Significance of the Battle of Midway

[tomo pauk]

Well, the US would have had one of the Midway carriers, the Saratoga, and the Wasp. We also may have seen the Ranger transferred over from the Atlantic.

That would have been 4 functioning carriers. I know the Wasp and Ranger were lighter, but in terms of aircraft capacity they were as good as anything the Japanese had. Survivability may not have been great, but they were as survivable as the Soryu and Hiryu at least, and with the superior US damage control.

I think at that point it would be 4 fleet carriers each.

The USN can throw in the Battle of E. Solomons 3 CVs (Wasp, Saratoga, Midway survivor). IJN can throw 4 fleet and one light CV. This requires that Wasp is not, as historically, detached due to low fuel situation (a direct consequence of it's small size?). If things play out as historically, it is is 2 USN CVs against 4.5 IJN carriers. So USN looses both carriers in the battle, Japanese 1 big and 1 small? Hopefully the Wasp will not get hit by sub's torpedoes...
Pulling the Ranger from A/C transportation duties means that less P-40s made it to N. Africa and Burma. Allies are also one CV short during operation Torch.

 

[pbehn]

The IJN lost all 4 of their fleet carriers present at Midway:

Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu.

Thanks my fault I was reading the early part of the battle.

 

[RCAFson]

Thanks my fault I was reading the early part of the battle.

BTW, this is an excellent article on the state of the IJNAF and it's carriers after Midway:

Reorganization of the Japanese Combined Fleet Air Assets - 14 July 1942

by the end of 1942 the IJN had added light fleet carrier Ryuho to the above.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Yamamoto missed the US Carriers at Pearl Harbor and I believe he felt (and was possibly obsessed) with the notion that he had to destroy all of the Pacific Fleet carriers before the US would either capitulate or be turned into an ineffective combatant, regardless of the gains Japan had achieved after Pearl Harbor. Unknown to him, the US Fleet waited in ambush. Like a boxer who thought he had a fight just about won, Midway was that phantom sucker punch that came out of nowhere and set the momentum to put Japan on the defensive for the rest of the war.

BTW, this is an excellent article on the state of the IJNAF and it's carriers after Midway:

Reorganization of the Japanese Combined Fleet Air Assets - 14 July 1942

by the end of 1942 the IJN had added light fleet carrier Ryuho to the above.

"Following the severe losses at Midway, the Japanese reversed their policy from offensive operations to defensive operations."

 

[Garyt]

Shokuko and Zuikaku were as good as Soryu, Kaga, Hiryu and Akagi.

I'd say they were better than the 4 Midway carriers, though the Midway carriers may have had better aviators. But as carriers go,I'd rate them above the Midway carriers.

I was of course referring to the other carriers besides the Kido Butai survivors.

The USN can throw in the Battle of E. Solomons 3 CVs (Wasp, Saratoga, Midway survivor). IJN can throw 4 fleet and one light CV. This requires that Wasp is not, as historically, detached due to low fuel situation (a direct consequence of it's small size?). If things play out as historically, it is is 2 USN CVs against 4.5 IJN carriers. So USN looses both carriers in the battle, Japanese 1 big and 1 small?

I'd think there would a good chance the US would do it's best not to respond, or perhaps even hope for some help from Great Britain in the Carrier department, At least until the Ranger is back. What might also be interesting is the plane capacity of the various forces. Pretty well all of the American Carriers have a larger complement of planes than the Japanese carriers.

The US might have been set back a bit, and the Japanese could advance further in the South Pacific for a while. But by Late '43, the US would have 4 brand new Essex class carriers, with an air arm of about 380 planes on these 4 carriers, and Hellcat fighters. With all 6 carriers, Kido Butai's air arm was only 409 planes.

 

[GrauGeist]

Yes and no. They had a handful of escort carriers, carriers with complements of 25-50 planes, and sometimes these were converted merchant ships, which makes them far less fit to handle battle damage.

