July 26, 1941. Build the Far East Air Force. (3 Viewers)

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I think you have correctly summarized the causal history, but in doing so also oversimplified a very complex situation, any element of which might be worthy of discussion. It's hard to argue with your last sentence but I don't think we (at least I don't) learn much by accepting it as a final, limiting statement.

Given all the cited problems encountered during the 1941 PI campaign were some factors more damaging than others? Was defeat simply the result of a poorly defined FEAF aircraft fleet requirements/capabilities?
In the big picture I would actually agree with varsity's 'final limiting statement'. This is an airplane discussion board, and I'm a WWII airplane fan too, but you have to look at the basic seapower situation to evaluate the big picture of first PI campaign. As long as the US Pacific Fleet was crippled, or anyway wasn't going to sortie quickly and in strength to relieve the PI, the US position in PI was hopeless. Eventually the US force there would run out of fuel and munitions (although if it could hold large physical areas of the PI it could feed itself, unlike the actual situation where the main force was backed into Bataan then largely starved into defeat).

The FEAF could conceivably have inflicted more serious losses on the Japanese invasion convoys at Aparri (N Luzon) Legaspi (S Luzon) and eventually the larger Lingayen Gulf landings (though never would have allowed the first two only to 'spring a trap' on the third: totally unrealistic). But in fact the Japanese were not that critically short of merchant type shipping at that stage of the war, and captured a good deal as they advanced. So FEAF delaying Japanese plans by causing heavier shipping losses and/or forcing JNAF units to dwell on Luzon longer is plausible. But FEAF 'defeating' the Japanese seizure of PI: not plausible. Only the main force of the USN could have done that by being ready to, then successfully executing, a decisive fleet action to relieve the PI. And that just wasn't going to happen after the PH attack; it's an interesting 'what if' whether the USN could have pulled it off *without* there having been a PH attack.

If you read personal recollections of many PI veterans, it was common knowledge among them that relief from the US by sea was their only real hope. And their morale was sustained by the belief that it would still happen, however impossible we know that was with hindsight.

Joe
 
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1. I didn't get that (about a Lingayen Gulf surprise attack), but maybe I missed something. It seems to me a reasonable argument supposes the historical battle must procede from the December 8 attack, but contested with the FEAF forces defined by the thread participant with plausibly camoflaged fields to make the force more resistent to attrition.

2. According to Bartsch, the A-24 group that arrived in the PI (sans aircraft) was comprised of well trained and I infer, high time pilots. They weren't the rookies that comprised the bulk of the pilots in some of the Pursuit squadrons. And yes, I wouldn't expect them to hide but rather to engage at the first hint of an invading force where ever it occurred. There were many more airfields in the PI than I previously realized (Bartsch again) and I believe resisting each landing could have been a possibility if the A-24 force or some other with antishipping attack capability, had been in place.

3. I think this might be diminishing the quality of the P-40E a little too much. My main concern with respect to the P-40 is its unsuitability as a high altitude interceptor. Encountering zeros while escorting A-24's at probably 15-20,000 feet is a different matter and may play more to the (few) strengths of the P-40E, (armor, its diving ability and its heavy armament) That seemed to work during the Java campaign although it doesn't seem to have been a game changer. It does seem to have allowed the P-40Es to survive Zero encounters and score some (very) limited success there.
1. The Lingayen landing was the third on Luzon. The FEAF put its maximum (then remaining) effort on the smaller landing at Aparri in northern Luzon Dec 10, then had very little left for the landings at Legaspi in southern Luzon Dec 12, or the bigger landing at Lingayen Gulf the 22nd. This same pattern must be assumed IMO to have a remotely realistic scenario. So, even if the A-24's score significant success against the Aparri landings (covered by relatively limited numbers of Army Type 97's and Navy 0's) the Japanese can adjust to that by keeping the bulk of Tainan/3rd AG's deployed v PI which they didn't in actual history...because it was apparent the FEAF was neutralized.

