How good was Japanese aviation?

[Glider]

The Ki43 I had a top speed of 308mph and the Ki43II 320 but both only had 2 x HMG and it should be remembered that the IJA HMG was probably the worst of all the fighting nations so it was heavily under gunned. Some early versions only had 2 x LMG or 1xHMG and 1 x LMG

Also I believe that it couldn't dive much as its controls almost locked solid at 350mph and it was standard practice to reduce the engine power before going into a dive as it was clean design and accelerated quickly to 350. With this in mind it was fairly easy for most allied aircraft to evade it asuming they saw it plus of course they had a fair chance of surviving the first burst unless it was particually accurate.

Interesting Quote follows which would mean that although the K143 was fragile it did at least have some armour.

'We were encountering a serious problem by this time. Recent Spitfires seem to have adopted even more powerful engines and and their climb and speed had improved considerably. Chasing and shooting down these enemy fighters with our Hayabusa MkIIs became increasingly difficult. Even if we succeeded in luring them into a close-in dogfight, the skill of the RAF pilots was not bad at all. In clear contrast to the USAAF pilots, the RAF pilots were seasoned veterans. They often seemed to intentionally try to dogfight us rather than using hit-and-run tactics.

So we made our best efforts to improve the rate of climb and maneuvrability of our mounts; stripping down our planes was the primary method. We removed our back armor, head armor (this was also to imrove rear vision), and reducedthe number of oxygen bottles.

Sgt. Masahiro Ikeda, 64th Sentai commenting on the state of battle in Burma , 1944


Nonskimmer is correct when he says that the IJA came up with newer designs such as the KI44, KI61, KI84 and finally the Ki100 which rectified the problems of the Ki43.
The Navy probably stuck with the Zero to long and went to the Raiden which wasn't a success and the Shinden was a lucky development of a floatplane fighter.

[cheddar cheese]

The J2M Raiden was a promising fighter design that could have been active in late 1942/early 1943. As such it encountered several design problems (mainly the engines) and didnt start to see service in any numbers until mid/late 1944.

[R Leonard]

Rich,

can you comment on this text?

According to revisionists, the weave was first used during the battle of Midway, giving credit to Commander Thatch for inventing it, and referred to it as the "Thach Weave."

An article in the Smithsonian magazine, Air & Space, said that Lt. Commander Thach had developed the weave which he said contributed in a large part, "...To the success of the Battle of Midway...." However, Commander Thatch admits he had heard it was used in China. Incidently this weave was used, during our training at Toungoo, and was part of a combat report when the AVG first encounter the Japanese on December 20, 1941.

Yes, I can.

This writing (above) is a case of someone taking words and meanings out of context. And my immediate response is that someone, who likes to throw around words with negative connotations in history circles, such as “revisionists” is apparently either an AVG apologist, at worst, or, at best, an overly enthusiastic AVG booster, or most likely, someone who does not know what a Thach Weave is and is simply keying on the word “Weave”. Regretfully, this goes on and on. Neither the historical timeline, nor an actually examination of what defines the tactics described supports the position that the AVG had anything to do with a Thach Weave type tactic, nor did they independently develop any weave type tactic, nor was Thach at all influenced by the activities of the AVG. Further, if one takes the time to read up on the AVG one finds not a single instance of a description of a Thach Weave type tactic being used in combat.

Thach was aware of tactical developments from the reports he was receiving. Important to note was that Thach worked out the details of his Beam Defense in July 1941. The first 29 of the AVG pilots and ground personnel did not arrive in Toungoo until 1 August 1941. A second contingent of 123 arrived on 18 August. By early September they were conducting training flights in their P-40’s. Kind of makes it a little tough for the AVG to come up first with a “Thach Weave” tactic some two months after Thach had already worked out the details and tested same, eh? Further, Thach and VF-3 were already off to the Pacific by the time the AVG entered its first combat. If indeed, Thach ever saw an AAR from this AVG action it was certainly long, long, after the fact. Kind of makes me wonder exactly when Thach “heard it was used in China” and exactly what did he hear. A quick look at his oral history doesn’t mention weaving in China, nor does Steve Ewing’s recent biography “Thach Weave – The Life of Jimmie Thach”.

