land based airpower vs carrier power Pt1

[syscom3]

I got this e-mail from another forum. I take no responsibility for its accuracy. I'm only posting it here for discussion.

Contrary to popular belief, land-based airpower played the key role
in decimating Japan's World War II shipping.
Sinking Ships
By Maj. Lawrence J. Spinetta

Air Force Maj. Lawrence J. Spinetta is an F-15 instructor pilot and
former international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations. This is his first article for Air Force Magazine.
Two days after Pearl Harbor, Japanese land-based bombers and torpedo
airplanes sank the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the
battle cruiser HMS Repulse north of Singapore in the South China
Sea.

Eight hundred and forty sailors died, but the loss of life is not
what shocked the naval world. The battle marked the first time in
history that capital ships were sunk by air attack while operating
on the high seas.

The efficacy of airpower against naval forces had already been
demonstrated at Pearl Harbor and, more than a year before that, in
the British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, but both of
those engagements were against fleets that were sitting in port.

Naval convention was sometimes difficult to overcome. Off the Malay
Peninsula on Dec. 9, 1941, Adm. Thomas S.V. Phillips, British force
commander, believed so strongly in battleship superiority that he
made no effort to arrange for air cover, even while under attack. He
was among those killed in the sinking of Prince of Wales and
Repulse.

Ironically, Phillips had once counseled a junior officer that
aviation was "poppycock" and steered the officer away from the
aviation profession because it would "ruin" his career.

By the end of the war, Japan was defeated, in large part, by the
same maritime interdiction strategy it had helped validate. Land-
based airpower helped destroy Japan's maritime capabilities,
paralyze the Japanese war machine, and strangle its industries and
economy.

As an island nation lacking strategic resources, Japan needed to
import raw materials and energy to fuel its economy and sustain its
military power. In 1937, Japan imported 82 percent of its oil via
sea-lanes criss-crossing the Southwest Pacific.

Although the atomic bomb delivered the coup de grace, it was the war
against transportation that sealed Japan's fate in World War II.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, it was land-based airpower—not
carrier-based aircraft—that proved most effective in the maritime
interdiction mission.

Divergent Approaches
Halfway across the world, Britain also was dependent on shipping to
support its wartime operations.

"The old dispute about whether the airplane could or could not sink
a battleship has long since been answered, but the issue was always
somewhat beside the point," observed Bernard Brodie, author of A
Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy, in 1942. "Discerning observers
asked not so much how well the warship would fare under air attack
as whether Britain's vast shipping could be carried on in the shadow
of the Luftwaffe."

The Luftwaffe did not emphasize maritime interdiction, but, after a
slow start, the Allies did. The Army Air Forces was woefully
unprepared to conduct maritime interdiction missions in the first
nine months of the war and initially proved almost totally inept
against Japanese shipping.

It took vision to improve the AAF's initially weak maritime
performance. Fortunately for the US and its Allies, Gen. George C.
Kenney, Gen. Douglas MacArthur's top airman in the Southwest
Pacific, embraced the maritime interdiction mission. (See "The
Genius of George Kenney," April 2002, p. 66.) Kenney set about
improving training and pushed for tactical and technical innovations
such as "skip bombing," low altitude ingresses, and addition of
forward firing machine guns.

The US Strategic Bombing Survey, performed by a team of civilian
analysts and military officers commissioned by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to investigate the effects of bombing, concluded, "The war
against shipping was perhaps the most decisive single factor in the
collapse of the Japanese economy and the logistic support of
Japanese military and naval power."

The Quiet Force Multiplier
Airpower played a low profile but critical role as a force
multiplier in the Pacific campaign. Submarines never were available
in sufficient numbers to enforce a blockade of Japan on their own
and, consequently, depended on land-based airpower to supplement
their search patterns.

"The development of effective cooperation between the submarines and
the air arm permitted the results of continual air patrol and search
to be translated into effective submarine attack, where such attack
was the most appropriate method to employ," stated the strategic
bombing survey. "It must be understood, however, that particularly
as the sea-lanes contracted and more effective escort was supplied,
the task of the submarine became hazardous and losses were
considerable."

Unlike the submarine experience, land-based airpower's effectiveness
improved as shipping lanes converged, especially when ships were
funneled into natural choke points.

Aerial attacks began to exact a dreadful price on Japanese ships,
even as they hugged the coasts in desperate attempts to escape the
deadly effects of Allied airpower. Enemy ships became sitting ducks,
and when bombers found concentrations of ships, the attacks were
lethal.

