P-38 Question

[Soren]

Nothing came as a shock, the P-38 did a poor job in the ETO.

[Marshall_Stack]

Another question (I am never short of these)..

I read that the P-38 was one of the first airplanes to use radar in the back of the airplane to warn the pilot if someone was on there tail.

Anyone know how well these worked?

[renrich]

Hop, good post. Very informative and I think hits the bulls eye. The reasons you gave for why the Spit was not a good candidate for a turbo, I think, explain why the P47 was such a big ac. I know Vought experimented with turbo charging a Corsair but decided there was not enough performance gain to make it worth while.

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by Soren

Nothing came as a shock, the P-38 did a poor job in the ETO.

Again, statement with no substance.

As an air-to-air fighter I could agree with average, as a fighter bomber it did well and as posted had a better survival rate than the P-51.

[Micdrow]

Originally Posted by Soren

Nothing came as a shock, the P-38 did a poor job in the ETO.

I wouldnt go that far, good example is the 7th Photo Group squadron. In July 1944 the P-38F-5C (Maxine 42-67114) became the groups first aircraft to complete 50 sorties with no mechanical failures on operations and suffered only minor damage when a pilot was performing an incautious buzzing. This aircraft went on to complete 14 more combat missions before retirement in Nov 1944.

Source: Mighty Eighth War manual by Roger Freeman.

Europene combat was not the best situation for the lighting but it still did some jobs with great sucess.

[Soren]

FLYBOYJ & Micdrow,

I was refering to its role as a fighter. As a ground attack a/c it did fine, it certainly packed a punch.

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by Soren

FLYBOYJ & Micdrow,

I was refering to its role as a fighter. As a ground attack a/c it did fine, it certainly packed a punch.

As a fighter, it also performed with distinction.

[SoD Stitch]

Originally Posted by syscom3

As a fighter, it also performed with distinction.

Hear, hear . . .

I'll be the first to admit I am biased, as I am a huge P-38 fan.

However, considering the fact it wasn't as maneuverable as a -51 (or a -47, for that matter), it aquitted itself very well.

I think, as with everything, it came down to who was flying the aircraft; an intelligent pilot would use the P-38's attributes to his advantage (climb rate, speed, firepower, low-speed turning radius). The dumb ones would fight on the Luftwaffe's terms (rate of roll, high-speed turnng ability, negative G's, etc.).

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by SoD Stitch

Hear, hear . . .

I'll be the first to admit I am biased, as I am a huge P-38 fan.

However, considering the fact it wasn't as maneuverable as a -51 (or a -47, for that matter), it aquitted itself very well.

I think, as with everything, it came down to who was flying the aircraft; an intelligent pilot would use the P-38's attributes to his advantage (climb rate, speed, firepower, low-speed turning radius). The dumb ones would fight on the Luftwaffe's terms (rate of roll, high-speed turnng ability, negative G's, etc.).

Soren doesnt want to admit that when a P38L was flown by a skilled pilot, it could hold its own against the best the LW had.

[FLYBOYJ]

Food for thought....

"The 55th FG became operational with the P-38H at Nuthampstead in the UK, in October, 1943, deploying from McChord Field in Washington state, where it was a training unit periodically stripped of squadrons to reinforce MTO and SWPA FGs. Tasked with bomber escort at high altitude, the single group of P-38s provided deep escort outside of the range of the seven P-47 groups and numerous RAF Spitfire squadrons, which escorted bombers over the Channel. At this time the Luftwaffe was at its peak, with 8 JagdGeschwaders (JG1, JG2, JG3, JG11, JG26, JG51, JG106) equipped with Bf109G and Fw190A and 3 NachtJagdGeschwaders (NJG1, NJG2, NJG6) equipped with Bf110G available to defend the continent, each JG/NJG with typically 3 Staffels (Squadrons) per JG/NJG.

The P-38s were all that stood between the Luftwaffe and the bombers, 500 NM deep inside hostile airspace. Unescorted, the B-17s and B-24s suffered up to 30% attrition on some raids and the P-38s were the only aircraft with the radius to the task. Typically, P-47 Thunderbolts provided fighter cover to and from the German border. The P-47, truly an excellent high altitude fighter, was saddled with its limited range. They were just beginning to be equipped with belly mounted drop tanks. Yet, these were still inadequate for flying beyond the German frontier. The rotund Thunderbolt would suffer from a lack of range until the arrival of the P-47D-25-RE later in 1944. This model had 100 gallons of increased internal tankage and provision for three external drop tanks. Even with the arrival of some P-51B Mustangs, the P-38 was to bear the brunt of deep penetration escort duty for the next several months. The P-51B equipped 354th (9th AF) went operational in late December, 1943, followed by the 357th and 4th FGs in February, 1944. The P-38 equipped 264th went operational in March, 1944, and the 479th as late as May 1944. During the critical late months of 1943 the P-38 stood alone, with Mustang numbers building rapidly from February 1944.

