Quote:
Originally Posted by Lucky13  Put Hartmann in the P-51 and Pretty in the K-4.... Johnson in the D-9 and Barkhorn in the 47-M. |
I think I'd rather have Pretty in the K-4 and chase her with Preddy in the 51..
I would like to take one moment to dissect the numerical advantage discussion. First let's take the 8th AF at three Points in time.
Jan1 1943 - zero fighter wings as everybody basically left for Afrika and the RAF had to provide escort. Huge Luftwaffe advantage over German targets (as in zero Allied Fighters escorting B-17s and B-24s to Germany)
Jan1 1944 - zero Mustangs but two P-38 wings capable of escorting to German targets but Allison engines and compressibility issues reduced numbers of 38s over target and reduced combat effectiveness - huge advantage of LW Fighter Arm over USAAF at the target... all escorted targets were well short of Berlin, Regensburg and Munich putting aircraft and Petoleum out of reach for escorts.
Jan1 1945 - 14 Mustang Wings/one P-47 wing capable of escorting heavy bombers to any occupied target in Europe, RAF and 9th AF capable of supporting Strategic air and the combined 12th and 15th about on par with 8th in total capability. Daily raids of 1500-2000 bombers and 1100 to 1500 USAAF Mustangs resulting in complete numerical superiority against the LW.
How did this happen?
One view is this:
Jan11, 1944 the 354FG on loan from 9th AF, Mid Feb the 357FG comes on line, late Feb/early March the 4th and 355th FG come on line and finally in April the 352FG receives its Mustangs.
USAAF puts at first maybe 40-50 Mustangs in the air per group to cover Deep Bomber penetrations over the target by end of Jan, resulting in a growth to 100 available at the end of Feb, 200 available at the end of March and 250 at the end of April
Forget the fact that 'effectives' were averaging 65-70% of launch due to mechanical problems of the new Mustang during those months.
8th AF had about 30 BW growing to 40+ with 2/3 B-17s and 1/3 B-24s.
1, then 2, then 4, then 5 Mustang wings incl 9th AF available to escort 30+ BW to, over and from target until P-47 range enabled them to take over
Each BD of the 3 would be able to compress 10 BW (at most) into a 40 mile track- each Bomb Division would have either one (or none) P-51 groups to support them over target until end of March, then maximum of two per Division until June - This is fact of life during raids to Leipzig, Regensburg, Berlin, Merseburg, Augsburg, Posnan, Munich, Stettin etc fro the period Jan11, 1944 through April 30, 1944. Three P-38 wings were also operational so boost the 'possible' American Fighter presence over those target to three wings to cover 7-10 bomb wings per division.
The Luftwaffe could easily bring to bear 300 fighters on any single point of the bomber stream in that time frame and never be opposed by more than 30-40 Mustangs at most.
Would you agree that the Luftwaffe in this case not only local air superiority at any point of the bomber stream but also approx parity w/escorts capable of reaching the target?
But the 109s and 190s and 110s and the 410s were slaughtered, losing so much of the experienced s/e fighter pilots but also even harder to replace t/e crews that could no longer survive in the same airspace with Mustangs - even helping the RAF the following night!
My point has always been that a small but extremely effective force (hate to use this term) broke the back of the LW day fighter arm in Germany - REQUIRING drawdown from Ost Front to try to stem the tide. Breaking Back to me means killing far more experienced and talented German pilots than the Training Arm could replace - necessitating Bomber and Transport pilots being pressed into service creating a graveyard spiral.
So, did USAAF 8th FC have 'overwhelming' numerical superiority? No, not when these events took place - a single fighter so often praised as The Greatest" wasn't the Greatest - it simply was the best at the altitudes that the LW was forced to compete.
And to answer the question posed in this thread "Better than the 190 and the 109?"
Yes
There were better performance versions that came after the Fw190A6 and the Me109G6 - but those two a/c were simply inferior to the P-51B at 25,000 feet and proved it against competent and experienced LW pilots over the deepest targets in Occupied Europe.. Not the P-47, not the Spitfire or Tempest - the Mustang..
And then it roamed at will from Strauburg east of Berlin to the airfields at Oberpfaffenhofen and Landsburg around Munich - there was no place to assemble freely, no place safe for flight schools or moving rolling stock across Germany. LW couldn't defend Munich to the south, or Stettin and Posnan to the east.
Long winded but the Luftwaffe was tough and smart - even in later stages of war they were able to 'outnumber' the USAAF at the point of attack up through the Bulge - but by then the overall numerical and experience advantage was too far in the balance of the Allies for their efforts to make a difference - except to the crews they shot down that day.
But not in the first five months of 1944 when the Luftwaffe lost control of the air.
Regards,
Bill - often wrong but rarely uncertain
I been trying to watch the hockey game and read this.....
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