2. But lack of individual pilot total hours wasn't most of the problem with USAAC units in this period. It was stuff like the historical problem with A-24 deployment: didn't have their planes, or, hadn't trained intensively in *those* types, which might prove to have bugs, as the recently received P-40E's did (gun chargers, rendering the armament useless in some early combat sorties). IMO it's totally unrealistic to compare such units to USN VS/VB squadrons of summer 1942, which had been cohesive units flying the same a/c in pretty intensive training for months before the war, then stepped up after Dec '41, and also those units had shakedown combats in the carriers raids v Japanese islands in early 1942. In fact it encapsulates the whole issue IMO, as I stated it earlier: if you assume unit effectiveness of USAAF units typical of late 42-early 43 (the USN had a headstart on them in readiness, since they weren't expanding hand over fist in 1940-41 like the Air Corps was), many things are possible. But the Army air units of late '41 just didn't have those capabilities. Individually competent pilots, yes, but high level of combat effectiveness as units: they proved repeatedly that they did not.

3. The kill ratio of P-40 units in the DEI campaign v Zeroes was considerable *worse* than that in the limited number of actual P-40/Zero combats in the PI, around 1:7 v perhaps 1:3+ (actual causes of Zero losses in the early raids, AA, P-40 or other, are hard to determine even with detailed Japanese records, most of the a/c lost were only known not to have returned). And in the brief sampling of P-40/A-24 teaming in the defense of Java, the A-24's did sink one Japanese transport w/o being intercepted on one mission, but a P-40 escort force was largley wiped out defending them on the other mission. Another book by Bartsch covering this period is "Every Day a Nightmare" but the basics are in "Bloody Shambles". Also in a slightly different context against mostly land targets, USAAF A-24's supported by RAAF Kittyhawks/USAAF P-39's in New Guinea in spring/summer 1942 proved at high risk to Zeroes. The USAAF swore off the plane after an A-24 force with P-39 escort was virtually wiped out, in July 1942.

Joe
 
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In the 1930s the Army concluded that the War Plan Orange strategy for defense/relief of the PI was untenable. Consequently the was little or no effort to modernize the what eventuall became FEAF. That changed abruptly when the political and military decision was made to turn the PI into a base for offensive missions against the Japanese homeland. The idea was to intimidate the Japanese and make them think twice about striking the PI. The War Department put the cart before the horse and decided to rush all available heavy bombardment to the PI without a splinter of the infrastructure required to support them. Brereton was shocked at the total lack of facilities to the support the B-17s already there when he arrived in Nov. '41. It was the same situation for other A/C(and pilots) that arrived prior to Dec 8th. More avaiable A/C on Dec. 8th would just have created a more target rich enviroment fot the Japanese. The FEAF failed because the overall
defense policy for the PI was a failure waiting to happen.

Duane
 
The 1941-42 PI campaign has been discussed nearly to ad nauseum. Yet it still evidently facinates...

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/po...aaf-debacle-philippines-dec-1941-a-29897.html and,

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/po...s-far-eastern-campaign-1941-1942-a-31741.html

I came aboard the forum with a preconception (From reading Costello and Layton mainly) that Mac should have been tarred and feather run out of town on a rail for his performance or lack thereof. Fortunately, I benefited greatly from forum members who knew more info than my limited reading provided. (Renrich especially!) Reading Bartsch: "Doomed...", the real cuprit has been identified and search parties have been dispersed to find his cemetery and gravesite for intended urination on his plot.

