Messerschmitt Me 264 and Heinkel He 277.

[phouse]

Oops, typo indeed! I meant ME-109.

As far as the ME-264 was concerned, only the reconnaissance versions were able to fly such a long range. Bombers would have required in flight refueling, a possibility nixed by Gen. Jeschonnek.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The Amerika Bomber project could have possibly only succeeded at first. Maybe 1 or 2 missions since the US had the production capacity to put up lots of AA and lots of fighters on the US East Coast and also would have put a lot of radar up real quickly.

It really only was a pipe dream.

For a good read on the Amerika Bomber project read this book:

Luftwaffe Over America - The Secret Plans to Bomb the United States in World War II by Manfred Griehl

[Civettone]

I agree Adler but my point was that those weapons and resources would have to stay there!

Kris

[phouse]

Originally Posted by Civettone

Anyway, I think the Amerika project was a damn good idea. With a couple of long-range bomber squadrons to reach random points along the American Eastcoast, the Americans would have to build radar stations and facilities along an at least thousand mile stretch and station fighter squadrons and AA battereis there. All resources which wouldn't have gone to the front. Even if this would have stopped any German bombers, those weapons would still stay in place even without a single German bomber crossing the Ocean.

Kris

This is a good point but I wonder if it would have made a significant difference for the United States?

I had a fantastic book that I'd love to cite on the long lasting impact the first BoB had on the Luftwaffe but I lent it to a friend. I need to get it back. To paraphrase and summarize, the author asserted that there was a substantial talent drain on the Luftwaffe because they lost so many top-rated fliers over England and the Channel. Some of this talent would have been cycled around to instruction by 1943. I am unclear maybe someone can clarify but what year was it that the Luftwaffe started pulling instructors from their flight academies and placing them in front line service? 1944?

[Civettone]

only the reconnaissance versions were able to fly such a long range

The range would have been, with a 3000 kg (6614 lbs) bomb load, 11600 km (7208 miles)

This is a good point but I wonder if it would have made a significant difference for the United States?

What's significant?
Fact is that those guns and fighters would not have been used in Europe. Seen on an economical scale it's also obvious that the Americans would have to assign more resources to set up a defence than the Germans would if they were to field a couple dozens semi-operational bombers.

the author asserted that there was a substantial talent drain on the Luftwaffe because they lost so many top-rated fliers over England and the Channel. Some of this talent would have been cycled around to instruction by 1943.

I don't think there's any debate about that. The Luftwaffe would have been stronger had they not lost those pilots. But you claimed the Luftwaffe was feeling those losses in 1943 which I think is exaggerated.
Also, the training problems the Luftwaffe suffered had nothing to do with a lack of experienced pilots available. They didn't demand their aces to give up their frontline positions which they should have done. Having more aces wouldn't have remedied their lack of experienced instructors.

Kris

[phouse]

Yes, I made the mistake of reading the text and not the specs. I was wrong Civettone.

My consideration with respect to the United States and resources spent, my assumption is that the bombers will be escortless and with the radar stations the US would invariably build, they would know about the bombers in time to have interceptors waiting for them. This assumes nominal numbers on Germany's part though. I'm going to reveal my episteme here but I think history is a series of contingencies but only within certain parameters. I doubt Germany could have done more than scare the US!

Finally, a comment on the Luftwaffe entering 1943 and manpower. The Luftwaffe from the Battle of France forward sustained attrition rates that hovered around 20%. During the Battle of Britain, according to "Logistics and the Battle of Britain" by Peter Dye, the number of servicable 109s may have dropped as low as 40%! Of course, this addresses material craft and not my assertion regarding pilots.

Since my book is on loan and my searches in Google are dry, I'm going to attempt to quote some statistics that may not be entirely accurate. If I recall correctly, only 1 in 5 Luftwaffe squadrons were operating above 80%, while most of the rest hovered around 60%-79%. I'm commenting to keep this conversation alive; once I retrieve my book with its charts and tables, I'll correct myself for sake of accuracy. I still feel that Germany, given its near constant loss from 1940 onward and inability to supply pilots at a rate to keep up with that loss that they would not have been able to set aside any considerable number of pilots to launch any sort of considerable bombing attack. Just look at the train wreck of the second Battle of Britain!

