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- #181
Luftwaffe after BoB: strategy, tactics, tecnology?
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Shortround6
Major General
Better engines for the HE 111 won't do much for speed but may improve the bomb load over distance figures IF the landing gear can handle the higher take-off weight.
He 177 had some restrictions of it's own with the bomb bay. The high figures are only hit using odd ball combinations of oddball bombs. When carrying small bombs the He 177 doesn't show that big of an advantage. And carrying the big bomb loads cuts into the range substantially. RANGE not radius, when carrying the max bomb load is given as 745miles(?). Max being 5600KG (?)
A more "normal" load is 3000kg and if made up of 12 SC 250lbs it is carrying only 50% more than the He 111. It appears that the He 177 could trade the four forward SC 250 bombs for extra space for fuel bringing to down to eight bombs (2000kg) but it's range may have been enough to equal a He 111 caring only four bombs (using 1/2 it's bomb bay for fuel) I haven't tried working out exact numbers. Performance charts for the He 177 seem a bit scarce. Here are links to two interesting manuals if you haven't seen them already, They are for the A-3 and are in German. The second one is a detailed description of the defensive armament. Please look at the elevation and traverse limits of some of the 20mm installations.
Description of He 177 A-3: http://www.deutscheluftwaffe.de/arc...ng He 177 A-3/Kurzbeschreibung He 177 A-3.pdf
He 177 A-3 defensive gun manual: http://www.deutscheluftwaffe.de/arc...nkel/He 177/He 177 A-3 Schusswaffenanlage.pdf
The early ones? and which cruise speed? MAX cruise or most economical? Most economical for an A-5 was 210mph (although that might be with under wing loads)
wiking85
Staff Sergeant
How was it any more lame than the Manchester before the Lancaster redesign?
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- #184
So now you want the Luftwaffe to develop a strategic bombing force. The reason the British and Americans deployed thousands of four engine bombers is because they needed that many to be sure of damaging German production. To hit a 200' by 200' structure they needed, statistically, to drop nearly 1000 bombs. It worked, the Anglo-American campaign seriously curtailed German production, we can argue about the figures, but at a cost that the Germans simply could not afford.
There is no point in building a few hundred strategic bombers and going after Soviet production, you won't do enough damage. Many facilities, or their infra structure like machine tools, were very resilient against bombing. If the Soviets react by dispersing production in the vast expanses of the USSR you'll be lucky to find it, even with thousands of bombers.
It's a complete dead end. The RLM had limited resources and had to martial them to best effect. Strategic bombers were a waste of those resources.
Cheers
Steve
Shortround6
Major General
The Germans kept the size of their bombers small (low drag) by trading bomb space for fuel space. Granted other people used the bomb bays for fuel but in planes like the He 177 two thirds of the bomb bay could be blocked off by fuel tankage for the long range mission. The British tended to keep their bomb bays clear a provide enough tankage elsewhere. Although it might mean a bigger/higher drag airplane. No freebie, the British still had to trade bomb weight for fuel weight so they couldn't fill all the available volume in the bomb bay. It might depend on your bombs and tactics as to which was better (incendiaries tend to have a low weight to volume ratio).
vinnye
Senior Airman
I think the LW should adopt the tactics used by the RAF to win the BoB. Instead of concentrating your fighters to make one big hit at the escorts and bombers, hit them with smaller groups - but more often.
I believe the LW bomber crews hated the knowledge that the RAF would come at them at any time - nerve shredding stuff!
If the LW can get its fighters up high enough to boom and zoom - then that's what hey should do - leave the escorts alone if possible.
I believe the LW bomber crews hated the knowledge that the RAF would come at them at any time - nerve shredding stuff!
If the LW can get its fighters up high enough to boom and zoom - then that's what hey should do - leave the escorts alone if possible.
The two are not really comparable.
The Manchester was not a 'dog' despite being somewhat under powered by its Vulture engines. Chadwick was already working on what would become the Lancaster as the Manchester went into production. The start of Manchester production allowed Chadwick to 'liberate' about 30 experienced design draughtsmen to work on the Type 683. As early as mid 1939 Chadwick knew that a four engine type would be required, though work on the Type 683, that would become Lancaster, was kept largely in the firm for another year. Switching to Merlins and adding 11' to the wings was not that big a deal because the original design was itself sound. This is supported by letters from Chadwick to Rowe and minutes from Farren at the MAP.
