To much development

[comiso90]

The Germans did not have a monopoly on innovation. The environment they operated under greatly facilitated innovation. They were under pressure to develop "Force Multipliers" to help stave off the onslaught of allied forces even if the result were more favorable surrender terms.

EXTREME HYPOTHETICAL:

The US never enters the war in Europe.
The Battle of Britain rages on and Germany develops heavy bombers.
Raw materials from north America are still getting through.

I'm 100% certain that our British friends would have developed some pretty wacky and desperate designs.

Why didn't the allies develop more exotic weapons? They didn't have too! We were getting the job done. When you're on the offensive, it's better to build 35 spitfires than 1 Meteor

[HoHun]

Hi Comiso,

>The Battle of Britain rages on and Germany develops heavy bombers.

Hm, I don't think the presence of absence of Luftwaffe heavy bombers had any impact on the Battle of Britain at all.

The B-17G in 1944 could carry 2.7 t of bombs to Berlin, requiring 2 pilots, 8 trained 8 crewmen and 4 engines in one airframe.

The Ju 88A-1/A-5 in 1940 could carry 1.9 t to London, requiring 1 pilot, 3 trained crewmen and 2 engines in one airframe.

Of course, the B-17 was a more advanced aircraft that carried its 2.7 tons over a much longer range, but the Ju 88 was based in Northern France and thus could fly short-range missions when it was attacking London.

To sum it up, I don't think it would have mady much of a difference for the outcome of the Battle of Britain if the Luftwaffe had had a four-engined bomber available in 1940.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Soundbreaker Welch?]

Hohun, that makes sense. Some people say the Allies should have done their long range bombings with just P-38's!

[Konigstiger205]

Well what would have been if Luftwaffe continued to attacks on british airfields instead of concentrating on London...what would have happened if the 6th army would have been retreated from Stalingrad....the germans were capable to design capable airplanes,tanks and so on but they lacked proper leadership and of course raw materials.And just as a curiosity what would have happened if Great Britain wasn't surrounded by waters?

[comiso90]

Originally Posted by HoHun

Hi Comiso,

>The Battle of Britain rages on and Germany develops heavy bombers.

Hm, I don't think the presence of absence of Luftwaffe heavy bombers had any impact on the Battle of Britain at all.

The B-17G in 1944 could carry 2.7 t of bombs to Berlin, requiring 2 pilots, 8 trained 8 crewmen and 4 engines in one airframe.

The Ju 88A-1/A-5 in 1940 could carry 1.9 t to London, requiring 1 pilot, 3 trained crewmen and 2 engines in one airframe.

Of course, the B-17 was a more advanced aircraft that carried its 2.7 tons over a much longer range, but the Ju 88 was based in Northern France and thus could fly short-range missions when it was attacking London.

To sum it up, I don't think it would have mady much of a difference for the outcome of the Battle of Britain if the Luftwaffe had had a four-engined bomber available in 1940.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

The statement about bombers was prefaced with "Extreme Hypothetical". My intention was illustrate that had the RAF been subjected to the same conditions as the Luftwaffe, they would have developed more exotic weapons of desperation too...

In other words, German aircraft development was driven by conditions they encountered.

[SoD Stitch]

The answer in a nutshell: Definitely.

The Germans wasted a huge amount of resources on dead-end projects. A good example is the super-heavy tank Maus. The Maus was a very impressive technical acheivement, but it was completely useless, even in the (non-mobile) defensive situation Germany found itself in in '45. I don't have any hard numbers, but I'm guessing they could've built 10 Panther tanks for the amount of time and materiel it took to build one Maus; that would've been more practical (not to mention effective).

That being said, there were a couple of advanced projects that could've turned the tide if the Germans had invested more time and energy in them earlier on in the War. The Me 262 comes to mind, as does the Do 335, the E-series of German tanks proposed in '45, and the superlative Mauser MG 213 20/30mm cannon, which never entered production.

And, if Hitler hadn't had the aversion to "Jewish science" that he did, they might've developed atomic energy before '45; the theoretical basis was there, but Hitler considered nuclear physics a "Jewish science" and, hence, dismissed it out of hand; therefore, it got little to no backing from the Nazi government.

[HoHun]

Hi Comiso,

>The statement about bombers was prefaced with "Extreme Hypothetical".

Well understood! I was just commenting on the assumptions implied by the hypothesis

>My intention was illustrate that had the RAF been subjected to the same conditions as the Luftwaffe, they would have developed more exotic weapons of desperation too...

Hm, I think this underestimates development times.

The Me 262 first flew in 1940, the Me 163 in 1941 and the Ar 234 in 1943 (two prototypes had been completed in 1941, but the jet engines too two years to be ready). The He 162 was developed in 1944, but driven by the anticipation of Allied jets (at least as far as Heinkel was concerned) and thus not in a reaction to actual events. The Ba 349 probably was driven by the requirements of air defense, based on actual conditions, but the Ho 229 was a response to the 1943 "3 x 1000" formula for a fighter bomber.