In the March 1943 Battle of the Bismarck Sea, more than 100 Allied
aircraft swarmed and destroyed an entire Japanese convoy. Japan lost
some 3,500 troops. Only about 800 of the 6,900 soldiers who were
being ferried to reinforce critical areas made it to their
destination. The defeat there was "unbelievable," remarked a
Japanese destroyer captain. "Never was there such a debacle."
(See "Victory in the Bismarck Sea," August 1996, p. 88.)

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea foreshadowed the terrible toll that
land-based bombers would exert on shipping. The Japanese high
command soon announced that every soldier would be taught to swim.

Carrier-based air attacks were similarly devastating against large
concentrations of merchant ships, but these strikes were sporadic
and not part of a continuing program to neutralize enemy shipping
lanes. The US Strategic Bombing Survey noted, "In general, the
responsibilities of carrier air were presumed to lie elsewhere and
to relate more directly to naval operations."

Kenney thought his land-based aircraft were the best tools to
support maritime operations, particularly amphibious landings,
because carrier-based aircraft had limited fuel, range, loiter time,
and payload. Additionally, aircraft carriers had to periodically
discontinue flying operations in order to refuel, rearm, and replace
lost or damaged aircraft.

"I consider it unwise to rely on carrier units completely," Kenney
told MacArthur. "Carrier-based aircraft do not have staying power
and therefore do not have the dependability of land-based aircraft."
Most importantly, Kenney was concerned about the fact that aircraft
carriers could be sunk.

Naval Vulnerability
Kenney's concern about aircraft carrier vulnerability and fleet
limitations proved remarkably prescient. American carriers
experienced severe operating challenges during several campaigns and
often were unable to protect their accompanying surface fleets.

Under increasing assault from the air, warships needed more capacity
to absorb punishment became an ever-more important characteristic of
wartime vessels. Shortly after the war, the Bureau of Ships applied
engineering principles to estimate the number of hits required to
sink each naval vessel and concluded aircraft carriers were the most
vulnerable class of combat ship.

results against Japan once anti-shipping efforts were a priority.

[syscom3]

The benefits of aircraft carriers, which provide on-call airpower
without a need for nearby land bases, are well-known, but the
limitations of naval aviation are less frequently discussed. Rear
Adm. Daniel V. Gallery, assistant chief of naval operations, summed
up an inherent design weakness of the aircraft carrier in a 1949
Science Illustrated article. "A big carrier is a tank farm, an
ammunition dump, and an airfield all rolled up into one tight
package," Gallery wrote. "This is a highly inflammable combination."

An aircraft carrier is a floating city concentrated into four-and-a-
half acres. It represents a huge investment in terms of money,
materials, skilled manpower, and time. A carrier also is a valuable
target for the enemy because of its mobile combat capability.
Consequently, the Japanese naval forces made the destruction of US
aircraft carriers their top priority.

Those aircraft carriers that were fortunate to survive the Japanese
onslaught were out of action for repairs an average of 30 percent of
the time during the last year of the war. This further increased the
relative importance of land-based airpower, and a series of battles
illustrate the critical role played by land-based aircraft.

First, according to the (since declassified) Secret Information
Bulletin No. 2, carrier forces were withdrawn during the Guadalcanal
landing of Aug. 7, 1942 because of decreased carrier fighter
strength, low fuel, and a large number of enemy torpedo and bombing
airplanes in the vicinity. During the campaign, Guadalcanal's
Henderson Field remained the key staging location for land-based
aircraft, despite repeated Japanese attempts to knock it out of
service.

Later, during the 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, Rear Adm. Jesse B.
Oldendorf cabled an urgent plea for air support to Kenney and the
Thirteenth Air Force commander, among others. His cable was
indicative of the problems US naval forces were still having in
dealing with attacking enemy aircraft.

Oldendorf relayed, "Naval forces covering Leyte report two heavy air
attacks today. One destroyer has been sunk by torpedo planes. Three
additional severely damaged. If adequate fighter cover not
maintained over combatant ships, their destruction is inevitable.
Can you provide necessary protection?"

Finally, during the spring 1945 Okinawa campaign, US Navy ships were
required to operate within range of Japanese land-based aircraft.
For that campaign, the Navy had 15 carriers in service, with 919
aircraft onboard, but the flattops proved unable to protect the
fleet from the Japanese.

