Which was the best night fighter? (2 Viewers)

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The He 162 didn't use up that many resources and was a simple effective design, a good idea id developed earlier, albeit not much good for anything but high alt day fighter. Simple and cheap to produce with good capabilities)

The Do 335 had unrelated political and situational production problems. (some due to bombings)

The 410 was a good design, but late and not what they needed, so a bit of a waste.

The continued development and production of older designs like the 109 and 190 was necessary, as the other designs weren't ready to be produced in large numbers yet. (production wasn't ready to shift, and shifting took time and would leave a gap in available a/c) This was made worse by the relatively moderate support/priority for the advanced designs prior to 1944, or the developmental problems.


The Jet engines on a whole were not that unreliable, though the prototype 004A's with full refractory metals were not very long lived either (25 hr TBO) they were still developmental designs. The early 004B's were not very good (~10 hr TBO, ie servicing/replacing combustors and turbine) but the later 004B-4 had better performance and could meet 25 hrs between hot section change (combustor change and turbine check/change) in real world conditions. (total of 50 hr before true overhaul/rebuild) The improved 004D was similar, but with better performance and fuel economy along with the solving of the vibration problems (limiting 004B to 8,700 rpm) allowing it to run at the original 9,000 rpm with 920 kp thrust. (~1050 kp at 10,000 rpm -over-rev) Allong with improved throttle control.

The BMW 003 was better in almost all terms (construction time, life, TBO, fuel economy, thrust/weight or thrust/frontal area) with 200 hr for the annular combustor (made mostly of mild steel) and somewhat better turbine life as well) The 003A had similar specific consumption as the 004B at 1.4 lb/[lbf x hr] but the 003E improved this a bit along with capability to overrev and achieve 115% power to 920 kp for 30 sec. Flame-out and over-throttling characteristics were also better than the 004B. The 003 wasn't available in numbers prior to early 1945 however, and couldn't be restarted in flight, while the 004 could.

The throttle problems with flame-outs and (worst) burst combustors was common to allied engines as well the early Welland, Derwent, Goblin, J31, and J33 all suffering from these problems. (though since their turbines were solid and not air cooled, the turbine softening as in an overthrottled 004B -causing excess fuel flow w/out sufficient cooling air as it spooled up- would not be present)


For more on this take it to: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/mistakes-aviation-12424.html


But on the night fighter issue, I think the Ar 234 would be better than the 262, more room for equipment, belly mounted guns (no muzzle flash blinding) and better endurance, higher ceiling. Performance not as good as the 262B, but more than enough for the role. Plus the 262 was needed more as a day interceptor, while the Ar 234 was a bit underused. (good in recon, but like the 262, sometimes wasted in roles not the most urgent, tough it was a good bomber, it could have served better as a night fighter, and using any jet at low level was not good, as it ate away tons of fuel, less than 1/2 the range than at altitude)
 
again why are you both dealing with what ifs...........

what was the best night fighter ? stay with the thread unless you want to start a what-if the Do 335 or Ar 234N was used in perscribed numbers and for comparitive purposes, etc ........

the Ar 234N was used in combat on several missions by the way
 
again why are you both dealing with what ifs...........
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Hello Erich, what promted me into going into a what if discussion was actually your earlier posted line:

"the way of the Me 262B-2 was at hand the Do 335 would not have been used by any NJG"

To my understanding (I could be wrong) the 262B-2 was more of a prototype with what? 2-3 samples build and maybe 1 in action?

Therefore the forwarded 262B-2 raised the impression in me of a "what if a/c" discussion.

So if we stick to history - or let me rather say actuall performance and contribution, the best NF to me as I stated in an earlier post would be the Mossie.

Regards
Kruska
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Oh, and a little off topic again, but one of the biggest problems with the Ho IX/229 program was Gotha's discontent with the arrangement, the construction of additional prototypes and preproduction a/c lagged so much. It was relatively simple to build, and flew over 8 months before the He 162.
 
Surely at some point in this debate the term "best" has to incorporate "effect". What was the "effect" of two Me 262 NFs. I would suggest, none. By contrast, what was the effect of the Mosquito, or Ju-88. I would suggest considerable. Surely at some point you have to stop worrying about the theoretical, and start worrying about the practical.

I have to say that in this whole argument, I have not seen anyone trying to rate the relative impotance of each aspect of an NF. Was manoueverability as important as speed. What were the important aspects of armament (weight of shell, range of the armament, configuration such as schrage musik etc), the importance of active and passive detection systems, the importance of crew protection. Only by catergorising the various elements, and then looking at its actual service career, can one begin to look at the term "best wwii night fighter" in any sort of rational or ordered way, IMHO
 
Yes that same kind of issue was a majot poin on the "best BoB a/c" thread too. The Hurrican obviously had the most impact and was the most necessary. But for performance and capability (and further development) it was either the 109 or the Spit. (maybe the Ju 88 for further developent)


So for actual acheivement and overall capability it's probably down to the Ju 88 and Mossie. (both having the bonus of versitility and proven design)
 
