July 26, 1941. Build the Far East Air Force. (1 Viewer)

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The A-24s should provide a potent offensive punch at virtually any point on Luzon flying from either Clark or Nichols. I believe the 1,000 pound bomb radius was about 225 miles and 500# pound range used for CV searches was closer to 300 miles. I can't recall whether these ranges are in nm or sm.
... Found the SBD range reference.... I am assuming, based on published numbers (Lundstrom Fletcher book) 175 and 225 nm that max combat radius was 200 and 260 sm with the 1942 CV battles providing the basis for the estimate.
Somewhat strangely, since the USN quoted a/c speeds in kts, all official USN data for their a/c ranges in WWII era are in statute, ie land, miles. Even when authors quote US WWII naval a/c ranges in nautical miles, they are often mistakenly assuming the official ranges are nm, rather than correctly converting the official land mile ranges.

The SBD-5 without drop tanks had similar characteristics to the SBD-2/3 which USN used in 1942 and which equated to early A-24's. The SBD-5's official radius with 1000# bomb was quoted in the original document "Airplane Characteristics and Performance" dated June 1 1944 as 240 statute miles. However this assumed highly conservative reserves for carrier operations (which are given in detail in the document). A land based SBD could be expect to safely range farther, especially in a mainly overland flight, as from a Luzon base against transports unloading just offshore.

Note though that we have a reality check on Army A-24's v Japanese shipping only a few months later in the DEI. They managed to sink one Japanese transport, a relatively unusual event for the Allies in that portion of the war, and avoided interception by Zeroes. But on one of the two missions their P-40 escort was almost wiped out by Zeroes. Eventually the A-24's also would have suffered heavy losses to Zeroes (as they eventually did in New Guinea, after which the USAAF swore off the a/c for use in areas with enemy fighters).

IMHO some 'what ifs' have a hard time dealing with the basic reality that Japanese air units at this stage of the war were just better trained and prepared than US Army ones. Switching around the types of a/c might gain another bomb hit here or there but isn't going to change anything dramatically. The bottom line is that the modern US Army fighter force could not stand on equal terms with the Zero force. This was repeatedly demonstrated in encounters over the early months of the war beyond the PI; it applied as much or more for the other Allied fighter arms in action at the time (RAF, Dutch). And there was a strict ceiling on what bombers could accomplish in face of enemy fighter superiority.

OTOH if you magically assume USAAF competence typical of around a year later, even B-17 units will score hits against ships in low altitude strikes, including at night (as B-17's did in several cases in Solomons in late 42-early 43), besides P-40 units standing up to Zeroes on at least roughly equal terms (though still no better than that); and IJN AA was even more deficient against such attacks in Dec 41 as a year later. But it's unrealistic. The USAAC of Dec '41, trying desperately to expand in size from a quite small force even in 1940, just wasn't the USAAF of spring 1943. It was necessarily cutting lots of corners on material and training readiness to build raw numbers, and its leaders were still subject to a peacetime mentality, in particular to systematically underestimating a potential opponent about whom they knew almost nothing. Frankly the latter tendency still has slight echoes even now, 70 years later, which makes it all the more ironic to assume the USAAC of then could have understood and countered Japanese capabilities. There was no alternative to US forces learning hard lessons about the Japanese in defeat, IMO.

Joe
 
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An excellent summary Joe! I was remiss in not adding the poor quality of VP operations at that stage of the war which didn't really improve substantially until the later half of 1942 with the maturation of black cat operations and better aircraft communications ID organization.... the latter sounds like it would require a pretty simple fix but it took a while to incorporate.

As you and others have more eloquently ponted out, the USA just wasn't ready for war in any of he many ways it needed to be as a nation and it took almost a year for the shock of PH and war to wear off. Looking at the USA's military capability as only specificaions on paper fails to reveal just how unprepared it was beyond numbers and strategy. How could the US force of modern cruisers have been beaten so badly at Savo Island? On paper it makes no sense whatsoever, considering the USN had search and fire control RADAR in its favor. Nearly a year after PH, the USA didn't know how to fight with the weapons it had, let alone with the ones it hoped to develop.It had yet to absorb just how good were the weapons and skill of its opponent. This despite the fact it had been warned by Chennault about the Zero and by Hart (I believe) about the Long Lance.
 
