P-40 vs. Hurricane

[evangilder]

I am with LG on this one. The resolve of the Brits would have been incredible. The "armada" of ships that were planned for Seelowe were woefully inadequate and it would have been a logistical nightmare for the Germans to pull it off. The may have been able to esatblish a beach-head at best, but I doubt they would have been able to occupy all of England, much less make it to London.

[Glider]

The Germans could only have destroyed the strips that were in range of their fighters. Any further and your talking about unescorted bombers against fighters and there is only one loser in that scenario.
This would have meant that the area above the british troops defending the beaches would have been a no mans land for the airforces. Both airforces, each being able to gain local control of the air whilst neither would have had total control.
German plans and equipment for the launching of an invasion were very very poor. They may, and I only say may, have made it across but supporting the beachheads would have been impossible with the equipment they had. Remember we are talking about using barges to cross the channel. If they had made it across, we still had a large navy and I am sure there would have been an all out assult on the beaches and supply lines to France. I suspect almost any casualties would have been accepted as we couldn't let the Germans get a strong base on our side as our army was too weak in heavy equipment, having lost most of it in France.
Its worth noting that the Germans would also have been short of armour as they didn't have the landing craft in any numbers to carry them.

[Lightning Guy]

That is one thing to remember, only the stips in SE England were really being hit. The RAF still had fields in northern and western UK. Plus there was the RN to deal with.

[Hop]

It was the decision to stop bombing the RAF's airfields and start bombing the major cities instead, that ultimatly led to the LW's loss of the BoB.
Had the LW continued their strikes against the RAF's airfields, then fighter-command would have eventually given up the fight.

If the Luftwaffe had kept up the same level of attacks throughout September that they'd managed in the last week of August, the RAF would have been in trouble. Not beaten, but certainly on the way to being beaten.

But the Luftwaffe could not do so. They lost too many planes, too many pilots, they had a shortage of spare parts, their pilots suffered from the strain and too many were unfit to fly.

Here's a graph of the fighter sorties flown by each side:


The first peak for the Luftwaffe marks Eagle day, and the subsequent week of fighting to destroy the RAF. That was considered a maximum effort by the Luftwaffe.

When that didn't work, they went back to the drawing board, and came back in the last week of August with another, even greater, effort. But you can see by the figures for the first week of September that they couldn't sustain that effort.

That's borne out by the serviceability figures as well:


Note the sharp decline in serviceability from mid August, only stemmed by the reduced fighter sorties from 7th September onwards (the Luftwaffe switched to attacking London on the 7th)

And by the fighter strength figures, note how the Luftwaffe, by September, was substantially weaker than the RAF, and how the required sorties were being flown by ever smaller numbers of fighters.


One side certainly was on the road to defeat, but it wasn't the RAF.

In actual fact, fighter-command was only 'one' week away from giving up the fight, when the decision to start bombing London was given by Goering.

No.

Fighter Command actually had a conference on the morning of the 7th, before they knew about the change in Luftwaffe tactics.

From The Most Dangerous Enemy, by Stephen Bungay:

Evill pointed out that at current rates the OTUs were turning out 280 Hurricane and Spitfire pilots a month, and that losses in the previous four weeks had been 348.

The discussion turned to the fighting. Park doubted that the enemy could keep up its pressure for more than three weeks. Dowding said that it could go on much longer - it depended on politics, Goring's personal ascendancy and other factors. Given recent appraisals of German air strength, one should reckon on a long campaign. It was agreed, after some arguing about the figures, that the supply of aircraft would not be a problem, or a constraint on expan¬sion.

Knowing that their enemy was preparing to 'go down hill' would have been cold comfort to the Luftwaffe. They assumed the enemy had been doing that for some time. In fact they believed he ought to be at his last gasp. General Stapf had reported to Haider on 30 August that the British had lost 800 Hurricanes and Spitfires since 8 August out of a front-line strength of 915. Given Schmid's estimate of their production capacity of 200-300 a month, the British could therefore only have 3-400 left at the outside. After another week of pounding in September, they must indeed be down to their last 200 machines.
In fact, on the evening of 6 September, Fighter Command had over 750 serviceable fighters and 1,381 pilots available to it, about 950 of whom flew Spitfires or Hurricanes. It needed 1,588 pilots to be at full establishment, which is of course what Dowding wanted, so from his point of view he was 200 short.20 From the Luftwaffe's point of view, he had almost 200 more pilots and 150 more planes than he had had at the beginning of July when they set out to destroy him.