I agree completely with the shortlist, but before we can begin to give a rating, we have to work out what were the important elements to Night fighter effectiveness, and rate their relative importance in a night battle

IMO the factors affecting NF effectiveness were

1) Passive detection systems
2) Active Detection systems
3) Armament
4) Endurance
5) Armament configuration and ammunition capacity
6) Speed
7) Mnv
8 ) Communication to Ground Control

In roughly that order. but we need to debate thisd list and get it into some sort of agreed priority before we can quantify the relative importance of each element. perhaps before that even, it might be necessary to discuss the nature of night fighrter combat, so as to understand the various techniques and organizations extraneous to the aircraft themsleves. Night Fighter combat IMO is one of the least well understood aspect of air combat of the war.....perhaps we should direct the discussion into that area first????
 
parsifal,

If I may, I respectfully disagree with your listing of important factors (although the conversation I agree 100% with!).

Since most kills on both sides were done under the control of GCI, comm with the ground should rank at #1. No 'God's eye' radar picture and a good radio link to get the fighter into position = random chance of intercepting the enemy.

Obviously, the intruder missions of both sides didn't use GCI and your other systems were vital to that mission, but for sheer impact to night fighting, the ground radar and controller were the most important factor.
 
parsifal,

If I may, I respectfully disagree with your listing of important factors (although the conversation I agree 100% with!).

Since most kills on both sides were done under the control of GCI, comm with the ground should rank at #1. No 'God's eye' radar picture and a good radio link to get the fighter into position = random chance of intercepting the enemy.

Obviously, the intruder missions of both sides didn't use GCI and your other systems were vital to that mission, but for sheer impact to night fighting, the ground radar and controller were the most important factor.
Yepif you can't find him particularly with the airborne radars of the day you can't shoot him . The GCI operator was the most important item . Getting his fighter into a position whereby the aircraft equipment could take over
 
This represents a fundamental difference with the british and german systems. To a much greater extent, the British NFs were able to rely on on-board detection than that provided by GCI.

The Germans were more able to rely on ground based detection systems, because much of the fighting occurred over their own territory. Also, for most of the war, german airborne radr was only fractionally as efficient as that carried in the allied fighters. Typically, and VERY approximately, a German NF might be able to "see" with it own on-board detection systems out to a range of about 5 -r 6 miles, with a detection arc or about 30 degrees. By comparison, the British Mk VIII AI was detecting at ranges at least twice that, and an effective search arc of something like 60 degrees. The centiemtric radar fitted to the allied NFs were also later in the war abale to detect targets at altitudes below 5000 ft as well.

My contention, as a generalization, was that german AI radar did not match the quality and range of allied radars, until very late in the war, however the germans did have very high quality passive systems to assist in target acquisition. Nevertheless, the effect of windoew affected the German NF forces far more than that which affected the allies.

I think that GCI is very important, because it places the defending fighters in the right general area, but it cannot get the fighter the visula or radar lock that it needs in order actually engage the target....so which is more important, getting to the right area, or actually achieving a target lock????
 
One interesting thing for the German onboard radar is almost all had rather large exposed radar antenas, which add a bit of drage compared to radomes. (there were some experements with wooden conical dome covers for the antena on the Ju 88, but I don't think they were fielded)
 
I think that GCI is very important, because it places the defending fighters in the right general area, but it cannot get the fighter the visula or radar lock that it needs in order actually engage the target....so which is more important, getting to the right area, or actually achieving a target lock????
getting the aircraft to the correct area for if the AI radar packed it in at which it often did at least you have the opportunity for a visual
 
British "escort" for their bomber streams, used the the bomber streams themselves as their "GCI". It was a favourite tactic of the mosquitos to trail a heavy, and wait for the NJG fighters to move up on the bomber, at the right moment the mossie would move in and shoot the stalking fighter down.

There is no doubt that right until the end, the NJGs extracted a fearful toll on the units of bomber command, however, from June '44 onward, my opinion is that the units of the British Night fighter force gave better than they received. The problem was that they could not dish out enough pain on the NJGs to deter them from their relentless pursuit of the bombers.
 
The whole story of the electronic war is fascinating, if difficult to follow. There will be a never ending debate about if, and when any turning point occurred in the electronic war. but for me, a truly significant landmark change occurred, when the the british devised various means to pinpoint the GCI frequencies that the germans used.

This was only the beginning however, , for the RAF could undertake a lot with this informationIt opened the possibility of sending the RAFs own Night Fighters over germany. This had enormous difficulties, however, because the majority of targets to be found in the sky would of course be the friendly bombers themselves, and the risk to shooting down ones own planes seemed very high. IFF was the obvious answer , but the RAF not only wanted an IFF system, they wanted to have a system that would home in on the signatures being left all over the sky by the german NJGs. The eventual answer was provided by TRE within a week of of the new Lichtenstein falling into british hands when a Ju88 landed at Aberdeen. They devised Serrate, a small receiver tuned to 490 MHZ, and displaying any received signals on a cockpit CRT. Serrate allowed the British NFs to home in on the radar sugnatures left by the germans, and moreover gave a full 360 degree arc for detection but it was still not able to achieve a final lock, which still remained the preserve of the active radar system. However one tactic introduced after Serrate, was for the Mosquito to act as if they were a heavy, and attract a pursuing NJG to attack it. at the right moment, the Mosquito would flick turn out of the pursuing fighters radar arc, and come round astern of the German, all of a sudden the hunted became the hunter. It was all designed to instill fear and hesitation in the German Night Fighter forces. From July onward, the percentages of the bombers being shot down began to drop, so evidently these sorts of tactics began to have an effect.
 