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Which is why they shouldn't be piddled away on missions that aren't important. The light bombardment group(s) should be at 100% strength 22 Dec 1941 when 27 Japanese troop transports steam into Lingayen Gulf. Destroy those transports and the battle is won, even if it costs every aircraft in FEAF.
 
Dave,

Let's look at a successful example of this kind of an operation and try to extrpolate back in time. The date is November 16, 1942. Enterprise dive bombers and those from Henderson field have searched for and found the 11 transports carrying 7,000 troops and their dozen or so surface escorts (mainly DDs) they have been expecting, all heading South to reinforce the IJA Guadacanal garrison. The IJN convoy is cyclically covered by perhaps 6 zeros from the nearby Junyo or from land based staged through Buka. Recall that this action occurs after the IJN's big deck carriers have had their air wings savaged during the battle of Santa Cruz so they are not able to play a role. The USN/USMC strike includes roughly 2 dozen aicraft (SBDs and TBFs) covered by 8 F4Fs and 4 Army P-39s. They were able to fataly damage 3 transports while losing none of their own US aircraft although some were damaged. Therafter the full weight of the combined Cactus and Enterprise strike force (over 40 VB with as many escorts) was felt as they apparently fataly damaged or sunk another 4 transports even though protected by a number of zeroes. But let's only consider the results of that first strike of the day.

On December 22nd, 1941, the Japanese approached Lingayen Gulf with 76 transports carrying 80,000 IJA soldiers covered by a force of Formosa roughly 200 land and carrier based fighters which had apparent access to airfields in Northern Luzon if needed. Yes, the zeros would have been attrited by the air battles over Luzon, but they must have had replacements in the pipeline becaue their factories were building aircraft and they had interior lines of supply. Also, if things hadn't gone their way. They could ultimately call on 6 big deck carriers with over 100 fighters to cover their invasion fleet. Even if they hadn't been piddled away, it seems to me the odds are hugely stacked against them. Based on what happened a year later under far more benigh circumstances, they could take out perhaps a dozen of the 76 ships. That would have been a severe blow to the IJ forces but I don't think a fatal one. And the USAAF strike aircraft are being attrited with every attack they make. That's my devils advocate take on the situation. I wish it weren't so but that's how it looks to me. I think I mentioned I started out a week or so ago thinking something could be done to reverse the historic outcome and salavage some kind of victory from the disaster. I don't think that now... :(

What if is a fun thing to do but in this case it just seems to be hopeless without some kind of miracle like a Pro-Phillipine version of the Divine Wind.

PS: If you contest the smaller landings in the North and South you may prevent them from obtaining those smaller beachheads but you also attrite you small force of bombers which diminishes your ability to contest the main assault.

OC
 
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On December 22nd, 1941, the Japanese approached Lingayen Gulf with 76 transports carrying 80,000 IJA soldiers
Where are you getting these numbers? The IJA assigned a low priority to the Philippine operation. IJA 14th Army that invaded during December 1941 was in fact just a weak infantry corps.

IJA 48th Infantry Divsion.
Landed at Lingayen Gulf using 27 troop transports.
Personnel and equipment at full strength but the unit was green as grass, having been raised on Formosa during 1940. LTG Homma considered this to be his only first rate ground combat unit.

IJA 16th Reserve Infantry Division.
Landed at Lamon Bay. As one would expect of a reserve unit this division had older equipment and personnel. Physical fitness and training were not up to active duty division standards.

IJA 65th Garrison Brigade.
Not part of the invasion per se. It was supposed to assume garrison duty after the U.S. surrender. However Japan transferred 48th Infantry Division to Java 14 January 1942, leaving Gen. Homma desperately short of infantry. So these military police were forced to participate in the Bataan operation.

Destroy IJA 48th Infantry Division by sinking their transports and the Japanese invasion of Luzon will be derailed. The relatively weak IJA 16th Reserve Division would be outnumbered 10 to 1. Even someone as inept as Big Mac can win that fight.
 
Chris Shores: Bloody Shambles. page 193 says 76 transports, plus two cruisers and 20 destroyers... Is he wrong? Of course if it's a total of about two dozen transports, taking out half may could make all the difference in detering further aggression.

OTOH, He states they proceeded down the gulf in three columns the first of which started landing the first of the total of 3.5 divisions you cite. This seems to correspond with the Guadacanal situation where a smaller force also approached in three columns.