Far from being 1 week from defeat, on the morning of the Luftwaffe change in tactics FC decided on plans that would have kept them going for months longer at the current rate, whereas the Germans had already decided to change tactics to minimize their losses.

As Bungay goes on:

There are many who believe that Fighter Command was on its knees after the attacks on the airfields. It was a strange way of kneeling. Given Evill's cal¬culations, and taking the worst scenario of no increase in output from the training units, if the Luftwaffe had continued its attacks on the airfields and continued to destroy aircraft in the air at the most favourable rate it ever achieved, there would still have been about 725 Hurricanes and Spitfires ready to take to the air in the third week of September.

And in contrast, Luftwaffe single engined pilot figures:

1 June 906
1 August 869
1 September 735
1 November 673

From outnumbering the RAF at the start of the BoB, the Luftwaffe had declined in strength, whilst the RAAF had actually gained strength. By the first week of September Fighter Command was larger than the Jagdwaffe, had more replacements coming through, and had already won the battle.

To a degree your right LG, as it would take a hell of alot to make the British actually "Give up", but eventually they would infact have "Given up", as decisions for this were already being discussed during the darkest period of the BoB.

No, the decisions taken at the darkest period of the BoB were to start reducing strength over the rest of the country to reinforce the south east. Plans which were designed to keep the fight going for many more months at the current rate of losses.

Think about it, what would the RAF have done with no airfields ? The answer is simple, they would have given up, cause anything else would've been nonsense.

The RAF had a large number of airfields in the SE, the Luftwaffe never even attacked many of them, because they were small and well camoflaged.

The only vulnerable ones were the larger sector stations, but even these stood up to damage very well. From Dowding to Park, later in the battle:

I agree with the Air Officer Commanding 11 Group that the damage done by air attack to aerodromes has been serious, and that it was begining at one time to affect materially the efficiency of our fighter operations. Nevertheless, I must point out:

(i) That 13 aerodromes in the Group underwent a total of over forty attacks in three weeks, but Manston and Lympne were the only two that were unfit for day flying for more than a few hours

(ii) That although the scale of the attack certainly exceeded te capacity of the works orginisation existing at the outset, this was rapidly strengthened, and I do not wish to express any dissatisfaction with the measures taken to effect this improvement

The attack on the airfields caused some damage and disruption, but came nowhere near shutting down the RAF in the SE.

The RAF would have either 1) flown from roads or grass strips (you can't bomb EVERY field in England)


The logistical support would be hampered in a rather significant way as a/c would have to be scattered all over the place, and that would have serious consequences for the RAF, which already was short on pilots.

The solution, if the major airfields in the SE had been wiped out (which was never a serious possibility), would be to operate the fighters off the minor airfields with grass runways, and to have flown them to major fields north of London for serviceing and repair.

Edit: graphs are from an article by Air Commodore Peter Dye on the BoB, by the RAF historical branch.

[Lightning Guy]

Excellent graphs and info.

[lesofprimus]

Good post Hop...

[Gnomey]

Good info hop!

[Nonskimmer]

Yes indeed. Good post.

[CurzonDax]

Exellent info. It supports a argument I always have with my colleges that it was all luck and leadership that let the RAF win.

:{)

[Soren]

Good post Hop. I haven't read this Bungay's work before, interesting.

Anyway I relied on my memory for this...

Originally Posted by Hop

No, the decisions taken at the darkest period of the BoB were to start reducing strength over the rest of the country to reinforce the south east. Plans which were designed to keep the fight going for many more months at the current rate of losses.

Yes those were the decisions 'taken', but surrendering certainly was 'discussed'.

IIRC, on the 4th September fighter-command only had "50" Spits left, not much.

Anyway onwards..

