July 26, 1941. Build the Far East Air Force. (1 Viewer)

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The Bf-109 story was by and large a propaganda ruse thought up to deflect the racist question of how we could have been so soundly defeated by an "inferior" race. It was easy for pilots to belive the stories that on Dec. 8th Bf-109s were shot down and "blonde, white pilots" were captured.

Duane

I agree that propaganda and racism played an important role in this myth. But, what I find most fascinating about this phenomena is its persistence into late 1942 despite observations by presumably well trained professionals. I believe the later advent of the Tony was regarded by some as confirmation of their early presence in theater. It seems to me a cautionary tale of the fallibility of human perception when combined with their own predjudices. In other words people tend to see what they believe they will see not what's actually there. On the one hand you have FEAF pilots being pursued by A6M's and initially mistaking them for T-6s (an understandable mistake based on similarity in the forward aspect). OTOH, mistaking a radial engine nose and extended bubble canopy for an inline (no matter how streamlined the A6M may have appeared) and blended canopy seems a difficult mistake to make on the surface. Not having experienced the drama of an actual aerial duel to the death, it may reveal the level of fear that may attend such an encounter.
 
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Dive bombing offers a better chance for survival vs defensive AA fire. So you use it when attacking warships. Sinking warships is a job for the USN, not FEAF.

You don't need dive bombers to sink merchant vessels. The Germans emphasized skip bombing during 1939 to 1943 with excellent results. Accuracy was as good or better then dive bombing and almost any aircraft could employ this method of attack. Even converted Fw-200 airliners and Fw-190F fighter-bombers. FEAF P-40Es could employ skip bombing with 500lb bombs. All they need is proper pilot training.
 
Dive bombing offers a better chance for survival vs defensive AA fire. So you use it when attacking warships. Sinking warships is a job for the USN, not FEAF.

Of course true but a primary tactical purpose of dive bombing in a coordinated torpedo attack was to dilute enemy ship's AA between two sets of targets in different directions, with bombs whose purpose was to destroy the topside AA during the final stage of the torpedo attack. As you might imagine, such perfect timing was only rarely achieved. The IJN accomplished such attacks nearly to perfection on a few occasions. The USN more rarely. Also, the IJN typically used a mix of HE, AP and SAP bombs so, even thought there weren't necessarily as heavy as those in the USN inventory they sometimes tended to inflict more damage than might be expected. Early in WW2, the USN relied pretty much on 500 1,000 lb. HE which turned out to be reasonably effective at knocking out a CV's flight capability but less effective at putting a large vessel under except in unusual circumstances such as at Midway. This was also aggravated by the faiure of the second generation of Mark 13 aerial torpedoes. After the original Mark 13s were used up at Coral Sea, USN torpedo attacks are said to have been relatively unproductive until about 1944.


You don't need dive bombers to sink merchant vessels. The Germans emphasized skip bombing during 1939 to 1943 with excellent results. Accuracy was as good or better then dive bombing and almost any aircraft could employ this method of attack. Even converted Fw-200 airliners and Fw-190F fighter-bombers. FEAF P-40Es could employ skip bombing with 500lb bombs. All they need is proper pilot training.

The FEAF actually had some success using P-40's as bomber and dive bombers during the Linguayan Gulf landings and later during the Bataan phase of the campaign. At an airfield on Bataan, they rigged up a P-40something (an ingenious fusion of a P-40B with a P-40E engine) that also included something akin to an SBD dive-bombing rig, where the bomb was forced to rotate out from the fuselage to miss the prop arc during release. It apparently worked pretty well.
 
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August 1941 FEAF cannot bomb accurately in any manner with any type aircraft. Nor can FEAF conduct an effective CAP over their own airfield. They must master the basics before attempting something as complex as coordinating two different bombing attacks against the same targets.

In any case it's pointless to speak of torpedo bombing with the crappy USN supplied topedoes of 1941. If you want two different attack methods then use A-24 dive bombers plus skip bombers.
 
August 1941 FEAF cannot bomb accurately in any manner with any type aircraft. Nor can FEAF conduct an effective CAP over their own airfield. They must master the basics before attempting something as complex as coordinating two different bombing attacks against the same targets.

Don't misunderstand me, I wasn't suggesting FEAF should attempt, let alone train, to do what the Navy practiced for sinking a warship. Dive bombing with 250-500 lb bombs should do the job for transports quite nicely. Just making a digressive observation that DB served two complementary purposes. The first, you pointed out: increasing the odds of the pilot surviving, which it continued to do down to this day (or at least it did until about 1975 and the advent of stand off precision weapons). The second purpose: to dilute and suppress the AA so other aircraft can attack with a greater probability of success and survival. With FEAF (at its best after December 8 ), there were no other aircraft doing anything but additional bombing or dive bombing.