It was also important that Avro fiercely resisted any moves to have them build the Halifax.
None of this applies to the He 177. Once again the Air Ministry, Ministry of Aircraft Production, RAF and Avro demonstrated that cooperation in a common cause could result in a successful aeroplane, even rooted in the disappointment of the Manchester. The RLM/Luftwaffe/ aircraft industry in Germany never seems to have been capable of this.
Cheers
Steve
Glider
Captain
My understanding is that the crews certainly considered the Manchester to be a 'Dog'. That said the rest of the posting I totally agree with
The report on the Manchester from Boscombe Down as tested there with a maximum a.u.w. of 52,000lbs due to limitations imposed whilst awaiting full clearance of the Vulture engines describes the aircraft as "extremely pleasant to fly."
The only modifications requested by the A&AEE related to the turrets, ammunition feeds and the arrangement of bomb loading stations.
There is no denying the difficult job that No. 207 Squadron undertook in working the Manchester up into operational service, but these were almost entirely caused by the engines. The problems with the lubrication and cooling systems of the Vulture are well documented and it was these that prevented operational restrictions being lifted from the Manchester and also led to periods of grounding.
Even the men of No.207 Squadron, assembled with experienced hands (the initial six operational crews included a DSO, six DFCs and seven DFMs) suffered from a lack of confidence in the engines.
The Manchester was not in any sense a dog of an aircraft. Once modified to fly with four Merlins rather than two Vultures it easily became the Lancaster, the problems left with the engines. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the He 177.
The Lancaster was based on a good aeroplane in the Manchester, it's why the conversion was so easy. Putting four engines on the He 177 was just polishing a turd. They polished long and hard for years but never got a meaningfully operational aircraft out of it.
Cheers
Steve
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- #191
The He 177 was a vastly better bomber than the Manchester was. Especially once the DB 610 engines were installed, and at least then it was every bit an operational aircraft. Manchester needed the 4 individual engines much more than He 177.
How many He 177s were ever operational at one time? How much damage was inflicted on Germany's enemies by He 177s? How can you justify the investment in the He 177 over many years in light of the return on that investment?
The He 177 would have been a better aircraft than the Manchester, but the point is that the British fixed the Manchester and produced the Lancaster.
The Manchester/Lancaster was the mainstay of Bomber Command from mid war onwards. Well over 7,000 were built and they flew a total of 156,192 of Bomber Command's 389,809 sorties for the entire war, including before the type entered service.
I'd love to see some comparable statistics for the wonderful He 177.
The Lancasters DNA, and hence the Manchester's, is evident in the Shackleton which served operationally until 1991. Hardly a dog.
I don't know how you quantify what makes a good aeroplane but the 'clunker' (in Col. Watson's words) that was the He 177 never was one. Whether it ever could have been is a moot point because the Germans couldn't make it work properly in significant numbers, despite all that polishing.
Cheers
Steve
The He 177 would have been a better aircraft than the Manchester, but the point is that the British fixed the Manchester and produced the Lancaster.
The Manchester/Lancaster was the mainstay of Bomber Command from mid war onwards. Well over 7,000 were built and they flew a total of 156,192 of Bomber Command's 389,809 sorties for the entire war, including before the type entered service.
I'd love to see some comparable statistics for the wonderful He 177.
The Lancasters DNA, and hence the Manchester's, is evident in the Shackleton which served operationally until 1991. Hardly a dog.
I don't know how you quantify what makes a good aeroplane but the 'clunker' (in Col. Watson's words) that was the He 177 never was one. Whether it ever could have been is a moot point because the Germans couldn't make it work properly in significant numbers, despite all that polishing.
Cheers
Steve
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- #193
Think you are confusing the capabilities of an aircraft with the capability of an airforce, or at least with the capability of one of it's important branches.
How much the combined effort of Whitley, Wellington and Hampden was instrumental in defeating the UK's enemy? The He 111, while on paper either equal or worse vs. RAF's counterparts, was instrumental in defeating Poland, Norway, Low Countries and France. Are we to conclude that RAF's bombers were lousy aircraft?
