Did the RAF have designs for a long range escort fighter?

[tomo pauk]

...
Third, you really should check on how often Spitfires were sent out to cover the return of USAAF bombers, after they'd had their original escort drawn away, and suffered a mauling.

They also covered the bombers on the 'outbound' part of the sorties. Spitfires giving at least as they got vs. the LW in such missions/tasks?

Fourth, trials on the U.S.-modified Spitfires were halted because the "work" done on the wings had, in the Air Ministry's view, weakened the structure enough to make the aircraft not combat-worthy. The U.K. worked with flexible tanks, aka "Mareng bags," which enabled the wings to retain their integrity.

The Supermarine also installed double skinning, above and under the leading edge tanks, so the wings retain their shape as the fuel is consumed.

...
The British could have stretched the Spitfire in the same way the Corsair was having a larger main tank in a longer fuselage or perhaps rearranged the wing.

IIRC the Corsair retained the length, but the cockpit was moved further back to accommodate fuel tank between engine compartment and cockpit. Spitfire already had such an arrangement, though.

The Spitfires wing had leading edge tanks which were conversions of the evaporated cooling system abandoned long before the war started. The bays were still pretty much still as originally laid out, why not a re design with 2 x 0.5in mgs in the outer part of the wing and the inner part for extra fuel, with an extra tank behind the pilot and drop tanks, it could be useful. The Mustang would always hold the upper hand because of its low drag. However for much of the war the British were occupied with getting the better of the FW190 and later Bf109s, putting bigger tanks inside a bigger fuselage wouldn't do that.

I'd say that technicalities were a far smaller obstacles than current doctrine
Once the Spitfire received 2-stage engines, it was at least as good as LW fighters*, and it is unfortunate that bigger internal fuel tankage was not higher on the priority list (while acknowledging the increase in fuel the Mk. VII and VIII received). The 2-stage engines provided the edge in RoC above 20-25000 ft vs. LW.

* not forgetting the 1939-early 1941 period, too.

 

[pbehn]

IIRC the Corsair retained the length, but the cockpit was moved further back to accommodate fuel tank between engine compartment and cockpit. Spitfire already had such an arrangement, though.

I used it as an illustration, just stretch the main tank so that the CoG is not massively disrupted



I'd say that technicalities were a far smaller obstacles than current doctrine
Once the Spitfire received 2-stage engines, it was at least as good as LW fighters*, and it is unfortunate that bigger internal fuel tankage was not higher on the priority list (while acknowledging the increase in fuel the Mk. VII and VIII received). The 2-stage engines provided the edge in RoC above 20-25000 ft vs. LW.

* not forgetting the 1939-early 1941 period, too.

I agree, it is a matter of history how quickly the Mustang and Mosquito were designed built and put into service, if there was ever a real need for a long distance spitfire it could have been built, it is mainly hindsight that says this was an oversight or misguided, extra fuel is extra weight in combat. Others maybe can correct me but I dont believe the P51 was routinely troubled when not actually acting as a bomber escort, did they often drop tanks to engage and fight with a full rear tank on their way to the RV?

 

[bobbysocks]

this was probably already stated but i dont think a LR escort was seriously considered because no one thought france would have been over run in the early goings like it was. the raf would have had air strips in france...close enough to the front and some of the industrial regions of germany to be effective. a war with germany was thought to go along the same scenario as ww1 with the maginot line keeping invasion forces from gaining too deep a foothold in french territory. with your enemy's forces all concentrated within 0 - 20 - 30 miles of the front why even think of something with a 500 mile operational envelope? as the war progressed and the completion changed you are not going to stop production of your essential aircraft if you can buy something off the shelf that is offered by another country....like the mustang.