Under the assault from Japan's land-based aircraft, the losses were
severe—28 US ships sunk and 225 damaged.

A postwar analysis of the Navy's Pacific Theater experience revealed
carrier airplanes averaged only one flight every other day while in
a combat area. Of those sorties, at least a quarter were normally
assigned to the defense of the naval task force—the burden of
defending carriers severely limited the offensive airpower provided
by carriers and the sorties available for maritime interdiction.

Army Air Forces units, meanwhile, generated unmatched sortie rates
and firepower. For example, in one three-day span, 167 B-29s
operating from the Mariana Islands delivered 2.5 times the bomb load
that 1,091 carrier aircraft did over the same days.

Aircraft carriers also must operate according to strict launch
cycles and cannot remain on station indefinitely. Carriers can surge
to temporarily generate additional sorties, but must eventually
stand down.

In contrast, the facilities at a land-based airfield are dispersed
over an area of several square miles, are frequently open to further
expansion and enlargement, are cost-effectively constructed of
ordinary building materials, and are available for use 365 days of
the year as they never have to return to port or refuel.

An Unwanted Mission?
Land-based airpower would have sunk even more ships if not for
interservice politics that hindered unity of effort. The Army and
Navy bickered over who should control bombers engaged in sea duty.

Neither service, though, was particularly interested in a more
robust use of bombers to attack Japanese shipping and, consequently,
did not take full advantage of land-based airpower's maritime
interdiction capabilities. Post-war analysis suggests a more
concentrated effort against enemy shipping, especially oil tankers,
could have accelerated Japan's decline.

Adm. Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, primarily wanted
to use bombers to supplement fleet defense, whereas Gen. Henry
H. "Hap" Arnold, the Chief of Army Air Forces, was less than
enthusiastic about assuming maritime duties at the expense of the
strategic bombing mission.

King advocated a plan to assign control of the bombers to Navy
commanders in specified sea frontiers. This would have divided
operational control, which ran counter to AAF doctrine. King was
suspicious of any plan that would bolster calls for air force
independence and potentially steal the Navy's air component.

Conversely, Arnold was suspicious that King's proposal, if approved,
might be the "forerunner of the Navy assuming the Army's primary
responsibilities and functions for operation and control" of a land-
based air force.

The Army and Navy negotiated the Arnold-McNarney-McCain agreement,
which divided responsibility for the employment of long-range
aircraft. "In return for unquestioned control of all forces employed
in protection of shipping, reconnaissance, and offshore patrol," the
Navy relinquished control of long-range striking forces operating
from shore bases.

The Army transferred its antisubmarine B-24s to the Navy. The
agreement was designed to prevent each service from encroaching on
the other's historic responsibilities.

Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, expressed dismay over
the two services' inability to work together and disapproved of
policies that artificially divided the maritime medium. He thought
the Army and Navy procedures were "neither economical nor highly
efficient and would inevitably meet with public condemnation were
all the facts known."

The limited cooperation between the Army and Navy air arms was
offset by the enmity between Japanese air arms, which far surpassed
the American interservice rivalry. The Imperial Japanese Army Air
Force did not help its naval counterparts to control shipping lanes.

Expressing discontent, Capt. Minoru Genda, a planner of the Pearl
Harbor attack and commander of an elite squadron of pilots,
commented, "The Army fliers didn't like to fly over the ocean"
and "acted as though they didn't realize the importance of the
control of the seas."

Lessons Relearned
The utility of land-based airpower against maritime forces has been
repeatedly demonstrated in more recent events. In the brief 1982 war
with Argentina over the Falkland Islands, Britain almost suffered a
fate similar to its Dec. 9, 1941 experience.

During the Falklands campaign, Argentina only had four French-built
Super Etendard fighters capable of employing Exocet antiship
missiles. Despite the small size of the threat, British task force
defenders were unable to stop these aircraft from sinking the
destroyer HMS Sheffield and a supply ship.

Other Argentine aircraft, carrying less advanced weapons, also found
their mark. In the South Atlantic waters around the Falklands, 75
percent of the British task force was damaged or sunk. The carnage
could have been far worse for the British forces: At least 14
Argentine bombs hit their targets but failed to detonate.

Aircraft carriers may no longer be the most effective way to exert
control over the world's oceans. Long-range aircraft can operate
worldwide, reducing the need for forward bases.