When you read up on this first action of the AVG you find that it is an intercept of about a dozen or so Ki-48 (Lily) twin-engined bombers. Without going into detail of the action itself, two of the P-40’s making the intercept, in accordance with the tactics laid out by Chennault, were instructed to remain overhead as a protection against the appearance of Japanese fighters. These two were described as weaving over the action and were referred to as “weavers.” This practice, which in the USN would be called a “high CAP” was, in reality, merely milling about over the action waiting for something to happen. It has absolutely nothing to do with the tactic later called a Thach Weave.

There are even cases of USN fighters weaving, but not in a Thach Weave. At Coral Sea the strike escort F4Fs weaved back an forth over their charges as they made their way towards the Shoho on the 7th and Shokaku on the 8th. This weave was intentional as it permitted the fighters to stay with their slower companions without having to throttle back. Another weave, for certain, but not a Thach Weave.

I think it is important to note, and cannot be repeated enough, that when developing his defensive tactic, Thach did not use the word “weave” at all. He called it a “beam defense”.

Thach deliberately avoided the word “weave” because he was aware of a tactic used by the RAF. If you note the timing of the quote, reporting use of a “weave” in their first combat on 20 Dec 41, obviously, then, the AVG was using a “weave” as well, but long after, as noted, Thach devised his defense. In actuality, the AVG “weave” or “weaver” was not particularly a pure “tactic”, but rather a formation lookout doctrine and was, in fact, the same as noted for the RAF. Oddly enough, the AVG use of weavers in their formations made them somewhat behind the times, doctrinally. For the sake of simplicity, though, I’ll go ahead and refer to the use of weavers as a “tactic” as once there is contact with enemy aircraft it no longer becomes a lookout doctrine, but a defensive tactic.

The “Weave” or “Weaver” was a formation defense developed, again, by the RAF. At its simplist, this involved having the tail-end-charlie of a given formation weave back and forth over the rear of the formation to discourage an overhead or rear attack. In other cases, such as the AVG having a couple of planes milling around over an action, there was more than one weaver, but the intent was the same. What the RAF found was that, and typical of most air forces of the time, the tail-end-charlie tended to be the most junior pilot. So, in retrospect, they were putting the least experienced pilot, or pilots, in a position critical to the defense of the formation. They also found that the Germans, no one ever said they were stupid, had a remarkable tendency to pick off these weavers as there was no one to protect them. The RAF lost a lot of FNGs that way. Eventually, in early 1942, the practice was discontinued for exactly that reason.

Thach was very much aware of this tactic/practice, from briefings and reports from liaison officers and observers, and experimented with it in training with VF-3 on the west coast. At the same time, on the east coast, Lt Cdr Oscar Pedersen’s VF-42 also experimented with concept of protective weavers, both in the spring of 1941. Both squadron commanders, and, of course, their pilots, quickly realized that the poor slob chosen to be weaver had a zero over two pi life expectancy in combat. By the end of May 1941, neither squadron ever considered the use of weavers as a viable tactic. I am unaware of any other USN VF squadrons that may have experimented with weavers.

So, adopted from the RAF, this also was the weave “tactic used by the AVG. I would posit that their use of the practice put them somewhat behind the curve in terms of formation protection.

The comparison of the RAF/AVG Weaver to the Thach Weave is simply a seizure upon the word “weave”. Remember, Thach did not use the word weave for his tactic. The expression Thach Weave did not come into the lexicon until Lt Cdr Jimmy Flatley named it in his after action report for the Battle of Santa Cruz. He recounted how Thach’s Beam Defense tactic had allowed him a successful defense in an almost sure destruction situation during the battle. He wrote: “. . . the four plane division is the only thing that will work and, I am calling it the Thach Weave.” This written in late October 1942.

The Thach Wave, on the other hand is, as stated, a tactic. Here you have, commonly, a four plane-two section division cruising along, probably in a finger four type mode (though in USN practice probably each section leader and his wing man are little closer together than the sections to each other). When attacked (note: “when attacked”) by superior numbers the sections separate farther, to use a naval term “abeam,” to where the distance between the sections is marginally greater that the turning radius at military power. It is the duty of each section to provide, to use an army term, an “overwatch” of the other section. When, say, the starboard side section detects an attack setting up on the port side section, the starboard side section initiates the weave with a turn to port as the enemy commits to his run. The port section see this move, realizes somebody’s starting a gunnery run on them and turns toward the starboard section. This accomplishes a couple of things . . . the turning to starboard creates a high deflection shot for the enemy airplane(s) that if they not particularly trained to do (and most air forces in those days tended to prefer the straight up the rear or head on zero deflection shot) you have spoiled their shot ... the next thing that usually happens is that the enemy is watching the port section and if he attempts to reacquire a sight picture (and he probably will) he’s going to turn to starboard as well, still watching his intended victim. Now the enemy pilot has set himself up for a head on encounter with the approaching starboard section. All he can do is hope for the best, because if he tries to break away he’s only opening himself up for a free low deflection shot from the starboard section ... game, set, match. An illustration of this can be found at