Where are your numbers coming from? Let's compare perhaps there's more here than I believed. :?:
 
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Which numbers? Chris Shores for the transports and the aircraft previously posted on Formosa and other sources for IJN carriers (I almost know those without looking them up)

You've just listed another 36 Ki-27s I hadn't included in my totals! I haven't even been thinking about the ground forces, just focusing on USAAF assets and IJA IJN air assets in theater. One factor I found out about last night that could have hypothetically turned the tables, was the presence of the 27 USN submarines lying beneath Manilla bay!!! That's a lot of subs if only their torpedos had worked. Game over.
 
:?:
36 Ki-27s were assigned to IJA 14th Army.

What other Ki-27s are you counting? Aircraft, naval vessels, troops transports and IJA divisions assigned to support operations in Malaya (the priority Japanese operation) weren't available in the Philippines. In fact IJA 14th Army had to give up part of what little they had during January 1942 for higher priority operations elsewhere. From mid January to mid March 1942 the Japanese were badly outnumbered on Luzon. If Big Mac had shown any initiative at all he could have attacked from Bataan and overwhelmed the tiny IJA force containing him.
 
OK. I won't take a back seat to anyone on this thread when it comes to a knowledge of the ACTUAL history of what went down with the FEAF in the PI in '41-42. But these what'ifa, would'a, could'a, should'a scenarios are being taken to the extreme. History is what is. It seems to me IMHP that this thread has become a competition about who knows the most about troop strength , how many A/C were on hand and the performance of a number of aircraft that were never slated to go to the PI
in Operation Plum or any other effort to reinforce the PI prior to Dec. 8th. It was a combination of limited
resources, human error and bad luck that contributed to what happened in the PI on Dec. 8th. BUT, the bottom line is that the PI were lost regardless of what the FEAF could have done before or after the the initial attack.

Duane
 
Somehow, I thought you meant there was another 36 aircraft in cargo holds for unloading. Sorry. But our numbers still don't agree.

According to Shores there were about 37+ Ki-27s operating out of small airstrips at Appari and Vigan in Northern Luzon after the 11th. According to Shores these were a portion of the 72 Ki-27s based on Formosa (the 24th Sentai at Hengchun and 50th Sentai at Chaochou each with 36 Ki-27s) both assigned to 14th army support. Some portion of these had flown in from Formosa via the small airfields on the recently captured Batan or Camiguin Islands.

So I come back to the total fighter aircraft available being about 200 comprised of a mixture of A6M (90) and Ki-27 (72) on Formosa, A5M (28) including 12 on Formosa and 16 on the Ryujo).

This compares to the number of fighters (about 176) Shores' seems to believe were available for operations in Indo China. That doesn't sound like a minimum effort in the PI, especially of you assume the big deck carriers were operating somewhere to the East of the PI and DEI to shield their Eastern flank.

Shores' claims about 400 IJN (150+) IJA (260+) fighters were available for all ops to the South (PI, Malaya ultimately DEI) of the home islands.

What is/are the source for a total of 36 Ki-27s supporting 14th army? Maybe Shores' is incorrect.
 
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According to Shores there were about 37+ Ki-27s operating out of small airstrips at Appari and Vigan in Northern Luzon after the 11th.
That's plausible as it's only one more Ki-27 then was assigned to 14th Army on Dec 8, 1941. Apparently they received 1 more replacement then what was lost in combat. Those were the only aircraft assigned directly to 14th Army during December 1941.

During March 1942 the IJN assigned a 23rd Air Flotilla detachment to Luzon.
.....18 dive bombers. Probably Vals.
.....9 fighters. Probably Zeros.

Japanese 14th Army had no other naval aircraft in direct support. 11th Air Fleet bombed the Manila area from Formosa during the first week of December 1941 for the purpose of destroying American submarines and heavy bombers. After that task was accomplished those aircraft were transferred to the East Indies and eventually New Guinea.

Aircraft from CVL Ryujo were used only to cover amphibious landings. As of 20 December 1941 IJN Ryujo airwing consisted of 12 fighter aircraft and 16 torpedo bombers. That single fighter squadron isn't going to stop or even seriously hinder a mass attack escorted by a couple squadrons of P-40 fighter aircraft.
 