Here is a timeline that may help identify the culprit:
Prior to 10/41: The 3rd Pursuit Squadron (PS) (~ 12 pilots) has been in the PI since 1919 (!!) now with 22 P-26As. Loss of PI to IJ aggression assumed.
10/23/40: SecNav Knox announces plan to update the PI speedbump with the 17th and 20th PS, to be equipped with 57 ex-Swedish P-35As.
11/23/40: ~ 12 of 20th PS's pilots (pre class 40-H) arrive PI,
12/5/40: ~12 of 17th PS's pilots (pre class 40-H) arrive PI
2/10/41: 24 pilots (class 40-H) arrive PI on Etolin. 5 to 17th PS, 6 to 20th PS 5 to 3rd PS, soon begin training in A-27 P-26
3/31/41: 52 of planned 57 P-35As arrive in PI
5/4/41: BGen H. Claggert arrives PI assumes command of PI Dept. AF with CoS H. George, with PS background.
5/6/41: Buzz Wagner becomes CO of 17th PS Joe Moore CO of 20th PS.
5/8/41 USAT Washington delivers 39 Pilots (Class 41-B) to PI. 8 each to each of the 3 PSs.
~ 5/15/41: training begins: 3-4 hrs in A-27, 10-15 hrs. in P-26A, 50-55 hrs. in P-35A (gunnery formation flt), before transition to promised P-40B
5/17/41: 31 P-40B fighters arrive in PI. (Without prestone coolant, O2 Production equipment and .50 cal. ammo necessary for flying fighting). A/C divied among squadrons as: 25 for 20th PS, 2 each for 3rd and 17th PS.
6/24/41: President Pierce arrives in PI with 96 pilots (68 of class 41-C 28 of class 41-D, the latter completed fight training 5/30), 22 going to the 3rd PS, 21 going to the 17th, 20 to the 20th PS.
~ 6/30/41: Most class 41-B pilots nearing completion of P-35A training phase.
7/2/41: 3rd PS (12 P-35As + 7 P-26As) and 20th PS (14P-35As + 6 P-26As) move A/C to Clark AB 17th PS (13 P-35As + 7 P-26As) moves A/C to Iba Airfield for gunnery training.
3rd PS 20th PS class 41C -D pilots begin training syllabus,
~7/7/41 Prestone coolant arrives, allowing P-40B transition training for 20th PS.
~ 7/15/41: 3rd PS 20th PS class 41-B complete training syllabus despite training delays due to Typhoon/Monsoon weather.
~ 7/15/41:,3rd 17th PS safety rules officially undermined, with command assuming recent arrivals possessed equivalent training as prior pilots; leads to an epidemic of crashes. Losses in aircraft pilots ~ combat.
~ July 31, 1941: 20th PS begins to transition to P-40B A/C. Castoff P-35As slowly replaces training losses in 3rd PS.
~ 8/1/1941(?): oxygen production plant ordered from states, never arrives...
~ 8/26/41, 3rd PS Integrates class 41-C -D pilots into squadron flights as wingmen for senior pilots, 20th PS separates squadron into operational (senior pilots) and training halves.
~ 8/31/41 20th PS equipped with 25 P-40B A/C
~ 9/7/41: 17th PS class 41-C -D pilots commence gunnery training at Iba
9/11/41: C Flight (6 P-40B A/C) fly to 27,000 ft.
9/16/41: 24th Pursuit Group formed; comprised of 3rd, 17th 20th PS.
~ 9/15/41: 17th PS adopts two ship elements based on RAF reports. 20th PS commences night flying training operational recon missions.
9/29/41: 50 P-41E aircraft arrive in PI:
10/17/41: 17th PS begins receiving first of 25 assigned P-40E A/C.
10/18/41: 3rd PS to Iba field for gunnery training. 20th PS class 41C -D pilots begin transition to P-40B.
10/23/41: 10 class 41-G pilots arrive and commence training at HQ squadron training unit.
~10/30/41: Hank Thorne assumes command of 3rd PS.
11/4/41: Maj. Gen. Lewis Brereton arrives PI to assume command of FEAF.
11/6/41: Brereton issues new max effort training schedule with 40% of flight time to be night ops (?)
11/8/41: 3rd PS receives last of 25 P-40E allotment. Squadron Ops officer judges the P-40E to possess "the flying qualities of a streamlined safe."
11/20/41: Experienced pilots of the 27th BG(light) and the 21st (13 pilots) 35th PS (15 pilots) arrive PI on the President Cooldge.
11/25/41: 24 P-40E arrive in PI. Slated for 21st PS.
11/26/41: 34th PS inherits 12-15 cast-off P-35As of the 17th PS. 21st and the 3rd PS when latter's Gunnery training phase completed.
11/27/41: War emergency operations instituted, training essentially suspended: Squadrons placed on alert due to snoopers detected overflying PI airspace. All aircraft armed and readied for immediate scramble. Amount of .50 cal ammo available sufficient for two full P-40E loads.
12/6/41: 21st PS begins receives allotment of 20 P-40E with 2 more due 12/8/41. 16 B-17s sent to Del Monte airfield on Mindanao

There are almost certainly errors in this time line compilation, mainly from Bartch, Doomed at the Start Edmunds They Fought With What They Had. I stopped it when the available aircraft had finally been distributed to their units and the invasion was imminent with Pursuit squadrons on alert and B-17s

I am pretty sure two-ship elements became more widely adopted but not sure of the timing or order in which that occurred. Corrections will be appreciated
 
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Thank you for the time and effort going into that time line.