He 177 was a better aircraft than Manchester. Even than the fixed Manchester.
All fair. The Lancaster was introduced when UK Commnwelth were fighting the Germany with USA and USSR, the 3:1 odds are usually more favorable in war, than the 1:3 odds. Despite the Italian and Japanese siding with Germans.
It would be cool to see just who was claiming that He 177 was wonderful. It was capable to lift a comparable weight of fuel and bombs, and to fly faster than Lancaster, let alone Manchester.
When UK was building Lancasters as much as they could, Germany was ramping up the fighter production, not the bomber production. No bombers produced = no sorties flown = no bombs dropped.
When modified, including the better installation of a better engine, it worked. See above about the numbers, or lack of those.
How much the combined effort of Whitley, Wellington and Hampden was instrumental in defeating the UK's enemy? The He 111, while on paper either equal or worse vs. RAF's counterparts, was instrumental in defeating Poland, Norway, Low Countries and France. Are we to conclude that RAF's bombers were lousy aircraft?
He 177 was a better aircraft than Manchester. Even than the fixed Manchester.
All fair. The Lancaster was introduced when UK Commnwelth were fighting the Germany with USA and USSR, the 3:1 odds are usually more favorable in war, than the 1:3 odds. Despite the Italian and Japanese siding with Germans.
It would be cool to see just who was claiming that He 177 was wonderful. It was capable to lift a comparable weight of fuel and bombs, and to fly faster than Lancaster, let alone Manchester.
When UK was building Lancasters as much as they could, Germany was ramping up the fighter production, not the bomber production. No bombers produced = no sorties flown = no bombs dropped.
When modified, including the better installation of a better engine, it worked. See above about the numbers, or lack of those.
You have misinterpreted my first point.
Essentially the question is what was the return on the investment for the He 177. The project started in 1936, a mock up was completed and approved by the RLM in November 1937. The first operational sorties were flown in November 1943!
That's six years of work and investment, who knows how many man hours and millions of Reich Marks, to produce an aircraft, in relatively small numbers, which still didn't work very well.
At this time there were still serious problems not just operating the aircraft but with production. There is a report from the special maintenance unit (Feldwerft Abteilung zbV 1) which was attached to II./KG 40 listing the problems with newly delivered aircraft that does not make pretty reading.
It is noticeable that on operations like 'Capricorn' and 'Steinbock' the supposedly fixed He 177 was still suffering early returns, losses in emergency landings and yes, you guessed it, at least one engine fire. There were on going problems with tyres causing many aborted take offs, oil leaks and fuel pipe breakages, all listed by the Feldwerft Abteilung. The He 177s anyway made up an almost insignificant number of the aircraft deployed.
To return to the original topic, Luftwaffe strategy after the BoB should not have involved a project like the He 177 at all.
Cheers
Steve
Essentially the question is what was the return on the investment for the He 177. The project started in 1936, a mock up was completed and approved by the RLM in November 1937. The first operational sorties were flown in November 1943!
That's six years of work and investment, who knows how many man hours and millions of Reich Marks, to produce an aircraft, in relatively small numbers, which still didn't work very well.
At this time there were still serious problems not just operating the aircraft but with production. There is a report from the special maintenance unit (Feldwerft Abteilung zbV 1) which was attached to II./KG 40 listing the problems with newly delivered aircraft that does not make pretty reading.
It is noticeable that on operations like 'Capricorn' and 'Steinbock' the supposedly fixed He 177 was still suffering early returns, losses in emergency landings and yes, you guessed it, at least one engine fire. There were on going problems with tyres causing many aborted take offs, oil leaks and fuel pipe breakages, all listed by the Feldwerft Abteilung. The He 177s anyway made up an almost insignificant number of the aircraft deployed.
To return to the original topic, Luftwaffe strategy after the BoB should not have involved a project like the He 177 at all.
Cheers
Steve
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- #196
A bit on the next iron in the fire, the Fw-190. While I admire most of the ww2 aircraft, the Fw-190 is one of my all-time favorites.
The 1941 will see the introduction in the 'Western front', with engine requiring plenty of work to became a reliable powerplant. The small changes in the airframe also helped to decrease the probability of engine overheating, or worse. A change from the 801C to 801D, it's S/C geared for higher altitudes, higher CR and rated for greater boost means better performance at all altitudes.