1. That's plausible as it's only one more Ki-27 then was assigned to 14th Army on Dec 8, 1941. Apparently they received 1 more replacement then what was lost in combat. Those were the only aircraft assigned directly to 14th Army during December 1941.

2. During March 1942 the IJN assigned a 23rd Air Flotilla detachment to Luzon.
.....18 dive bombers. Probably Vals.
.....9 fighters. Probably Zeros.

Aircraft from CVL Ryujo were used only to cover amphibious landings. As of 20 December 1941 IJN Ryujo airwing consisted of 12 fighter aircraft and 16 torpedo bombers. That single fighter squadron isn't going to stop or even seriously hinder a mass attack escorted by a couple squadrons of P-40 fighter aircraft.
But your basic scenario is a hodge podge of unrealistic what if assumption (that the FEAF would hide its strength until the Lingayen Gulf landings) put together with the actual lesser Japanese air strength by that time because *they knew the FEAF had been largely neutralized*.

Even assuming (unrealistically IMO) that the FEAF could have had any number of *properly trained and ready* A-24 units, they would have been used to counter the landings in Northern Luzon Dec 10, just as the B-17 force was, and the suriviving fighters too. I doubt a realistic size and capability A-24/P-40 force would have inflicted devastating damage on even that smaller Northern Luzon force. But in any case, the Japanese would have time and resources to realign things to meet that threat, by keeping the Tainan and 3rd Air Groups around (ie the landbased Zero force on Formosa, mainly transferred out by the time of the Lingayen landing and not supporting it), and even bringing in a/c from the main carrier force or that force itself, if FEAF resistance proved effective enough.

But again, the thing that's hardest to plausibly 'what if' your way around is the manifest inability of USAAF P-40 units to meet Zeroes on anything like even terms in Dec 41-Mar 42, at least. A-24's covered by P-40's have the P-40's stripped away by Zeroes, then eventually fall prey to Zeroes. And a sudden springing of a huge trap at Lingayen, after allowing the Japanese to land unopposed in north Luzon (and Legaspi in the south), is totally unrealistic.

As far as historical order of battle items:
1. Both 24th and 50th Flying Regiments were on Luzon at the time of the Lingayen landings. Japanese Monograph No.11 states that 20 and 24 Type 97's from the two regiments provided air cover to the approaching convoy Dec 21. As of early January the total strength of the two regiments is given in Sensi Sosho 34 as 73 with 50 a/c serviceable. Meanwhile from Dec 8 to Jan 7, 4 and 12 Type 97's of the two regiments were 'damaged', though the cause of only a few of those loss/damage cases is known (1 burned on ground by Buzz Wagner Dec 12, 2 disappeared in weather over Lingayen Dec 22, one lost in accident Dec 27). The complete records of those units didn't survive, unlike relevant JNAF records which did.

2. The JNAF bombing component brought back to Luzon in March consisted of 18 Type 1 Rikko of the Takao Air Group, which bombed Corregidor in support of JAAF 'heavy' (ie Type 97, 'Sally') bomber units. They flew their first mission March 24 and their last April 17; two Type 1's were downed by AA fire from Corregidor over that period (source is Takao group's original combat reports, it's not mentioned in "Shambles"). A Tainan AG Zero detachment accompanied them but the few remaining FEAF a/c were avoiding contact.

The JNAF deployment to Luzon more relevant to this discussion was the detachment of the Tainan AG sent to Legaspi in southern Luzon from Dec 14, initially 9 a/c later reinforced. They remained until early January, and besides one air combat with FEAF (they lost a Zero to a P-35A Dec 23 per their and FEAF's records, misreported in 'Shambles' as possible Phil AF P-26 victory Dec 24) also strafed Del Monte, and virtually wiped out the USN floatplane detachment at Bataan, increasing the American impression of a strong Japanese fighter force throughout the PI, despite their small number.

Anyway again, these Japanese strengths were based on needs. If the FEAF fighter force had survived longer in greater number, it could have slowed other Japanese operations by requiring more fighter strength, especially JNAF, to be kept against Luzon. But that's what the Japanese would have done. And a grand surprise trap Dec 22 by a previously undetected FEAF force is just pure fantasy, not how military organizations or operations work in real life.