The Japanese Navy (and yes, the Army, too) had more than a handful of carriers. Listed below, are the ones that saw action of any type during WWII. This list does not include the various carriers that were completed, near complete or had been recently laid down and saw no action during the course of the war. Also, this list does not include the aircraft carrying submarine types that the IJN had in service.

The list is organized by the date of which the carrier was either sunk or taken out of action.

IJN Fleet Carriers:
Kaga - damaged/scuttled, Battle of Midway - 4 June 1942
Sōryū - sunk, Battle of Midway - 4 June 1942
Akagi - damaged/scuttled, Battle of Midway - 5 June 1942
Hiryū - damaged/scuttled, Battle of Midway - 5 June 1942
Shōkaku - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Cavalla (SS-244) - 19 June 1944
Taiho - sunk, Battle of Phillippine Sea - 19 June 1944
Hiyō - sunk, Battle of the Phillippine Sea - 20 June 1944
Zuikaku - sunk, Battle of Leyte Gulf - 25 October 1944
Shinano - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Archerfish (SS-311) - 29 November 1944
Unryū - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Redfish (SS-395) - 19 December 1944
Hōshō - survived WWII

IJN Hybrid Battleship Carriers: (did not see a significant role in WWII)
Ise - survived WWII
Hyūga - survived WWII

IJN Light Fleet Carrier:
Shōhō - sunk, Battle of Coral Sea - 6 May 1942
Ryūjō - sunk, Battle of the Solomons - 24 August 1942
Chuyo - torpedoed/sunk - 4 December 1943
Chitose - sunk, Battle of Leyte Gulf - 25 October 1944
Chiyoda - sunk, Battle of Leyte Gulf - 25 October 1944
Zuihō - sunk - Battle of Leyte Gulf - 25 October 1944
Ryūhō - damaged/AoA(survived WWII), by air attack - 19 March 1945
Amagi - sunk, by aircraft - 29 July 1945
Kaiyo - survived WWII

IJN Escort Carrier:
Unyo - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Barb (SS-220) - 17 September 1944
Shinyo - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Spadefish (SS-411) - 17 November 1944

IJA Escort Carrier:
Shinshu Maru - sunk - 5 January 1945
Yamashiro Maru - sunk - 17 February 1945

IJA Light Landing Carrier:
Nigitsu Maru - sunk - 12 January 1944
Kumano Maru - survived WWII


Midway can be seen as a "turning point" of the war not because the Japanese Navy lost 4 valuable aircraft carriers but because they confronted an enemy and were handed a serious defeat.

However, as seen by the list above, they were certainly still a serious threat and would continue to be for at least two more years.

 

[parsifal]

It was my opinion being discussed here....that Midway was a tactical rather than a strategic victory. I am not denigrating the extent of the victory by stating that. at least thats not my intention. 4 carriers lost to 1 carrier is a very one sided result. Full credit to the USN for achiving the victory.

So why would I claim it only as atactical victory at best. Because other issues were already at work to blunt the Japanese attack anyway. To claim total victory, all of the IJN aircrew would need to have been lost, but in point of fact as Joe B has shown me, nearly all the surviving Japanese pilots were rescued to fight again on the remaining Japanese carriers later in 1942. They suffered some losses to aircrew in the Midway strikes, but there was virtually no loss of pilots over the TG itself, and those on board were also rescued to a man. Japan simply could not sustain the numbers of pilots with carrier training for al 6 of the fleet carriers, and a carrier without planes is a useless piece of hardware.

A psychological victory of strategic proportions could have been claimed if after midway, the Japanese had shelved their plans for further exapansion. But it didnt. they believed the USN was hurting as badly as they had been hurt, and that all that was was required was a "final push" in order to secure victory. that misplaced belief was what put the final nail in their coffin. At first they embarked on the capture of Milne Bay and Moresby, very rash, both of which unravelled, and this then left them exposed in other parts of the TO, which the green horn Marine formations were able to exploit and achieve a truly strategic seismic shift in the overall situation at Guadacanal.