August 1941, many to most of the pilots had about 200 hours in stateside trainers. Doesn't suggest a lot of expertise in just about anything. The guy who pulled it off in March was a high-time pilot, commander of the 21st Pursuit Squadron on Dec. 8 ,1941 ... Organizationally, in August 41, FEAF dive bombing wouldn't have worked very well, but there were certainly individuals who could pick it up or do it in a pinch, later on...

In any case it's pointless to speak of torpedo bombing with the crappy USN supplied topedoes of 1941. If you want two different attack methods then use A-24 dive bombers plus skip bombers.

Actually the torpedoes used in 1941 were apparently much better than the ones used later. The mod 0, Mark 13 was purported to be pretty good (scoring something like 3-5 hits on the Shoho) until the stocks ran out about May 1942. the mod 1 that replaced it was a total failure. In any case, I didn't mean to suggest the use of torpedoes by FEAF.
 
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Perhaps so but fighter pilots have 4 months to train before the bad guys arrive. During those 4 months pilots will receive at least 200 additional training hours and it will all be with their wartime units and wartime equipment. Building that critical unit cohesion which produces effective military units.
 
Perhaps so but fighter pilots have 4 months to train before the bad guys arrive. During those 4 months pilots will receive at least 200 additional training hours and it will all be with their wartime units and wartime equipment. Building that critical unit cohesion which produces effective military units.

Would certainly see that as a requirement for having some greater success in defending the PI. The newly arrived green pilots were apparently getting a canned fighter aircraft training course consisting of about 65-70 hours before they began flying with their respective units: 5 hours in a T-6, 10-15 in a P-26, then about 50 hours in a P-35 before transitioning to the P-40. That process appears to have taken about 2 months. of course it was very little to no gunnery training and virtually no interception training. Fighter tactics appear to have been largely confined to dogfighting techiques and much time spent on day and night formation flying (???). Some of the CO's were converting their organizations from 6 plane flights made up of two 3 plane elements to 6 plane flights comprised of three, 2 plane elements sarting in September '41.
 
Perhaps so but fighter pilots have 4 months to train before the bad guys arrive. During those 4 months pilots will receive at least 200 additional training hours and it will all be with their wartime units and wartime equipment. Building that critical unit cohesion which produces effective military units.

50 gallons an hour (low estimate) x 200 hours X 50 pilots = 500,000 gallons of fuel plus 50 engines approaching the end of their useful life if not a few already trashed.

At least the mechanics will be well trained :)

"The wet season starts in June, peaks in July to September, and peters out in October."

This flips for the eastern seaboard but the monsoon season just might affect the training schedule, especial on those grass airfields.
 
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As I recall reading in Bartsch, the weather did seriously impact training. But of course it had already suffered a 5 week delay due to logistical shortcoming (lack of gycol coolant) In the end, it always seems to come down to logistics...

The real meteorological problem seems to have arisen during the dry season. The fields didn't stay nice and grassy, but became a nasty dust bowl whose contents became airborne with the first aircraft launched and obscured the vision of all subsequent pilots who crashed frequently. Many losses of aircraft both before and after December 8th.
 
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:lol:
If we want something besides a historical result then we need to think outside the box.

IMO Robert Stanford Tuck was one of the best fighter pilots produced by any nation. He did good work for RAF Fighter Command during the BoB.

Unlikely that the US would be putting a Brit in charge....

Yes, it appears to be a possible solution, but would Tuck with his RAF and Eurpoean war experience repeat the Darwin Spitfire V experience? Knowing about European fighter direction may not translate well to the Far East. Would he be victim of the same european-ethnocentrism that hampered American, British Dutch preparation for the inevitable conflict? Would he share the belief that the greatest threat to USAAF P-40s were IJAAF and IJN flown Bf-109s?(

The British were under no such illusion, the conference of late 1940 early 1941 understood that there was considerable danger from Japanese aviation.
They didn't seem to underestimate the Japanese pilots, nor did they expect Bf-109s

[ Werner Baumbach - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is the guy I want commanding FEAF bombers. After a couple months of his training we shouldn't have any problem sinking anchored IJA troop transports.