Göring had planned what he considered to be a knockout blow starting on 13 August. Adlerangriff (Eagle Attack). It was a failure. Most of the force was recalled but some Gruppen did not receive the signal and continued to meet strong opposition without fighter escorts. Again, there were no target priorities and the poor weather made an already confused situation worse. Later in the day, when the weather had improved, military targets were specified, particularly fighter airfields, but the Luftwaffe could not distinguish between fighter and bomber fields. By the end of the day the losses on both side were approximately equal. But, most important, the Luftwaffe had failed to subdue Fighter Command. On 15 August another massive attack was attempted, this time coordinated with Luftflotte 5, so that RAF forces were split. Again, confused orders and misunderstandings blunted the attack. The attacks in August became as regular as they were ferocious. RAF Fighter Command was now desperately short of pilots and the existing crews were exhausted. In the last week of August, 11 Group airfields were targeted and Fighter Command was now in serious trouble. At this rate there would be little to put into the air and even less to land on within two weeks. The RAF was now on the edge of defeat. Then, on 7 September, Hitler permitted the bombing of London and the Luftwaffe for the first time had a specified target. It was a miracle for the RAF and a massive blunder by the Luftwaffe who never knew how close they had come to victory.

The question is 'how' close to victory was the LW really, and I believe they were fairly close. (However Bungay has some fairly good arguments against this though)

As to how successful Op. Seelöwe would have been "if" the British airforce had given up, well I'd guess pretty successful.

[Lightning Guy]

I'm not sure about that. First of all, to this point only Fighter Command had been attacked. Bomber and Coastal Commands were still more or less intact and could have been a series obstacle. There was still the entire RN to deal with (which was vastly superior to the Kriegsmarine). Add the fact that the Wermacht had virtually no experience with this type of amphibious operation and I think Sealion was still in danger of failing.

Consider for example, the Allies had complete air supremacy over Normandy on D-Day but the issue was still in doubt.

[carpenoctem1689]

Sea lion was doomed had it been launched, even with fighter comman near decimated. As stated, bomber and coastal command were more or less intact, and would reak havoc on the barges, while crossing, and after they had landed, and then on the forces that made it ashore. They royal navy would not miss such a chance to make its power known. The luftwaffe would attack and probably sink or seriously damage some very important ships later in the war, but ultimatly would not be able to conquer england. British reslove was astounding, and would never have allowed a surrender unless the most gruesome fate certainly awaited.

[lesofprimus]

The Germans did not have the sealift capacity, or the # of landing and assault craft required to make an amphibious assault... That operation was nothing more than a wet dream in Hitlers mountain retreat...

[Jabberwocky]

Originally Posted by Soren

IIRC, on the 4th September fighter-command only had "50" Spits left, not much.

From 'The Narrow Margin' by Derek Wood and Derek Dempster

pp. 104

Contrary to popular belief, the R.A.F was never down to its last half-dozen Spitfires and Hurricanes in reserve during the Battle of Britain. The lowest point in the Battle was reached in the week ending September 13th, when there were 127 fighters ready for delivery in storage units. Of these 80 were Hurricanes and 47 were Spitfires.

Fighter command was down to it's last 50 Spitfires in storage, not in service. The Fighter Command order of battle for September 7th, 1940 shows 20 Spitfire squadrons on strength. The nominal strength of a RAF fighter unit was 18 pilots, 12 ready aircraft and 8 reserve aircraft. Even if we put all Spitfire squadrons at ony half strength that still leaves 200 Spitfires in squadron service, with 50 in reserve.[/u]

[Hop]

IIRC, on the 4th September fighter-command only had "50" Spits left, not much.

Spitfire numbers did drop to about 50 on the 4th September. But that's the number in the reserve, which went from about 70 in late August to 40 something on the 7th September.

The front line squadrons had well over 200 Spitfires, with the returns for 4th September showing 218 Spitfires serviceable, along with 407 Hurricanes, 50 Blenheims, 21 Defiants and 8 Gladiators.

At no point were the RAF reserves in storage exhausted, and front line strength remained at 100%, with losses being made good from the reserve.

