Kursk MkII - The Air Battle

[parsifal]

I would bow to Alteas far better explanation on this one, that immediately precedes my own. Gives a pretty good account of what was happening on the "other side of the hill" as it were

[Tante Ju]

Germans had advanced flying schools, but as the strain of the war took effect, pilo9ts were attached directly to operational JGs. These "training JGs were expected to learn the trade at the front....a disastrous policy for the LW, but forced on them by the shortage of advanced trainiers, training staff (after Stalingrad) and the need to get planes forward as fast as possible. Air fleet Commanders like Richthofen refused to commit these greenhorns until they had received considerable additional hours. But as the war progrssed, the situation on all frontsd became increasingly desperate, and front commanders were forceed to commit their training staffeln to battle.

Training JGs did not fly combat. They did train pilot to tactics etc. after they complete their training on operational type, they would receive instruction from actual front pilot. When he considered ready, he was transfer to front JG. I think Englisih equivalent is OTU.

Also this system existed before war, so it was not developed wartime. If you read Knoke, you know how it was.

[riacrato]

Here's another file I haven't read:

Battlefield air interdiction by the Luftwaffe at the Battle of Kursk -- 1943. :: Master of Military Art and Science Theses

Summary says it's more about LW air-to-ground than about LW vs VVS in the air.

Tossed into the fray to encourage one and all to have a look around the Combined Arms Reseach Library digital collection.

Read it and it raises some interesting points. BUT it does make some blatant errors, e. g. claims Fw 190 were equipped with 30mm cannons. AFAIK only a handful of prototypes were produced and they were never used operationally at least not in the air-to-ground role. Thus some of its implications are very doubtful and if an author makes such obvious mistakes i tend to distrust his work as a whole: who guarantees the parts that I have less knowledge on aren't full of mistakes as well?

[parsifal]

Hi Tante


I will try and track down a copy of your source material and have a look, and as for Altea, would bow to your superior knowledge of the LW. However, having said that, this does appear like another case of applying the "situation normal" to the East Front, which for Germany was never normal. It was always in crisis, and consequently almost never operated as the textbooks said they should. This was true for their repair and refit arrangements, and its almost certainly true for their pilot trraining arrangements.

Anyway, a reasonable summary of Luftwaffe training problems can be found with this link:


Pilot Training of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) in WW2.


Relevantly it says

"The relentless rate of losses from the beginning of the Russian campaign, however, made demands which the flying training organisation found almost impossible to meet: during the first six months of the offensive Luftwaffe casualties in aircrew, of all categories from all causes in all theatres, amounted to some 2,200 men; during the second six months an almost exactly equal number of men was lost.

The campaign in Russia also brought more direct forms of pressure on the flying training organisation. Early in 1942 many Ju52 aircraft, together with their instructor pilots, were removed from the C, blind-flying and bomber schools and sent to Russia to supplement the fleet of air transports engaged in flying supplies to the German troops cut off at Demjansk and Cholm. Owing to actual losses and shortages at the front line units, many of the instructors and aircraft were never returned to the training organisation. Later in the year the pace of air operations in the east led to a shortage of aviation fuel throughout the Luftwaffe; again it was the flying training schools that suffered.

The shortages of instructors, suitable aircraft and fuel threw out of gear the training programme for bomber and reconnaissance crews; in the short term there was a surplus of partially-trained pilots from the A/B Schools, but at the same time a lack of trained crews available at the Ergaenzungseinheiten.
In July 1942 General Kuehl, the Director of Training, brought to Goering's notice the fact that the shortages were leading to an impossible situation at the C Schools. As was so often the case, the Reichsmarschall had a glib answer: he ordered that the C Schools should be disbanded, and their functions taken over by the Ergaenzungseinheiten.
This proved to be beyond the capacity of the latter, however, for they had insufficient aircraft or instructors to cope with this sudden influx of pupils; so, in their turn, the Ergaenzungseinheiten farmed out many of them to the operational Gruppen (groups) for training. The net result of this confused situation was that the general standard of training of new crews for the bomber and long-range reconnaissance units fell so low that operational efficiency began to suffer."


So whilst it may be technically correct to say the training groups were not committed to battle, by 1942 the situation was so confused, resources so limited that the effect was the same. Aircrews were being committed without full and proper training according to this article, and efficiency was suffering as a result. In the following year (1943) ther was a partial recovery at least on the east front, before the final nosedive into oblivion in 1944.

[parsifal]

Here's another file I haven't read:

Battlefield air interdiction by the Luftwaffe at the Battle of Kursk -- 1943. :: Master of Military Art and Science Theses

Summary says it's more about LW air-to-ground than about LW vs VVS in the air.

Tossed into the fray to encourage one and all to have a look around the Combined Arms Reseach Library digital collection.

Hi MX


This is the same article as I posted. Asa Riacrato points out, it does have some errors, but proof that it is considered competent as a body of research is shown in the signatures of the assessment staff at the front of the document, that permits its release for general circulation. It cannot be dismissed as inaccurate because it has some relatively minor errors in the work.

