Greatest aviation related Blunders of WWII

[tomo pauk]

The US mistakes about (but not only) P-38s are well covered in syscom' post:

1) The USAACs criminally slow development of the P38 after Q1 of 1939. And losing the only flying P38 on a cross country publicity stunt was deserving of career ends for some generals.



2) The War Production Boards refusal to allow a 2nd P38 production facility to be built until late in the war when it meant nothing.

3) The USAAFs refusal to produce external drop tanks for use by the P47 and P38 until after heavy bomber losses were to severe to ignore.

IMO the abundant quantities of P-38s in late 1942 would've had much more impact to the war than a P-38 of really great performance, in late 1943.

(for 3), USAAF's P-38s were conducting combat sorties with drop tanks from 1942?)

[GregP]

I think the biggest aviation-related blunder in WWII for Germany was the decision not to produce a strategic bomber, like the Me 264 or the He-277 or not fixing the Me 109 landing gear issue, take your pick.

For the British, it was not fixing the short range of its fighters.

For the Japanese, it was not figuring out the liquid-cooled engine that ran GREAT in Europe ... the DB 600 series. The Japanese never DID get a liquid-cooled engine aircraft going very well.

For the Italians, it was not figuring out mass production and thinking that perfect aerobatics was the answer to aerial combat! Mostly the mass-production issue.

For the Americans it was not putting a turbocharger into Allison-powered fighters except for the P-38.

For the Russians it was not assasinating Stalin early in the war ... or not letting their pilots think for themselves instead of having them controlled by ground personnell who weren't in the aerial fight at the time.

For the French it was apparently flying any aircraft in WW2.

[Gixxerman]

How about Germany not producing the V1 - with range to cover to Portsmouth & Southampton - ready to go just 2 weeks earlier than they did?
If they had been able to make up that short space of time & begun the campaign against the Southern English ports as the D-day build-up was going at full steam then D-day itself would have been placed in grave danger.

I'd also add in the total failure of LW reconaissance to keep the German command informed that this was happening in S. England.

[Shortround6]

The problem with the V-1 was it's really lousy accuracy. Greater London is over 600Sq miles? The Port Cities were much smaller. A much lager percentage of the V-1s would fallen into the sea or on farmland.

[Gixxerman]

The problem with the V-1 was it's really lousy accuracy. Greater London is over 600Sq miles? The Port Cities were much smaller. A much lager percentage of the V-1s would fallen into the sea or on farmland.

For the most part I totally agree with you Shortround6, but that was why I was talking specifically about the timing just before D-day.
The truly vast amount of material gathered ready to go to sea would - I think - have been a perfect target for the V1.

The one proviso being a functioning reconaissance section of the LW before during & after the attacks.

[wuzak]

Or would dropping them on the invasion beaches been a better idea?

Would teh shorter range allow for better accuracy?

[tyrodtom]

Or would dropping them on the invasion beaches been a better idea?

Would teh shorter range allow for better accuracy?

There were more than just allies on the invasion beaches.

[tomo pauk]

The Germans were mostly well dug in.

[renrich]

The Doolittle raid was a public relations stunt which succeeded but a huge blunder from other points of view. It risked one brand new carrier and another that turned out to be a war winner plus other smaller ships for no significant resultant damage. The Hornet had no chance to work up it's air group while on the wild goose chase which was costly at Midway. The Enterprise was kept from being at Coral Sea. With it's air group present, more damage might might have been done to the IJN and the Lexington might have been better protected.

[wuzak]

There were more than just allies on the invasion beaches.

What about after the beaches had been secured by the Allies and were being used to bring in troops and equipment?

[tyrodtom]

They started firing the V1 at London one week after D-Day. But London is a big target, some one posted recently 600 sg miles. At that time they were using huge ramps aimed at London. I suspose by the time ramps could have been built aimed at the beaches, they'd be over run. They didn't know where the invasion would be until it happened.
They fired a combined 5700 V1 and V2's at Antwerp, but didn't even manage one death per missile, though all the alerts had to have disrupted operations some.

[wuzak]

They started firing the V1 at London one week after D-Day. But London is a big target, some one posted recently 600 sg miles. At that time they were using huge ramps aimed at London. I suspose by the time ramps could have been built aimed at the beaches, they'd be over run. They didn't know where the invasion would be until it happened.
They fired a combined 5700 V1 and V2's at Antwerp, but didn't even manage one death per missile, though all the alerts had to have disrupted operations some.

But doesn't that count as a blunder?

They knew, for some time, that an invasion was coming in the west.

Why then did they build fixed installations, rather than the mobile launchers they used later? If they had been set up to use mobile launchers from the start they would have provided a more flexible system, and may have proved more valuable - especially if targetted at the invasion beachs and the temporary harbour the Allies had set up.

[GrauGeist]

I think the biggest aviation-related blunder in WWII for Germany was the decision not to produce a strategic bomber, like the Me 264 or the He-277 or not fixing the Me 109 landing gear issue, take your pick...

While the Me264 had excellent potential, Germany did not have a long range fighter to protect it at the time it was being developed.

As for the Bf109's landing gear...the design did allow for a much lower cost in production and maintenance. The fixed tail wheel later on was one step to cure that.

[GregP]

Not having a long range fighter is no excuse for not having a strategic bomber if you are taking on the world in 1939. It was one of the Thrid Reich's worst downfalls along with having Adoph Hitler as a chief executive and Goering as any position with command authority.

They STILL might have won of they had a strategic bomber, crews, armament, and gas to fly them, and had been nice to the peoples they conquered ... oh, and ... not having attacked the Soviet Unoin. Bad decision in the extreme. Attacking Russia is like sticking your finger into an ant nest; it hurts. Just try it and see.

GrauGeist, you are local. Why not come out to the Planes of Fame and see me any Saturday? I'd be glad to show you around. Ask for Greg Pascal.

[Tante Ju]

I think the biggest aviation-related blunder in WWII for Germany was the decision not to produce a strategic bomber, like the Me 264 or the He-277 or not fixing the Me 109 landing gear issue, take your pick.

Heinkel He 177 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

But I strongly doubt that it would be that advantage for German. I don't see how a single He 177 can do the same job much better than two Ju 88s or He 111.. you do not get but about half the number of heavy strategic bomber than a twin bomber. If France had not fallen, the He 177 would have importance, because basis from England for example would be further. But in practice, the only difference was that He 177s bombing England could do it even from taking off from Germany, just as He 111s could do the same in 1940 by taking off from France bases..