[syscom3]

Allied Air Attack Damage—By the Numbers

Carrier-based aircraft in World War II were responsible for sinking
the greatest proportion of Japan's combat fleet, including five
battleships and 10 enemy aircraft carriers. It was land-based
airpower, however, that was most effective against Japanese merchant
shipping.

Land-based aircraft (through direct action and mines) sunk
approximately 23 percent of the total enemy merchant ship tonnage
sent to the bottom of the Pacific. Carrier-based aviation accounted
for approximately 16 percent.

Yet these figures underestimate the contribution of land-based
aircraft to the maritime fight. Land-based airpower also destroyed
large numbers of barges and small vessels—of less than 500 tons
gross weight—not counted in the totals. (Sea-based aircraft
destroyed relatively few small ships because they spent little time
patrolling the coastal waters and harbors.)

The Army Air Forces attacks compare favorably to the efforts of the
other services—the AAF devoted less effort but dropped more bombs
and sank a greater number of ships than the other services.

AAF's Pacific forces flew 7,250 (1.5 percent) of their sorties to
maritime interdiction and sank 265,360 tons of enemy shipping. In
comparison, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flew 25,657 (9.9 percent)
of their sorties against merchant shipping and sank 102,702 total
tons.

The AAF sank 2.5 times the enemy tonnage with less than a third of
the sorties devoted to the mission.

The disparity in relative effectiveness is magnified when you
include Twentieth Air Force's mine-laying campaign. Twentieth flew
28,826 sorties and delivered 9,875 tons of mines, which sank 287
enemy ships and damaged 323 others.

After April 1945, mines dropped by B-29s in Japanese harbors and
inland waterways accounted for half of all enemy ships sunk or
damaged.

This aerial mining crippled Japanese merchant shipping, denied
damaged ships access to repair facilities, closed strategic
waterways, and threw the administration of Japanese shipping into
hopeless confusion.


There are limits to what constitutes acceptable risk as well. Losing
a single aircraft is bad enough, but, security affairs writer Robert
Kaplan has warned, "The effect of a single Chinese cruise missile's
hitting a US carrier, even if it did not sink the ship, would be
politically and psychologically catastrophic."

"The capability for airmen to rapidly respond anywhere in the
Pacific to sink naval vessels in all weather, day or night, is
crucial," noted Gen. Paul V. Hester, commander of Pacific Air
Forces. In 2004, he and Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, PACAF vice
commander, recognized that the Air Force's ability to contribute to
the maritime fight had atrophied and sought to reinvigorate PACAF's
maritime capabilities.

Consequently, the November 2004 Resultant Fury exercise demonstrated
the ability of fighters and bombers to hit and sink moving ships,
with precision weapons, in all weather conditions.

The exercise showcased prototype technology. Strike aircraft coupled
the GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition with the developmental
Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement system.

Air Force and Navy forces worked together to destroy multiple mobile
seaborne targets, including a decommissioned tank landing ship, USS
Schenectady. Tracked on the move by E-8 Joint STARS aircraft, the
targets off Hawaii came under fire from B-1 and B-52 bombers flying
nonstop from Andersen AFB, Guam, and Dyess AFB, Tex., among other
aircraft.

Resultant Fury was judged a resounding success, demonstrating that
Air Force aircraft can sink moving targets. AMSTE is still a
developmental system, however, so the exercise did not reflect
current operational capabilities.

The fact that land-based airpower is effective against active
shipping and naval forces is well-understood today. During World War
II, however, this was a new concept that achieved spectacular

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Interesting read. The only thing I am wondering about is the whole tonnage thing. Maybe I missed it, is that just one year or season or something, because according o that one paragragh in part 3, it says the US sank only a little over 300,000 tons of Japanese ships.

Did I misunderstand that? Was is just merchant shippng or what not, but that 300,000 tons is just a few carriers and battlships, so if I read it right, that is quite wrong.

I know you did not write it syscom. I am just wondering if I read it wrong, or is it just really screwed up at that part.

Very interesting to read though, eitherway. Good thread and posting.

[syscom3]

Yes, it does say 300,000 tons. But thats for air sorties only.

But I think the author is being intellectually dishonest.

Land based aircraft did sink a lot of Japanese shipping through the end of 1943. But these were really only ships in the SW pacific, at the "front". They never went after convoys in the high seas between japan and its possesions simply because they were too far away. Once the US subs got torpedo's that worked, the Japanese merchant fleet went to the bottom quickly, or in some instances, couldnt even sail.