I dont agree with everything he says, but the research cant be dismissed on the basis of minor errors. Thats akin to saying thee are spelling errors, therefore I can ignore it as aa piece of research

[Juha]

Hello Altea
IIRC IMHO Groehler’s book, Geschichte des Luftkrieges 1910 bis 1970, is a bit biased but has some interesting info and tables, but it was some 35 years ago when I read parts of it (very slowly because my knowledge on German was very basic).
IMHO Williamson Murray is not anti-Soviet or anti- or pro-LW but was clearly pro strategic bomber force.

Juha

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
first OT, see for newer info on the BoB losses: BBC News - Battle of Britain: The cost
Sums are in a/c: 1918 vs 1012, RAF losses incl only fighters, LW all combat types, I have also numbers which incl also RAF BC and CC losses, but not time to dig them out.
I still have not had time to dig out the report on VVS training, but Altea gave already good info on that, but I’ll anyway look the report later on. But anyway VVS also used a system in which a new or a reformed regiment first got some operational training in the rear before it was sent to the battle.

Juha

[Altea]

The OBs for the forces involved

Soviet Frontal Aviation units

16 Air Army 455 Fighters; 241 Gd Attack; 260 Day Bombers; 74 Night Bombers

etc..

Now the thread has a good start, don't you mind i present it in another way?

6 Fighter Aviation Corps Iarische Gen AB Yumashev
273 Fighter Air Division Kolpny Col IF Fedorov Yak 1/7/9
279 Fighter Air Division Mokhozoe Col FN Dementyev La-5

6 Mixed Aviation Corps Khmel'nets Gen ID Antoshkin
221 Bomber Air Division Pelets Col SF Buzylev A20B, Boston III
282 Fighter Air Division Kunach Col AM Ryazanov Yak-1

3 Bomber Aviation Corps Elets Gen AZ Karavysky
241 Bomber Air Division Chernovo-Piatnitskaia Col IG Kurilenko Pe-2
301 Bomber Air Division Voronets Col FM Fedorenko Pe-2

1 Guards Fighter Air Division Ol'khavatka Lt-col Krupenin Yak-1, P-39
283 Fighter Air Division Mokva/Kursk Col SP Denisov Yak-1/7
286 Fighter Air Division Zybino Col II Ivanov Yak-1 La-5
2 Guards Assault Air Division Ryshkovo Col GI Komarov Il-2
299 Assault Air Division Kr. Zaria St. Col VI Krupsky Il-2
271 Night Bomber Air Division Kazanka Lt-col KP Rasskazov U-2
16 ODRAP (organic reconaissance regiment) Maj DS Shertsyuk A20B/Pe-2
98 GvODRAP Lnt-col VP Artemyev Pe-2

Regards

PS this it not to critisize, only to complete post...

[Altea]

But anyway VVS also used a system in which a new or a reformed regiment first got some operational training in the rear before it was sent to the battle.

Juha

This is true, due to heavy losses in 1941-42 many front line regiments were disactivated (disbanded) and reconstituated/rearmed in the rear. But this was an "imposed by circumstances" not the "normal procedure".
I also point out the fact that some best pupils as Kojedoub or Evstingeyev in schools, were kept as instructors. When the wait to front they already had many hundreds of flying hours. With the obvious results we know.
To complete the big picture, first shortened flying programm occured only in 1940 with VVS tremendous expansion. All 1937-1939 pilots recieved the complete 150h programm.

So finding crews with 800 -1 000 flying hours was not that uncommon in 1941.

[parsifal]

Hello Parsifal
first OT, see for newer info on the BoB losses: BBC News - Battle of Britain: The cost
Sums are in a/c: 1918 vs 1012, RAF losses incl only fighters, LW all combat types, I have also numbers which incl also RAF BC and CC losses, but not time to dig them out.
I still have not had time to dig out the report on VVS training, but Altea gave already good info on that, but I’ll anyway look the report later on. But anyway VVS also used a system in which a new or a reformed regiment first got some operational training in the rear before it was sent to the battle.

Juha

Whilst talking about BoB losses is off topic, it can be used to illustrate why quoting losses is not so easy or accurate as any of us would like to imagine. Think back just a few posts when we were looking at Zetterlings loss figures. For 1942 he said that the Germans lost 4100 aircraft to combat causes (I think on the eastern front). However, to that total you would need to add a further 497 returned to Germany for rebuilding but ultimately scrapped, and then a further 1700 retained in theatre but also scrapped. These additional losses would not appear as losses under the german system. In particular combat, a reported loss of say 41 aircraft in a given combat in reality the number of airframes lost in that particular combat would be closer to 65 crates, because of these "long term" write offs.

