P-39 D Aircobra vs. Me-109

[Nikademus]

Davparlr I sincerely doubt that!

No'one doubted the superior turn performance of the Zero, esp. not anyone who flew the P-40 6 P-39. The Flying Tigers used B&Z tactics to dispose of the Zero, they NEVER turn fought it, and that is made exceedingly clear!

The Bf-109 F-4 should be able to out-turn the P-40, and so should the Spitfire.

Hello,

Just an FYI, the Flying Tigers never faced Zeros. They did use ambush tactics and B&Z to good effect.



On the issue of turning. Shores considered men like Marseilles the "exception" rather than the rule. A fighter pilot so gifted that he could on occasion outmaneuver his opponents despite their technical superiority in that dept. On one or more occasions he accomplished such a feat vs. a Luftberry type defensive circle.

The general rule of Thumb for the 109 pilots during fighting in 42 was to never dogfight "Curtiss" aircraft, especially at low altitude. Vertical maneuvers and slashing attacks ruled the day. This was primarily when using the Emil though there were a few -F's as well. That latter's arrival didn't seem to bring any major change in tactics that I noticed.

[Soren]

Just an FYI, the Flying Tigers never faced Zeros.

Are you kidding me ??

[timshatz]

Texting. Ok, I got it now.

Suddenly, I feel old.

[JoeB]

Are you kidding me ??

No he's not, and I mentioned it too in my response to that post a few pages back . The AVG proper, which flew combat from December 1941 thru June 1942 before being subsumed into the USAAF, met strictly Japanese Army Air Force fighters, mostly Type 97 (Ki-27, later codename 'Nate'), though also some Type 1's (Ki-43 'Oscar') against whom the AVG did about as well, (around 3:1 real exchange ratio) though in a smaller sample. They also met a few pre-production Type 2's (Ki-44 'Tojo') undergoing combat evaluation with no known victories or losses, and a few early Type 2, 2 seaters (Ki-45 'Nick'), also with success.

Pre-AVG Chinese AF units met Zeroes from 1940 until JNAF units were withdrawn from China in the fall of '41 to prepare for the Pac War; and the USAAF 14th AF units post AVG sometimes called themselves 'Flying Tigers', much to the annoyance of AVG veterans down to this day, but even they met Zeroes in China on only a small handful of occasions later in the war; USAAF P-40 opposition in China was also overwhelmingly JAAF.

Joe

[FLYBOYJ]

JoeB is 100% correct....

[joy17782]

i hears the the torgue from the engines gave it problems and it had a bad habit of turning on its back is this correct , and also the book stuka pilot has a few words about russian pilots in there p-40

[Soren]

Hmmm, so it wasn't the fliyng tigers who gave the warning to USAAF & USN of the Zero and its flying characteristics as-well as the advice on how to defeat it? I know they didn't listen though and ended up having real troubles defeating the Zero in the beginning.

[FLYBOYJ]

Hmmm, so it wasn't the fliyng tigers who gave the warning to USAAF & USN of the Zero and its flying characteristics as-well as the advice on how to defeat it?

Chenault gave that information based on what the Chinese encountered. The same intelligence covered information on the "Oscar."

I know they didn't listen though and ended up having real troubles defeating the Zero in the beginning.

Depends where, when and who. In the very beginning there were problems dealing with the Zero over all but then you have some pilots who quickly figured out how to use their aircraft to the best of its ability (we keep bringing up Buzz Wagner). I think by the end of 1942 it was well figured out.

[renrich]

Actually, before June of 42, (Midway) Jimmy Thach had figured out the Thach Weave to use against the A6M and used it during the battle. During that battle the Wildcats gave about as good as they got. Thach also gave the pilots of the VTs some good advice about surviving against the Zero and some of the few who got back used his advice to save their lives.

[Nikademus]

Hmmm, so it wasn't the fliyng tigers who gave the warning to USAAF & USN of the Zero and its flying characteristics as-well as the advice on how to defeat it? I know they didn't listen though and ended up having real troubles defeating the Zero in the beginning.

As mentioned, Chenault received intel regarding the new "Zero" from Chinese sources. Unlike most other westerners, Chenault took the information very seriously and tried to warn Washington that the Japanese had developed a formidable new airplane. Noone listened. At the time, the West considered Japanese aviation to be sub-par....essentially a bunch of copycats who produced inferior versions of their current planes. (hence the idea that "Buffalos.....considered inadequate for ETO ops, would work "fine" in Asia")

Worse still were the opinions of Japanese airmen. Basically it was felt they coudn't fly worth beans or even see well. Racism was very prevalent in shaping views in that area of the world at the time.