So, once there is enough of cannons the 190 can have 4 installed, delete the 4 LMGs. That would save ~105 kg/230 lbs, slightly benefiting the RoC and speed, while not taking away much from the firepower. When the limitations of the internal intakes are known for hi-altitude tasks (historically already in 1942), install the external ones - should give another 10-15 km at 7 km and above. External tasks also facilitate the installation of air filters.
By early/mid 1943, the engines with two-stage compressors, either from Jumo 211 or BMW 801 line should come in service. A version of the BMW 801 with enlarged 1-stage S/C might also be interesting, akin to the historical DB-605 AS versions.
The Jumo 213 following suit shortly after, 1st with single stage compressor, along with the DB 603 with a 2-stager.
The 1941 will see the introduction in the 'Western front', with engine requiring plenty of work to became a reliable powerplant. The small changes in the airframe also helped to decrease the probability of engine overheating, or worse. A change from the 801C to 801D, it's S/C geared for higher altitudes, higher CR and rated for greater boost means better performance at all altitudes.
So, once there is enough of cannons the 190 can have 4 installed, delete the 4 LMGs. That would save ~105 kg/230 lbs, slightly benefiting the RoC and speed, while not taking away much from the firepower. When the limitations of the internal intakes are known for hi-altitude tasks (historically already in 1942), install the external ones - should give another 10-15 km at 7 km and above. External tasks also facilitate the installation of air filters.
By early/mid 1943, the engines with two-stage compressors, either from Jumo 211 or BMW 801 line should come in service. A version of the BMW 801 with enlarged 1-stage S/C might also be interesting, akin to the historical DB-605 AS versions.
The Jumo 213 following suit shortly after, 1st with single stage compressor, along with the DB 603 with a 2-stager.
The only thing I'd question there is the need for four cannons. Such armament wasn't required until those pesky American bombers started arriving in numbers
Whether your other proposals were actually practical I'd have to check, but I don't disagree with them.
The Fw 190 was one of the great aeroplanes of WW2, no doubt about that.
Cheers
Steve
Whether your other proposals were actually practical I'd have to check, but I don't disagree with them.
The Fw 190 was one of the great aeroplanes of WW2, no doubt about that.
Cheers
Steve
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- #198
The only thing I'd question there is the need for four cannons. Such armament wasn't required until those pesky American bombers started arriving in numbers
Yep, we can remember that Bf-109F1 to G4 carried just one cannon as standard outfit - no wonder it the 109F4 was able to handily out-climb the Fw-190A-2!
Two MG 151/20 in wing roots would've probably sufficed for most tasks before 1943 in the West; historically the outer pair of cannons was listed as 'Ruszatz' for the Fw-190s for a long period of time (from A-2 until A-5).
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- #199
Here is what the Fw 190A3/U7 was capable for, second half of 1942. The U7 factory mod involved deletion of much of pilots protection (almost 50 kg worth, including head back armor), along with removal of fuel tank protection (another 50 kg worth). The fuselage mounted MG 15s their ammo were also removed (100+ kg). Result was the top speed of almost 700 km/h (694 km/h, 431 mph) at 7400 m (24,278 ft), for the take off weight of 3640 kg. The external intakes were installed, for better use of ram effect.
The report notes that the installed supercharger happened to be an excellent example, the full throttle altitude with run-on-the-mill superchargers was expected to be at 7000-7100 m, for some speed loss.
Obviously, we want the fighter to carry the protection, so 'our' hi-altitude Fw 190 would be at ~3750 kg. Speed of some 680+ km/h at 7000m - equal or better than any Bf 109 prior 1944, still with decent firepower for fighter vs. fighter job. Or, comparable with the Fw-190D-9.
Link to the test: here.
The report notes that the installed supercharger happened to be an excellent example, the full throttle altitude with run-on-the-mill superchargers was expected to be at 7000-7100 m, for some speed loss.
Obviously, we want the fighter to carry the protection, so 'our' hi-altitude Fw 190 would be at ~3750 kg. Speed of some 680+ km/h at 7000m - equal or better than any Bf 109 prior 1944, still with decent firepower for fighter vs. fighter job. Or, comparable with the Fw-190D-9.
Link to the test: here.
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- #200