In the west you are going to encounter a similar problem in calculating losses, though on a less dramatic scale. Its not going to be a phenomenon exclusively German, of course, but the reality is that the Luftwaffe suffered from this "lomg term" loss rate to a greater extent than the western allies (I dont have figures for the Soviets). Wheras in the west these kinds of attritional losses increased losses by anything from 15-25% of admitted "immediate" losses, and in the East by as much as 40-50%, for units based in Britain it only ran at a consistent 5-10% of "immediate loses/ These losses are called attritional losses, and the facts are that the allies suffered a lower attritional loss rate than the Germans. US attritional losses (both combat and noncombat related) were about 18000 airframes in the ETO out of a total of 45000 or so airframes lost in total. Thus only 40% of airframe losses were attritional. If we compare this to the attritional losses for the Germans in 1942, from Zetterlings figures, we find an attritional loss rate of about 60% of airframes. In another thread, I found that attritional losses for one particular JG selected at ramdom (JG11) amounted to 248% in one year of the force structure, in just one year. LW attrition rates were exceptionally high for some reason, I suspect for the arduous service their flying units were called upon to provide.

So I am extremely sceptical that this figure pf 1800 to 1000 is at all accurate, despite the meticulous nature of the research that produced it. It gets back to the recurring problem when quoting losses.....when is a loss a loss?????

[Milosh]

To illustrate parsifal's comment:

I./JG54 was based at Orel

In July 1943, I./JG54 lost 19 a/c 'due to enemy action' and lost 14 'not due to enemy action' (total 33). In Aug, it was 11 and 17 (total 2 respectively. What is more revealing is that the Germans couldn't keep up with the losses (at least for I./JG54). On July 1, I./JG54 had 38 Fw190As on hand which was reduced to 23 on Sept 1.

Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, I./JG54

[Juha]

Hello Milosh
As I wrote in my message #19 to the original tread:”Fuel wasn’t the only problem, Kless:”A/c allotments were generally sufficient to make up for losses, with exception of Fw 190s, Ju 88s and Bf 110G-2s...”
so that is not surprising, and I checked the 109G equipped II. and III./JG 3, they didn’t have replacement problems in Jul 43, they were recalled to Reich in Aug 43. Or I./JG 52, which stayed in the East See:
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, II./JG3 , Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, III./JG3
& Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, I./JG52

Juha

[Nikademus]

An interesting thesis that I found from a USAF Major dated 1980. I had difficulty scrolling through the article because its one of those facebook attachments, and I dont use facebook. Nevertheless I saw enough of the paper to conclude it might be of interest. Basically it argues that the germans put too much emphasis on the close air support mission at the expense of the interdiction mission, and that this mistake was a crucial factor in the air battle. Not sure if I agree totally with the major, buts still an interesting read.

Like I said, I found it difficult to navigate through the document, but it might be of interest just the same

He's technically correct but without having read the article yet, but it sounds like he's waggling his finger at the LW without understanding the nature of the Eastern Front.

Bergstrom's series relates the major problem the LW had in it's heyday years (1941 - 1942) with the Army continually needing it to perform "flying artillery" missions (aka...tactical ground support), particularily during crisis moments, of which the army had many, particularily during major Soviet offensives and/or during times of great German ground weakness. The LW was well aware that it's primary missions were Operational in nature, including Air Superiority, Interdiction, Supply hub/rail attacks and of course Airbase attack. Bergstrom relates well the frustration the LW flyers and planners felt having to bleed off assets and wear out men and machines conducting these punishing missions but he also well represents the critical effect these tactical missions had, often saving the day for the hard pressed infantrymen.

I think US authors as well as alot of posters tend to forget just how massive and draining the Eastern Front war was. It was after all, the largest modern conflict in human history involving millions of men, hundreds of divisional units (and thousands of smaller sized units), a massive amount of terrain/front and of course thousands of aircraft. It's one thing for example to commit resources to a massive strategic bombing campaign when you have no or limited such ground committments to attend too, another when your fighting such a war as was seen in the East.

One can argue that perhaps Bergstrom 'over represents' the importance of these ground support missions in regards to the army's situation I suppose but reading Glantz's new 3 volume accounts of Stalingrad as well as his book on Kursk also conveys the sheer amount of manpower and ground assets the Soviets attempted to flood the German lines with. However the air stories tend to mesh with those of the Panzerjager who also, with limited numbers were often forced to perform "fireman" missions, reacting to individual crisis vs. being used for their primary offensive role in exploitation and maneuver.

[Erich]

as to close support follow along if you will on some of the Stuka RK winners missions and how many were done per day during 1943 in the summer for just a short time period. you were ordered to fly until you die. easily seen why some could mount well over 400 missions in their talley......unheard of.

[Juha]

One can argue that perhaps Bergstrom 'over represents' the importance of these ground support missions in regards to the army's situation I suppose...

IMHO he definitely "over presents" the impact of CAS, at least in his BC/RS Vols 1 and 2 and Barbarossa books, the only ones of his books I have read, and seems to do so in his Kursk book, at least that was my imression when I leafed it a couple years ago.

Juha