It highlights some of the problems with expanding the FEAF very much (without stripping other areas of pilots and planes, like the Panama canal).

Any aircraft type except for the B-17 (or B-24) has to go as deck cargo. Planes have to knocked down, crated, loaded on ships and sailed to the Philippines where they have to unloaded, uncrated and reassembled and test flown before issuing to squadrons. This means that there is a 5-6 week period ( at best) BEFORE Dec 8th were anything in route will arrive too late. There is also the 5-6 week delay after July 26 it takes for anything even already at the docks to get to the Philippines and start to be used, either for training or airfield construction. As far as airfield construction goes even the best, most on the ball commander has just about 3 months from the earliest possible delivery of non local equipment and materials to get working air fields by Dec 8th. Depending on which Islands one wishes to place some of the auxiliary airfields the equipment/materials may require transhipment to smaller ships from the larger ocean going ones. The Philippine road network was none too good and easy transportation of large equipment or large amounts of supplies to areas removed from the major cities would be difficult. The US Army managed to get a SCR-270 mobile radar unit stuck in a swamp where it had to be destroyed.
There was also no large pool of experienced (or even high time) pilots to pull from with out leaving other units almost entirely in the hands of low time fliers.

There is no doubt that more could have been done but even increasing the effectiveness of the force by 50% just adds a few days or a week to the final outcome.
 
you have to look at the basic seapower situation to evaluate the big picture of first PI campaign. As long as the US Pacific Fleet was crippled, or anyway wasn't going to sortie quickly and in strength to relieve the PI, the US position in PI was hopeless. Eventually the US force there would run out of fuel and munitions (although if it could hold large physical areas of the PI it could feed itself, unlike the actual situation where the main force was backed into Bataan then largely starved into defeat).

Totally in agreement. That's why I brought up the 25-29 USN subs in theater earlier (numbers depending on your source). Their inconsequential employment or failure to make a contribution proportionate to their numbers may be the single greatest contributor to the rapidity of the defeat and an indication of just how unprepared the USA was for war. Of course, the subs did play a major role in the evacuation of Corregidor but if I understand correctly, that's not exactly the role MacArthur was anticipating them to play. He evidently saw them as his first line of defense without understanding the Navy's prewar doctrine on their use. When that defense failed to produce, the rest quickly followed. At best, the outcome could only be delayed by the forces available.

IF the subs had been deployed effectively and IF their torpedoes had worked, I think the IJN invasion might have been somewhat crippled at the start. But the PI has a VERY long coastline to defend. Even 29 subs are likely to have been challenged to cover all bases effectively. Spread too thin, they provide a porous line of defense with minimal impact capability, concentration allows greater impact but leaves larger defensive holes. Subs are essentially manuevering, intelligently-directed mine fields (which hadn't been deployed either except for Manilla Bay) and the IJN had a lot of destroyers to force them to remain submerged and minimize their abiility to manuever. As you say this is an aircraft forum.

The FEAF could conceivably have inflicted more serious losses on the Japanese invasion convoys at Aparri (N Luzon) Legaspi (S Luzon) and eventually the larger Lingayen Gulf landings (though never would have allowed the first two only to 'spring a trap' on the third: totally unrealistic). But in fact the Japanese were not that critically short of merchant type shipping at that stage of the war, and captured a good deal as they advanced. So FEAF delaying Japanese plans by causing heavier shipping losses and/or forcing JNAF units to dwell on Luzon longer is plausible. But FEAF 'defeating' the Japanese seizure of PI: not plausible. Only the main force of the USN could have done that by being ready to, then successfully executing, a decisive fleet action to relieve the PI. And that just wasn't going to happen after the PH attack; it's an interesting 'what if' whether the USN could have pulled it off *without* there having been a PH attack.