 

[Shortround6]

Actually if you re-read some of the documents provided by Stubbsy in Post #270 it seems that the RAF (or air ministry) was thinking about escort fighters back in 1937. They just couldn't agree on which avenue to pursue. They seemed to want flying flak batteries to accompany the bombers (turret fighters) that would keep station with the bomber formations (remember 1937, not how it was actually done 3-5 years later) or perhaps move from one side of the formation to the other. Single seat fighters being ruled out as they would be forced out of 'position'.
Now with the benefit of hind sight they did reach some rather strange conclusions but the story that they 'ignored' the problem does not stand up.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

The Spitfires wing had leading edge tanks which were conversions of the evaporated cooling system abandoned long before the war started The bays were still pretty much still as originally laid out, why not a re design with 2 x 0.5in mgs in the outer part of the wing and the inner part for extra fuel, with an extra tank behind the pilot and drop tanks, it could be useful..

.
The only "Spitfire" with evaporative cooling was the prototype K5054, in its hand-built wings, and it was removed before K5054's first flight. There were no tanks left in the wing's leading edge of service aircraft, in fact the Vb Vc had hot air pipes, from the engine's exhaust stubs, passing through the leading edge, and out to the pair of .303" Brownings; I doubt that a combination of fuel and hot air, in that area, was ever considered.
There was no spare space, in the leading edges, until the twin-radiator design (Mk.VII and onwards) could provide enough heat for each wing on their own.
The early fighter versions of the Spitfire could not fly with a tank behind the pilot; even with the Mark V, the tank had to be used in conjunction with the 170-gallon ferry tank, and had to be emptied first.
The Air Ministry were never going to consider a longer heavier, slower-firing gun, with less ammunition, until they were certain that a pilot would hit what he aimed at, and that didn't happen until the gyro gunsight arrived in 1944.

The Mustang would always hold the upper hand because of its low drag.

Not until they put a British engine into it

However for much of the war the British were occupied with getting the better of the FW190 and later Bf109s,

Which was achieved in 1942.

 

[stubbsy]

stubbsy, I wouldn't get hung up on that 610 Squadron mention of 90 gallons tanks in September. Other Spitfire XIV units were already using 90 gallon drop tanks in the spring of 1944

Thanks Mike,

I think you're right: I went to far in seeing a link between the 5 Sep decision and the 6 Sep flight over Germany.

That said, though the dates are different I think the basic argument has some merit: that it was the very success of POINTBLANK, which was terminated on 1 April 1944 (Kirby and Capey, The Area Bombing of Germany in World War II, pp. 673-674) which reduced the risks and enabled the use of the 90-gallon tanks in May as you describe above. On pages 313-316 of First Light, Geofrey Wellum describes how 38 Spitfires were to launch from HMS Furious in four formations, starting south of the Balearic Islands, about sixty miles off Algiers for a 3-hr trip with what he described as 'ninety gallon overload tanks.'

Because the LW had Me 109s at Pantelleria it was decided to fly the Tunisia to Gulf of Tripoli route to Malta. Wellum was surprised and amazed when the armourers took all the ammunition out of the ammunition boxes on his Spitfire,EP465, only to be told by his Sqn Ldr Walter Churchill that taking out the ammunition would reduce weight and filling the space with cigarettes would help the morale of those on Malta.

Fascinating eh?

 

[stubbsy]

Unfortunately you make too many assumptions:-
First, the RAF didn't "implicitly accept" anything, tactics were dictated by the Air Ministry, and the RAF did as it was told. Bombing aids H2S, Oboe, Gee-H were in use long before September 1944, in fact they were offered to the USAAF in September 1943. Also the civilian casualties were a deliberate policy, introduced in September 1941 to destroy morale (didn't work, of course.)
Second (really an extension of the first) the RAF did not choose to continue the bombing campaign, neither did they choose to do without a long-range fighter. As always, they did as they were told; nobody ever explains how you escort individual aircraft (bombers never flew in Groups, never mind Squadrons,) when every gunner is itching to open fire on twin, or single, engine fighter he sees one, or the pilot, acting on a sighting report, corkscrews down, and out of sight.
Third, you really should check on how often Spitfires were sent out to cover the return of USAAF bombers, after they'd had their original escort drawn away, and suffered a mauling.
Fourth, trials on the U.S.-modified Spitfires were halted because the "work" done on the wings had, in the Air Ministry's view, weakened the structure enough to make the aircraft not combat-worthy. The U.K. worked with flexible tanks, aka "Mareng bags," which enabled the wings to retain their integrity.
Aircraft, heading for Malta, were not told to avoid combat due to fear of the danger, but because the authorities wanted them to hang on to the ferry tanks, and preferably land with them intact, since there was a shortage, and they could be returned to Gibraltar for future re-use.