It was the sub fleet that strangled the Japanese homeland. The B29 mining operations were just icing on the cake.

For me, I would summarize it this way:
If the ship is within range of land based airpower and has no air cover, then it is as good as sunk.

If its not in range, then a sub (with working torpedo's) will put it into Davey Jones locker.

For WW2, untill land based bombers were located in the Philipines, there was no way for the AAF to interdict the shipping far from the "front".

It was the subs that shattered the Japanese merchant marine and strangled the Japanese homeland.

B29 mining misisons didnt occur untill late in the war when it was just one of the "coupe de grais"

[Hunter368]

Originally Posted by syscom3

Yes, it does say 300,000 tons. But thats for air sorties only.

But I think the author is being intellectually dishonest.

Land based aircraft did sink a lot of Japanese shipping through the end of 1943. But these were really only ships in the SW pacific, at the "front". They never went after convoys in the high seas between japan and its possesions simply because they were too far away. Once the US subs got torpedo's that worked, the Japanese merchant fleet went to the bottom quickly, or in some instances, couldnt even sail.

It was the sub fleet that strangled the Japanese homeland. The B29 mining operations were just icing on the cake.

For me, I would summarize it this way:
If the ship is within range of land based airpower and has no air cover, then it is as good as sunk.

If its not in range, then a sub (with working torpedo's) will put it into Davey Jones locker.

For WW2, untill land based bombers were located in the Philipines, there was no way for the AAF to interdict the shipping far from the "front".

It was the subs that shattered the Japanese merchant marine and strangled the Japanese homeland.

B29 mining misisons didnt occur untill late in the war when it was just one of the "coupe de grais"

I totally agree with you, I like the little comment about "working torpedos". lol

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by Hunter368

...."working torpedos". lol

Do know the story about the debacle with the US sub torpedo's?

The more I read about it, the more I truely believe that if there ever was a reason for some high ranking naval officials to be executed for malfeasence in wartime, this was the case.

[Hunter368]

Originally Posted by syscom3

Do know the story about the debacle with the US sub torpedo's?

The more I read about it, the more I truely believe that if there ever was a reason for some high ranking naval officials to be executed for malfeasence in wartime, this was the case.

Yes I know that was why I was laughing about it. You slipped it in there nicely. Well done. Subtle

[Wildcat]

Originally Posted by syscom3

B29 mining misisons didnt occur untill late in the war when it was just one of the "coupe de grais"

Yep, but don't forget that role the Black cats played in mining Japanese held ports and sea lanes. I don't know about the USAAF/USN, but the first RAAF mine laying mission flown by PBY's was conducted in April of 43. Further raids were flown as far as the Philippines and to the Chinese coast.

[Twitch]

I fail to see why one or another needs to be lauded over the other. I have never questioned why the Navy had aircraft any more than why the Army has aircraft. Nobody should have aircraft except the Air Force then by that logic.

The article is decently written but the theme of why the US should rely on one aerial attack contingent is rather redundant. Might be valid for some small country without much $$ to ponder whether they should have Naval aircaft, but not here.

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by Wildcat

Yep, but don't forget that role the Black cats played in mining Japanese held ports and sea lanes. I don't know about the USAAF/USN, but the first RAAF mine laying mission flown by PBY's was conducted in April of 43. Further raids were flown as far as the Philippines and to the Chinese coast.

The PBY mining missions in the Solomons and New Guinie (in 1943 and 1944) had some effect, but once the medium bombers started hunting down the Japanese ships, then the ships didnt even sail at all.

The RAAF mining missions in the Mollucca's did occur early in the war, but also didnt seem to have much of an impact. In 1945, the mining missions were in full swing, but the Japanese didnt even have much of a navy to sail at that time, so there effectivness cannot be deduced.

The mining missions against The PI did not occur untill the fall of 1944 (at the very earliest), and the Chinese coast untill early 1945.

There could have been some 10th and 14th AF mining missions along the chinese coast before 1945, but the very few aircraft available to do the missions meant there was little if any impact on Japanese shipping.

The B29 mining missions over japan were effective, in that the inland sea region was targeted, and even it was a natural chokepoint. At that time, many of the Japanese coastal vessels plying that sea route were still coal fired, and could operate regardless of the petroleum shortages.

[R Leonard]

Response to Spinetta Article - Part 1 of 5

Sinking Ships - Contrary to popular belief, land-based airpower played the key role in decimating Japan's World War II shipping.

