Interesting P-38 Comments

[Tony Williams]

An interesting letter on the Gabelschwanz Teufel site:

20th Fighter Group Headquarters
APO 637 U.S. Army
(E-2)

3 June 1944

Subject: P-38 Airplane in Combat.

To: Commanding General, VIII Fighter Command, APO 637, U.S. Army.

1. The following observations are being put in writing by the undersigned at the request of the Commanding General, VII FC. They are intended purely as constructive criticism and are intended in any way to "low rate" our present equipment.

2. After flying the P-38 for a little over one hundred hours on combat missions it is my belief that the airplane, as it stands now, is too complicated for the 'average' pilot. I want to put strong emphasis on the word 'average, taking full consideration just how little combat training our pilots have before going on as operational status.

3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure.

4. In my limited experience with a P-38 group, we have lost as least four (4) pilots, who when bounced, took no immediate evasive action. The logical assumption is that they were so busy in the cockpit, trying to get organized that they were shot down before they could get going.

5. The question that arises is, what are you going to do about it? It is standard procedure for the group leader to call, five minutes before R/V and tell all the pilots to "prepare for trouble". This is the signal for everyone to get into auto rich, turn drop tank switches on, gun heaters on, combat and sight switches on and to increase RPM and manifold pressure to maximum cruise. This procedure, however, does not help the pilot who is bounced on the way in and who is trying to conserve his gasoline and equipment for the escort job ahead.

6. What is the answer to these difficulties? During the past several weeks we have been visited at this station time and time again by Lockheed representatives, Allison representatives and high ranking Army personnel connected with these two companies. They all ask about our troubles and then proceed to tell us about the marvelous mechanisms that they have devised to overcome these troubles that the Air Force has turned down as "unnecessary". Chief among these is a unit power control, incorporating an automatic manifold pressure regulator, which will control power, RPM and mixture by use of a single lever. It is obvious that there is a crying need for a device like that in combat.

7. It is easy to understand why test pilots, who have never been in combat, cannot readily appreciate what each split second means when a "bounce" occurs. Every last motion when you get bounced is just another nail in your coffin. Any device which would eliminate any of the enumerated above, are obviously very necessary to make the P-38 a really effective combat airplane.

8. It is also felt that that much could done to simplify the gas switching system in this airplane. The switches {valve selector handles} are all in awkward positions and extremely hard to turn. The toggle switches for outboard tanks are almost impossible to operate with gloves on.

9. My personal feeling about this airplane is that it is a fine piece of equipment, and if properly handled, takes a back seat for nothing that the enemy can produce. But it does need simplifying to bring it within the capabilities of the 'average' pilot. I believe that pilots like Colonel Ben Kelsey and Colonel Cass Huff are among the finest pilots in the world today. But I also believe that it is difficult for men like them to place their thinking and ability on the level of a youngster with a bare 25 hours in the airplane, going into his first combat. That is the sort of thinking that will have to be done, in my opinion, to make the P-38 a first-class all around fighting airplane.

HAROLD J. RAU
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

[FLYBOYJ]

Interesting memo - I have to laugh about this part...

"3. As a typical case to demonstrate my point, let us assume that we have a pilot fresh out of flying school with about a total of twenty-five hours in a P-38, starting out on a combat mission. He is on a deep ramrod, penetration and target support to maximum endurance. He is cruising along with his power set at maximum economy. He is pulling 31" Hg and 2100 RPM. He is auto lean and running on external tanks. His gun heater is off to relieve the load on his generator, which frequently gives out (under sustained heavy load). His sight is off to save burning out the bulb. His combat switch may or may not be on. Flying along in this condition, he suddenly gets "bounced", what to do flashes through his mind. He must turn, he must increase power and get rid of those external tanks and get on his main. So, he reaches down and turns two stiff, difficult gas switches {valves} to main - turns on his drop tank switches, presses his release button, puts the mixture to auto rich (two separate and clumsy operations), increases his RPM, increases his manifold pressure, turns on his gun heater switch (which he must feel for and cannot possibly see), turns on his combat switch and he is ready to fight. At this point, he has probably been shot down or he has done one of several things wrong. Most common error is to push the throttles wide open before increasing RPM. This causes detonation and subsequent engine failure. Or, he forgets to switch back to auto rich, and gets excessive cylinder head temperature with subsequent engine failure."

Col. Rau gives a "worse case scenario" not only for flying a P-38, but for flying any twin engine aircraft. The switches he describes are no different on say A P-47 or P-51, the only problem there is 2 of them. See for your self in some of these links and the way the P-38, P-47 and P-51 cockpits are laid out.

P-38 COCKPIT

More P-47 Suff

More P-51 Stuff from real P-51 Mustang pilot and mechanic's manuals

Everything he describes could be held for the same on any other single engine aircraft - I see bias here but agree with his premise that a low time pilot of that era needed a lot more training to be proficient in the P-38...

[Jank]

Tony,

The Report of Joint Fighter Conference 1944 had similar criticisms of the P-38. Too complicated. Poor visibility was also criticized.

