Night fighter rear gun: was it worth it

[drgondog]

for what it is worth, the top ace in the ETO at the time, Bud Mahurin, was shot down by a tail gunner - it was a Do 217, believed to be a NJG ship, near Chartres..on 27 March 1944

[Kruska]

Hello drgondog,

One of my relatives was flying for KG 4. According to him: Only undetermined/unstable attackers could be fended off, not even taking the probability of a gunner being able to knock out an attacking a/c into account. If an attacker was hit, it was regarded as a lucky combined effort of multiple gunners defending a group of bombers.
The best chance to survive in his He111 was the fact that this a/c could take a hell of a punch or damage.
Off course the downing of an attacker by one or many gunners cannot be out ruled as facts demonstrate this, but these are cases of luck, individual accounts and not based on a solid defensive account. Just look at the devastating losses during the BoB, despite partial fighter cover.

It is not that the LW bombers were of a weak structure or had “Glass cockpits”, it was there totally inadequate defensive armament that made most of its missions a flight without return ticket.

Regards
Kruska

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Kruska

Hello drgondog,

One of my relatives was flying for KG 4. According to him: Only undetermined/unstable attackers could be fended off, not even taking the probability of a gunner being able to knock out an attacking a/c into account. If an attacker was hit, it was regarded as a lucky combined effort of multiple gunners defending a group of bombers.
The best chance to survive in his He111 was the fact that this a/c could take a hell of a punch or damage.
Off course the downing of an attacker by one or many gunners cannot be out ruled as facts demonstrate this, but these are cases of luck, individual accounts and not based on a solid defensive account. Just look at the devastating losses during the BoB, despite partial fighter cover.

It is not that the LW bombers were of a weak structure or had “Glass cockpits”, it was there totally inadequate defensive armament that made most of its missions a flight without return ticket.

Regards
Kruska

No real argument from me. Even a B-17 designed with many more defensive capabilities was at risk from a single heavily armed fighter.

BTW- Lucky hit or not, he was with three other P-47s in his flight - all crowding to get shots ot the D0 217 which they did shoot down but would have preferred to pass and keep Mahurin.

Mahurin also was shot down in Korea and spent nearly three years in China

[Milos Sijacki]

Actually, I don't know about that. Never gave it any thought to be quite honest.
I think that the rear gunner could have been useful in some situations. Sorry for not being able to offer any more information. Pozdrav.

[buzzard]

I'm certainly not going to dismiss the views of the Nachtjag pilots interviewed by Erich--They were there, I was not...

That said, I still think that the penalties imposed by gunners and their equipment, while undoubtably handy in certain circumstances, were an unnecessary impediment to the task at hand. The role of a fighter, night-flying or otherwise, is to shoot down the enemy. Anything that adds to the offensive capability of a fighter enhances its ability to perform that task...and superior performance is the most useful capability of all. That stealth was the method of choice in the final attack run, does not alter the fact that high performance allows one to make more attacks. And of equal importance, avoid being attacked yourself.

The Luftwaffe nightfighters were all adaptations of AC designed for other purposes. That they were as successful as they were, is a testament to German ingenuity, but they also had the inestimable advantage of the rigid dogma of Bomber Command. The near-religious RAF devotion to numbers and bomb load gave the Nachtjag a shooting gallery of poorly-armed bombers with minimal fighter support. It is this, not the quality of their AC, that allowed the Luftwaffe to exact such a terrible toll. Had the bombers been fitted with heavily-armed ventral turrets, and been accompanied by large numbers of hi-performance escort fighters (All within the means of the RAF during the Nachtjagdgeschwader's most successful period) things would have been very different.

That even the Luftwaffe recognized the primacy of performance over defensive capability in the nightfighter role, is demonstrated by the nature of the final nightfighter designs. Where are the dorsal/rear-gunners in the Me262, Do335, and Ta154 nachtjager variants? And while the situation certainly altered with the advent of the AAM age, where were the defensive gunners in the early incarnations of the AC that supplanted the nightfighter; the all-weather fighter?

JL

[parsifal]

Rear gunners for LW NFs were essential after the British started to mount intruder and escort operations, particualrly after the introduction of Serrate. German AI radar was generally short ranged and with a narrow search arc, so that a quick manouvre by a Mossie could not be followed. the tactics adopted by the escorting Mosquitoes was to execute a quick flick turn once the German NF was about 6000 feet astern. The flick turn was designed to lead to the Mosquito trading places with the pursuing German NF. Once astern of the German, there was no way for the german to detect and re-acquire the allied fighters except by visual.

