LUFTWAFFE EXPERTEN Claims vs. Kills

[Juha]

My hypothesis would be, leaving P-38 out because lack of knowledge, that longer ranged P-51s could strafe less well protected a/fs farther from Allied airbases where LW had evacuated much of it’s a/c which were less well dispersed and camouflaged than those at a/fs nearer to frontlines, which were targets of shorter legged P-47s

Juha

[Juha]

Bill most probably know this but one book from which one might find some clues is Osprey’s A/c of the Aces 51 Special ”Down to Earth” Strafing Aces of the Eight Air Force. It is based on the training manual compiled by battle-seasoned USAAF fighter pilots during the war. IMHO with Osprey’s A/c of the Aces 31 Special VIII Fighter Command at War “Long Reach” and Osprey’s A/c of the Aces 61 Special ”Twelve to One” V Fighter Command Aces of the Pacific, which both are also based on same kind war time material, it is the most important book published in that series. They give a good insight of thinking the leading USAAF aces and of course some inkling to their ability to transfer their thoughts onto paper.

Juha

[Hop]

Is it possible to break the strafing claims down by date? Looking at the USAAF statistical digest, 3,703 of the 6,796 strafing kills in Europe occurred in April 1945. I'm guessing by that date German resistance was collapsing and many of these attacks saw little or no flak opposition. Weren't the 8th AF almost totally converted to Mustangs by April 1945?

[Timppa]

Perhaps the better yardstick for vulnerability is loss/sortie. ETO numbers 1942-1945:
P-47: 0.7%
P-51: 1.2%
P-38: 1.4%

The P-47's dropped around 20 times as much bombs as P-51. So it was the dedicated late war fighter-bomber, where as P-51's could seek more lightly defended targets.

See the data in this page:
P-51 Mustang by Ray Wagner - Page 3

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Hop

Is it possible to break the strafing claims down by date? Looking at the USAAF statistical digest, 3,703 of the 6,796 strafing kills in Europe occurred in April 1945. I'm guessing by that date German resistance was collapsing and many of these attacks saw little or no flak opposition. Weren't the 8th AF almost totally converted to Mustangs by April 1945?

I have a WIP to break it our by month for the 8th AF and about halfway converted.

The 56th FG remained with P-47 throughout the war but all other P-47 groups fully converted by Nov 1944.

The ground scores were quite high in April but it was with accompanying high losses to heavily defended airfields. Having said that the award to loss ratio in April WAS ~ 3:1 over prior period of combat ops.

The 8th destroyed ~ 1724 on the ground for losses of 127 (all causes). The 56th lost 7 for 147 destroyed the 339th lost 4 for 271 destroyed and the top 8th AF strafing group (355th) lost 13 for 171 destroyed - all causes.

I have the sorties/loss/award statistics for the 355th 100% complete

Total 17222 sorties, 341 air awards, 508 ground awards, 180 lost to all causes including accidents ,write off's, ops.

P-47 --------2,912 sorties 39 air awards, 8 ground awards, 31 of the 180 lost

P-51 -------14,310 sorties, 302 air awards, 500 ground awards, 149 of the 180 lost

Loss per sortie------------award per sortie
P-47 .. 0.0106 ............. 0.0161

P-51 .. .0.104 .... ......... 0.560

I haven't finished but for German aircraft destroyed on a per sortie comparison the 339th and 355th are at the top of the 8th AF.

The 356th is near the bottom (awards per sortie) in this comparison and the 4th and 56th (in the upper third) but the 4th is nowhere close to the 56th in loss per sortie. The 56th will be at or near the top in lowest loss per sortie... which seems to favor the Jug but have to be careful as the 56th was by and of itself an 'elite' group. We have to get the rest of the Jug Ops under scrutiny.

The difficulty in playing the statistics game arises when comparing aircraft flown versus the timeframe and mission profiles from 1943 through early 1944 - then spring 44 through Jan 1944 - then ops thru the EOW. There was a different complexion to LW, the transition to Mustangs, the focus on long range attacks against enemy airfield which precluded the Jug from scoring much on the ground.

Then you have to consider the variables when comparing the 339th or 357th versus the 56th and 4th FG. The 4th and 56th were in operations for more 8 months to a year longer, had far fewer opportunities to both score and lose aircraft, as the airwar had a totally different complexion in 1944 from 1943 - and the biggest killer of 8th AF fighters was flak by far. Strafing didn't start until Feb 1944 and really wasn't significant until April 1944.

At any rate I am still looking for the holy grail which has the most accurate compliation of sorties per group for the 8th AF. So far unit histories seem to be the root that we all look at to try to develop the information

I speculate when I complete the project that that the P-47 will have approx 30% lower loss per sortie ratio compared to P-51 for 8th AF but, as I have shown, the P-47 was significantly less effective at destroying enemy aircraft than the Mustang (in all USAAF commands) - and the P-47 was significantly more expensive to produce.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Timppa

Perhaps the better yardstick for vulnerability is loss/sortie. ETO numbers 1942-1945:
P-47: 0.7%
P-51: 1.2%
P-38: 1.4%

The P-47's dropped around 20 times as much bombs as P-51. So it was the dedicated late war fighter-bomber, where as P-51's could seek more lightly defended targets.

See the data in this page:
P-51 Mustang by Ray Wagner - Page 3

Timppa - the same data is shown on p 133 of his book "Mustang Designer".