What Midway did do was to expose the true Japanese weakness in the levels of recovery they could bring to bear. After the initial headlong rush at the beginning of the year, they proved unable o replace losses, even to the extent of replacing lost planes and aircrew. Akagi and Kaga, for example, were ships quite able to operate in excess of 80 aircraft apiece, but went into Midway with just over 60. Hiryu and Soryu were began the war with 65 apiece, but by Midway managed only to field slightly over 50 for each carrier. Its a telling story as to what was happening already to the Japanese naval air corps. At Rabaul, at a time when they were faced with more than 1000 Allied aircraqft in the combat zone, at the beginning of Coral Sea, the land based air component was slightly over 100, including a large contingent of flying boats. The Japanese were already being overwhelmed, and had Midway not occurred, the outcome could scarcely have been any different.

Only if the Japanese somehow managed to sink all the US carriers, their support ships, and not lose many of their own aircraft (ie less than 100) could they have claimed any victory. even under that circumstance,it would have taken many months for the CAGs to have been rebuilt, if ever. My opinion is that the Japanese carriers would have wound up beiung used as decoys, without planes embarked within a few short months, even under the most optimistic of scenarios.

 

[RCAFson]

However, as seen by the list above, they were certainly still a serious threat and would continue to be for at least two more years.

However, many of the carriers in the above list were not operational until 1943/44 and so were more than countered by the arrival of the Essex class, along with the USN's new fast light carriers.

 

[Garyt]

GrauGeist wrote:

The Japanese Navy (and yes, the Army, too) had more than a handful of carriers.

Well, let's make sure the context we were discussing. I was looking at what their carrier assets would have been after midway if both Japan and the US had lost 2 carriers.

The Taiyo, Perhaps Unyo as well would have been available. Converted merchants with a speed of 21 knots and 27 aircraft.
The Hiyo and Junyo, also converted merchants, top speed of 25 knots, 54 aircraft.
The Ryjuho, a true carrier with a 29 knot speed but a complement of only 38
The Zuiho, another true carrier, speed of 28 knots but complement of only 30 aircraft.

And of course, the 4 surviving members of Kido Butai.

All in all, capable of carrying a max of about 449 aircraft. But I must also say it seems that these small/light/merchant carriers seemed to accomplish little in combat situations compared to the larger carriers. And when I say "little", I mean they under performed per what you might have expected from their complement of planes. Maybe it's because their pilots were inferior to the pilots on the bigger carriers.

Parsifal wrote:

My opinion is that the Japanese carriers would have wound up beiung used as decoys, without planes embarked within a few short months, even under the most optimistic of scenarios.

Interesting. The Japanese struggled with replacing pilots, which did seem to be more the issue than the planes. And the struggled with having enough fuel, but until the US Submarine offensive took out some of their merchant fleet Japan was not in too bad of shape.

I think at some point the pilots would be an issue, but we must remember what a meat grinder Guadacanal was for the Japanese air arm. The go into it very competent, able to go toe-to-toe with the US, and by the end of that campaign they are almost impotent, as evidenced at the Marianas.

If Japan could have kept away from a long campaigns of attrition they would have had more success with keeping competent air crews. Beating the US at Midway, taking more territory against weak opposition as they did in the time leading up to Midway, and some quick decisive carrier strikes would have helped.

but in point of fact as Joe B has shown me, nearly all the surviving Japanese pilots were rescued to fight again on the remaining Japanese carriers later in 1942.

Indeed. The Japanese air arm died in the Guadacanal campaign, not Midway.

 

[RCAFson]

GrauGeist wrote:



Well, let's make sure the context we were discussing. I was looking at what their carrier assets would have been after midway if both Japan and the US had lost 2 carriers.

The Taiyo, Perhaps Unyo as well would have been available. Converted merchants with a speed of 21 knots and 27 aircraft.
The Hiyo and Junyo, also converted merchants, top speed of 25 knots, 54 aircraft.
The Ryjuho, a true carrier with a 29 knot speed but a complement of only 38
The Zuiho, another true carrier, speed of 28 knots but complement of only 30 aircraft.