[Nikademus]

Depends where, when and who. In the very beginning there were problems dealing with the Zero over all but then you have some pilots who quickly figured out how to use their aircraft to the best of its ability (we keep bringing up Buzz Wagner). I think by the end of 1942 it was well figured out.

I'd also say it depends on the level of rotation of the pilots and the impact on the overall level of experience. The Commonwealth suffered a similar problem in the Western Desert in 42. With tours expiring and experienced pilots leaving to be replaced by greenies, often the same mistakes were made and/or tactics that proved less than optimal for the plane types continued to be used. The Luftwaffe "experten" were able to run up their scores big time due in part to this as they continued to fight and refine the tactics that best utilized their 109's.

[FLYBOYJ]

I'd also say it depends on the level of rotation of the pilots and the impact on the overall level of experience. The Commonwealth suffered a similar problem in the Western Desert in 42. With tours expiring and experienced pilots leaving to be replaced by greenies, often the same mistakes were made and/or tactics that proved less than optimal for the plane types continued to be used. The Luftwaffe "experten" were able to run up their scores big time due in part to this as they continued to fight and refine the tactics that best utilized their 109's.

If you look at the number of kills/ losses in the South Pacific things really started to change at the latter end of 1942. I know JoeB may chime in here with info on "overclaims" by both sides, but the fact remains that the Japanese started loosing large amounts of fighters and most of them were Zeros. I don't think pilot rotation had anything to do with it, at least on the USAAF side....

Army Air Forces in World War II

Army Air Forces in World War II

[JoeB]

If you look at the number of kills/ losses in the South Pacific things really started to change at the latter end of 1942. I know JoeB may chime in here with info on "overclaims" by both sides, but the fact remains that the Japanese started loosing large amounts of fighters and most of them were Zeros.

They lost more fighters as '42 went on but I'll repeat, I you like , the Stats Digest while a good source for many topics, and easy to access on web, is just not meaningful measure of how many Japanese planes were really downed. The fact that 'the other side' overclaimed is not really relevant. The problem is in the unknown and highly variable degree of overclaim in the claims you're looking at. In a previous thread we went bottom up on the Feb '42 numbers and found they didn't really agree with US losses (too low if including the planes sunk with USS Langely, too high for just air combat), and the actual number of JNAF fighter victims was a fairly small fraction of what was claimed. Just not a very good indicator. You need Japanese losses to make a statement about...Japanese losses, IMO.

Leaving aside Allied losses and ratio's, here's an approximate count of Japanese Navy fighter pilot losses by campaign in 1942, from the listings in "Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units of WWII" by Hata and Izawa:
Pearl Harbor: 9
Philippines: 14
Malaya: 2
DEI/Bismarks/raids Australia through Feb: 19
New Guinea/raids Australia March-up to Coral Sea: 16
Ceylon: 6
Coral Sea: 7
Midway/Aleutians raids: 24
NG/Aus after Coral Sea>end '42:39
G'canal (including carrier battles) to end '42: 122

So Guadalcanal was where fighter pilot attrition became a big problem, and overall the USN and USMC F4F's were the big problem, accounting for virtually all the carrier battle losses and great bulk of G'canal/Solomons losses in '42. The Midway number may surprise, but it's well documented the Japanese lost relatively few aircrew of all kinds on the sunk carriers, almost half the Midway fighter pilot losses were air combat.

Joe

[FLYBOYJ]

you're missing something there Joe - you're showing losses by campaign - what about the day-to-day operations, patrols, sweeps etc. out side the major campaigns - I know "Bloody Shambles" documents a good parts of that (I haven't really looked at Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units of WWII) but I think there's a lot of daily operations that was not included in any of this. The Zeros went somewhere, and while there was attrition - weather and losses to ground fire, the obvious fact remains at the end of the day the Japanese suffered more aerial losses than the allies...

Oh and BTW, I don't think pilot rotation had anything to do with this...

[renrich]

According to Lundstrom, between 7 August, 42 and 15 November, 42, VF kills and losses both land based and carrier based, there were 31 Wildcats lost versus 25 Zeros lost. On 7 August, there were 9 Wildcats lost to 2 Zeros lost. After that it was pretty even. These were all US Navy Wildcats.