Sorry Edgar, but I think you are too accepting of the previous historiography on this topic and appear averse to discerning what happened from the evidence. You will note that I try to provide evidence for each of my posts.

In this case, for example, I note that the minutes I posted earlier from the Air Fighting sub-committee meeting on 9th June 1937 discussed the topic of LR fighters as a 'hardy annual' (i.e. showing minor irritation that it has appeared on the agenda again). As you point out the Air Ministry, not the RAF made these decisions. So, lets look at the composition of this sub-Committe. It was chaired by none other than Sholto Douglas, not Dowding the highest ranking officer. In all, at the meeting I count 24 RAF officers, 3 RN officer, 2 army officers - no civil servants. All of those speaking on the topic of LR fighters were RAF officers; none of which wanted LR single-seat fighters. So, in 1937 the topic of LR fighters was put to bed by an Air Ministry sub-committee decision, as discussed by senior RAF officers, who had described it as a hardy annual. From then on Sholto Douglas (who became AOC-in-C Fighter Command after managing to get Dowding sacked) and Leigh-Mallory, who was known to work hard but lacked the ability to think conceptually, were not going to seek a change in the Air Ministry policy on this topic and their subordinates were not apt to propose something they knew their bosses didn't want.

Reference your second point about the RAF doing what it was directed to do in bombing. Semantically correct, but my point is that they didn't propose an alternative solution. It is a bit like the Leigh-Mallory point here; it appears that many were hamstrung/conceptually unable to propose alternative solutions.

Reference your third. Please provide your evidence as to the number of times the USAAF bombers were mauled after their own fighters had been drawn away, if you have such detailed evidence it would help the debate. My view on this is that it was a learning curve issue. The Americans adjusted their tactics when they recognised the problem and they did it pretty quickly. See McFarland and Newton, To Command the Sky, pp.137-195.

Fourth, it is pretty clear that there should have been an option of using the 'Mareng bags' in the wings together with 40 or 72 gallons of extra fuel behind the pilot and a 45 gallon drop tank much earlier than 1944 as it would have provided much greater range for the Spitfire for their Circus, Rodeo missions. Wellum describes the negative influence a lack of fuel had on these missions in First Light pp. 275-280. After all, Jeffrey Quill flew in a similar configuration, albeit without wing Mareng bags, at low level from High Post on Salisbury Plain to the Moray Firth and back. This could have, and should have, been achieved much earlier than 1944 and would have opened up the option of considering daylight bombing together with the USAAF in a truly combined and planned operation. As one of the above posts shows a Spitfire with a 90-gallon drop tank game back from a mission over Western Germany with 50 gallons of fuel! So, with say 16,16,40 and 45 = 117 extra gallons a significantly greater range could have been achieved.

What you say wrt to return ferry tanks from Malta makes perfect sense (please provide ref), but that was not what Geoffrey Wellum was told. See First Light p.316.

Regards

 

[buffnut453]

Stubbsy,

You make some valid points but please remember you're looking at the issue from a position of hindsight. In 1937, the entire concept for "the next war" was that British forces would forward deploy to the continent, just as they had done in 1914-1918. Nobody considered the possibility of Britain fighting alone with all of Europe occupied by the Nazis. Furthermore, the idea of a long-range, single-engined fighter was simply impractical in the 1937 timeframe. We can point to the P-51 but that was developed very rapidly starting with a paper proposal in early 1940. It still took a further 2 years before Merlin-engined variants appeared in numbers. That's a 5-year period during which tremendous advances were made in aeronautics. Criticizing the Air Ministry of 1937 for not knowing what would happen in 1940 is a little harsh. The RAF's response to the problem of providing long-range strategic bombing during wartime was to switch to night ops. These were initially woefully ineffective but Bomber Command evolved, brought in new tactics and technology, and ultimately became a highly capable force. The USAAF went in another direction but both were valid.