With a large proportion of Pacific and Med P-38 operations flown at medium to low altitudes, Lockheed and Allison had little operational experience with the aircraft at high altitude and low ambients and this was quickly revealed. The Allisons misbehaved quite consistently, 'throwing rods, swallowing valves and fouling plugs' while the intercoolers often ruptured under sustained high boost, and turbocharger regulators froze at 10 in. or 80 in. of boost, the latter often resulting in catastrophic failures. Even with the arrival of the P-38J, engines and turbochargers continued to fail. The new intercooler/oil cooler design was actually too efficient and the enlarged radiators became a new problem. Fuel too, was a source of trouble, it is believed by many knowledgeable people that the majority of fuel used in Britain was improperly blended, the anti-knock lead compounds coming out of solution (separating) in the Allison's induction system at extreme low temperatures. This could lead to detonation and rapid engine failure, especially at the higher power settings demanded for combat.

Many of the P-38's assigned to escort missions were forced to abort and return to base. Most of the aborts were related to engines coming apart in flight. The intercoolers that chilled the fuel/air mixture too much. Radiators that could lower engine temps below normal operating minimums. Oil coolers that could congeal the oil to sludge. These problems could have been fixed at the squadron level. Yet, they were not. It took the P-38J-25-LO and L model to eliminate these headaches. Add sub-standard fuel, green pilots, poor tactics and the 8th had a serious problem in the making. Having had their numbers seriously reduced by aborts, the remaining fighters were all the more hard pressed by vastly superior numbers of Luftwaffe fighters. The single inexperienced 55th FG often fought the JGs outnumbered 5:1, and the operational debut of the 20th FG in late December 1943, equipped with a mixed inventory of P-38H and P-38J-5/10-LO did not dramatically improve the situation.

There is little wonder that loss rates were relatively high and the kill to loss ratio was below that of the P-47's which could be massed by the hundreds (700 P-47's flying escort was not uncommon). The Luftwaffe quickly learned to position the bulk of their fighters just beyond the range of the Thunderbolts and repeatedly flew aggressive small unit ambushes against the handful of P-38s tied to close escort and thus denied the freedom to engage at will.

To aggravate these problems, inadequate cockpit heating resulted in severe pilot frostbite, while the Luftwaffe quickly learned about the compressibility problems in dives, with German pilots evading the P-38s by executing a split-S at high speed. The initial roll rate was not spectacular and the easily recognized planform provided the Luftwaffe with yet another advantage to play.

Poor serviceability and engine problems meant that initially 50 or less aircraft were available for such missions, including the first escorts over Berlin, and therefore the 55th and later also 20th FG usually fought the JGs outnumbered between three to one and five to one, as noted previously. The large number of engine failures deep inside enemy airspace exacerbated the problem, and the aggregate exchange rate, accidents inclusive, dropped to about 1:1.5 in favour of the Lightning by 1944. Aircrew morale dropped, moreso due to the large number of single engine landing accidents, thus further damaging the aircraft's reputation. The technical problems were not resolved until the introduction of the P-38J-25-LO, by which time the 8th had decided that the new Merlin powered P-51B/C was a better choice for the mission.

In hindsight, while the P-38H and early J variants may not have performed to expectations in the ETO, what is overlooked is that their presence alone allowed the daylight offensive to proceed at the most crucial phase of the battle, the last quarter of 1943, leading to eventual air superiority by the middle of 1944, when the P-51's reached full strength. It is safe to say that were larger numbers of the P-38 available to offset Luftwaffe numbers, and more experienced pilots made available to crew the P-38, the overall result would have looked far better.

