RAF after BoB: mid-term strategy, tactics technology?

[Shortround6]

You are NOT going to get other 50mph out of it without strapping jets or rockets to it. That is where the whole thing falls apart.

The Lancastrian only about 2,400lb less than a Lancaster empty. max loaded weight war 65,000lbs or about 3,000lb less that the "normal" loaded weight of the Lancaster with the same engines. trouble is that the Performance figures are for a mean weight of 53,000lbs and max speed was 310mph at 12,000ft. Max weak cruise 285 at 17,500ft. rates of climb and ceiling are given at 65,000ft (ceiling was 23,000ft),

Range was rather spectacular but that is because of the fuel carried, not the streamlining. It carried not only 2154 imp gallons in the wings but 1020imp gallons under the 'cabin floor' (old bomb bay?). Three ranges are given carrying a 3597lb payload at 15,000ft: At max weak mixture cruise (265mph) 3,570miles, at speed between max weak cruise and most economical( 232mph) 3,950 miles, at most economical (200mph) 4501 miles. Please note that these are theoretical ranges and do not include take-off and climb.

Also please note that the Avro York had a max speed using the same engines and wing of 290mph.

 

[Greyman]

For what it's worth I have an A&AEE test of a Lancaster I at light load (38,800 lb), no mid-upper turret (I think) and it made, at only +9 boost/3000 rpm:

310 mph at 21,100 ft
302 mph at 15,000 ft

That's about +40 mph and +3,500 feet.

EDIT: Now that I think about it - this test is probably without exhaust shrouds either.

 

[wuzak]

A Twin Wasp powered Mosquito?

Are you making bombers or targets?

V-1710 powered version?

A V-1710 powered version would be excellent for a low altitude bomber version. Low altitude attacks are where the Mosquito excelled.

That said, I don't think Merlin supply was what was lacking in Mosquito production.

Also, if you are using more Mosquito bombers I would expect that the numbers of Lancasters being used would be trimmed, freeing up more Merlins.

At the end of the day, Mosquito production would have the same problem as historically - what mix of versions is made?

 

[wuzak]

It was also most powerful the British had - a more reliable Sabre should make the life for the Fw-190 problematic, at least under 15000 ft. Historically, the Fw-190 threat was the raison d'etre for the Typhoon/Sabre for quite a time.

Maybe expedite the Spitfire XII instead. That would be more than a match for the Fw 190.

I certainly don't wan't to forget about the LE tanks. However, both the under-seat and rear fuselage tanks were in use before the LE tanks. They would require a minor change in airframe, compared with LE tanks.
Once there is enough of breathing space in production lines, the LE tanks (maybe made install an L-shaped tank to fit under behind the pilot, to?) should be installed, by all means. All together 150-160 imp gals for the 'new Spitfire VIII'?
The (front) fuselage tank(s) were increased to 96 imp gals for the Spit VII, in late 1944 also the Spitfire IXs received the modification.

If you make the Spitfires carry 2 x 20mm or 1 x 20mm + 1 x 0.50" in each wing earlier, you could use the outer wings to store fuel in leading edge tanks. Maybe even use the old mg bays and ammo bays to store a little more?

 

[nuuumannn]

we can debate if the idea of an armed bomber was a good one or not but an armed bomber does NOT need turrets that can double as forest fire look out towers.

Those godawful FN.7 turrets were a real problem; cramped inside, they caused severe tail buffeting in the Manchester when rotated. That led to the third fin on the centre fuse. The Hudson turret was a Boulton Paul unit and although bulky, was actually well liked as it was roomy and easy to manipulate, as it was exactly the same as the Defiant turret in mechanical workings, but with two guns. Both BP and FN built twin turrets fitted with .50 cal guns early war, but these weren't put into production until later.

I'm very much in agreement with SR regarding removing turrets from four engined bombers - not a good idea. That wouldn't improve performance by much at all and it would leave them hopelessly unable to defend themselves. Fast unarmed bombers make sense if they are Ju 88 or Mossie size, but you have to wait until the jet age before a good fast unarmed heavy bomber. If you want fast bombers, concentrate on building lots of smaller aircraft rather than larger ones.