By Maj. Lawrence J. Spinetta

Two days after Pearl Harbor, Japanese land-based bombers and torpedo airplanes sank the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser HMS Repulse north of Singapore in the South China Sea.

Eight hundred and forty sailors died, but the loss of life is not what shocked the naval world. The battle marked the first time in history that capital ships were sunk by air attack while operating on the high seas.

While certainly an eye opener for the general public, I hardly think that the professional aviator or surface warfare officer was at all surprised . . . here’s a couple of capital warships and four escorting destroyers wandering around an area known to be inhabited by some very aggressive enemy air types and suddenly they’re faced with a series of combined aerial bomb and torpedo attacks which overwhelm what little AA capability they possess. No, to the professionals, this was not a surprise. Even beyond mere theory, the writing was on the wall. Cases in point:

(1) witness the fateful torpedo hit on Bismarck, which caused the damage that allowed the pursuing RN surface forces to close in for the kill.
(2) The turning for home by the Italians after modest and partially successful attacks from HMS Formidable at Cape Matapan, including aerial torpedo hits on Vittorio Veneto and Pola which caused a slowing that allowed Cunningham’s surface forces to overtake (from 80 miles away) them.

While, ultimately, sinkings in these two actions were accomplished by the surfaces forces, these at-sea air strike instances made it clear that a capital ship, without air support, had little chance of emerging unscathed from an air attack and pointed, especially when the small size of the FAA strike groups in each action is taken into account, that large strike forces were sure to achieve a capital ship sinking sooner or later.

This general ability of air forces (note small case) to get through defenses, strike, score hits, and even sink naval or merchant shipping, even in the presence of airborne defensive assets, is a given; especially the more willing an attacker is to accept losses to do so (witness the late war Kamikaze attacks, the ultimate guided missiles). The position espoused by Major Spinetta in his article is simply a rephrasing and recitations of a litany of this basic truism.

The efficacy of airpower against naval forces had already been demonstrated at Pearl Harbor and, more than a year before that, in the British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto, but both of those engagements were against fleets that were sitting in port.

Again, hardly earth shattering revelations, first a night attack (and night being the really important part of the attack that most people miss – torpedoing a docked vessel is not all that difficult, but night attacks from carriers, in 1940, were really unusual) on an enemy anchorage and the second against a somewhat warned (“This is war warning”), but unprepared non-belligerent at its home base.

Naval convention was sometimes difficult to overcome. Off the Malay Peninsula on Dec. 9, 1941, Adm. Thomas S.V. Phillips, British force commander, believed so strongly in battleship superiority that he made no effort to arrange for air cover, even while under attack. He was among those killed in the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse.

Air cover originally was to have been supplied by HMS Indomitable, which was removed from the equation through hull damage in a November grounding. One might wonder how the unescorted Japanese G3Ms might have faired against a defense offered by Indomitable’s Sea Hurricanes and Fulmars. I suspect, however, that even despite the low fuel (the Japanese had been off searching in all the wrong places), lack of escorting fighters, and the uncoordinated and piece-meal nature of the attack by the Saigon based 22d Air Flotilla (note, an IJN unit, not an IJAAF) that any airborne defenders, whether from Indomitable or even shore based fighters would, too, be overwhelmed simply by the weight of the attack. Again, Spinetta is overly simplistic. As with the examples of Bismarck and Cape Matapan, combined with the experiences of operating with range of enemy airfields off Norway, the Admiralty, and I suspect, Phillips, (and since Spinetta can make his supposition without attribution, so shall I) was well aware of the danger posed by enemy aircraft. In fact, Phillips did request air cover and was turned down as his initial plan was considered “too far” for coverage. Spinetta ignores the high speeds maintained by Force Z and a, truly wishful, reliance on poor weather and cloud cover to provide some shielding from prying Japanese air searches. There is also some evidence to indicate that the British were unaware of the true capabilities and strength of the air forces arrayed against them and even then there was a failure by the intelligence folks in the Singapore command to communicate what little they did know to either Phillips or his staff. Spinetta either doesn’t know or ignores that there was, indeed, even a later call for air cover when Phillips changed the direction of his sortie and then found that he was being shadowed by enemy search planes; however, the 11 Brewster Buffaloes dispatched arrived on the scene long after the Japanese departure and Prince of Wales and Repulse had gone down. Further, Spinetta ignores the shear weight of the attack. Ultimately, there were 49 torpedoes dropped (11 hits) and 23 bombs (2 hits). I would not be at all surprised at any similar sized naval force not faring well against a similar weight of attack. Spinetta has yet to present anything anyone did not, then, or does not, now, already know. Also, Repulse and Prince of Wales were sunk in attacks that occurred on December 10, 1941, not on December 9th. All in all a fairly poor research job.