Joe
 
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Have you looked at Japanese resources vs operation plans for December 1941? Japan had essentially no reserves at all. A serious defeat anywhere would have been catastrophic.

If 1941 Japan had doubts about seizing Malaya and the Philippines with the historical forces allocated it would probably deter them from attacking in the first place. Japan would back down concerning their plans to control all of China. The U.S. military build up on Luzon would have achieved its objective.
 
OK. I won't take a back seat to anyone on this thread when it comes to a knowledge of the ACTUAL history of what went down with the FEAF in the PI in '41-42. But these what'ifa, would'a, could'a, should'a scenarios are being taken to the extreme. History is what is.

Duane,

I am happy to defer to many knowledgeable folks in this forum, and have learned a great deal in the short time I have been hanging out here. I also think Dave's exercise has more value than you allow. I see it as a form of intelectual gaming. A thought experiment to illuminate factors that might have contributed to the historical defeat. It may seem silly considering the wealth of literature on the subject, but I believe this kind of a discussion also creates an opportunity for education that may be a little more participatory or interactive than the passivity of sitting in a chair and reading. More often than not, this kind of discussion frequently leads to valuable literary recommendations. So far, the discussion of supporting literature has been a little disappointing.

It seems to me IMHP that this thread has become a competition about who knows the most about troop strength , how many A/C were on hand and the performance of a number of aircraft that were never slated to go to the PI
in Operation Plum or any other effort to reinforce the PI prior to Dec. 8th.

I think you are correct that that the original objective of the thread, (as I understood it): defining a hypothetical FEAF that might have prevented the fall of the PI, has digressed a bit into an accounting of ground IJA ground forces that diverges from the original intent. However, it seem to me that defining the IJ USAAF air order of battle is a necessary initial exercise that provides a context for defining the hypothetical force necessary to counter the invasion of the PI. Establishing the number of ships transporting the invasion force helps define the necessary requirement for success. Beyond that, it may become a basis for unhelpful contention and further digression.

It was a combination of limited resources, human error and bad luck that contributed to what happened in the PI on Dec. 8th. BUT, the bottom line is that the PI were lost regardless of what the FEAF could have done before or after the the initial attack.

Duane

I think you have correctly summarized the causal history, but in doing so also oversimplified a very complex situation, any element of which might be worthy of discussion. It's hard to argue with your last sentence but I don't think we (at least I don't) learn much by accepting it as a final, limiting statement.

Given all the cited problems encountered during the 1941 PI campaign were some factors more damaging than others? Was defeat simply the result of a poorly defined FEAF aircraft fleet requirements/capabilities?
 
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Great attitude, so far from I-know-all escapades frequently encountered here (coming sometimes also from yours truly).
 
Have you looked at Japanese resources vs operation plans for December 1941? Japan had essentially no reserves at all. A serious defeat anywhere would have been catastrophic.
I'm quoting details of Japanese strength and deployments in the campaign including info directly from the records of Japanese air units involved, and you're asking me if I've ever looked into the subject, really?

It's hard to tell if you're basically confused or trying to confuse. The intial Japanese raids (Dec 8-10) in PI were supported by a force of around 90 Zeroes (Tainan and 3rd AG). This force suffered only light losses and was quickly mainly deployed to the southern PI and DEI to support further operations there. If OTOH the FEAF had proven harder to neutralize, the further operations might indeed have been delayed, but that Zero force could instead have been retained to support the Lingayen landings, and/or just spend more time to neutralize the FEAF figther force.

And as well, the main Mobile Force carrier unit was not committed to any operation in this period, besides Soryu and Hiryu supporting the seizure of Wake ca. Dec 23. At least the other 4 carriers, or all 6 if accepting some delay, could have been used to support PI operations, or their fighters could have been detached to land bases to do so, if necessary. The Mobile Force in fact served as a mainly uncommitted reserve from its return from the Hawaii operation until its commitment to the Indian Ocean operation in April 1942. In the meantime it only supported the seizure of Rabaul (it was massive overkill against that then lightly held Allied outpost), and some raids as part of DEI campaign (most notably v Darwin in Feb) and helping to mop up Allied shipping trying to escape Java at the end of that campaign.