It was not necessary for the Mosquito to have a rear gunner to nearly such an extent as the Germans. Firstly, the combination of AI Mk VIII and serrate, meant that at a critical point in the war, the allies had very nearly all round detection of most german NFs. In the second instance, once detection astern had been made, the mosquito had the necessary performance to pull away, and outmanouvre the would be attacker.

Of course, things did not always work out that way.....

[buzzard]

Parsifal,

I don't know if you're replying to me (How do you tell?) but thanks for confirming the validity of my stance

Indeed, the LW NFs needed their defensive armament. Their planes lacked the performance to fight the Mossie NFs on an equal basis. Having lost the initiative, the LW NF had to hope that the NF.30 did not attack from beneath in the blind spot...The Mosquito had the performance, and it, not the LW NF called the shots.

I can't remember if the LW had a receiver that could pick up Mosqito radar emissions, or if they were fitted, but if not--why not? It hardly seems an insurmountable technical challenge.

The Nachtdgeschwader would have been far better served by something with the performance of the Do335, than by any lumbering bomber or obsolete fighter, rear-gunner and all...

[parsifal]

Hi Buzzard

yes I was replying mostly to your post. There is one word of caution that needs to be acknowledged. Night Fighter statistics are about the most poorly documented for the whole air war. Even the "populist" histories are frustratingly sparse in their treament of this subject. However, I am reasonably certain of the tactics, just not the numbers shot down

[Erich]

let me say this that the RAF and Allied nfs could not be everywhere at once, in fact some of the aces I interviewed said they never ran into Mossie NF's or P-61's. All Ju 88G-6 NF's had rear warning radar it was standard equipment, and in fact the highest % of LW NF losses was He 219 per quantum and Bf 110G-4's which only very late in the war were starting to be equipped with Rückswart, and not all He 219A variants were equipped either sadly.

The LW best defense was to bank hard and dive for the ground and only pull up the last minute.

As for the oversized Do 335 forget it as it does not even come into play unless you want to pose the magical what-if's ? ..... lets not shall we.

LW NF losses are adequately covered...........and Dr. Boitens volumes on the air war at night will cover essentially what we all want this late fall 08 in 2 volumes

[Kruska]

Originally Posted by drgondog

No real argument from me. Even a B-17 designed with many more defensive capabilities was at risk from a single heavily armed fighter.

Hello drgondog,

I never forwarded that a B-17 was never at risk from being shot down by fighters. What I said was that the defensive armament of a LW bomber was too poor to provide a realistic defense such as the far more effectively armed US or RAF bombers.

That a LW Night-fighter pilot didn’t mind the extra crewmember was most probably not because of an added protection or additional eyes, but most likely to give a reason for his crew buddy not to be send to the eastern front or provide fresh meat for HG’s field divisions.

But there is a simple way to find out:
Are there statistics that document the ratio of LW night fighters that were downed by the Bombers and those shoot down by some Mosquito? Because I never heard about Spitfires, Hurricanes or Typhoons accompanying RAF night raids into Germany posing a threat to LW night fighters and therefore providing a solid argument for a rear gunner.

As for the additional eyes:

The usual mission length for night fighters upon reaching the Bombers via ground control I believe was around 30 – 40 minutes, so what could a rear gunner see that the forward sitting pilot of a 110, and co pilot of an 88 or 217couldn’t see themselves? besides a Mossie shooting up from nowhere or behind sending a gun burst (too late for the gunner already) and the NJ gunner hampering around with a 7.92 toy gun in a burning LW nightfighter.

Regards
Kruska

[Erich]

well it is fully documented through all of 1945 that the extra crew-member was for confirmation of downed Allied bomber as well as operating either the main radar set usually FuG 220d and the other member operated the FuG 350Z Naxos, both were needed. where you got the notion that it was saving the member from going to the ost front I cannot tell but that is quite incorrect. I have already stated that the LW losses are already covered in 2 volumes from previous postings on this forum and the mentioning of Dr. Boitens book against the RAF mission by mission will give everyone the details they want, and in fact the author and collegues are in process of updating the 2 volumes already to be re-released maybe within 10 years as more documental footage is becoming more available

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Kruska

Hello drgondog,

I never forwarded that a B-17 was never at risk from being shot down by fighters. What I said was that the defensive armament of a LW bomber was too poor to provide a realistic defense such as the far more effectively armed US or RAF bombers.