[machine shop tom]

As a point of interest, in early 1944, a Ju390 made a trip to a point some 12 miles from the US coast, north of NYC. I think that if any plane, Ju390, Me264 or whatever, had dropped bombs on the US mainland, there would have been a big re-deployment of forces to counter this threat. It wouldn't have to have been a terribly effective bombing to have been a rude wake-up call that the US wasn't untouchable. If you look at the resources used to keep the Tirpitz bottled up, it isn't hard to realize how much out-of-proportion the use of resources would have been to counter a perceived bomber threat.

tom

[Civettone]

Phouse, you're absolutely right that Germany was not capable of launching a credible bombing offensive against the US. In fact, no bomber fleet would have been able to cross the ocean, attack targets and lose sustainable numbers, until the arrival of supersonic bombers.

But like I said, it would have been a good investment for the Germans though of course it wouldn't have changed the outcome. But let it be clear that the bombing during Big Week had a much larger indirect effect than the actual destructions. Defence systems had to be enlarged and improved, shelters had to be build, further decentralization of production, construction of underground facilities, relocation to the east, ... which swallowed up large amounts of resources and manpower.

Your comments on the Luftwaffe during and after the BoB are interesting though I wonder if they belong in this thread.


Tom, the Ju 390 story is well known on the internet. Unfortunately it's not supported by any flight data of the specific unit and probably never happened. Although a Ju 390 could be modified to fly to NY and back, it would probably not have been able to carry bombs. But especially the 12 miles from NY is a bit weird. Once you're that close you can just as well go the distance and try to get back with economical flying. 12 miles isn't enough to abort if your entire mission is over 5000 miles.

Oh, and the Ju 290 didn't fly to Manchuria either.

Kris

[plan_D]

Any long-range German bombers put into service in 1943 would have been used against the Russian industry, it would not have been wasted on mindless U.S attacks or suicidal daylight raids on Great Britain.

Remember now, the Bf 109 did not have the effective range to escort bombers any further north than London so British industry was safe from escorted bombers; those that went up without escort would be met by Spitfire IXs for an uncomfortable ride, which did carry cannon. In the event, Hurricane IIC and IV would be made ready for interception duties with four 20mm. This is on top of the USAAF readily available for action in Great Britain.

But that is all null and void, as I said, the Luftwaffe would use its bomber force against the Ural industry as it would finally be in range.

[phouse]

Originally Posted by Civettone

But like I said, it would have been a good investment for the Germans though of course it wouldn't have changed the outcome. But let it be clear that the bombing during Big Week had a much larger indirect effect than the actual destructions. Defence systems had to be enlarged and improved, shelters had to be build, further decentralization of production, construction of underground facilities, relocation to the east, ... which swallowed up large amounts of resources and manpower.

Kris

Good point. I'll drop any further defense of my assertion regarding manpower in 1943 to keep this thread relatively on topic.

[machine shop tom]

Originally Posted by Civettone

.........
Tom, the Ju 390 story is well known on the internet. Unfortunately it's not supported by any flight data of the specific unit and probably never happened. Although a Ju 390 could be modified to fly to NY and back, it would probably not have been able to carry bombs. But especially the 12 miles from NY is a bit weird. Once you're that close you can just as well go the distance and try to get back with economical flying. 12 miles isn't enough to abort if your entire mission is over 5000 miles.

Oh, and the Ju 290 didn't fly to Manchuria either.

Kris

I'll have to debate you on this one, Kris. My source is the book "The Warplanes Of The Third Reich" by William Green. This book was copyrighted in 1970 and was meticulously researched for years before being published. It also predates the internet by decades.

From the book: "In January 1944, the Ju 390 V2 was delivered to Fernaufklarungs-Gruppe 5 at Mont de Marson, south of Bordeaux, for operational evaluation. The Ju 390 V2 carried sufficient fuel for an endurance of 32 hours, and after a few short-distance flights, the aircraft flew from Mont de Marsan to a point some 12 miles from the U.S. coast, north of New York, returning successfully to its base."