[Glider]

Do we know if these changes or at least some of them were made on later versions of the plane?

[Jank]

I don't know. However, The Report of Joint Fighter Conference 1944 used a "J" model in it's testing.

[wmaxt]

Originally Posted by Glider

Do we know if these changes or at least some of them were made on later versions of the plane?

Yes, many changes were made to the systems of the later P-38s
1. Two generators were added with the early J's - the single generator is singled out by Art Heiden as one of the worst problems for the early P-38s because the props were electrically controlled.
2, Turbo controls became automatic in the Js.
3. Cooling flaps became automatic with manual override in the J models - major engine and turbo problems esp at altitude were directly related to cold (~130deg oil at the engine) engine oil, mostly resulting from improper operating techniques.
4, Prop/mixture controls were simplified. a two setting mixture control was implemented in the H and Lockheed had a unified prop/mixture/throttle control designed but was denied permission to install it by the War Production Board.
5, Fuel system was redone to provide crossfeed from any internal tank to either engine.
6, heat ducting to the cockpit was redesigned for the J-25 and L models.
7, Hydraulic controls for the ailerons.
8, Almost forgot one of the most important, Intercoolers were changed to core type with auto temp control on the Js eliminating the too cool/overheated air issues the earlier aircraft had, and eliminating both a cockpit load and increasing hp by ~250hp each engine (the H had the same engines as the J but the intercoolers allowed full output).

As Colonel Rau mentioned the performance of the P-38 was great but the experience with combat and twin engines to low time pilots with inadequate training was a very great issue. As Flyboy pointed out the controls weren't that different from any other fighter of that era.

wmaxt

[FLYBOYJ]

The fact that in June, 1944 he's still talking about early P-38 problems shows the bias. Bulb on the gun sight burning out?? Gun Heater (The report is June 44)??? This guy should of gotten a Pulitzer!

[Twitch]

When you can't SEE the enemy you are in sad shape. In the ETO P-38 never had the defroster problem satisfactorily solved. Forget all the rest. When you have to carry rags and smear the perspex up to continually clear the frost and fog away at higher altitudes you can't even see enemy planes out gunning for you! Game over!

[FLYBOYJ]

That I agree 100%

[Gnomey]

Yep, if your are seen before you see your enemy your are as good as dead. The classic bounce...

[V-1710]

About the intercooler redesign on the J models: They solved one problem, but created another. The increased capacity of the core intercoolers over the leading edge duct type lessened the likelyhood of detonation at high boost settings, but the redesigned oil coolers introduced at the same time were too efficient (for conditions in the ETO), and caused the motor oil to thicken at high altitudes, resulting in the 'Allison Time Bomb'. It took some time to figure out that poor oil flow due to cold temps. was causing engine failures (it sure wasn't happening in the South Pacific). Overall, there's no denying the P-38 was best suited for the Pacific, though I think given time the P-38 could have been just as effective in Europe.

[wmaxt]

Originally Posted by V-1710

About the intercooler redesign on the J models: They solved one problem, but created another. The increased capacity of the core intercoolers over the leading edge duct type lessened the likelyhood of detonation at high boost settings, but the redesigned oil coolers introduced at the same time were too efficient (for conditions in the ETO), and caused the motor oil to thicken at high altitudes, resulting in the 'Allison Time Bomb'. It took some time to figure out that poor oil flow due to cold temps. was causing engine failures (it sure wasn't happening in the South Pacific). Overall, there's no denying the P-38 was best suited for the Pacific, though I think given time the P-38 could have been just as effective in Europe.

I don't deny these things happened in the ETO but I've done some comparisons so please think about this:

1. The Aleutions had temps of -150f ON THE GROUND. The were no complaints regarding heat in cockpits, engine/turbo problems etc.
2. A significant number of escort and strategic strike missions were flown above 20,000' in ALL THEATERS, its -30/-40f at that altitudes everywhere, there were no complaints of heat, or bad engines/turbos.
3. the 20th FG had 4 losses due to failed engines.
4. the 8th AF flew between 75,000/100,000 sorties with P-38s. These included bombing, PR, G/A, training and escort missions with 451 aircraft lost. They also flew P-51s for 170,000/190,000 sorties primarily escort missions for a loss of 2,201 P-51s. Five times the P-51s lost as P-38s for ~2 times the sorties. The P-38s flew G/A much more that the P-51s though the P-51s did strikes after escorting the bombers out. The difference is that the P-51 made one pass then went to the next target, the P-38s were on orders to stay until the target was destroyed.
5. In March 45, the 428th F/B squadron flew their P-38J/Ls on 662 sorties for 8 aborts. That same month the 359th FS with P-51Ds flew 404 sorties with 22 aborts. Granted this was after these guys figured the P-38s out.