 

[Shortround6]

From the papers in post #270 it appears that the idea had been considered and rejected by some members. Others kept bringing it up. Now in 1937 we have to remember that the Defiant was considered a very viable project. The Gloster F.9/37 had started as a rival to the defiant as a twin engine turret fighter (F.34/35) and there were other proposals for for turret equipped bomber destroyer. The British were also behind the curve in adopting constant speed props which put many British designs behind in performance. Too many ideas seem to have hung on too long, like fighters need to be light which meant even when they changed from fixed pitch props they were denied constant speed props and instead fitted with the lighter weight 2 position props. The props actually weighed the same but the 2 position prop wasn't equipped with the speed governor, different pumps, etc.
Given the lousy propellers, the high state/altitude of supercharge in the Melrin III which meant low take-off power weight was very important. Unfortunately it was a self fulfilling prophesy of shorts, A better prop would have both allowed better use of the power and allowed higher rpm (more power in the first place) to be used which would have more than compensated for the increase in weight. this meant that fitting enough fuel into the single engine fighter in 1937-39 for long range work was not going to happen.
You also had to fight against the totally unrealistic notions that pilots would be unable to cope with the high closing speeds, and that future airfighting, unlike WW I, would be conducted by fleets (formations) of aircraft flying near parallel courses firing "broadsides" at each other.
The papers presented seem to hold out for some sort of "escort" that could accompany the bombers and defend them from attacks from the rear by use of a flexible battery or turret. You also have to remember that in 1937 the Bristol Blenheim was the fastest bomber known to be in service and it was considered that any enemy fighters would be unable to attack from ahead or from the beam.
You also have the 'argument' over close and distant escort which continued in a number of nations for quite a number of years. It appears the 1937 British view of distant escort meant escorts shouldn't even get out of gun range of the bombers they were protecting without being called "distant" escort let alone get several miles from their charges (30 seconds flight time?).

To have a decent chance of success the "idea" of a long range single engine single seat escort fighter needed a change in thinking about what was possible or practical in air fighting tactics in addition to changes in technical qualities of engines, props and airframes.

I would note that the French, Russians, Italians and Japanese were all working on or building twin engine long range fighters at this time because they didn't believe a single engine fighter could carry enough fuel and perform well enough to be effective.

The British were certainly not alone in believing it could not be done at that point in time.

 

[stubbsy]

Buffnut453 and Shortround6,

I think the outcome of the 1937 meeting entirely rational given the facts at the time. My argument is that given the reality of the ineffectiveness of daylight bombing in 1940-1941, without LR fighter support, two options could have been run in parallel: first, to switch to night bombing to avoid losses and continue the fight, and second to adjust or procure a LR fighter capable of competing with the LW short-range fighters to enable daylight bombing.

It is the inertia that surrounds doing nothing about the second option, because they (Air Staff/Senior RAF leaders involved) had convinced themselves in 1937 that LR fighters would not be effective and, despite evidence to the contrary, they maintained their 1937 position that I am questioning. I don't think this is hindsight as the decision could have been made on the evidence available at the time. Effectively, it is what the USAAF did, though it took them 18 months as posted earlier by another contributor. The RAF took 48 months to come to the same decision.

Cheers

 

[Shortround6]

The US was also starting from a point in having much longer ranged fighters to begin with. The P-38, P-40 and P-47 having roughly double the range/endurance of a Spitfire to begin with if flying at most economical speeds. And the P-47 held 100 imp gallons more in it's internal tank/s than a Hawker Typhoon (254 imp gal to 154 imp gal) for over 40% more range at most economical.