Another of those graphs, from the same source:


That's one of the things that worried the RAF, reserves were decling, which meant, in time, front line strength would begin to decline as well.

What the RAF didn't realise was the Germans had very few reserves, had exhausted them long before, and had suffered a major drop in front line strength.

Bungay references Milch's report on his tour of Luftwaffe airfields in France in late August/early September. He reports that the gruppen were seriously under strength, with gruppes supposed to have 35 - 40 aircraft, the bomber gruppes averaged 20, the 109 gruppes only 18.

So whilst the RAF reserves were declining, they were never completely exhausted, and front line strength never declined, whereas the Luftwaffe had no reserves, had very low aircraft production, and were well below strength.

The RAF BoB website has the serviceable figures in their daily reports:

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html

They don't give them for the first few days, but:

17 July
* Blenheim - 67
* Spitfire - 237
* Hurricane - 331
* Defiant - 20
* Total - 659

24 July
* Blenheim - 56
* Spitfire - 238
* Hurricane - 294
* Defiant - 15
* Total - 603

31 July
* Blenheim - 63
* Spitfire - 239
* Hurricane - 348
* Defiant - 25
* Total - 675

7 August
* Blenheim - 66
* Spitfire - 256
* Hurricane - 368
* Defiant - 24
* Total - 714

14 August
* Blenheim - 59
* Spitfire - 219
* Hurricane - 342
* Defiant - 25
* Gladiator - 2
* Total - 647

21 August
* Blenheim - 58
* Spitire - 239
* Hurricane - 400
* Defiant - 25
* Gladiator - 7
* Total - 729

28 August
* Blenheim - 55
* Spitfire - 225
* Hurricane - 413
* Defiant - 23
* Gladiator - 7
* Total - 723

4 September
* Blenheim - 50
* Spitfire - 218
* Hurricane - 407
* Defiant - 21
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 704

11 September
* Blenheim - 61
* Spitfire - 214
* Hurricane - 387
* Defiant - 21
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 691

The figures bounce around a lot, because they are serviceable aircraft, not aircraft on hand, and after a heavy period of fighting the serviceable numbers go down temporarily. But the RAF actually gained front line strength during the battle, the number of Spitfire and Hurricanes squadrons gradually increased, from 44 on the 14th July to 51 on the 1st September.

Richard Overy, The Battle, sums up in one sentence why the BoB is often represented as a very close run thing, with the RAF only narrowly staving off defeat in September. He goes into a description of how the British (and Americans) greatly overestimated the size of the Luftwaffe, and German production capability, and how the Germans underestimated the size of the RAF, and British production capability. Then:

The British fought the battle as if it were a last ditch struggle against an overwhelming enemy; the German side fought against a force persistently misrepresented as technically and tactically inept, short of aircraft, pilots and bases.

From a British perspective, they were losing the BoB. Their losses were unsustainable, and in a matter of months they would be reduced to a state where they couldn't defend British airspace.

The Germans felt they were winning. Their losses were high, but they thought the RAF's losses were much higher. Their strength was declining, but they thought the RAF's strength was declining faster. They knew they couldn't keep the same level of attack up for weeks, but they felt the RAF was only days from collapsing.

What the sides believed then still colours accounts, because it comes through in all the official records of the time. It's also a good story, and Churchill made some memorable speeches about it.

But from an impartial perspective, with full access to both sides losses and replacements, it's clear the RAF were winning from the start. They actually increased strength for the first months, where the Germans declined. They declined in strength slightly in late August and early September, but the Luftwaffe declined sharply at the same time, and expended all their effort in attacks that the RAF weathered fairly comfortably.

Here's another graph, showing the production balance for both sides:


For the RAF there's only a brief period when losses outstrip replacements. For the Luftwaffe losses outstrip replacements for almost the entire battle.

As to how successful Op. Seelöwe would have been "if" the British airforce had given up, well I'd guess pretty successful.

I don't think Sea Lion would have been, because the Luftwaffe cannot stop the RN sinking the invasion fleet, but if the RAF had been defeated, then unhindered German bombing might well have been sufficient to force Britain out of the war.