So in summary, the set piece idea you keep harping on of an FEAF force able to inflict serious damage on the Lingayen landing convoy ca. Dec 22, v just the two Army fighter regiments covering it, has a gaping hole: the fighter cover was limited to just those two Army regiments and not the IJN's considerable available Zero force, because there *wasn't* a serious FEAF anymore by Dec 22, and the Japanese knew it.

A more capable FEAF would still have had to overcome the Tainain/3rd AG Zero force, reinforced with Mobile Force's Zeroes if necessary. Those forces wouldn't have pulled away from PI if the FEAF P-40 force hadn't proved so easy to neutralize. And the P-40 units showed no signs of being able to contend with the Zero units on even terms, in PI or different units in DEI campaign in subsequent weeks either. Increasing strength of FEAF strike units would be useless because of the basic weakness in fighter unit quality/readiness to protect them, as well as unrealistic due to the same weaknesses as plagued the USAAC/F generally at the beginning of the war (lack of training in new types flown, lack of unit cohesion, bugs in new a/c types such as the P-40E's of FEAF).

I think you might do well to read up more on these early campaigns.

Joe
 
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Have you looked at Japanese resources vs operation plans for December 1941? Japan had essentially no reserves at all. A serious defeat anywhere would have been catastrophic.
I'm quoting details of Japanese strength and deployments in the campaign from Japanese language sources about the campaign, and you're asking me if I've ever looked into the subject, really?

It's hard to tell if you're basically confused or trying to confuse. The intial Japanese raids (Dec 8-10) in PI were supported by a force of around 90 Zeroes (Tainan and 3rd AG). This force suffered only light losses and was quickly mainly deployed to the southern PI and DEI to support further operations there. If OTOH the FEAF had proven harder to neutralize, the further operations might indeed have been delayed, but that Zero force could instead have been retained to support the Lingayen landings, and/or just spend more time to neutralize the FEAF figther force.

And as well, the main Mobile Force carrier unit was not committed to any operation in this period, besides Soryu and Hiryu supporting the seizure of Wake ca. Dec 23. At least the other 4 carriers, or all 6 if accepting some delay, could have been used to support PI operations, or their fighters could have been detached to land bases to do so, if necessary. The Mobile Force in fact served as a mainly uncommitted reserve from its return from the Hawaii operation until its commitment to the Indian Ocean operation in April. In the meantime it only supported the relatively less important seizure of Rabaul (against which it was overkill), and some raids as part of DEI campaign (most notably v Darwin) and helping to mop up Allied shipping trying to escape Java at the end of that campaign.

So in summary, the set piece idea you keep harping on of an FEAF force able to inflict serious damage on the Lingayen landing convoy ca. Dec 22, v just the two Army fighter regiments covering it, has a gaping hole: the fighter cover was limited to just the two Army regiments and not the IJN's considerable available Zero force, because there *wasn't* a serious FEAF force by Dec 22.

A more capable FEAF would still have had to overcome the Tainain/3rd AG Zero force, reinforced with Mobile Force's Zeroes if necessary. Those forces wouldn't have pulled away from PI if the FEAF P-40 force hadn't proved so easy to neutralize. And the P-40 units showed no signs of being able to contend with the Zero units on even terms, in PI or different units in DEI campaign in subsequent weeks either. Increasing strength of FEAF strike units would be useless because of the basic weakness in fighter unit quality/readiness to protect them, as well as unrealistic due to the same weaknesses as plagued the USAAC/F generally at the beginning of the war (lack of training in new types flown, lack of unit cohesion, bugs in new a/c types such as the P-40E's of FEAF).

I think you might do well to read up more on these early campaigns.

Joe
 
But your basic scenario is a hodge podge of unrealistic what if assumption (that the FEAF would hide its strength until the Lingayen Gulf landings put together with the actual lesser Japanese air strength by that time because *they knew the FEAF had been largely neutralized*.

Joe, I didn't get that (about a Lingayen Gulf surprise attack), but maybe I missed something. It seems to me a reasonable argument supposes the historical battle must procede from the December 8 attack, but contested with the FEAF forces defined by the thread participant with plausibly camoflaged fields to make the force more resistent to attrition. I do get the impression that Dave diminishes the importance of IJ Air force reinforcement which seems to hobble Japan with the same logistical limitations as USAAF forces in the PI. I would envision it to be an intense battle of attrition weighted heavily in favor of an IJ Air force able to replenish its losses.

