to normal for some time. Dwellings destroyed amounted to 214,350 out of 414,500.[12] Hamburg was hit by air raids another 69 times before the end of World War II.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr
In his study of the German war economy, Adam Tooze stated that during the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command severely disrupted German production. Steel production fell by 200,000 tons. The armaments industry was facing a steel shortfall of 400,000 tons. After doubling production in 1942, production of steel increased only by 20 percent in 1943. Hitler and Speer were forced to cut planned increases in production. This disruption caused resulted in the Zulieferungskrise (sub-components crisis). The increase of aircraft production for the Luftwaffe also came to an abrupt halt. Monthly production failed to increase between July 1943 and March 1944. "Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks".[22]
At Essen after more than 3,000 sorties and the loss of 138 aircraft, the "Krupps works...and the town...itself contained large areas of devastation"[4] Krupps never restarted locomotive production after the second March raid.[4]
Operation Chastise caused some temporary effect on industrial production, through the disruption of the water supply and hydroelectric power. The Eder Valley dam "had nothing whatsoever" to do with supplying the Ruhr Area.[23] A backup pumping system had already been put in place for the Ruhr, and Speer's Organisation Todt rapidly mobilized repairs, taking workers from the construction of the Atlantic Wall. The destruction of the Sorpe dam would have caused significantly more damage but since it was a stronger design less likely to be breached it was effectively a secondary target.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Berlin_(RAF_campaign)
This last one resulted in the massive Flaktürme, which were massive resource sinks:These raids caused immense devastation and loss of life in Berlin. The 22 November 1943 raid killed 2,000 Berliners and rendered 175,000 homeless. The following night 1,000 were killed and 100,000 made homeless. During December and January regular raids killed hundreds of people each night and rendered between 20,000 and 80,000 homeless each time.[15] Laurenz Demps figured the losses. He evaluated (1) the damage reports of the Berlin police commissioner (Polizeipräsident) issued after each air raid with descriptions of losses and damages indicated by houses, and distributed to 100–50 organisations and administrations busy with rescue, repair, planning etc., (2) the reports of the main bureau for air raid protection (Hauptluftschutzstelle) of the city of Berlin, issued again in more than 100 copies in altering frequency, each summarising losses and damages by a number of air raids, (3) the war diary of the air raid warning command (Luftwarnkommando, Wako Berlin), a branch of the German air force (Luftwaffe), and (4) various sources on specific damages. According to Demps a total of 7,480 were killed (with an additional 2,194 missing), 17,092 injured and 817,730 made homeless.[16] According to Reinhard Rürup, nearly 4,000 were killed, 10,000 injured and 450,000 made homeless.[4]
The effect of smoke and dust in the air from the bombing and long periods spent in shelters gave rise to symptoms that were called "cellar influenza".[17]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flak_tower
Flak-Turm - Weapons and Warfare
The cost of the massive AA guns like the 128mm cannon were extensive.The building's sheer size was not only the result of the Nazis' passion for monumental architecture. It was in essence an enormous static gun platform – and it fairly bristled with weaponry. At each of its four corners, there was a heavy-calibre anti-aircraft gun. The 128mm 'Dora' flak gun was one of the largest produced during the war, and weighing in at over 25 tonnes – with a further 25-tonne recoil force – it required a substantial structure to support it. In addition, guns of lesser calibres, such as the 20mm Vierling, or four-barrelled 'quad' weapon, were located elsewhere on the roof.
Without all of these expenses, what could they have produced to fight just the USSR? Could they equip their allies in Europe better? Could they have developed enough of an aerial threat to force Russia to divert resources to aerial defense? What does 1000 less Uboats mean in terms of other weapons production? How about tens of thousands of less AAA weapons? Does this mean the Axis could gain fire superiority in terms of increased artillery output?