Regarding the what if ideas, obviously, much of what we are proposing here is based very much on what we know now and could not have been necessarily known in late 1940 early 1941. What the RAF faced immediately after the BoB was a increasing bombing campaign by the Germans, who used sophisticated navigation and bombing aids. Certainly the most useful advances at that time would have been to bolster night fighter defences and other means of deterence not necessarily directly connected with aircraft. Regarding the aircraft in service and about to enter service in that period; the die is already cast, as many have said here already. You are stuck with the likes of the Manchester, Wellington, Whitley, Hampden, Sunderland, lots of Blenheims and Battles, Hurricanes and Spitfire I and IIs. Also small but increasing numbers of Beaufighters, Beauforts, Defiants etc. As I've said before; you go to war with what you have, not necessarily what you want.

One thing that would have been of great benefit would be the decision to fit high altitude Merlins to fighters before bombers sooner than it was made. The two-speed, two-stage Merlin was originally intended as a bomber engine - scrap that and fit it directly to the prototype Spit III as is what eventually happened anyway and you have a Spit IX a year or so earlier, maybe if haste is applied - the Fw 190 provided enormous impetus to British fighter development. The Mosquito requires little modification to its timeline or spec, but certainly if it could be done, speed up production and increase the number being built. Get Hawker to work on a thin wing Typhoon; the Tempest earlier and bring Hurricane production to a slow to incorporate that aircraft. Do the same with the Blenheim with the Beaufighter. Heavy bombers? Can't really do much. The Lanc is really the only thing that is going to be effective and that's a year or so away from service. The Halifax was beset with problems, which took another two years before a really suitable aircraft could be built, the Mk.III. You could possibly insist that the Hali be powered by Hercs from the start, but that doesn't help the drag or instability issues. So that leaves the Stirling. Not much you can do, really.

 

[nuuumannn]

Another thing I forgot about turrets, they weren't just somewhere to put gunners. Putting men in cupolas at the extremities of aeroplanes increased the flight crews' situational awareness. Take that away and you are effectively flying half blind. Gunners provided extra sets of eyes, the only proximity sensors afforded the bombers of the day (1940 - 42). Equally important since Bomber Command was also flying a large number of daylight raids. Having turrets at least gave you the ability to interrupt any attacking fighter's concentration, thereby buying time. Get rid of that and you have little option for defence. You could put glazed sections around the turretless bombers for crew to sit in, but when not occupied, instead of stooging about and clogging up the Elsan, you might as well put a gun in front of them.

 

[Shortround6]

On the British 4 engine bombers you have to remember that they were ALL designed to a requirement that they should be able to transport 24 fully armed soldiers in case of need. This means they had rather large fuselages right from the start. Some designers may have placed more importance on that requirement than others.
A 4 engine bomber, designed from the START to have no guns and NO secondary transport role might very well be considerably faster. But pulling the guns from an existing fat fuselage bomber is NOT going to turn it into a large Mosquito.
First Prototype flights for the Sterling, Halifax and Manchester all took place in 1939 and production was starting on all three by late 1940. Scrapping one or more of them and starting over in late 1940 means the super-bomber isn't going to show up until late 1943 or 1944.

 

[yulzari]

x

 

[merlin]

To got at from a different - don't have Leigh-Mallory in Charge, or for that matter Douglas - the 'Big Wings' failed in the BoB, failed in France in '41, and still failed over Dieppe in '42!

There would be a number of imperatives:

- guard South-East England just in case the Luftwaffe tries BoB mark II,

- after the Blitz London, and other Cities had endured - now was pay back time,

- after the German Invasion of the Soviet Union, came the need create a situation whereby Luftwaffe Fighters in the East would be called back (not achieved in OTL),

If Dowding had been promoted to CAS and Park made AoC Fighter Command - maybe unlikely but not impossible. My thinking is that Dowding would have made BC navigation and bombing accuracy a higher priority - to make raids more effective. His maxim of protect the 'base' - would just as easily apply to Malta North-Africa - so they get the Spit's earlier. And Park, I think would apply better tactics over France.