Ironically, Phillips had once counseled a junior officer that aviation was "poppycock" and steered the officer away from the aviation profession because it would "ruin" his career.

Not an uncommon thing for senior officers to say to juniors seeking to enter naval aviation in those days and earlier. My father’s division head aboard USS Arkansas in the spring of 1940 said the same thing. He retired as a Commander, my father, designated a naval aviator in November 1941, retired as a Rear Admiral. One found the same point of view in the US Army. If one expected to get ahead, there were far more senior billets for Ground and Service Forces officers than Air Corps officers. Basic fact of military life in the 1930’s; there were only so many billets for a finite number of personnel. There was, in the RN, the further complication that the FAA, up until 1937, was subordinate to the RAF, thus a movement to the FAA could, indeed, ruin the career of an RN officer. USAF boosters, and, perhaps, Spinetta, offering Phillips’ sentiment in this matter seem to forget that inconvenient arrangement and present his (Phillips) opinion seemingly as one uttered on the eve of the battle.

By the end of the war, Japan was defeated, in large part, by the same maritime interdiction strategy it had helped validate. Land-based airpower helped destroy Japan's maritime capabilities, paralyze the Japanese war machine, and strangle its industries and economy.

And here, Spinetta is correct, land-based airpower DID help destroy Japan’s maritime capabilities . . . along with submarines, surface warships, and, yes, carrier aircraft.

Although the atomic bomb delivered the coup de grace, it was the war against transportation that sealed Japan's fate in World War II. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it was land-based airpower—not carrier-based aircraft—that proved most effective in the maritime interdiction mission.

This is a classic straw-man exercise. Even I, as most long time posters here know, a most vociferous proponent of carrier airpower, do not consider carrier airpower as the most effective in the maritime interdiction mission to be the conventional wisdom. So, Spinetta sets up his efficacy of carrier-based aircraft strawman and proceeds to bash away at it through a recitation of AAF propaganda.

The Army Air Forces was woefully unprepared to conduct maritime interdiction missions in the first nine months of the war and initially proved almost totally inept against Japanese shipping.

How true, but, in fairness, in the first months of the Pacific war, with what was the AAF supposed to attack Japanese shipping or even naval forces? Most of the airpower in the Philippines got wiped out; the A-24’s sent to Australia and then forward to New Guinea were basket cases on arrival and were mostly lost to operational accidents; and the B-17 drivers persisted in thinking they could sink Japanese carriers with high altitude bombing.

[R Leonard]

Response to Spinetta Article - Part 2 of 5

It took vision to improve the AAF's initially weak maritime performance. Fortunately for the US and its Allies, Gen. George C. Kenney, Gen. Douglas MacArthur's top airman in the Southwest Pacific, embraced the maritime interdiction mission. (See "The Genius of George Kenney," April 2002, p. 66.) Kenney set about improving training and pushed for tactical and technical innovations such as "skip bombing," low altitude ingresses, and addition of forward firing machine guns.

The Navy already knew that in order to sink a ship of any kind you had to get down where the ship was, not from bombs from high above. Kenney was hardly espousing a sudden epiphany, or maybe it was, for him. Obviously, if you are approaching a vessel at low level, the more firepower you can bring to bear, the better. Again, hardly rocket science. The AAF used skip bombing, the USN, torpedoes; both accomplished the same thing, let the water in where it shouldn’t be.

The US Strategic Bombing Survey, performed by a team of civilian analysts and military officers commissioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to investigate the effects of bombing, concluded, ‘The war against shipping was perhaps the most decisive single factor in the collapse of the Japanese economy and the logistic support of Japanese military and naval power.’

Note that Spinetta is drawing his USSBS quotes from the 1947 US Air Force report, not from the USSBS summary report.

‘The Quiet Force Multiplier
Airpower played a low profile but critical role as a force multiplier in the Pacific campaign. Submarines never were available in sufficient numbers to enforce a blockade of Japan on their own and, consequently, depended on land-based airpower to supplement their search patterns.