AFAIK, these CVLs were available to the IJN by the end of 1942:

ship/completion

Taiyo/sept 41

Unyo/june 42

Chuyo/dec 42

Ryjho/prewar

Ryuho/Dec 1942

Zuiho/jan 41

 

[parsifal]

Fleet carrier Shokaku was ready for operations mid July, but needed to be worked up which took until the beginning of August. Zuiho was ready, but needed her CAG assembed, which was done with the Midway survivors. So too for the carriers Junyo and Hiyo. Junyo had about 40 aircraft onboard, but the aircrews were not trained properly. This was normalised by the Midway survivors. Ryujo was operating with about 24 a/c at the time of Midway. Hiyo had no aircaft attached at the time of Midway, but this was rectified after the battle.

Taiyo and Chuyo were never escort carriers in the western sense. they were use as aircraft transports, and as such, never had permanent CAGs attached, Ryuho was never used on fleet operation because of structural defects in the hull. Mizuho, her sister ship was to be taken in hand for conversion (which generally took about 10 months to complete) but was sunk by a submarine before she could be taken in hand. Carriers Chiyoda and Chitose were in existence at the time of Midway as sub tenders, but work on their conversion to carriers was not begun until almost a year later. The japnese were in no hurry to get more carriers. They knew they lacked the pilot replacement rates to use them anyway. At the time of Midway, an average of 16 pilots per month were receiving their carrier wings, and this rate was changing only slowly. It took about 5 years to be carrier trained at the beginning of the war, by mid-43, trained pilots needed about a further 6 months conversion training to be carrier trained. Increasing the supply of carrier pilots was always aq big problem for the Japanese, made worse by the shortages of instructors and training aircraft. Ive read somewhere (but admit i forget exactly where), that by mid 1943 replacement rates had crept up to about 35 pilots per month. There were reasons why the mobile fleet did not sally forth to give battle between Santa Cruz and Phil Sea. Twice the IJN had laboriously built up the CAGs of the fleet, only to be forced to use them as supplements to the rabaul air garrison. Once in April 1943, when about 330 carrier pilots were committed, and once in November, when just over 400. From October to April is a a 6 months delay. The starting total after Santa Cruz was about 100 aviators or an average of 33 aviators per month, whilst the November effort required a replacement rate somewhere just above 35 pilots per month. In the meantime, the USN was churning out aircrew like hotcakes at a school fete.

How did the USN compare to this situation? If you look at USN pilot training, in the years 1925 through 1941 (very few aviators from classes prior to 1925 were still in flying billets by 1941) 7,061 pilots had completed the program. Of these, 44 percent, 3,112 completed the program just in 1941 and about 40% were carrier trained. That equates to about 103 pilots per month for USN carriers, in 1941. Between 1934 and 1941, some 5,687 pilots were trained in the USN . How many of these were carrier qualified? I have not the slightest idea; I would suspect that certainly a majority, as the USN, especially in the 1930's, had a habit of moving pilots from one type of squadron to another.

In the USN it wasn't all that unusual both before and after the war to move from one community to another. This was made relatively eassy for the USN because of the education base of their manpower and the depth of their training programs. IJN pilots took far longer to train and were of limited adpatability, because of the very narrow and rigid training regimes and restricted education bases of the manpower.


In 1942 USN pilot training programs started to ramp up; 10,869 aviators received their wings of gold, almost twice as many as had completed the program in the previous 8 years. i do not know the proportion of pilots for carriers, but one would assume a proportional increase, which would equate to somewhere in the vicinity of 2-300 carrier qualified pilots each and every month . In 1943 there were 20,842 graduates; 1944, 21,067; and, with then end of the war in sight, 1945 ended with 8,880 graduates. Thus in the period 1942 to 1945, the USN produced more than 2.5 times the number of pilots as the IJN. And each of those USN pilots went through a program of primary, intermediate, advanced, and, for the carrier pilots combat preparation in RAGs before heading west. New pilots were arriving for action in USN carrier squadrons with as many as 600 hours flying under their belts and as much as 200 hours of that in type.