Since the British Canadians had an officer exchange program, maybe Hitler will agree to one with the US? :lol:

So the demonstrated antishipping dive bombing expertise lay in either the Luftwaffe, the IJN, the USN, and perhaps one squadron of army A-24's

None have demonstrated proficiency in antishipping dive bombing except the Luftwaffe, however they have come to realize that DB are very vulnerable to interception AA.

Britain and/or Australia may have bomber pilots able to sink ships. Tough to determine as Allied maritime attack pilots operated in an environment where targets were few and far between.

German, Italian and Japanese bomber pilots had the opposite problem. Enemy merchant ships were more numerous then sand on the seashore. You will get plenty of target practise if you survive awhile.

Not correct at all.
Germany has lost 38% of merchant ships of 7,000 tons or more (66 of 181) by the end of 1941, and 45% of ships 5,000 - 7,000 tons. (70 of 159)
During WWII air-laid mines were the single most effective method of sinking German cargo ships (by tonnage) followed by FAA/Coastal Command air attack.
1940 was the worst year for German merchant sinkings (5,000 tons+), with 65 ships lost.
 
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IMO logistics during August to November 1941 is a matter of competent leadership.

There was no shortage of American shipping in the Pacific. If the FEAF commander orders an adequate supply of fuel, spare parts, .50cal ammunition, pierced metal planking to improve airfields during the rainy season, aircraft oxygen equipment etc. on July 27, 1941 there's no reason this stuff shouldn't arrive during September 1941.
 
1940 was the worst year for German merchant sinkings (5,000 tons+), with 65 ships lost.
You've proven my point. Werner Baumbach sank that much shipping tonnage all by himself.
 
IMO logistics during August to November 1941 is a matter of competent leadership.

There was no shortage of American shipping in the Pacific. If the FEAF commander orders an adequate supply of fuel, spare parts, .50cal ammunition, pierced metal planking to improve airfields during the rainy season, aircraft oxygen equipment etc. on July 27, 1941 there's no reason this stuff shouldn't arrive during September 1941.
Marston mat, or PSP wasn't invented till Nov. 41.
 
You've proven my point. Werner Baumbach sank that much shipping tonnage all by himself.

Uh no actually, supposedly he sank about 40 ships. Sinking a few heavy ships (warships, liners etc) will bring up the total.
It also includes French Soviet ships which were much more poorly defended.
Germany was never able to sink 40% - 45% of major British shipping throughout the war, let alone before 1942. It wasn't as big a deal for Germany, but it would be for Japan.


Regardless, if you are looking for actual plausible things that might have been done in 1941, putting a Nazi in charge (most of whose notable exploits would occur in the futue), is pretty far out there.




The key question I have though - in July 1941 does anyone in the US military or USAAF realize that any problem exists at all? :confused:
Or do they just expect that the B-17s will bomb the Japanese military into rubble? :rolleyes:

The theory that the B-17 groups didn't need any escort was obviously flawed, but this fact wouldn't truley be hammered in until after the Schweinfurt raids, when it was finally accepted that day bombing over enemy-controlled airspace required major fighter escort.
So in 1941 unless there was someone in US command who believed this, it's inevitable that the US will keep planning building up B-17 forces for unescorted raids over Formosa etc.
 
None have demonstrated proficiency in antishipping dive bombing except the Luftwaffe, however they have come to realize that DB are very vulnerable to interception AA.

You may not have seen the 1932 flick "Helldivers" with Clark Gable and Wallace Beery

The Japanese took it to heart and when the SBDs were falling upon their carriers at Midway, some sources report Genda as looking up and exclaiming "Helldivers!"

During the prewar years three countries were building and training in the technique using dedicated, purpose-built dive bombers:

Germany: He 50
Japan: Aichi D1A2
USA: F8C

From wikipedia:

"As planes grew in strength and load capability, the technique became more valuable. By the early 1930s, the technique was clearly favoured in tactical doctrine, notably against targets that would otherwise be too small to hit with level bombers. In the 1920s the US Navy ordered the first custom dive bomber aircraft, the Curtiss F8C Hell-Diver biplane (not to be confused with the later SB2C Helldiver). The Imperial Japanese Navy followed by ordering the Heinkel He 50 in 1931, which they developed into their own Aichi D1A."

There may have been other countries engaged in this activity but this seems to be the forefront of the movement.

Prior to WW2, the Navy adopted Dive bombing as a cultural paradigm (perhaps in the way the IJN adopted the aerial torpedo attack) It was practiced as an integral part of its advanced training curriculum. The training paid off in the USN's early pacific island raids.