 

[stona]

The Battle of the Atlantic was won and without denuding Bomber Command any further. Britain didn't lose the battle or the war which effectively proves the decision makers of the time correct. Remember that they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. War involves politics and any solution to OldSkeptics point #1 which involves preventing Bomber Command from striking back at Germany, however ineffectively was not acceptable.
I've already posted the parlous state of the command shortly after Harris took over. Anything to prevent the build up through 1942/3 would have had to pass not only the old heads at the Air Ministry, bomber men almost to a man, but just as importantly, the Prime Minister. That's why it didn't happen.

The Battle of the Atlantic is often mooted as a closer run thing than it was, largely down to Churchill's recollections. Can anyone cite me a month in the war when RAF operations from the UK were curtailed for a lack of fuel for example? Nobody in Britain starved or came close to it. Food and clothing rationing might not have been popular or bountiful, but it WAS enough.

I absolutely agree that Spitfires should and, crucially, could have been sent to North Africa/The Mediterranean earlier.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

...Isn't the solution for the Sabre's issues to use sleeves as the ones from Taurus - maybe RAF/AM can be more persuasive with Bristol, so we can have the Sabre working in good order a bit earlier (6 months?)? ...

IIRC the culprit was Napier not Bristol, the latter gave all the help asked but Napier was more interested in to design new versions than to modify current ones reliable. In the end AM lost its patience and gave the operational control of napier to someone else and fairly soon most of Sabre's problems were solved.

juha

 

[parsifal]

The Battle of the Atlantic was won and without denuding Bomber Command any further. Britain didn't lose the battle or the war which effectively proves the decision makers of the time correct. Remember that they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. War involves politics and any solution to OldSkeptics point #1 which involves preventing Bomber Command from striking back at Germany, however ineffectively was not acceptable.
I've already posted the parlous state of the command shortly after Harris took over. Anything to prevent the build up through 1942/3 would have had to pass not only the old heads at the Air Ministry, bomber men almost to a man, but just as importantly, the Prime Minister. That's why it didn't happen.

The Battle of the Atlantic is often mooted as a closer run thing than it was, largely down to Churchill's recollections. Can anyone cite me a month in the war when RAF operations from the UK were curtailed for a lack of fuel for example? Nobody in Britain starved or came close to it. Food and clothing rationing might not have been popular or bountiful, but it WAS enough.

I absolutely agree that Spitfires should and, crucially, could have been sent to North Africa/The Mediterranean earlier.

Cheers

Steve

Steve, with regard to the air offensive i agree very strongly. With regard to your second point about the battle of the Atlantic and fuel shortages, at one point things did get perilously close to collapse actually. britain entered the war with fuel reserves for the navy at normal operation consumption rates for just over 18 months. by the latter part of 1942, fuel reserves for the navy were at a very dangerous level of about 3 months. capital ship movements and training were cut back, for a while. The so called "line of death" for britain in 1942 was just over 12 million tons per annum of imports overall, and by the latter part of 1942 were hovering just above that. the drop off in sinkings caused by the winter gales, combined with increased outputs of shipping by the US and Canada were what saved the british really. They did manage to divert nearly a million tons of shipping temporarily in preparation for Alamein, but other attacks, in particular the TORCH landings were to suffer severe cutbacks to the point of making the margin for error dangerously close (that wasnt the sole reason but it was A reason). There were reasons why the invasion of guadacanal was unnofficially named "operation shoestring"

For most of the period 1941-3, the ME Command had at its disposal more than 20 divs from various nations, but they mostly just lolled around the delta, because the formations were incapable of being used actively because of a lack of supply. 8th army for most of its existence could support no more than about 5 or 6 divs beyond the Matruh line. In the pacific, the US suffered similar problems. they had available nearly 20 divs combat ready in the pacific or in the continental US awaiting shipment to the TO. most of them had to be kept at home whilst the allies were being pushed hard with inadequate forces....not because they were short of manpower for fighting, but because they simply lacked the shipping to use these formations effectively.