First its obvious the problems were greatly exaggerated.
Second, if you look at the operating procedures of the units everywhere but in Europe they normally flew with 25"-30" map and 2,000rpm, in the ETO they often flew with 18" and 2.500rpm. The lower map meant:
1. Less apparent compression resulting in higher fuel consumption.
2. Colder oil leading to higher turbo and engine failures.
3. Colder exhaust manifolds meant colder cockpits, granted they weren't very good at their best, lower pressure made it worse.

This is what Doolittle had to say about the P-38 in Europe as related to Warren Bodie in his book on the P-38.

The P-38 may not have been the best fighter in WWII, but concedes that this can probably be factors unrelated to the aircrafts capability's. Strategic and tactical doctrine proved to be a severe handicap to utilization of the type at the time the first groupers were deployed in northern Europe. Both the P-47 and P-51Bs would have faired poorly under the rules then prevailing, but it is necessary to recognize that neither type was developed or mass produced until later.

And

In his personal opinion was that on the balance the P-38 was far ahead of all but one or two of the most outstanding fighters of WWII. It was certainly the most versatile, outstripping even its contemporaries of the war years because it served widely and effectively in combat as an air-to-air combat fighter, long range escort fighter, dive/skip bomber, strategic bomber, tactical fighter/bomber, PR and radar equipped night fighter.

Those are Doolittle's thoughts.

My point is that these issues were there but they weren't as great as publicized or completely the fault of the aircraft.

Check this mission out P-38s escorting Mossies to Singapore.
Timur-I-Leng: Mission over Singapore

wmaxt

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by wmaxt

1. The Aleutions had temps of -150f ON THE GROUND. The were no complaints regarding heat in cockpits, engine/turbo problems etc.

-150F? That must be a typo

2. A significant number of escort and strategic strike missions were flown above 20,000' in ALL THEATERS, its -30/-40f at that altitudes everywhere, there were no complaints of heat, or bad engines/turbos.

Escort/bombing missions in the PTO and CBI were always done at far lower altitudes.

Check this mission out P-38s escorting Mossies to Singapore.
Timur-I-Leng: Mission over Singapore

I posted informnation about that several months ago. That has to be the record for range for a fighter mission. Not even the 7th AF P47N's went on mission lenghts like that over Japan.

[Jank]

Report of Joint Fighter Conference 1944

P-38L (above I indicated that they tested a J model. My mistake) These are not criticisms in relation to other allied aircraft but just absolute criticisms recorded in an attempt to determine the negative attributes of the aircraft that ought to be addressed by aircraft manufacturers for future fighter design.

The report is what it is. Accept it. Reject it. But realize it is the CRITICAL evaluation of fighter and test pilots trying to determine the NEGATIVE aspects of this aircraft.


Cockpit (separate critical comments from fighter and test pilots)

Complicated

Controls inaccessible

Crowded

Instrument panel and windshield too far away

Many switches could not be reached with harness locked - including auto override switches

Position of tabs poor

No landing grear position indicator

Visibility not good

Combat Qualities (separate critical comments from fighter and test pilots)

Bad visibility to sides and down

Would rather have F4U or F6F for Pacific

Would not consider this a modern fighting aircraft

Poor coordinatin of control forces and effectiveness, combined with weak directional stability make it a poor gun platform, and its manueverability is so low as to preclude its use in modern combat.

Too complicated and full of gadgets - would make serviceability rating low

Too much mechanical equipment for one man to operate in combat

[davparlr]

Originally Posted by Jank

Report of Joint Fighter Conference 1944

P-38L (above I indicated that they tested a J model. My mistake) These are not criticisms in relation to other allied aircraft but just absolute criticisms recorded in an attempt to determine the negative attributes of the aircraft that ought to be addressed by aircraft manufacturers for future fighter design.

The report is what it is. Accept it. Reject it. But realize it is the CRITICAL evaluation of fighter and test pilots trying to determine the NEGATIVE aspects of this aircraft.


Cockpit (separate critical comments from fighter and test pilots)

Complicated

Controls inaccessible

Crowded

Instrument panel and windshield too far away

Many switches could not be reached with harness locked - including auto override switches

Position of tabs poor

No landing grear position indicator

Visibility not good

Combat Qualities (separate critical comments from fighter and test pilots)

Bad visibility to sides and down

Would rather have F4U or F6F for Pacific

Would not consider this a modern fighting aircraft

Poor coordinatin of control forces and effectiveness, combined with weak directional stability make it a poor gun platform, and its manueverability is so low as to preclude its use in modern combat.

Too complicated and full of gadgets - would make serviceability rating low

Too much mechanical equipment for one man to operate in combat

Something you must remember about this report. The non-operating sevice and contractors flew each aircraft. That means Navy pilots and contractor pilots flew the P-38. Now if there is one thing that Navy pilots hated more than the Japs (using a WWII term here) was Army pilots followed closely by Army planes. And the P-38 was their direct competition, therefore, was probably their most hated Army plane. I doubt if they would have said positive things about the F8F, if it was an Army plane! Most Army plane reviews were mostly negative except for the P-51D, they seem to have some trouble criticizing it, but then (1944) it was not competing with the Navy in the Pacific.