This feat is also mentioned in the book "The Encyclopedia Of Aircraft Of WWII", published in 2004.

Of the Manchurian trip, Green's tome says: "........(In the spring of 1944) three aircraft were recalled to Germany where, within 48 hours at Finsterwalde, they had been completely stripped of armour and armament, fitted with two additional 550 Imp. gal. fuel tanks to increase the total fuel load to 5,235 Imp. gal. From Odessa and Mielec, the aircraft (Ju 290A-4s or A5s) were flown non-stop to Manchuria with special cargoes, refuelling and returning to Mielec with strategic materials that were in critical supply in Germany."

I see no reason to doubt these two resources, especially Green's.

tom

[bigZ]

I cant see the introduction of a small number of 4 engine bombers significantly effect the war. It would only be a small force due to the lack of suitable materials.

I also agree with Alder on how long it takes to introduce new aircraft designs. Their are exceptions such as the He 162. Just how many new types of aircraft did the Germans actually manage to introduce operationally during WWII not including upgrades to existing designs?

Even if they do bomb the US the effect on the course of the war will be slight. I also cant see them doing significate damage to factories in the Urals.

In reality the 4 main points that stopped Germany having a strategic 4 engine bombing force was the lack of materials/economy the death of General Wever and being a contintental power the priority to defend itself before it could bring a strategic bomber force into play.

[Civettone]

Originally Posted by plan_D

Any long-range German bombers put into service in 1943 would have been used against the Russian industry

Plan_D, I have to disagree with you. Speer is very very clear on this: even as late as 1944 Speer tried to get the Luftwaffe to attack industrial targets in Russia. To be exact, it was the power central near Moscow. He was convinced this would have had an effect as he noticed what the American air raids did to 'his' industry.
Yet he failed to get a fleet together as the army leaders kept using bombers for tactical missions.

On the other hand, the Amerika project was very real and Hitler kept pushing for it. Even in 1945 Amerika bombers were being designed and built!
Horten Ho XVIII - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

My source is the book "The Warplanes Of The Third Reich" by William Green.

I know, Tom.
Green is the first to mention this story and many (lesser) publications and websites have simply copied the story. Yet I can assure you that no flight ever took place. Probably it was just one guy mentioning such a flight and this story getting a life of its own.
Too bad it didn't happen...

Kris

[Civettone]

I cant see the introduction of a small number of 4 engine bombers significantly effect the war.

Well, if they carry an atomic bomb, I can.
But like I said, bombing the US would not significantly effect the war. Yet it seems clear that it would have lead to less American fighters, guns and other resources fighting in Europe.

It would only be a small force due to the lack of suitable materials.

I also agree with Alder on how long it takes to introduce new aircraft designs.

I do to but that doesn't seem to have been the question. The starting point of this thread is that Germany has these bombers ready for production.

In reality the 4 main points that stopped Germany having a strategic 4 engine bombing force was the lack of materials/economy

That's not true. The Germans built over a thousand 4 engined bombers. That's enough to have a strategic bombing force.

the death of General Wever

This is an outdated vision. In fact, in the days of Wever there were no bombers powerful enough to reach the Urals. What Wever had in mind, was unrealistic.

and being a contintental power the priority to defend itself before it could bring a strategic bomber force into play.

What do you base this on? How do you see Germany was prioritizing defence. I think it's clear that the Germans believed in strategic bombing: just see what they did in Guernica, Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, ...
They made a deliberate choice to build multifunctional bombers instead of dedicated heavy bombers.

Kris

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by Civettone

I agree Adler but my point was that those weapons and resources would have to stay there!

Kris

Does not matter. The US had the production capacity to build more and more than what they were doing. The weapons and resources that were used to defend the east coast would only have been a fraction.

Not much would have been required to shoot down the few bombers anyhow. It is not like they would have had fighter cover escorting them from Germany to the US....