make no mistake, the shortages in shipping worldwide acted as a massive sheet anchor on the ability of the allies to enage in effective force projection for a very long time, and the majority of those shipping losses came from the allied merchant marines in the Atlantic, and one reason for that happening was the pitifully small resources poured into the VLR patrol requirements

Though not directly linked, the shortage of shipping WAS felt worldwide. Nimitz famously had a sign above his desk "DO WE HAVE THE SHIPPING...IF YOU DONT KNOW, DONT ASK?" In 1942, for a number of critical operations the answer was a resounding "NO!!!!" Operations like the 1942 and then the 1943 cross channel incursions were all, (thankfully I might add) cancelled , primarily for a lack of shipping. Even the normandy operation to a degree was curtailed or limited at least by shipping restrictions. Thats because offensive operations soak up roughly three times the supply consumption compared to what might be thought as "normal" or "defensivfge" operations. Even by 1944, though the battle of the Atlantic was won the deep losses that had been suffered were having a residual effect.

Churchill might have exaggerated a little, but the threat was more than just a possibility. It was the one thing that came closest to wrecking the allies. And what is all the more galling is that the aircraft that were really needed....the VLR b-24s, were at one point in such pitifully short supply as to be laughable.

Churchill, except for a few moments of panic in 1942, actually kept his nerve and supported those who supported a continued priority for BC. his carry on was largely a post war construct, but at various conferences held on the issue and usage of BC resources at various times in 1942, the Navy argued very strongly, and convincingly at the time t for the need of a much greater slice of the long range air assets.

 

[stona]

None of which I dispute at all. But none of it actually amounts to anything like a narrow escape for Britain, certainly not complete defeat, and that's my point. Of course it would have been nice for Coastal Command to have been equipped with all the latest long range types in unlimited numbers but in war as elsewhere resources are limited and hard choices have to be made.
The argument that Coastal Command should have had some kind of priority over Bomber Command is one which has been frequently made post war with the benefit of hindsight, particularly a more realistic assessment of what the bombing campaign(s) achieved in 1942/3.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

That maybe but there is little denying that Coast Command struggled for a long time without adequate resources. Avro Ansons might have been faster than some of the planes that went sub hunting in WW I but they had very little change in armament (and sometimes less)or 'sensors' (eyeball, Mark I) early in the war.

"Nice to have" is a far cry from what was actually used for too long. The very long range planes of coastal command equipped how many squadrons in 1940/41??? one or two?? You have given us the numbers of aircraft available at a single point in time, how many were pis**d away before that day in ineffective attacks on Germany?

It didn't have to be all or nothing. Just two squadrons of Wellingtons or Whitleys would have made a difference, not closed the "gap" but narrowed it by 1-2 days steaming time.

 

[tomo pauk]

[about Mossie + Twin Wasp] Are you making bombers or targets?

Bombers. That powerplant would yield a better performer than an early Douglas DB-7 (tough target for Bf-109Es) or B-26 (hard catch for Zeroes), let alone the Beaufort, Maryland or Baltimore. Should do just fine at CBI PTO.
Goes without saying that other engines should be better choices, though.

A V-1710 powered version would be excellent for a low altitude bomber version. Low altitude attacks are where the Mosquito excelled.
That said, I don't think Merlin supply was what was lacking in Mosquito production.
Also, if you are using more Mosquito bombers I would expect that the numbers of Lancasters being used would be trimmed, freeing up more Merlins.
At the end of the day, Mosquito production would have the same problem as historically - what mix of versions is made?

A bit of the PR versions (Merlin), decent number of NFs and intruders (V-12s, Hercules) and fighter bombers (Hercules, V-1710), majority of bombers (Merlin). We can have Halifax with Hercules exclusively, so extra Merlins are available for the Mossie?