Inflicting heavier shipping losses is not terribly helpful unless you have a clue as to what you are hitting. Blunting the tip of the IJ spear by preferentially hitting those transports containing the assault troops and equipment in the van should have consequences. The problem is, that's also the part that will be most aggressively defended and it needs to be targeted and successfully engaged. That's not going to be easy. B-17s won't be particularly helpful (More flawed prewar doctrine) and subs tend to have a myopic view of the battle space. P-40 strafing or even bombing is a mere annoyance that will be readily countered. I'll address your insightful comments on the P-40 and A-24 situation in another post.

I don't believe we could have beaten the IJN and fought our way to the PI in 1941-42. They knew how to use concentrated carrier based air, the USN was very resistent to adopting a similar concentration of its own carrier forces and of course there was the difference in contemporary aircraft quality. Wake Island relief being a classic example with three carrier task forces acting totally independent of one another. Like its view of submarines in warfare, the USN viewed carriers as essentially providing battle fleet scouting support and was not yet fully appreciative of their strike capability when emolyed collectively which is astonishing considering the lesson it has been taught by the IJN at Pearl.

If you read personal recollections of many PI veterans, it was common knowledge among them that relief from the US by sea was their only real hope. And their morale was sustained by the belief that it would still happen, however impossible we know that was with hindsight.

Joe
There was almost certainly a lot more realism present among the troops stuck in the PI in 1941 than there may be in this thread (With no insult intended to anyone posting here!), but I suggest that some of that came as a result of the rapid and utter collapse of the primary (and ineffectual) deterents: The USN's Asiatic sub fleet and FEAF. :( But, I think they themselves knew they were fighting a losing battle for time even before the first bomb fell. At least that's the impression I get from reading Bartsch.
 
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1. The Lingayen landing was the third on Luzon. The FEAF put its maximum (then remaining) effort on the smaller landing at Aparri in northern Luzon Dec 10, … very little left for the landings at Legaspi in southern Luzon Dec 12, or the bigger landing at Lingayen Gulf the 22nd. … the Japanese can adjust … by keeping the bulk of Tainan/3rd AG's deployed v PI which they didn't ... because it was apparent the FEAF was neutralized.

I agree with your first point without reservation.

2. But lack of individual pilot total hours wasn't most of the problem with USAAC units in this period. It was stuff like the historical problem with A-24 deployment: didn't have their planes, or, hadn't trained intensively in *those* types, which might prove to have bugs, as the recently received P-40E's did (gun chargers, rendering the armament useless in some early combat sorties).

The dreadful quality and condition of the 27th BG's A-24 aircraft did pose a significant problem. You reminded me of the problems Bartsch described with the A-24s when they were unpacked in Australia. Your comments also provoked me to question differences in the A-24 Banshees and USN Dauntless. The A-24 Banshee was NOT the SBD-2 or 3 Dauntless successfully used by the USN. The army's first batch of A-24s meant for the PI and shipped to Oz lacked armor, self-sealing tanks and bullet resistant windscreens. The army apparently assumed it was obtaining denavalized SBD-3s but evidently received -3A models which were essentially upgraded -2s, without the -3's standard protective equipment). All the USN -2s were retrofitted to -3 protective standards when they went to war. By some accounts, the -3A nomenclature denoted a weapons upgrade to the nose mounted twin .50s and the flex .30s. The A-24s were decrepit after a 2-month period of intensive flying in the Louisiana Manuevers held late summer, 1941. Only about 50% of the 52 bombers were flyable when initially assembled and that only after considerable reworking and rehabilitation. Only about a dozen of these could be made ready for transfer to Java. As might be expected for the low numbers, these did not have an impact on the campaign, but its pilots, apparently brought south from the besieged PI, did demonstrate some skill and daring in the pitifully few numbers committed. In any event, I can't imagine an early arrival in the PI of these derelict aircraft could have been a significant factor in the Japanese invasion of the PI.

IMO it's totally unrealistic to compare such units to USN VS/VB squadrons of summer 1942, which had been cohesive units flying the same a/c in pretty intensive training for months before the war, then stepped up after Dec '41, and also those units had shakedown combats in the carriers raids v Japanese islands in early 1942. In fact it encapsulates the whole issue IMO, as I stated it earlier: if you assume unit effectiveness of USAAF units typical of late 42-early 43 (the USN had a headstart on them in readiness, since they weren't expanding hand over fist in 1940-41 like the Air Corps was), many things are possible. But the Army air units of late '41 just didn't have those capabilities. Individually competent pilots, yes, but high level of combat effectiveness as units: they proved repeatedly that they did not.

