Significance of the Battle of Midway

[parsifal]

Taihos loss is a story of what not to do in damage control. The ship began to fill with vapoure, and rather than keep the ships watertight doors closed, the DC officer decided to open everything up to try and clear out the vapor. A stupid decision if ever there was one. It is believed that a spark from an arcing generator provided the ignition, and the carrier, with its fuel well oxygenated, exploded as a bomb.

by 1944, there were manpower shortages in the Japanese fleet generally, not just the aircrews, and with inadequate crew numbers, it was the DC crews that tended to suffer cutbacks before anyone. Training was also cut back severely, and lastly, of course, the fuls pumped into the ships was unprocessed and too high in octane to be used safely. Japan lacked the shipping, particulalry tankers, to ship the oil back to japan, process it properly and return it to the front. A major reason why most of her battle line spent the war swinging around its anchor chains in Japanese ports. US had similar problems early on, so early deletions fro the TOand E of the active US fleet were the older BBs. They were too slow and too fuel hungry to be usefeul. later, they found a use as bombardment platforms, but that came quite a bit later.

The American submarine fleet probably did more to destroy the Japanese fleet than any other single arm of the USN. And they did it not by direct fleet support, but a crippling blockade, for which Japan had no answer and no effective defence.

 

[syscom3]

Just wondering .... for those that are contributing to the thread, who has read "Shattered Sword"?

 

[parsifal]

I have, and i know Old Crow has as well. Ive modified my attitude to Lundstrom quite a bit. he is the best single volume account of the battle around, but he is not quite as accurate as everyone believes. as an example he cites that the reason for hiryu and Akagi having port side islands arose becuse of studies into air turbulence, that suggested ports side islands were less prone to damage. True, but not the only reason, or even the main reason the Japanese designed these two carriers as they did. They in fact wanted these carriers to operate in tandem with their respective sisters, launching and recovering aircraft from the port side, whilst the sisters operated from a starboard side. in formation this allowed the Japanese to adopt the classic diamond formations for their carriers, and it was felt could operate more effectively as a homogenous unit. Unfortunately, there was a very bad side effect arising from this arrangement. human nature being what it is, an aircraft deciding to abort a landing will instinctively pull to port, rather than to starboard, and as a result both hiryu and akagi suffered accident rates somewhat higher than starboard side carriers of the same general class.

There is no single volume that covers all of the major points of the battle. not even Lundstrom. though I agree with his summation of Fuchida.

My main beefs about Lundstrom relate to his comments about Japanese AA, and his impressions of Fletcher. Suffice it to say I am not a fan of Fletcher, though he did do well enough.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Pars, glad to see you've read 1st Team. Like Shattered Sword, it is an eye opener in its detailed coverage of fighter ops in the early days. Lundstrom is certainly not perfect. Like many before him, he seems to have missed the significance of the differences in the F2A and F4F entirely, partially redeemed in the second volume but not in a comparative sense. I too have found shortcomings in his coverage of events but believe he has done a service with his generally detailed research. if you can overcome your distaste I recommend his Black Shoe Admiral. My main feeling about Fletcher is that he doesn't get the deserved credit for what he did accomplish and has had something of a bum rap in the USN/USNR. If you examine the contemporaries who trash his reputation, you will find they have feet of clay themselves. While I'm generally not overly religious, I like and think "Let those without sin cast the first stone." applies in his case.

 

[tomo pauk]

The 'Shattered sword' being written by Parshall and Tully?

Units under Fletcher's command managed to cut down the premier offensive Navy of the world into a shadow of it's former self within less than a year. Of course, he was helped by accurate intelligence and enemy's mistakes, but relegating Fletcher under 2nd (or worse) class of Allied commanders is injustice, plain and simple.

 

[Garyt]

I have not read Shattered Sword. One of my favorite regarding the pacific war is "The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945" though this is not specific to Midway of course. I have read through the 2006 Historicon presentation about Midway by Jon Parshall. He is a well respected source, haven given a presentation on the subject at the US Naval War College's Battle of Midway Commemoration ceremony in 2010.

He corrects things such as Fuchida's comments that planes were on the main deck being refueled and re-armed when the Dive Bombers attacked. This would have been impossible, as planes may recover or launch, but not both, and either voids the flight deck for any other usage. Plus the Japanese in particular did not fuel and arm on the main deck - this was done on the hangar deck. It's a bit of a dry read, goes through things like Japanese flight records of exactly which planes took off and landed and at what time.