This was a level of training and preparation with which the IJN could never dream of competing. The IJN training programs suffered from an insufficient number of qualified instructors, lack of fuel for extensive flying time, poor maintenance of training aircraft, and shortages of ordnance. There two most critically lacking areas were a continued adherence to traditional adversarial nature of their programs (for every one graduate, there were nine others who did not) and, of course, time. There was never enough time to develop the students' skills, to practice attack tactics or defensive actions. Before the war, the average flight time of Japanese aviators was in excess of 1000 hours, with an average of 700 hours in frontline combat. by 1943, this was down to less than 200 hours, with no combat experience. by 1944 it sank even further,, to less than 100 hours training. Limited supplies of pilots, and limited quality puts the Midway situation in sharp focus. The Japanese were defeated in the USNs training progrmas, not in the skies over Midway Island

Edit:
A significant source for a lot of this material is our own R Leonard. Anyone who knows him, knows he is encyclopedic on this stuff
.

 

[Garyt]

Interesting info, Parsifal. I find the specific numbers on pilots trained and carrier pilots trained per month the most informative. Always knew that was the case, but I never knew the hard numbers. The amount of flight hours is interesting as well.

If I am reading correctly, the Japanese would have about 30-35 pilots per month for carriers at their peak, the US was 200-300 per month on average?

It would make sense to not have a lot of pilots on carriers and try to focus more on land based by late war for the Japanese. With such poorly trained pilots, landing on the carrier itself would be an adventure. Non combat losses would soar when trained pilots were rare.

 

[BiffF15]

This is very good info, or way of "de-constructing" or breaking down an event (I watch too much Overhaulin). I didn't realize that we were out producing them pilot wise by such a margin. The effects snowballed, and the further behind they go the greater / more devistating the impact.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[buffnut453]

Japan had problems across the board scaling up for total war. The key strategic challenge for Japan was maintaining SLOCs (sea lanes of communication) to their Pacific outposts which required far more combat and cargo vessels than Japan could produce...and that was before the attrition inflicted by the US Pacific Fleet and, later (and to a much lesser extent), the RN assets dedicated to the theatre.

 

[VBF-13]

The main purpose was not to take Midway, rather it was to draw out the US Pacific Fleet into open battle where, naturally, the IJN would be victorious. The IJA didn't support the operation because of the resource impact on the Army when there was little tangible gain in terms of defensible real estate. The entire Operation MI plan was lacking in logic and at no stage was wargaming rigour applied, with predictable results. The "diversion" attack on the Aleutians was a stupid dissipation of resources that achieved nothing. Midway is perhaps the best example of Japanese military leaders suffering from "the victory disease".

Up until Midway, the Japanese Navy, for the most part, was doing the business of the Japanese Army, sweeping through the Southwest Pacific. What of Hawaii and Alaska? What of Panama and the West Coast? We'll never know, but those had to be on their minds. That was a huge occupation force they had coming in there. They were coming in to stay. They didn't throw together an occupation force of that size and secret it from the striking force and try to move it in for nothing. All that had to happen was the striking force had to draw out and get the jump on the U.S. carriers, and finish them off. Instead, the U.S. got the jump, and the Japanese got turned back looking like a wet dog that got kicked out of the house for chewing on a shoe. But they had plans, and that big occupation force says they were big plans. I don't know exactly what they were, and I'd of course like to see record on it, but I can't see it any other way, really, not with that occupation force waiting to take the stage.

 

[buffnut453]

The occupation force was huge for 2 small atolls but it was miniscule from an operational perspective. IIRC the Japanese Army dedicated approx 5,000 men to the occupation force. That's peanuts. You're not going anywhere with 5,000 men. The key is in the name - it was an occupation force. My question remains - once they took Midway, where next? It's not a jumping-off point to anything or anywhere, just a useful staging post...but staging posts have to be resupplied and THAT was always a problem for the Japanese.