http://www.daveswarbirds.com/navalwar/defense.htm

Bottom line is that weaving about over ones charges on escort or boring holes on the sky keeping a lookout for your squadron mates as the execute an attack is not a Thach Weave. The Thach Weave requires a particular positioning of the division or section and the “weave” is not initiated until the attacking enemy has committed to his run-in.


Regards,

Rich

[FLYBOYJ]

Excellent!

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by vanir

I mean come on. Why don't you just put a pointy hat on and hang some niggers.

Alright vanir we dont need talk like that in this forum. This forum contains people from all walks of life and we will not have people being offended by that kind of talk.

[Cojimar 1945]

The wehrmacht may have had very capable soldiers but since Germany's defeat the country's military is not considered to be among the world's strongest. It seems ironic that the Germans would be so capable yet become irrelevant in the postwar era.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by Cojimar 1945

The wehrmacht may have had very capable soldiers but since Germany's defeat the country's military is not considered to be among the world's strongest. It seems ironic that the Germans would be so capable yet become irrelevant in the postwar era.

I promise you that they are not as irrelevent as you say they are. They may not be that strong on paper but the German military is quite strong.

The soldiers still recieve some of the best training in the world and the German NCO is still one of the top just as it was in WW2.
The German tank force made up of Leopard II's is one of the best tanks to built in modern times.
The German soldiers use G-36 which is a damng good gun.
German Airborne troops are considered very elite.
German mountain troops are the best in the world.
German Airforce is made up of capable aircraft such as the Mig-29 and the Eurofighter (coming on line now).
German Navy is lacking in large explosiveness but the new U-Boots that they are putting out are the most quiet subs in the World.

Where Germany is now lacking is the fact that it is a small force. Because of WW2 they are not allowed to have a larger force. It is for Defense only.

The German ministry however would like to enlargen the force and get more involved in international affairs with NATO. It just does not look like it will be approved.

[Glider]

Have to agree with Deralder on his comments and would suggest that the other problem is the Policians holding the soldiers back. I believe that the Germans in Afganistan would like to do more to assist the USA, Canadian and British troops in teir hotspots but its the lack of will at home that it stopping them.

[plan_D]

But, no offence to Germany, the world is justified to be at least mildly cautious. Personally, I would not be because Germany is a great ally (and a great country) but I don't blame NATO for being cautious over a German armament.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by Glider

Have to agree with Deralder on his comments and would suggest that the other problem is the Policians holding the soldiers back. I believe that the Germans in Afganistan would like to do more to assist the USA, Canadian and British troops in teir hotspots but its the lack of will at home that it stopping them.

The problem is in fighting between polotical parties. Some wishing to be more involved and some wishing to keep Germansy military as a pure defence force.

[the lancaster kicks ass]

smaller forces are typical of Europe though, the up side of it is that European troops tend to be better trained than those of larger forces, and often in very specialised roles over the wide range of enviropments found in Europe, but a lot of the forces wouldn't be as strong as they are if it weren't for the strong international co-operation in Europe, but as a side note Adler what is the German strength limited to?

[mkloby]

Originally Posted by the lancaster kicks ass

smaller forces are typical of Europe though, the up side of it is that European troops tend to be better trained than those of larger forces, and often in very specialised roles over the wide range of enviropments found in Europe, but a lot of the forces wouldn't be as strong as they are if it weren't for the strong international co-operation in Europe, but as a side note Adler what is the German strength limited to?

I know that you're speaking in general terms, but I want to point this out regarding the "better trained because they're smaller" argument: the US trains several other nation's pilots!
This is only other nations pilots that I have trained with:
Germany
Italy - Regia Marina
Spain
Denmark
India

I know for sure that all the Italian naval aviators are trained in the US, and I believe that it's the other nation's naval aviators not AF pilots that we train.
I'm sure there are even more, as this is just from my personal experience.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by the lancaster kicks ass

but as a side note Adler what is the German strength limited to?