So three out of the four series-production jet/rocket aircraft were designed before the situation became desperate for Germany, and of the three most serious jet/rocket development projects that didn't lead to series production, two were simply due to ambitious planning, leaving only one that could be seen as a response to the actual strategic conditions.

(The He 162 might have been a borderline case as its conception pre-dated an RLM requirement that had a different motivation than Heinkel's own ideas and could be seen as defensive in the way you suggest, and it might be possible to find other examples that didn't occurr to me right now that also fit your description.)

However, with regard to most of the "exotic" jet/rocket types that actually saw action in numbers it seems safe to say that they were not the product of desperate minds because they were conceived long before there war situation warranted despair.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[Konigstiger205]

So it is settled...to many projects..many projects impossible even for the beginning of the war....for example the King Tiger...a very potent tank but too many problems...indeed it was virtually invincible to allied or russian tanks but they would have better solved the problems with Tiger I or better invest more in the Panther.Its like your house is on fire and you try various methods of putting out the fire instead of stick to most efficient method and use it.But thats how the germans are...they are always thinking of something new.

[Njaco]

So is that a blunder(thinking of the other thread) or an unwillingness to change?

It seems their doctrine, though innovative, did not succeed. Like Konigtiger said, you can have great equipment but still lose. What would've happened if the quanity was there along with the quality? If Germany had one more year?

In the east, Operation Eisenhammer succeeded and stopped Russian advance.

In the west, the Bulge made it to the coast and Bodenplatt suspended Allies air ops.

Germany gets a breather and these new contraptions are available in mass amounts in a few months. Stalemate?

[delcyros]

The R&D of new equipment is a necessary part in wartime economies. The application into mass production and the proper utilization of this equipment is at least as important, too.
However, the one aspect does not necessarely prevent the other from working, nor can it be viewed seperately.
R&D is a capacity which can be used or neglected, it does not PER SE cost that much ressources compared to mass production fundings.
For example: In 1940, Hitler suspended all long time R&D not because they haven´t been useful in this war but in order to simplify mass production, exactly what You have in mind. This can be seen as a very questional ratio. It indeed turned out to be counter productive as soon as the wehrmacht faced the KV-1, KV-2 and T-34 in the East. In this timeframe, Germany LACKED in R&D. I could also take examples from Radar technologies or powerplant technology. The Fw-190 nearly was cancelled because of this! The suspended R&D left Germany in 1940-1941 with rapidly aging equipment in mass production.

Another aspect is mass production itselfe. The capacity of mass production is widely dependant on the potential economy, organization, ressources and the level of basic tooling technology. The potential economy was excellent in Germany, organization was at best mediocre until 1943, when Albert Speer overtook the ministry of arms and industry, ressource avaiability was acceptable until 1943 (a cross trade effect with the higher productivity caused by Speer and the generally strong dependance in raw materials) and the degree of basic tooling technology finally improved in incremental steps over the years.

What now happens if You combine these aspects and analyse them in relation to time is clear:
1.) Germany could afford long time R&D (short time R&D usually aims at the improvement of existing equipment) in the early war period but suspended most of them (only finalizing projects such as the Me-163, Me-262, He-177, He-280, Ju-288 and Fw-190 were continued) in 1940 in order to simplify mass production. The production numbers still did not increase substantially in this period thanks to a low basic tooling level, weak organization of production / distribution of ressources.
As a result of this a number of the remaining projects were reduced in importance (Me-163, Me-262) and even cancelled in 1941-42, such as the complete bomber-B program (which left Germany with no advanced medium bomber in the mid war period).

In the developed mid war period, things were reconsidered. Albert Speer overtook the organization, he dispersed industries, established a self sustaining transportation network and improved the basic tooling level. In the meantime, R&D of specific projects rapidly expanded, resulting in the Tiger and Panther designs (both beeing applied to quickly into mass production), the V-1 , certain advances in rocketry and jet engeneering.
In this period (1943-wars end), the production numbers increased drastically despite the expendad R&D! R&D was used in it´s full capacity.

The late war period showed an excessive use of R&D for desperate projects (death rays, sun guns, the V-3, Natter), which perhaps prevented funding of more groundstanding projects. In the meantime mass production of the latest early war projects (Me-163, Me-262) began to be applied effectively. The production numbers still show a growth at wars end but since Germany only improved organization and tooling level but not the potential economy nor it´s raw material sources, it must ultimately show critical shortcomings in this timeframe.

What if the long time R&D had been suspended completely? With hindsight we are able to estimate that neither the Panther, nor the Tiger I or -II, the Me-163, the Me-262 or the Ar-234 would ever see the battlefield but instead the Pz-III and Pz-IV, the Me-109, Ju-87, Ju-88 and He-111 would still be used on the battlefield in excessive numbers. Even if we assume two times the actual production of 1942, it would not have made a difference in the East and arguably the wehrmacht would find itselfe in deep troubles from late 1943 on in the West and totally outdated from mid 44 onwards in both theatres.
It even might happen that Speer don´t overtake the ministry as this post was dependant on the rapid application of new R&D into mass production, which would leave Germany with less production AND less R&D.

[Njaco]

Great post, Del. Some points I never thought of.

[mkloby]

Yes - very well considered and insightful post.