Maybe expedite the Spitfire XII instead. That would be more than a match for the Fw 190.

It probably would. We need to have working Griffons prior the summer of 1942, though? Again, what the Napier and Hawker/Gloster to build if we forget Sabre Typhoon? An expedited 2-stage Merlin pretty much negates the need for the 1-stage Griffon.

If you make the Spitfires carry 2 x 20mm or 1 x 20mm + 1 x 0.50" in each wing earlier, you could use the outer wings to store fuel in leading edge tanks. Maybe even use the old mg bays and ammo bays to store a little more?

I've suggested something similar in the 'faster, longer ranged Spitfire' thread some time ago

 

[Shortround6]

In reverse order, the trickier you make the fuel system the more planes/pilots you loose due to mistakes/malfunctions of the fuel system. How many planes were (and still are) lost due to pilot selecting the wrong tank or failing to switch over in time and not being able to restart the engine? The more tanks, lines and valves the more chances for a leak and that goes both ways, fuel leaking out (fire hazard) or air leaking in ( air bubble in fuel line can mean engine stoppage or failure to draw from tank). It was does but KISS!!
Mustang pilots only had to manage 5 tanks and that included two drop tanks. P-47 pilots had two inside and 1-3 outside. Coming up with 5 or more inside tanks is staring to look like and accident waiting to happen.

single stage Griffons are a nice belt and suspenders approach. They don't NEED super fuel or high boost numbers to make decent power. Perhaps not enough use was made of them during the war.

With enough lead time you can have Hawker/Gloster and even Napair build whatever you want. With first production Typhoon not delivered until Sept 1941, you have some wiggle room if you trash the project in Nov/Dec of 1940. If you wait until July/Aug 1941 you are pretty much committed. (although they did have second thoughts later) as you already have all the contracts placed and parts under construction at sub-contractors (landing gear legs, brakes, hydraulic cylinders, radiators, etc.) leaving you with a large amount of expensive scrap.

 

[OldSkeptic]

Maybe expedite the Spitfire XII instead. That would be more than a match for the Fw 190.
If you make the Spitfires carry 2 x 20mm or 1 x 20mm + 1 x 0.50" in each wing earlier, you could use the outer wings to store fuel in leading edge tanks. Maybe even use the old mg bays and ammo bays to store a little more?

Very underestimated plane the Spit XII, pretty competitive at low level even in July '44 as per their V1 victories (and by that stage they were getting pretty old). Run rings around a Typhoon.

A rear tank (even an L shaped on) is the best for the Spit because of simplicity. You have the option of fully filling it for LR missions, half fill for MR and empty for SR ones. Elevator bob weights (and perhaps further modified elevator horns?) reduce the CoG issues for full fill ones. But, using the rear tank for take off, climb and initial cruise takes care of that issue pretty quickly, so the plane returns to stability long before it enters a combat zone. The Mk VIII data card gives 26 gals used for takeoff and climb to 20,000ft, that's a fair chunk of a 66 (UK) gal rear tank. After even just another 100 miles cruise you are down to 25 gals, where things are getting much better.

A Mustang was unstable (particularly the P-51B) with a full rear tank (51Ds added an elevator bob weight). It settled down to about normal and fairly combat worthy as you got down to about 30 gals in the rear. At that level a Spit was probably still a bit twitchy but was definitely fine at 10 gals (all UK gals by the way). A Griffon Spit is better of course because of the greater weight of the engine (just as a Merlin 60 series Spit was better than a Mk V).

An L shaped tank (as per the 109) might have helped the Spit more of course, maybe been ok at 20 gals?

The key thing is that there were a lot of technical options, only dogma got in the way of the RAF in this.

