RAF daylight strategic bombing campaign results

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As a general observation I agree that a daylight raid has to have the same type of aircraft or the performance difficulties make the whole thing impractical. Its clear that fighter escort is a requirement for there to be any chance of success but that aside I doubt that the Lancaster and Halifax III would have less success than the B17/B24 combination as used in the USAAF. On daylight raids when attacked by fighters the bomber being targeted was encouraged to evade down and then use any manoeuver they wanted in particular the corkscrew. This was directly different from the US practice of holding formation and shooting it out with the fighters.

RAF bombers were encouraged to evade down below the main formation as it gave a number of advantages.
1) the most accurate shots tend to be the first and if you can get out of the stream of fire then its likely that you will receive fewer hits.
2) The fighter was drawn into the fire of the other bombers
3) A corkscrewing heavy bomber is a difficult target to hit whatever fighter your flying
4) This bought the bomber time helping the escort to intervene
5) If nothing else it took the fighter away from the other bombers, taking it out of the fight.

I believe that the loss ratios for RAF daylight raids were very similar to the USAAF as each force played to the strengths of the aircraft they had

At night there was no formation flying at all sa its impossible to fly formation if you cannot see the others that were supposed to be in the formation. Each bomber had their own timings, altitude way points etc. which kept the bomber stream tight .
 
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It's difficult to compare loss ratios for USAAF and RAF raids. The RAF's heavies (meaning Lancasters and Halifaxes) only operated in daylight and in a way comparable to their US counterparts, with few exceptions, after the Luftwaffe day fighter force had been effectively neutralised, almost entirely by those Americans.
Early war daylight efforts by Bomber Command bore no resemblance to even the earliest USAAF raids after the Americans finally arrived.
Cheers
Steve
 
Maybe to add to the discussion - the cruising speeds in mph at 15000 ft (at most economical speed vs. at max weak mixture power):
-Wellington IA - IC (Perseus): 165 - 195
-Hampden (with external bombs; I don't have other data): 155 - 200
-Whitley VII (Merlin X): 165 - 195
-Blenheim I: 165 - 200
 
Maybe to add to the discussion - the cruising speeds in mph at 15000 ft (at most economical speed vs. at max weak mixture power):
-Wellington IA - IC (Perseus): 165 - 195
-Hampden (with external bombs; I don't have other data): 155 - 200
-Whitley VII (Merlin X): 165 - 195
-Blenheim I: 165 - 200

And we know what happened to the Blenheim over Europe...
 
Any 'usual' bomber of ww2 will suffer against a decent fighter opposition. The only help can come out from friendly (preferably long range) fighters providing escort.
 
If RAF build large numbers of long range bomber escorts in addition to historical short range fighter aircraft the Luftwaffe will take notice and Germany will change production priorities.

Obvious example.
October 1935. Genshagen DB601 engine plant was supposed to receive RM 50 million for construction. Historical RLM reduced this to RM 20 million which eliminate any chance for Heinkel to build fighter aircraft as there weren't enough engines. It also eliminate any chance for mass production of Fw-187. That won't do as Germany must have more fighter aircraft to combat the greater aerial threat.
 
That won't do as Germany must have more fighter aircraft to combat the greater aerial threat.

In 1935? German defensive strategy was based more on the theories of men like Felmy and Rudel (Gunther) which was far more reliant on flak of all types than interceptors. It was only in 1935 that the flak forces were subordinated to the Luftwaffe.

Point number two of the 1935 'conduct of aerial warfare' makes roles quite clear:

'From the start of the conflict the air forces bring the war to the enemy...

The anti- aircraft artillery directly protects the homeland. Its primary mission is the defence of the homeland in cooperation with the fighter forces....'


I think you are applying hindsight to a question which arose four years before the war and only shortly after the Nazis came to power.

Cheers

Steve
 
Appearance of the RAF's long range fighter in 1941 means that Germany must act different in 1941/42, not in 1935.
 
The wellington Hampden and Lancaster suffered disastrous losses in daylight raid(s) also.

Wellington and Hampden yes, Lancaster no. There were some raids that paid a heavy price certainly, but there were others which did very well. On the 17th October 1942 94 Lancaster's bombed Le Creusot in a daylight raid without any escort and one was lost. On the 24th October 1942 88 Lancaster's did another unescorted daylight raid on Milan and four were lost.
 