British "escort" for their bomber streams, used the the bomber streams themselves as their "GCI". It was a favourite tactic of the mosquitos to trail a heavy, and wait for the NJG fighters to move up on the bomber, at the right moment the mossie would move in and shoot the stalking fighter down.

Never heard of that as a tactic. I know that the Mossies ere split into three main roles.

1) Patroling airbases
These were targeted at the German NF bases and there job was to ake things as difficult as possible for the Germans to operate. Some of these were not Mossie NF's but GA versions which were able to carry bombs others were NF's. It depended on what was available.

2) Patroling Beacons
The Germans used beaons as a holding area or to assist with navigation these would be targeted by Mossie NF's

3) Escort
This was the main activity. Each Mossie had a beat or patrol area to the side of the bomber stream from which it tried to intercept any German NF that tried to get into the bomber stream. There were strict rules about the patrol area and how it couldn't be left until a certain time had passed. Once that time had gone the bomber stream should have passed their position and the NF was free to operate on their own initiative. Often they would follow the stream or find an airfield to monitor.

Considering the difficulties the tactics worked pretty well. The best result was one Mossie that shot down four German NF's in one night. An achievement most British pilots considered to be unequalled by anyone.
 
Never heard of that as a tactic. I know that the Mossies ere split into three main roles.

1) Patroling airbases
These were targeted at the German NF bases and there job was to ake things as difficult as possible for the Germans to operate. Some of these were not Mossie NF's but GA versions which were able to carry bombs others were NF's. It depended on what was available.

2) Patroling Beacons
The Germans used beaons as a holding area or to assist with navigation these would be targeted by Mossie NF's

3) Escort
This was the main activity. Each Mossie had a beat or patrol area to the side of the bomber stream from which it tried to intercept any German NF that tried to get into the bomber stream. There were strict rules about the patrol area and how it couldn't be left until a certain time had passed. Once that time had gone the bomber stream should have passed their position and the NF was free to operate on their own initiative. Often they would follow the stream or find an airfield to monitor.

Considering the difficulties the tactics worked pretty well. The best result was one Mossie that shot down four German NF's in one night. An achievement most British pilots considered to be unequalled by anyone.

Recomend that yoou have a read of "Night Fighter" by Bill Gunston Patrick Stephens Limited 1976. Gunston goes into great detail about the various tactics employed by the Night Fighter Force. Whilst your summary is partially correct, it is far too limited and short changes the Brit NFs by a wide margin. In September 1944 alone for example, 141 group, flying Beafighters, shot down 23 Nightfighters (this is the same unit as is mentioned in the Wiki article below), using the new serrate passive detection system.

The best short explanation of Serrate that I could find was from wikipedia....

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Serrate radar detector was an Allied Lichtenstein radar detection and homing device, used in Allied nightfighters to track German night fighters equipped with Lichtenstein radar during World War II.

No. 141 Squadron RAF, commanded by Wing Commander Bob" John Randall Daniel Braham and flying the Bristol Beaufighter, commenced operations over Germany in support of the Bomber Offensive from 14 June to 7 Sept 1943. 179 operational sorties yielded 14 claimed fighters shot down, for 3 losses.

The technique developed was for the RAF nightfighters to fly slowly off the bomber stream, aping the flight pattern of a heavy bomber, until the rearward facing Serrate detector picked up the emissions from a Luftwaffe night fighter approaching from behind. The Radar Operator would then pass directions to the pilot until the fighter was 6,000 feet behind, at which point the Beaufighter would execute a swift turn onto the tail of the German night fighter, pick up the enemy aircraft on his forward radar and (hopefully) shoot it down. It can be appreciated this was a highly skilled and complex manoeuvre that needed teamwork, split-second timing and a cool nerve.

Serrate was also subsequently fitted to de Havilland Mosquito nightfighters
.
 
Thanks I will do that. I have Night Fighter by CF Rawnsley and Robert Wright as well as Night Flyer by Lewis Brandon.
In Night Flyer, they go into some detail about how they organised Bomber Support missions and its worth a read
 
I understand the calling of claims but according to official German documentation of NF losses there were 7 losses to Fernenachtjäger and they mention Mossies only: the month of September 44, I can accept that this is incorrect and possibly should read for Beus
 
I think 141 Gp were flying Mossies by that time (so my earlier post is probably in error, my apologies). Would have to go for LW records over RAF claims. Probably you are right on thaqt basis alone.

Would like to know your opinions on the nature and effect of Night Fighter combats (NJG vs Bombers, NF vs NJG, and NJG vs NF) in the Bomber Offensive. I find it a very difficult topic to understand, let alone discuss.
 

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