 

[OldSkeptic]

None of which I dispute at all. But none of it actually amounts to anything like a narrow escape for Britain, certainly not complete defeat, and that's my point. Of course it would have been nice for Coastal Command to have been equipped with all the latest long range types in unlimited numbers but in war as elsewhere resources are limited and hard choices have to be made.
The argument that Coastal Command should have had some kind of priority over Bomber Command is one which has been frequently made post war with the benefit of hindsight, particularly a more realistic assessment of what the bombing campaign(s) achieved in 1942/3.
Cheers
Steve

Good little book is CINDERELLA SERVICE: RAF Coastal Command 1939 - 1945. Part of the problem was that BC over promised (lied?) in that it claimed it would take out the U-Boat production (it didn't) so there was no need to go "swanning all over the ocean" (Harris quote).
Every decent plane that CC got was over the howls of protest of BC (and Portal being ex BC was on their side). So Churchill was conned a bit.

Back to that critical '41 period. Now BC couldn't hit anything in the dark anywhere (lucky to hit the right country at times). At that point the Germans were just starting their U-Boat pens construction on the Biscay ports. Giving them that chance was a strategic mistake of the first order. It enabled the Germans to put large numbers of U-Boats into the Atlantic with little (until much, much later) opposition. Their other northern ports all could be constricted much more easily (by mines, patrols,etc) as they had to run a gauntlet through the Channel or the North Sea to get to the Atlantic.

So the British handed them a great gift, for which the paid for dearly later.

Those ports should have been hit by the RAF endlessly by day as they were being built, until the Germans gave up, this was within their technical capabilties. With even a moderately modified Spit getting the range necessary to escort the bombers. Add night time nuisance raids (you could not expect any accuracy at night back then) just to keep them on their toes.

This would have been expensive, but at least productive. BC and FC threw away huge numbers of planes on far less important stuff at that time. It would have given FC the big air battles against the Luftwaffe that they wanted, something they could afford but the Germans couldn't. The Luftwaffe did so well against FC in '41 because they could pick and choose their fights to when it suited them (hence got something like 4:1 victories). But if those pens are being hammered they have to fight everytime, therefore the odds become much more even.

 

[Aozora]

Good little book is CINDERELLA SERVICE: RAF Coastal Command 1939 - 1945. Part of the problem was that BC over promised (lied?) in that it claimed it would take out the U-Boat production (it didn't) so there was no need to go "swanning all over the ocean" (Harris quote).
Every decent plane that CC got was over the howls of protest of BC (and Portal being ex BC was on their side). So Churchill was conned a bit.

It was probably inevitable that the first 20 B-17s handed to the RAF in 1941 were used by 90 Sqn BC to carry out ineffectual high-altitude daylight attacks. The USAAF criticised the RAF for flying the B-17s over Europe in small formations and attempting to bomb from too high an altitude. Even one squadron of long-range B-17s flying escort missions over North Atlantic convoys during 1941 might have helped make a difference.

 

[parsifal]

Its a bit misleading to claim that the pens provided an immediate decisive advantage for the germans. The first pens were built in 1941 from memory, and 1941 was described by Donitz himself as an overall defeat for the Uboat arm, as it began to suffer significant losses from about March. by the end of the year, the average survival time for a Uboat man had dropped from just over 200 days at the beginning of the year to just over 100 days by the end of the year. many of the aces, including Shepke, Prien and Kretschmer were dead or captured.

But more importantly, the mere presence of CC aircraft with some range and ASV capabilities (a relatively rare thing in 1941) would often force uboats to submerge, thereby denying one of their greatest advantages....their mobility. this was a major factor in the drop in tonnage losses, in fact the losses were almost manageable by the end of 1941.

The Germans responded to this, firstly by switching attacks to the US East Coast, but also shifting the main focus of attacks to the remaining air gap mid ocean. The pens helped in this regard, to the extent that I would say "a lot' but moreso, the germans were reducing habitability standards in the Uboats so that they could carry extra fuel and thereby increase their times on station. always the limiting factor for most Uboat cruises was the torpedo supply rather than range or endurance.

Without the pens, the Germans would have been forced to keep their uboats on the harbour floors whilst in port, to avoid destruction from the air, but losses would not have been catastrophic. What would have been the issue was the turnaround times for the uboats. In essence, the pens were "nice to have", but weren't the whole of why the Uboats could do what they did.