So the British have to put roughly 40-50% more fuel inside the Spitfire plus drop tanks to equal the combat radius of the initial short range US escorts.

Granted the P-40 would have been a lousy escort in Europe but I hope it gets the idea across. The Americans fitted not only drop tanks but bigger internal tanks in the P-47 (21% increase to 308imp gallons) and P-38s (36% increase) which were accompanied by more powerful engines and better propellers in order to come up with the "escorts" that the P-51 replaced.

Sticking 30-40 imp gallons in a 1941 Spitfire would not have resulted in enough greater radius (regardless of drop tanks) to hit very much of Germany in daylight leaving you with a split bombing campaign in any case. Daylight against France, the low countries and a narrow strip of Germany with night attacks against the rest of Germany?
Granted it took a while for the Fw 190 to really have an impact but do you really want your MK V Spits saddled with an extra 200-250lbs of fuel and tanks while fighting FW 190s until the MK IX comes along?

 

[tomo pauk]

One of the recommendations for the Spitfire V pilots, when Fw 190 was recognized as threat was to cruise faster than they did before, so they don't get bounced while in low speed. Faster cruising means greater consumption. Extra fuel were were needed, if just to restore the previous range/radius.
We can recall that there was a big 'chunk' of 1941 when the Fw-190 was not around.

Re. prop-related issues: in case anybody was interested, there was some 2000+ of 2-pitch props installed in the Fairey Battlles?

 

[Shortround6]

One of the recommendations for the Spitfire V pilots, when Fw 190 was recognized as threat was to cruise faster than they did before, so they don't get bounced while in low speed. Faster cruising means greater consumption. Extra fuel were were needed, if just to restore the previous range/radius.
We can recall that there was a big 'chunk' of 1941 when the Fw-190 was not around.

and that is where a lot of the difference between "book" range and actual operational radius went. The FW 190 may not have been around for a good part of 1941 but increasing numbers (slowly) of 109Fs were and the later 109Fs had better engines than the early ones.

Re. prop-related issues: in case anybody was interested, there was some 2000+ of 2-pitch props installed in the Fairey Battlles?

True but so did the early Defiants, Bristol Blenhiems and a number of other early British bombers.

Somebody once compared a 2 pitch prop to using 1st and 4th gears on a 4 speed car. Much better than using 3rd or 4th gear alone but still leaving a gaping hole in performance between the two settings. I believe that in most (all?) set ups the pilot had to manually switch back and forth which may be alright in bombers (except in an engine out emergency) but having fighter pilots trying to remember when to switch back and forth in a dogfight seems to be setting up more than few pilots for problems.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Sorry Edgar, but I think you are too accepting of the previous historiography on this topic and appear averse to discerning what happened from the evidence.

It rather depends on your sources, and, since I refuse to accept only "historiography," mine are the files held in our National Archives.

Fourth, it is pretty clear that there should have been an option of using the 'Mareng bags' in the wings together with 40 or 72 gallons of extra fuel behind the pilot and a 45 gallon drop tank much earlier than 1944 as it would have provided much greater range for the Spitfire for their Circus, Rodeo missions.

It does, if you haven't done any research into what was needed to carry out the alterations.

This could have, and should have, been achieved much earlier than 1944 and would have opened up the option of considering daylight bombing together with the USAAF in a truly combined and planned operation. As one of the above posts shows a Spitfire with a 90-gallon drop tank game back from a mission over Western Germany with 50 gallons of fuel! So, with say 16,16,40 and 45 = 117 extra gallons a significantly greater range could have been achieved.