I would hope you understand my statement agrees yours.

My only comments were to illustrate that there were examples of NJG ships, even in daylight, occasionally scoring on an Allied fighter. But until the He 177 no LW light ot medium or heavy bomber was equipped to defend like a B-17 - as you noted above

Clearly, any LW twin engine night fighter caught in daylight by an Allied fighter was in serious trouble. The Mustangs took that very effective NJG 'deep defense' deployment to stop daylight attacks out of action between Dec, 1943 and April, 1944 - when there was no place they could operate safely - even east of Berlin

We are on the same page in our views

[Erich]

and Bill your statements are the reason the NJG force was removed from all day light defenses except for the single engine 109/190's

[Udet]

The Luftwaffe nightfighters were all adaptations of AC designed for other purposes. That they were as successful as they were, is a testament to German ingenuity, but they also had the inestimable advantage of the rigid dogma of Bomber Command. The near-religious RAF devotion to numbers and bomb load gave the Nachtjag a shooting gallery of poorly-armed bombers with minimal fighter support. It is this, not the quality of their AC, that allowed the Luftwaffe to exact such a terrible toll. Had the bombers been fitted with heavily-armed ventral turrets, and been accompanied by large numbers of hi-performance escort fighters (All within the means of the RAF during the Nachtjagdgeschwader's most successful period) things would have been very different.

Not all of them...the Heinkel He 219 was a pure night-fighter virtually from the outset, even if the model saw action in very limited numbers never becoming the most important of the German night-fighters.

As for the other German planes used as night-fighters your statement will likewise apply to the dreaded Mosquito; in the night-fighter role the Mossie too was an adaptation of a plane originally conceived for other roles...same case as it happened in Germany, a flexible airframe that became a valuable night fighting toy.

Also i will dispute that argument of yours, when you said, quote: "It is this, not the quality of their AC, that allowed the Luftwaffe to exact such a terrible toll. Had the bombers been fitted with heavily-armed ventral turrets, and been accompanied by large numbers of hi-performance escort fighters (All within the means of the RAF during the Nachtjagdgeschwader's most successful period) things would have been very different."

Hmmm...then it would seem obvious that the quality of the main German night-fighters was more than sufficient to inflict heavy losses to Bomber Command streams entering German air space.

Would you think it was the Luftwaffe´s fault Bomber Command´s ships were awfully armed? To put this in other words, German utilization of their resources to counter Bomber Command night bombing operations was wise and desirable...if making some adaptations to existing airframes that are flexible enough will work to deal with such menace (and hell it did work) what we will do is make the necessary convertions on the airframes and deploy them in operations. Or what is it that you believe the German should have done in view of the miserable defensive capabilities of RAF bombers?

You have to believe that if the Lancaster had been equiped with far more powerful defensive armament instead of the silly defensive hardware it got, or had more RAF night-fighters been involved in the action, the Germans would have responded accordingly bringing new tactics and equipment to the action. In this regard, the Germans knew the enemy very well, and knew themselves, therefore they obtained excellent results.



That even the Luftwaffe recognized the primacy of performance over defensive capability in the nightfighter role, is demonstrated by the nature of the final nightfighter designs. Where are the dorsal/rear-gunners in the Me262, Do335, and Ta154 nachtjager variants? And while the situation certainly altered with the advent of the AAM age, where were the defensive gunners in the early incarnations of the AC that supplanted the nightfighter; the all-weather fighter?

I fail to detect a clear connection between the two notions: (i) Germany´s late war night-fighters [referring to the Me 262, for the Do 225 never saw action] had no rear/dorsal gunners, then (ii) the Germans did recognize the primacy of performance over defensive capabilities...

You should be aware the Me 262 was not conceived as a night-fighter plane; it was only after the model became operational that some German commanders noticed its capabilities should put to test in the night-fighter role. When it entered service as such, mainly under Welter, it chewed Mosquitos at will...

You are giving a bad connotation to the fact Germany simply converted existing aircraft to fulfill roles they were not originally conceived for, or perhaps as a sign of "weakness" on the German part. I do think my above comment clears the atmosphere. Not only was it a very valid thing, it worked very well. You are trying to present such fact as anomaly when it is nearly standard procedure in any branch of most armed forces in the world. (the Germans were not the only ones to convert or adapt weapons for new/different roles).

[Soren]

Agreed Udet, good post.