The common conclusion that the P-38 was inadequate for the needs of the 8th is frequently based upon comparisons of the scores achieved by the 20th and 55th FGs during the late February "Argument" raids, in comparison with the P-51B equipped 354th FG (9th AF) and the 357th FG (8th AF), and the scoring performance of the P-51B equipped 4th FG in the early March raids into Germany. The factor which is ignored by critics of the P-38 is tactical and aircraft/powerplant handling experience. The 4th FG comprised the former RAF Eagle Spitfire squadrons, and was by far the most experienced USAAF FG in the ETO. The 354th was being led by Blakeslee, formerly of the 4th FG. The 357th drew directly on the experience of the 4th and the 354th FGs. All three FGs drew on the initial long range escort experience of the 55th."

P-38: Der Gabelschwanz Teufel

[SoD Stitch]

Excellent post, Flyboy; couldn't have said it better myself . . .

[renrich]

Actually the stats I posted show that the P38 had one loss for every 74 combat sorties. The P51 had one loss for every 85 combat sorties. The P47 had one loss for every 138 combat sorties. These stats are incredible to me given the time when the P47 was in service and the way it was used. Simply put, if you were a fighter pilot in the ETO in the AAF in 1943,44,45, and wanted to survive you would be wise to fly a P47. Given that the top ace for the US flew P47s, seems like the Jug and the PW R2800 deserve a lot of credit.

[SoD Stitch]

Originally Posted by renrich

Given that the top ace for the US flew P47s, seems like the Jug and the PW R2800 deserve a lot of credit.

Incorrect; the top ace for the US was Maj. Richard Bong of the USAAF, who (surprise!) flew P-38's in the PTO. He is credited with 40 "kills", all of which were acheived in the -38.

I think what you meant to say is that Gabreski was the top-scoring ace in the ETO

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Marshall_Stack

I read that the P-38 was one of the first airplanes to use radar in the back of the airplane to warn the pilot if someone was on there tail.

Anyone know how well these worked?

Late P-38's had AN/APS-13 which was fitted to a number of a/c types late in the war, P-51's and P-47's too. It didn't work that well, high false alarm rate, one more gadget to break. It had been removed from surviving piston fighters (and early jets it was sometimes fitted to) by the time of the Korean War and new fighters at that time no longer had it.

The British used tail warning radars first but ran into the other natural problem with them: German night fighters used passive receivers which could often detect the bombers' warning radars outside the range the warning radar could detect the night fighter. Active tail warning radars are always a potential two edged sword that way.

On P-38 the classic debate for 8th AF . Stats above in the Aleutians show P-38E's less effective air-air than P-39D's and P-40E/K's. In such a small sample that could be part be luck as was suggested, but hard to argue the P-38 was a lot *more* effective air combat machine in that situation. Likewise in some combats in New Guinea where all three of those planes fought together the (pre-J model) P-38's results in terms of ratio weren't that much different. The P-38 was ultimately a far more effective plane in the Pacific than the P-39 or P-40, (or P-47 until the 'N'), mainly because it reached much further. The range of bomber missions and amphibious ops was often set by the reach of *P-38* cover, they then saw the bulk of the action and did most of the destruction of enemy a/c. P-39's and P-40's sat idle more and more as they couldn't reach where the action was, and the Japanese weren't attacking US bases as much anymore. The P-38 was also superior in pure air combat to 39 and 40, using its speed, and more so in later models, but not necessarily way more when compared directly fighting alongside each other.

In ETO/MTO I think it's pretty clear the P-38 was on the whole a less effective air-air fighter than either the P-47 or P-51 (I'm talking overall as it was in history, not best version of one v best of another on paper). It's hard to find cases of P-38 and 47/51 units doing the same missions where the latter didn't do better against German fighters (8th AF, 9th when they occasionally faced enemy fighters P-38 groups took some big losses P-47 groups seemed to avoid, 15th same story). Specific cases could be argued to be fuel or weather or group leadership etc., but it seems a pretty consistent pattern. On ratio ETO/MTO is a huge war, can't summarize in a post like the Aleutians , but I'd say from anecdotes of two sided accounting of P-38's v German fighters it's unlikely the P-38 had a real ratio >1 until perhaps some time in 1944, and perhaps not overall. The blanket stats quoted usually include non-air combat losses but are of course based on claims not real German losses so aren't very useful to determine pure air combat effectivness, and they are of only limited use to compare P-38 to 47/51 because they often didn't fly the same missions in the same time periods. Those stats tend to make the P-38 look worse than it was I think, but again just can't conclude much from them IMO.

Joe

[syscom3]

One thing we can give credit to the P38 for operations in the ETO:

Once it started doing missions over Germany, every single multi engined aircraft of the LW was very vulnerable and risked being shot down.