 

[VBF-13]

What if they parked the carriers they brought there? Was Yamamoto thinking of finishing the job at Pearl? If they just wanted the U.S. carriers, why bring the occupation force? An occupation force supplying Midway and the carriers would make sense if they were thinking a stroke at Pearl.

 

[buffnut453]

Take a look at this satellite image of Midway Atoll. Where are the port facilities, particularly deep anchorages and fuel storage, sufficient to handle aircraft carriers from an operational perspective?

The occupation force was just that...to occupy the atoll. If you don't occupy something, someone else will take it while you're back is turned. The only potential use for Midway is as a base for seaplane operations. There's no way you could launch an offensive operation from Midway.

 

[parsifal]

by June 1942, the americans had two reinforced Infantry Divisions permanently stationed and well dug in on Oahu. There were other odds and sods but a conservative estimate of the defensive forces stationed on the island would have to be at or above 100000 men. Two divisions at full ToE is about 70000 men.....15500 men, and an equal number of supporting or Corps Troops. according to Shelby Stanton US Army Order Of Battle WWII huge numbers of independant CA Bn s were attached to the two Infantry Divs (24th and 25th) stationed on the island to defend it.

The Japanese formation tasked to invade Midway, the so called Midway Occupation Force was actually the Ichiki Detachment, a force of 5000 men, with a combat element of about 2000, built around 28th Infantry Regiment of the IJA. For the record, the Japanese Armed Forces Order Of Battle 1937-45 by Victor Madej ( a commercial version of the US Army's Intelligence Division publication titled simply "Japanese Armed Forces" dated Setember 1945.

In the version I have the assault forces consisted of

Ichiki Detachment

Infantry 28th Regiment (part)
1 x infantry batallion, with
4 infantry companies
MG company (8 HMG)
infantry gun platoon (2 guns)
regimental infantry gun battery
high-velocity (AT) gun battery
radio unit
stretcher unit ('1/3 size'...usually stretcher unit had 3 companies, so perhaps only one company)

1st company, engineer 7th regiment (both 7th ER and 28th IR belonged to 7th division)

independent high-velocity gun 8th battery

The formation was nominally under the kawaguchi detachment, based on Truk, and was in fact one of the Armies "Independant Mized Brigades". It had formerly been known as the 65 IMB, and had fought, not particularly well at Bataan. The IMBs were meant to be light infantry, and were really only equipped for defensive operations, and lacked many things including organic artillery (to any significant extent), or transport, or indeed heavy weapons. They were used in amphibs bewcause they were easy to move and it was thought they could be sufficient to defeat most of the defences the Americans were likley to throw up against them in the island wars. They were totally wrong...Ichiki was decimated at Tenaru River two months later by a single marine battalion, reportedly losing 916 men in a single night in suicidal Banzi charges against the dug in US marines, who held the high ground.

There were no plans in the Midway operation, or indeed as part of the Japanese "2nd Operational phase" plans to attempt to tackle Hawaii. it was far too well defended and the Japanese knew it. The aim of the Midway invasion was primarily to entice the USN out to a decisive battle, but failingt that , the atoll would be taken and developed as an advanced seaplane base from which the movements of the USN into and out of the naval failities at PH could be watched. this was a knife to the USNs throat, and unacceptable, though exactly what the IJN was going to do with that information, nobody is sure.

 

[Garyt]

They were used in amphibs bewcause they were easy to move and it was thought they could be sufficient to defeat most of the defences the Americans were likley to throw up against them in the island wars. They were totally wrong...Ichiki was decimated at Tenaru River two months later by a single marine battalion, reportedly losing 916 men in a single night in suicidal Banzi charges against the dug in US marines, who held the high ground.

I agree there was no real chance for the Japanese to take Pearl, at least not with a force the size of the Midway Invasion.

Regarding the battle of Tenaru though, about 1,000 Japanese attacked a US force of 3,000 - and the US had artillery, tanks, even some air support, the Japanese had liitle but mortars and machine guns. Steven Spielberg portrayed it a bit differently of course