I originally said:

"54 A-24's is equivalent to 3 squadrons of Dauntlesses and that same amount proved to be fairly devastating at Midway 6 months later."

I suspect you misunderstood my meaning. I certainly was not suggesting the skill of the three 27th Bomb Group squadrons was comparable to that of VB-3 and 6 or VS-3 and 6 either at Midway or perhaps more appropriate, the contemporary island raids of Fletcher and Halsey or Wilson Brown's raid on Lae and Salamaua over the Owen Stanley Range, March 10, 1942. I merely meant that the potential destructive power of three dauntless squadrons could be considerable. I am happy to clarify my meaning. Of course, making that statement I was assuming the A-24s were just denavalized USN SBDs which they weren't and that 1,000 lb naval ordnance was available which it wasn't.
OTOH, considering that a fair amount of flight time is devoted to perfecting carrier landing technique and over-water navigation skills in working up any navy carrier based squadron, an army squadron comprised of reasonably experienced pilots (having transitioned to a new aircraft) might have spent comparable time in bombing practice and developed skills perhaps roughly comparable to that of newly created VB-8 or VS-8 pilots assigned to the newly commissioned Hornet. These squadrons had only recently transitioned to SBD aircraft from their Curtiss SBC biplanes. Operational training for the Hornet squadrons was curtailed by the Doolittle raid and effectiveness apparently diminished. At Midway, it took VB and VS 8 about 2-3 days of combat missions and bombing to begin operating effectively. Both the USN and USA squadrons also apparently shared the experience of the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers. The few A-24 pilots flying in Java appear to have come up to speed reasonably fast on the two missions they flew in Java.

3. The kill ratio of P-40 units in the DEI campaign v Zeroes was considerable *worse* than that in the limited number of actual P-40/Zero combats in the PI, around 1:7 v perhaps 1:3+ (actual causes of Zero losses in the early raids, AA, P-40 or other, are hard to determine even with detailed Japanese records, most of the a/c lost were only known not to have returned). And in the brief sampling of P-40/A-24 teaming in the defense of Java, the A-24's did sink one Japanese transport w/o being intercepted on one mission, but a P-40 escort force was largely wiped out defending them on the other mission. Another book by Bartsch covering this period is "Every Day a Nightmare" but the basics are in "Bloody Shambles". Also in a slightly different context against mostly land targets, USAAF A-24's supported by RAAF Kittyhawks/USAAF P-39's in New Guinea in spring/summer 1942 proved at high risk to Zeroes. The USAAF swore off the plane after an A-24 force with P-39 escort was virtually wiped out, in July 1942.