Not sure. The Bundeswehr at the hight of the Cold War had 495,000 military personel. In 1990 it was reduced to 370,000. I has since been reduced again to a little more than 250,000 personel of which 50,000 are conscripts.

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by plan_D

Vice-Admiral Nagumo Chuichi arrived in the Bay of Bengal on the 2nd April, 1942 with five aircraft carriers to attack Trincomalee in Ceylon. Vice-Admiral Ozawa Jisabura attacked Cocanda and Vizagapatam on the 5th April. On the 9th Trincomalee was attacked by Nagumo and the RAF attacked Nagumo's flagship, the Akagi.

I'm finding the proper information but that's what I can remember. So, naturally, the Zero would have been met by the RAF.

A good general source for Allied fighters v the Japanese Army and Navy fighters is "Bloody Shambles" by Shores, first 2 vols about 1941-42 SEA, a third recent one about Burma for the rest of the war. Afficianados pick at minor errors in his chronologies, but still a remarkable book. Two other narrower ones "Flying Tigers" by Ford and "Doomed at the Start" by Bartsch (US fighters in the Philippines 1941-42).

The AVG did not meet JNAF A6M's. Their opposition was mostly JAAF, ie. Army, Type 97's (Ki-27 later dubbed "Nate") with increasing proportion of Type 1's (Ki-43, "Oscar") as time went one. The AVG outscored the JAAF around 3:1 (accepting Japanese loss records), strictly fighter v fighter ratio.

The RAF met mainly Japanese Army fighters too, but did meet the A6M's in some cases over Malaya, and then in the Japanese raids on Ceylon. The exchange ratio's throughout were heavily in favor of the Japanese well over 3:1 against the Brits, sometimes much worse (eg. Ceylon). There are many extenuating circumstance, not to start an AVG v. RAF or general Brits/US debate thread, but this is the apparent fact, per Shores which uses both sides' records. The Hurricane didn't even have >1 exchange ratio even against the Nate.

The USAAF P-40's in Philippines, Dutch East Indies and defence of Australia in up to mid 1942 mainly met the JNAF and were on the short end of around 1:3 ratio. They did OK in their few encounters with the JAAF, all cases Nates.

The USN F4F's didn't meet intense Japanese fighter opposition until May '42 so it's not quite apples and apples with "come as you are" fighting the landbased Allied fighters had to do in SEA. The USN/USMC F4F's achieved an exchange ratio of almost exactly 1:1 v A6M's from May to November (climax of G'canal). They didn't meet any JAAF fighters till early 1943. Sources there are Lundstrom "First Team" 2 volumes and Frank "Guadalcanal".

The Japanese fighter units, especially their navy, had excellent success in general in 1942, for whatever combination of plane, tactical, supply, strategic intiative (but not numerical superiority overall in general) etc etc reasons, that's the fact, absolutely not a myth. What would happen in a paper or computer match up of the planes, in an operational vacuum?, I've no idea. Nobody consistently beat the JNAF fighters in the real situation until well into 1943. The USN tie was the best Allied perforamce in 1942 against them. How the AVG would have done against the JNAF, given its unmatched success among Allied units v the JAAF, is a very interesting what if.

Joe

[FLYBOYJ]

This was from an earlier post...

Here is an amazing wesite.....

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroo...of_tables.html

I found in there a table for 1942 Kills/ Losses

FEAF (China excluded) Fighters only (P-39s and P-40s)....

FEAF
LOSSES
Jan - 0
Feb - 44
Mar - 12
Apr - 0
May - 32
Jun - 28
Jul - 11
Aug - 11
Sep - 10
Oct - 0
Nov - 32
Dec - 8

FEAF
KILLS
Jan 0
Feb 20
Mar 14
Apr 14
May 14
Jun 20
Jul 4
Aug 41
Sep 0
Oct 6
Nov 25
Dec 54

For entire 1942 the FEAF lost 148 aircraft in air-to-air combat while destroying 212 = 1.43 to 1 FEAR vs Japan. You could slice numbers and do more research and attempt to insert Japanese aircraft by type, but considering the most numerous aircraft were the Zero and Oscar, these numbers do not represent great success by the Japanese. If you note Dec 1942, it's the month the P-38 began heavy operations.

If you go to the site the remaining years shown on these tables show a huge lop-sided picture with one month showing 130 kills for 19 losses (Aug. 1943).