The development of effective cooperation between the submarines and the air arm permitted the results of continual air patrol and search to be translated into effective submarine attack, where such attack was the most appropriate method to employ,' stated the strategic bombing survey. 'It must be understood, however, that particularly
as the sea-lanes contracted and more effective escort was supplied, the task of the submarine became hazardous and losses were considerable.’

This is, again, an USAF 1947 interpretation and not exactly true. USN submarine losses, as a percentage of available assets actually declined as the war progressed. Certainly the loss of the crew of a single submarine equates to the crews of 10-15 bombers, but there were considerably more bomber crews lost than submarine crews.

Unlike the submarine experience, land-based airpower's effectiveness improved as shipping lanes converged, especially when ships were funneled into natural choke points.

As a statement on the efficacy of air power, true, but as a observation of submarine operations this is not a true statement. Choke points were just as likely to be submarine infested as covered by airpower, in fact, the submarine had the advantage of being able to remain on station, good weather and bad, night and dark, something airpower, generally, could not do.

Aerial attacks began to exact a dreadful price on Japanese ships, even as they hugged the coasts in desperate attempts to escape the deadly effects of Allied airpower. Enemy ships became sitting ducks, and when bombers found concentrations of ships, the attacks were lethal.

In the March 1943 Battle of the Bismarck Sea, more than 100 Allied aircraft swarmed and destroyed an entire Japanese convoy. Japan lost some 3,500 troops. Only about 800 of the 6,900 soldiers who were being ferried to reinforce critical areas made it to their
destination. The defeat there was 'unbelievable,' remarked a Japanese destroyer captain. 'Never was there such a debacle.' (See 'Victory in the Bismarck Sea,' August 1996, p. 88.)

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea foreshadowed the terrible toll that land-based bombers would exert on shipping. The Japanese high command soon announced that every soldier would be taught to swim.

But land-based aircraft are only able to inflict such losses on those enemy vessels which happen to enter their operational ranges. Land-based are exactly that and are tied securely to their home bases. While the Bismarck Sea convoy attacks, hardly what one would call a “battle,” were devastating to the Japanese, all were conducted well with the operating ranges of the aircraft involved, thus allowing for multiple sorties to keep the pressure on. Any large concentration of transports and cargo vessels with only destroyers as escorts and no air coverage of it’s own is in danger, whether from air-based or carrier-based aircraft. One wonders just what point Spinetta is trying to make here.

Carrier-based air attacks were similarly devastating against large concentrations of merchant ships, but these strikes were sporadic and not part of a continuing program to neutralize enemy shipping lanes. The US Strategic Bombing Survey noted, ‘In general, the responsibilities of carrier air were presumed to lie elsewhere and to relate more directly to naval operations.’

Again from the highly partisan 1947 USAF report. And is one to presume that the Bismarck Sea 'Battle' was the norm for the USAAF land-based forces or just a spectacular one time occurrence? Just how many times was this success repeated? On how many occasions were Japanese convoys waylaid by carrier-based aircraft? And should one suppose. based on Spinetta’s comments, that carrier-based strikes on Japanese merchant and naval vessels had no apparent purpose except to litter the bottom of the ocean with scrap metal? And Spinetta forgets one important factoid. Once within the range of land-based bombers, be they USAAF or USN, an 'enemy shipping lane' was no longer such, it was a target area. To truly attack enemy shipping lanes requires entering deep into enemy controlled seas, something that requires aircraft carriers or submarines and something not particularly done well by land-based aircraft when such lanes lay beyond the range of the land-based airplane. While carrier aircraft, it is true, were more oriented toward disposing of their naval adversaries, each such adversary removed was one less potential escort for merchant shipping, so, though Spinetta does not see it, there was, indeed, a method to the madness.

Kenney thought his land-based aircraft were the best tools to support maritime operations, particularly amphibious landings, because carrier-based aircraft had limited fuel, range, loiter time, and payload. Additionally, aircraft carriers had to periodically discontinue flying operations in order to refuel, rearm, and replace lost or damaged aircraft.

Really? . . . and just who was providing air support to various invasions when, specifically, Kenney and company could not seem to get their acts together enough to move their assets forward as per plans and establish forward airfields? Why were carriers stuck off the coasts of the Philippines and Okinawa? Why was the AAF unable to live up to their claimed capabilities? None of this argument, in this and the next eight paragraphs has anything to do with the relative efficacy of carrier-based or land-based aircraft in the destruction of Japanese maritime and naval capability. Spinetta cannot seem to stay on subject, not does he appear to be completely familiar with the history.