The British had trouble with the whole "forward lean" tactic/strategy in 1941/42. Trying to move the targets 100-125 miles further inland and use a lower number of fighters to bombers ratio doesn't sound like a recipe for success. Yes the Luftwaffe may come up and fight but can the British sustain the losses in 1941/42? Until the Summer of 1942 you are pretty much relying on some sort of MK V Spitfire with extra tankage for your "escort fighter" and MK V Spitfires had trouble with 109Fs and early Fw 190s as it was without trying to fly to and from the Germany border/Rhine valley. Germans don't have to slaughter the bombers, just shoot down around 10% or better and the campaign becomes unsustainable pretty quickly. And the losses can be from the combined efforts of Flak and fighters.
 
British heavies in daylight raids would have a major problem - their limited ceiling in the low 20ks, in the optimum operational altitude for german fighters. They would need a hell lot of escorts if the Luftwaffe was on strength and active.
 
The 17th October 1942 94 Lancaster raid on Le Creusot in a daylight was a special thing and doesn't prove much one way or the other. It is less than 500 miles from the British based used to Le Creusot in a straight line and yet the flight path was 1700 miles. Le Creusot was just over the "border" from Vichey territory. A dog leg flight path might have avoided whatever fighter fields were in Northern France. Photo shows planes over Montrichard which is near Tours. Altitude to target was under 1000ft.

17th October 1942: Operation Robinson hits Le Creusot works
 
Wellington and Hampden yes, Lancaster no. There were some raids that paid a heavy price certainly, but there were others which did very well. On the 17th October 1942 94 Lancaster's bombed Le Creusot in a daylight raid without any escort and one was lost. On the 24th October 1942 88 Lancaster's did another unescorted daylight raid on Milan and four were lost.

The raids on Italy showed the complete disdain for defence in Italy

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...v=onepage&q=1942 lancaster raid milan&f=false


The le creusot raid saw no enemy AC defense and little flack flown at low level overland it was a surprise attack not possible against Germany.
 
how early would they have realistically been able to get the mustang mk1?

Much quicker if they had ordered it instead of the A 36 Apache. As I have read the Mustang was put into production and service ASAP but its altitude performance limited it to Tactical Recon for the RAF. The US budget for fighters was used up so it was ordered as a "dive bomber" With an Allison engine it would struggle as an escort.
 
As a complete surprise? How does peacetime (1930s) Britain fund such a massive project complete with production facilities for engines and airframes without it becoming public knowledge? Not even Stalin's Soviet Union could prevent other nations from monitoring construction of his military industrial complex.
 
The Mustang I will not be available before early 1942, as historically; even that is quite a feat. The A-36 entered production after Mustang I and Ia (version with 4 cannons; us nomenclature P-51), and before Mustang II (P-51A).

The US budget for fighters was used up so it was ordered as a "dive bomber"

Indeed.
Maybe change the orders for the P-40 - let Curtis add dive brakes to the P-40 and produce 500 of 'A-40', that would free the 'fighter funds' for 500 Mustangs? Even so, the Mustang will not be a major player before 1943.

With an Allison engine it would struggle as an escort.

Probably. Installing a V-1710-81 will help with altitude capability, the wing racks are a must (originally not installed on Mustang I and Ia, A-36 got them 1st). Again, it will be 1943 until those Mustangs are deployed in ETO MTO.
 
As a complete surprise? How does peacetime (1930s) Britain fund such a massive project complete with production facilities for engines and airframes without it becoming public knowledge? Not even Stalin's Soviet Union could prevent other nations from monitoring construction of his military industrial complex.

Britain funded Beaufighter, Mosquito, Typhoon, Whirlwind, plus a host of 2-engined bombers, while starting out with 4-engined types. I'm not sure those caused any uproar in LW circles (bar Mosquito).
The long range fighter is not a massive project, what would might be called 'massive' was the prejudice and opposition to it.
 
As a complete surprise? How does peacetime (1930s) Britain fund such a massive project complete with production facilities for engines and airframes without it becoming public knowledge? Not even Stalin's Soviet Union could prevent other nations from monitoring construction of his military industrial complex.

The long range spitfire just added an extra fuel tank behind the pilot seat
 

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