I suspect the loss per sortie statistics for the 8th AF will fairly closely mirror the above ETO (includes 9th AF) figures for the USAAF Statistical Digest even though the blend of mission profiles for 9th AF was materially different (except for Pioneer Mustang 354FG)

The P-38 in the MTO closely approached the P-47 in the 9th with a mixture of escort and fighter bombing missions throughout the 1943-1945 timeframe so the P-47 did not have that role entirely or dominantly for all of Europe (USAAF).

So, what is your definition of 'lightly defended targets'? Airfields around Munich, Berlin, Brunswick, Hannover, Prague, Leipzig? What made them lighty defended in contrast to your notions of 8th AF P-47 strafing targets? (restricted to airfields in France, Belgium, Holland, western Germany until late 1944)..

I don't have my arms around the bomb tonnage dropped by 8th AF P-51's, P-47's and P-38's but a.) not many fighter bomber sweeps other than Normandy Campaign were flown by 8th AF. When they did occur the 47 and 38 could carry twice the bomb load but most of those missions were flown with parafrags, 250 and 500 pound bombs. 9th AF flew a significant amount of missions with 1000 pound bombs - particularly when attacking bridges...

But during the Normandy campaign there were more Mustang groups than Jug Groups and only two P-38 Groups remained.

So back to the point of this particular discussion - namely 8th AF P-47 versus P-51.

The loss per sortie rate of the P-47 is superior to the P-51
The award of enemy aircraft destroyed to the loss in air to air is superior for the P-51 by 43%.
The award of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground to the lost while strafing favors the P-51 by 51%
The loss of bomber crews to enemy aircraft was greatly reduced by the P-51 over the P-47

The P-47 was slightly superior in Awards to Total a/c lost (all causes ops and accidents) 2.88:1 vs 2.64:1 perhaps reflecting more Mechanical related (i.e Coolant loss, engine failure, etc) issues with the 51.

PS - I apologise for taking this thread away from the Experten - we'll set up something later or move it to P-51 vs P-47 as a subtopic?

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Juha

Bill most probably know this but one book from which one might find some clues is Osprey’s A/c of the Aces 51 Special ”Down to Earth” Strafing Aces of the Eight Air Force. It is based on the training manual compiled by battle-seasoned USAAF fighter pilots during the war. IMHO with Osprey’s A/c of the Aces 31 Special VIII Fighter Command at War “Long Reach” and Osprey’s A/c of the Aces 61 Special ”Twelve to One” V Fighter Command Aces of the Pacific, which both are also based on same kind war time material, it is the most important book published in that series. They give a good insight of thinking the leading USAAF aces and of course some inkling to their ability to transfer their thoughts onto paper.

Juha

Juha - I have them. Scutts made a lot of mistakes in his particular contributions so I don't reference him so very much.

The prime sources (ground) for me are 8th FC Victory Credits Board from which the USAF parsed and extracted dubious awards (air to air) to compile the USAF Study 85. USAF is prime source for me because it remains The Official Source - but I believe Olynyk's scholarship.

Dr Frank Olynyk further researched returning POW Questionnaires as well as as complete a set of encounter reports for all services to compile his totals. The difference being awards cited and substantiated After USAF 85 was published. But he remains THE source for USN/USMC details.

The only 'official' ground award source for 8th AF is 8th AF VCB developed after WWII in 1945. It has bot omissions and errors (some double entries, name mispelling, etc, as well as some conflicts with final totals from original VCB Awards reports - which are mystifying but a very small % of the total.

Kent Miller did a fine job of rolling those up in his Fighter Units and Pilot of 8th AF. I have found errors but only a small percecentage. His totals and mine and Olynyk and USAF are at variance +/- about 10 awards over 5,170+ air awards

[Timppa]

Originally Posted by drgondog

So, what is your definition of 'lightly defended targets'?

Defined by those P-51 bomber escort pilots who had no specific orders to strafe any target after they were released by other escort groups. It was their call.

Versus fighter-bomber groups who were under orders to attack a predestined target, whatever the resistance or cost.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Timppa

Defined by those P-51 bomber escort pilots who had no specific orders to strafe any target after they were released by other escort groups. It was their call.

Versus fighter-bomber groups who were under orders to attack a predestined target, whatever the resistance or cost.

You may wish to research 8th AF FC Field Orders a little more. There were Many FO's directing individual Fighter Groups to attack specific airfields. Examples include such attacks on airfields during a bombing attack on the same airfields.

8th AF mustangs had the leeway to strafe airfields and targets of opportunity after relief from escort - true. Equally true is that Sweep assignments often included specific orders to sweep certain airfields 100 miles out in fron of the Task Forces or simply attack specific airfields.

Just as an example look at FO 288 in which the 355th was directed to attack Oberphaffenhofen, Landsberg, Ottingen. On that same FO, the 4th FG was directed to Freidersdorf, Stendahl, Brandenburg, Plaue and Pottsdam a/d near Berlin. All 8th AF FG were on airfield attack fighter sweeps to specific airfields all over Germany.

In a two week period alone the 355th had assignments to strafe Biscarrosse a/d, Dijon a/d, Munich area a/d, Bourges a/d, and Oberphaffenhofen (again). These were specific orders either as a stand alone fighter sweeop or directives following break escort.

[Juha]

Hello Bill
I agree on Scutts, that’s why I didn’t mention his books. Osprey’s series is rather uneven but there are some very good books in it.

On losses, I agree that strafing remained dangerous right to the end of war. For ex some a/fs in Czech were very well defended and strafing P-51s suffered accordingly. IMHO one cannot say that P-51 jockeys lacked aggressiveness.

Juha