Even assuming (unrealistically IMO) that the FEAF could have had any number of *properly trained and ready* A-24 units, they would have been used to counter the landings in Northern Luzon Dec 10, just as the B-17 force was, and the suriviving fighters too. I doubt a realistic size and capability A-24/P-40 force would have inflicted devastating damage on even that smaller Northern Luzon force.

According to Bartsch, the A-24 group that arrived in the PI (sans aircraft) was comprised of well trained and I infer, high time pilots. They weren't the rookies that comprised the bulk of the pilots in some of the Pursuit squadrons. And yes, I wouldn't expect them to hide but rather to engage at the first hint of an invading force where ever it occurred. There were many more airfields in the PI than I previously realized (Bartsch again) and I believe resisting each landing could have been a possibility if the A-24 force or some other with antishipping attack capability, had been in place. 54 A-24's is equivalent to 3 squadrons of Dauntlesses and that same amount proved to be fairly devastating at Midway 6 months later. I know this might provoke a discussion of why and how that number achieved such success but that's another discussion. however, it must be said that three squadrons is also a number that can be attrited to ineffectuality fairly quickly.

But again, the thing that's hardest to plausibly 'what if' your way around is the manifest inability of USAAF P-40 units to meet Zeroes on anything like even terms in Dec 41-Mar 42, at least. A-24's covered by P-40's have the P-40's stripped away by Zeroes, then eventually fall prey to Zeroes. And a sudden springing of a huge trap at Lingayen, after allowing the Japanese to land unopposed in north Luzon (and Legaspi in the south), is totally unrealistic.

I think this might be diminishing the quality of the P-40E a little too much. My main concern with respect to the P-40 is its unsuitability as a high altitude interceptor. Encountering zeros while escorting A-24's at probably 15-20,000 feet is a different matter and may play more to the (few) strengths of the P-40E, (armor, its diving ability and its heavy armament) That seemed to work during the Java campaign although it doesn't seem to have been a game changer. It does seem to have allowed the P-40Es to survive Zero encounters and score some (very) limited success there.

As far as historical order of battle items:
1. Both 24th and 50th Flying Regiments were on Luzon at the time of the Lingayen landings. Japanese Monograph No.11 states that 20 and 24 Type 97's from the two regiments provided air cover to the approaching convoy Dec 21. As of early January the total strength of the two regiments is given in Sensi Sosho 34 as 73 with 50 a/c serviceable. Meanwhile from Dec 8 to Jan 7, 4 and 12 Type 97's of the two regiments were 'damaged', though the cause of only a few of those loss/damage cases is known (1 burned on ground by Buzz Wagner Dec 12, 2 disappeared in weather over Lingayen Dec 22, one lost in accident Dec 27). The complete records of those units didn't survive, unlike relevant JNAF records which did.

2. The JNAF bombing component brought back to Luzon in March consisted of 18 Type 1 Rikko of the Takao Air Group, which bombed Corregidor in support of JAAF 'heavy' (ie Type 97, 'Sally') bomber units. They flew their first mission March 24 and their last April 17; two Type 1's were downed by AA fire from Corregidor over that period (source is Takao group's original combat reports, it's not mentioned in "Shambles"). A Tainan AG Zero detachment accompanied them but the few remaining FEAF a/c were avoiding contact.

The JNAF deployment to Luzon more relevant to this discussion was the detachment of the Tainan AG sent to Legaspi in southern Luzon from Dec 14, initially 9 a/c later reinforced. They remained until early January, and besides one air combat with FEAF (they lost a Zero to a P-35A Dec 23 per their and FEAF's records, misreported in 'Shambles' as possible Phil AF P-26 victory Dec 24) also strafed Del Monte, and virtually wiped out the USN floatplane detachment at Bataan, increasing the American impression of a strong Japanese fighter force throughout the PI, despite their small number.

Anyway again, these Japanese strengths were based on needs. If the FEAF fighter force had survived longer in greater number, it could have slowed other Japanese operations by requiring more fighter strength, especially JNAF, to be kept against Luzon. But that's what the Japanese would have done. And a grand surprise trap Dec 22 by a previously undetected FEAF force is just pure fantasy, not how military organizations or operations work in real life.

Joe

Great stuff and an interesting source which I might add somewhat redeems the discussion wrt the paucity of sources to date. :D
 
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