Dive bombing is the least vulnerable method of attacking warships and practiced expertise was sought through to the modern era.
Dive bombing was a tactic in heavy use throughout Vietnam. It remained a cultural staple of the USN...
 
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Dive bombing is the least vulnerable method of attacking warships and practiced expertise was sought through to the modern era.
I'm all in favor of dive bombing. If I get to run the Philippine Army Air Corps from 1936 onward as Big Mac did they would be dive bombing experts by 1941.

However July 26, 1941 is too late to acquire dive bombers and learn how to employ them effectively. FEAF needs readily available aircraft and simple operational doctrine.

P-40E skip bombers are about as simple as it gets.
.....Approach speed of 200 mph.
.....Altitude of 150 feet.
.....Bomb(s) released 250 yards from the target.
.....Bombs have an 8 second fuze delay to allow the bomber to clear the blast area.
.....Accuracy against moving merchant / transport ships of about 25%.
.....No fancy bombsight required. Get the speed, altitude and bomb release distance correct and you will get hits.
.....This method was combat proven by mid 1941. Just read British reports about attacks on their shipping.

A fully loaded P-40E requires only a 1,000 foot runway. And that runway can be rather crude.

After bombs are gone P-40Es are relatively fast. Faster then an A6M2 @ 150 feet. So they don't require escort while returning to base.
 
P-40E skip bombers are about as simple as it gets.
.....Approach speed of 200 mph.
.....Altitude of 150 feet.
.....Bomb(s) released 250 yards from the target.
.....Bombs have an 8 second fuze delay to allow the bomber to clear the blast area.
.....Accuracy against moving merchant / transport ships of about 25%.
.....No fancy bombsight required. Get the speed, altitude and bomb release distance correct and you will get hits.
.....This method was combat proven by mid 1941. Just read British reports about attacks on their shipping.

A fully loaded P-40E requires only a 1,000 foot runway. And that runway can be rather crude.

After bombs are gone P-40Es are relatively fast. Faster then an A6M2 @ 150 feet. So they don't require escort while returning to base.

But typically enjoyed a top cover P=40 when possible during FEAF bombing of IJN Transports.

Skip bmbing is certainly a good tactic, perhaps easier to learn, as is glide bombing, a bit more vulnerable perhaps because it trades speed for accuracy in the glide. The neat thing about skip bombing (and dive bombing) is as you point out, you don't slow down much to do it. You also have a decent sized target at which to aim. Keeping up the attacking aircraft's speed, made the IJN torpedo attacks more deadly than those of the early USN practitioners. I believe if either the IJN or USN had been able to develop a higher speed torpedo attack profile, the technique would have remained in favor for far longer than the it did.
 
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high speed torpedo attack profile, the technique would have remained in favor for far longer than the it did.
Light flak effectiveness was increasing by leaps and bounds during 1939 to 1945. When weapons like the 40mm Bofors and 3.7cm Flak 43 were coupled with radar directed fire control even a 400 mph torpedo run would be little short of suicide. That's why Germany and the USA were developing weapons and bomb sights that allowed bombers to remain outside light flak range.
 
A fully loaded P-40E requires only a 1,000 foot runway. And that runway can be rather crude.

If we are going to discuss this can we please keep the fantasy numbers out of the discussion?

1000ft of runway is for a P-40 at fully loaded WITH A 20MPH HEADWIND without the head wind it needs 1600ft of PAVEMENT. 1750 ft of soft runway.

These numbers are for sea level and O degrees C (32degrees F), While the Philippine airfields may or may not be very high they are certainly not at freezing even in December.
85 degrees F needs just about 30% more runway than 32 degrees.

A fully loaded P-40 at 1500ft altitude and at 85 degrees could need 3900ft from start to clear a 50 ft tree line if there is no wind.

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/P-40/P-40TOCLC.pdf
 
Light flak effectiveness was increasing by leaps and bounds during 1939 to 1945. When weapons like the 40mm Bofors and 3.7cm Flak 43 were coupled with radar directed fire control even a 400 mph torpedo run would be little short of suicide. That's why Germany and the USA were developing weapons and bomb sights that allowed bombers to remain outside light flak range.

Of course, that's correct, Radar directed, rapid fire, medium calber, long range AA would limit the success probability pf any such low level attacks and ultimately even those of dive bombers. in additions to weapons and bomb sights, delivery techniques were also modified to minimize time in the threat envelope. The writing was on the wall a bit sooner for aerial torpedo attacks than for the other methods and weapons.
 
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