Joe
With respect to kill ratios determined from IJN Zero vs. USAAF P-40 combat for all encounters occurring during the DEI campaign. That appears to follow Bartsch, but I choose (perhaps arbitrarily) to consider only the results of combat encounters that occurred between USAAF pilots who launched with the sole intent of engaging any enemy A/C. That produces a somewhat different result than the one you cite. Based on Bartsch's account, I do not include any victories or losses during the debacle over Darwin where even the so-called top-cover P-40s were orbiting oblivious to the A6M threat. I do include every encounter from February 1 through March 1, 1942 that occurred between Japanese A/C and the pilots of the USAAF composite 17th Provisional Pursuit Squadron based at Ngoro field. The tally for that period as presented by Bartsch appears to be: 9 USA victories vs. 12 losses. Not counted are the Nell destroyed on 2/5, Buel's fatal 2/15 Mavis intercept or the Val destroyed on 2/19, over Darwin.
I believe the success the USAFF pilots achieved on 2/18 when downing 3 G4M Betty A/C while probably damaging a number of others was representative of the 17th's increased,(albeit temporary) effectiveness. An indication might be seen in the three instances when IJN bombers retired after jettisoning their bombs when sighting P-40 interceptors during the following week. The Bali A-24 escort mission on 2/21 does not appear to have been wiped out. It apparently lost 4 P-40s shot down out of 16 aircraft committed. A fifth ran out of gas and ditched.
Based strictly upon Bartsch's description, it appears to me these USAAF pilots, flying inferior aircraft, were yet managing to be, at least temporarily, somewhat effective in the face of daunting opposition using the few strengths of their outmatched aircraft to at least survive encounters while inflicting some telling damage on their opponents. The 7 KIA of the composite squadron based at Ngoro field for one month of combat are comparable to the 5 33rd PPS KIAs lost over Darwin in one day on 2/19.
Looks like air-to-air P-40 vs A6M loss ratio was about 2.75:1, so roughly similar to that in the PI for this composite unit composed of many PI vets.
That's just my opinion. To be fair, I haven't performed the same analysis for the PI.
I am assuming the July New Guinea mission you are citing is that of July 29 (or 26 depending on source), 1942 and consisted of 7 (some say 5) A-24 Banshees from the same flawed batch of 67 A-24s that arrived in Australia during Jan Feb 1942. Without the standard protective equipment on most contemporary combat aircraft and having lost the cover of their escorting P-39s, these vulnerable Banshees were attacked and destroyed.
The USAAF subsequently used remaining A-24 upgraded A-24A (presumably the SBD-4) most frequently as a service aircraft and A-24B Banshee (equivalent to a combat ready USN SBD-5) with some success in combat from mid-1943 until mid-1944.
 
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A good example of piddling away FEAF aircraft on an unnecessary operation.

Japan seized the Aparri, Luzon airfield with two infantry companies. USAFFE doesn't need air support to wipe out such a tiny IJA force.
 
The aircraft being piddled away was partly a leadership problem, partly a logistics and maintenance problem. In far too many engagements, the P-40's six 50's didn't all work. In too many cases none of the 6 worked, while in other instances only one or two operated properly and then only initially before quiting. That situation seems to have gotten worse with time. The dry season apparently played havoc with air operations contributing to dust-obscured vision-related take off and landing accidents that accounted for as many losses as one would expect in combat. Although squadron level leadership appears to have been competent, Leadership at Group and above appears to have been horrific and seems to have suffered due to an extended state of shock. Launches were ordered when safety conditions were marginal, objectives questionable and with low probability of success. In short, I have the impression of assets and lives not so much piddled away, as squandered.

On December 8, Group Commander Grover located at Clark, drew the 3rd Pursuit Squadron away from Iba to protect Manilla (Mac's HQ?) preventing the squadron from protecting their own base at Iba containing the high-value RADAR early warning asset. He then assigned the P-40Es of the 17th and 21st PSs based at Nichols field to defend Manilla (once again, Mac's HQ?), both squadrons subsequently spent the first day of battle orbiting Manilla Bay making no contact with the enemy, probably due mainly to poor communications, nonexistent after Clark was hit.

It's interesting that the career of Grover flourished, after this less than stellar performance. He went to Austalia with Mac and ascended to Brigadier General, while Brereton got away as quickly as possible from Mac and then chose to go to India rather than with Mac to Oz.

It seems to me, the problem with the FEAF was not type or numbers of aircraft assets but rather bad logistical support (that buck stopped at Army Quartermaster General LTG Edwin Gregory) and very thin maintenance support wrt the P-40E's 50 cal guns and engine problems. Grover's handling of his P-40B E assets appears to have bordered on negligence, ordering night intercepts under the worst of conditions on aircraft whose altitude he didn't know and path was only predicted based on an assessment of target. The PI in 1941 was a helluva place to experiment with the difficult problem of night intereception without RADAR.
 
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IMO that's a leadership problem. So are malfunctioning .50cal machineguns. If the FEAF commander had been doing his job he would kick as much arse as necessary to get the important problems fixed. Organizing a party for B-17 aircrew can wait until later.
 
But Brereton only arrived on November 4rth. That's not much time considering that there was virtually no extra ammo for testing the guns, let alone fixing the logistical shortfall in ammo. The logistical problem dates back to the original shipment of P-40Bs May 17th. I am sure there are folks in the chain of command to be blamed but which ones? Presumably commanders earlier than Brereton.
 