Permit me to explain to you what was required, in order to fit the extra tanks into the Spitfire XVI.
First, the extra weight decreed that some equipment had to be removed from the fuselage, to try to keep the CoG within acceptable limits, or the aircraft would rear up, and stall, on take off.
The extra flight time meant a need for extra oxygen, and the XVI had 3 bottles fitted, so two had to be resited. The compressed-air bottles could not be fitted in the usual place, since the tank was in the way, so they, too, had to be resited.
The only place where the bottles could go was in the wings, so they replaced the four Brownings; this meant reconfiguring the wing to "E" armament, and the Air Ministry refused to allow the (in their view) lesser armament until the gyro gunsight was fitted, and that was not available until 1944.
The gyro gunsight needed a modified throttle (a sort of early HOTAS system.)
The sight also had to be fitted before the fuel tank, because there were black boxes and wiring which had to be installed first.
Because of the extra weight, the XVI needed a hard runway, and the majority of airfields were all grass; with a hard runway, the wheel tracking had to be changed, and that caused problems with the wheels/tyres scrubbing on the wings' upper surfaces, so the wings needed a bulged modification.
The extra weight meant that the XVI needed the pointed rudder of the Mk.XII, but that wasn't generally available until 1944; the weight also need metal-covered elevators.
As soon as the war was over, use of the fuel tanks was banned, and the filler point was ordered to be wired shut.
Put simply, if that much modification was needed for the longer, heavier 60-series Merlin, there was never a chance of doing it with the shorter Merlin III/XX/45.

What you say wrt to return ferry tanks from Malta makes perfect sense (please provide ref), but that was not what Geoffrey Wellum was told. See First Light p.316.

The "reference" to the Malta tanks is open to view in the N.A. files, and service personnel were not normally privy to all instructions issued by the Air Ministry. "Need to know" was, and still is, very much the watch word in the forces.

 

[Zipper730]

I forget the name at the moment (old age) but one of the top British "boffins" had declared that a long range single engine fighter was "impossible" and the RAF trusted him.

I take it they weren't willing to entertain a twin-engine?

 

[wuzak]

I miss Edgar.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Sticking 30-40 imp gallons in a 1941 Spitfire would not have resulted in enough greater radius (regardless of drop tanks) to hit very much of Germany in daylight leaving you with a split bombing campaign in any case. Daylight against France, the low countries and a narrow strip of Germany with night attacks against the rest of Germany?
Granted it took a while for the Fw 190 to really have an impact but do you really want your MK V Spits saddled with an extra 200-250lbs of fuel and tanks while fighting FW 190s until the MK IX comes along?

What about (revisionist history in 3, 2, 1...) the Spitfire Mk.III? With its improved drag characteristics, could it have been saddled effectively with extra fuel, with a corresponding increase in combat radius?

 

[Zipper730]

S Shortround6

Your thoughts on this?
Escort Spitfire - a missed opportunity for longer reach? - Royal Aeronautical Society

 

[Zipper730]

QUOTE="Clayton Magnet, post: 1458489, member: 52873"]What about (revisionist history in 3, 2, 1...) the Spitfire Mk.III?[/quote]Well, off the bat -- the smaller wing area when saddled with extra fuel would potentially have turning characteristics that would readily decline.

One of the paradoxes of Arthur Harris is that he demanded and expected complete loyalty and obedience from his subordinates whilst adopting a more 'flexible' attitude towards the orders of his own superiors.

That attitude is quite common among dominant personalities. That said, there was a chaplain who didn't view the bombing of civilians positively, and in fact one time referred to a movie on "the ethics of bombing" as "the bombing of ethics"

Amazingly, he managed to avoid getting into trouble for it, Harris knew his views, and let him stay.

The copy of the letter asking Harris to follow the orders he had been given that Freeman sent to Sorley bears the hand written note, "The only way to deal with Bert [Harris] is to treat him rough." He was wrong. He should have fired him, but never did.

That's correct, if he won't follow orders -- he should be relieved of command.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

the smaller wing area when saddled with extra fuel would potentially have turning characteristics that would readily decline.

but with greatly increased rolling performance. Even with the same fuel load as a Mk.I, the slipperier Mk.III should have cruised at a much higher speed, with increased range as a result