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While I agree that FEAF (like AHQFE in Singapore) should have done more to ensure the guns worked and that sufficient ammo was available to get pilots to a high degree of gunnery proficiency, the problems of .50 cal failures were far more widespread than just FEAF. Pretty much every fighter equipped with .50 cals had major gun reliability issues in the period thru the end of 1942 including the F4F, Buffalo, P-40 and early P-51 variants.
 
You can organize a party to keep morale up much quicker and easier than getting ammo and parts from the west coast thousands of miles across the Pacific Ocean. One ton of .50 cal Ammo won't even fill up the ammo boxes of 5 P-40Es once so even bringing it in by air in any significant amount doesn't look good. Add in normal packaging weight to the Bare belts and it just gets worse.
While a party may sound frivolous it may mean better morale and men who will work harder and longer hours if needed because they WANT TO rather than trying to beat them into better performance.
 
While I agree that FEAF (like AHQFE in Singapore) should have done more to ensure the guns worked and that sufficient ammo was available to get pilots to a high degree of gunnery proficiency, the problems of .50 cal failures were far more widespread than just FEAF. Pretty much every fighter equipped with .50 cals had major gun reliability issues in the period thru the end of 1942 including the F4F, Buffalo, P-40 and early P-51 variants.

I have read of that problem being indeed widespread, however, reading Bartsch, I get the impression the problem was far worse in FEAF P-40s than I recall reading anywhere else. As an example, in one instance, a ground-pounder senior NCO examines the guns of a pilot's P-40 and declares the problem to be a mis-installed solenoid (which he promptly fixes) makes me wonder if there wasn't an additional maintenance issue that aggravated the problem. Perhaps this was due to the generally more relaxed peacetime attitude that appears to have been embraced at all levels.
 
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The Buffalos in Singapore also suffered from solenoid problems. There wasn't just one problem, though. Each installation had its peculiarities (eg ammunition feed trays etc).
 
The Buffalos in Singapore also suffered from solenoid problems. There wasn't just one problem, though. Each installation had its peculiarities (eg ammunition feed trays etc).

Electrical problems come from people thinking that to make a reliable connection all you need to do is screw a wire into a terminal. It takes a tradesman, technician or studious engineer to get the craftsmenship right in regards to wire protection, ferrules, plating material compatibillity, terminal re tightening, etc. Likewise with hydraulics. You need someone who can obsess about gaskets, flanges and most of all cleanliness.
 
USAFFE was created July 26, 1941. Someone had to be in charge of FEAF before Brereton arrived. That person had over 4 months to fix logistical shortfalls. Plenty of time for cargo shipments to reach Manila from San Francisco.
 
BGen. Henry Clagett, Commander, Phillipine Department Air Force assigned in early May. He was relieved by Brereton upon the creation of the FEAF, November 1941.

Biographies : BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY B. CLAGETT

From that website:

In April 1941, he was ordered to duty in the Philippine Islands where he was commander of the Army Air Forces until a month before Pearl Harbor when the command was taken over by Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. From:

During the summer of 1941, he flew to China and parts of Southeastern Asia where he conferred on strategy and defense with Nationalist Chinese, British and Dutch commanders. In November, General Brereton named him commander of the Philippines interceptor force of pursuit planes.

I would expect such a conference to have raise the issue of the new IJN super fighter (the A6M) Chennault had observed over China in 1940. Was it? Did he consider have an opportunity to discuss Chennault's proposed tactics? Did he fail to relate what he learned and if he was made aware of the information, what did he do with it? :?:
 
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Think that Chennault never encountered Zeroes, let alone before 1942?

True AFAIK, (its been debated here, but I think not yet proven unless I missed some relevant thread), but Channault had seen and reported on them in 1940 in China. He knew the A6M was "out there" in the IJN "quiver" and the Ki-43's were good enough to know the A6M was not a fluke. I think the real problem with US willingness to absorb this new reality, lay in inherent racism that persisted in the West and sustained a belief that the Japanese just couldn't field a credible air force whether army or navy. I am pretty sure a few realized what the US was up against but the widespread and persistent belief that US aircraft were encountering Bf-109s in the Far East, persisted until mid-1942. That suggests a reluctance to accept the truth that I am at a loss to understand otherwise.
 
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