That time honored picture though of US dive bombers hitting the Japanese carriers with a bunch of planes on their flight decks is inaccurate - they would have been below the main on the hangar deck.

Another issue with the Japanese planes being supposedly on deck - it does not match the pictorial evidence either.

 

[Garyt]

Duplicate

 

[Garyt]

The American submarine fleet probably did more to destroy the Japanese fleet than any other single arm of the USN. And they did it not by direct fleet support, but a crippling blockade, for which Japan had no answer and no effective defence.

Amazing, Parsifal that a nation so dependent upon seaborne imports put so little effort into anti-submarine warfare. The Matsu class DD that came late in the war - they would have worked well as convoy escorts had they been available earlier and in sufficient numbers.

What the Japanese really would have needed though were low cost escort vessels - and these could have been made "cheaply". Something similar to the Corvette or Frigate type ships, maybe 1000 ton displacement, max speed of 20 knots, even use merchant level construction and give them a few 3-4" guns with the standard 25mm AA and depth charges.

Possibly a few small converted merchant escort carriers as well.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I have not read Shattered Sword. One of my favorite regarding the pacific war is "The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945" though this is not specific to Midway of course. I have read through the 2006 Historicon presentation about Midway by Jon Parshall. He is a well respected source, haven given a presentation on the subject at the US Naval War College's Battle of Midway Commemoration ceremony in 2010.

Parshall (with Tully) is of course one of the authors of "Shattered Sword"

This would have been impossible, as planes may recover or launch, but not both, and either voids the flight deck for any other usage. Plus the Japanese in particular did not fuel and arm on the main deck - this was done on the hangar deck.

Minor nit to pick… The practice on USN carrier was to move the landed planes forward to the bow park and continue flight operations on the aft portion of the flight deck. The pack placed forward were at risk from an floater catapulting over or missing the barrier entirely and impacting among the deck park. Not a pretty sight. So it's not so much a question of impossibility as differences in doctrine and deck hardware between the two navies.

Of course there could have been and AFAIR some reports state one or a few A6Ms were present on at least some of the IJN flight decks being serviced as they cycled their CAP during the battle.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Possibly a few small converted merchant escort carriers as well.

Actually the IJ Army developed two small saw carriers and apparently intended to use Autogyros to locate subs late in the war. Weird if not inspired but apparently true.

From wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-submarine_warfare

"The Japanese Army also developed two small aircraft carriers and Ka-1 autogyro aircraft for use in an antisubmarine warfare role."

History channel did a show that included this item.

That should be 'ASW' carriers (not saw)!! My eyes must be failing me not to catch that typo last month! (5/7/14)

 

[Garyt]

Parshall (with Tully) is of course one of the authors of "Shattered Sword"

LOL, I did not know that!

Minor nit to pick… The practice on USN carrier was to move the landed planes forward to the bow park and continue flight operations on the aft portion of the flight deck. The pack placed forward were at risk from an floater catapulting over or missing the barrier entirely and impacting among the deck park. Not a pretty sight.

Well, that was per Parshall. So are you saying a US carrier in WW2 would be conducting launches at the same time it recovers planes?

 

[bobbysocks]

LOL, I did not know that!



We So are you saying a US carrier in WW2 would be conducting launches at the same time it recovers planes?

i think that would be very difficult as the carrier would be facing the wind to launch and then needs ( at least i assume as much ) to be sailing with the wind to recover.

 

[Garyt]

i think that would be very difficult as the carrier would be facing the wind to launch and then needs ( at least i assume as much ) to be sailing with the wind to recover.

Well, that is what I was thinking as well.

 

[tomo pauk]

Shouldn't the carrier be trying to sail into wind during both take off and landing phases - gives more wind speed for A/C wing for more lift?

 

[Garyt]

Specifically from Parshall:

Before angled flight decks, you did
one thing at a time:
 Spotting
 Launching
 Recovery
 Recovery, in particular, shuts down the
flight deck completely

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Well, that was per Parshall. So are you saying a US carrier in WW2 would be conducting launches at the same time it recovers planes?

No, I am saying a USN flight deck is likely to have large numbers of aircraft present on the flight deck: parked forward or aft with flight ops also occurring. landing even with aircraft parked forward and launching with a/c parked aft... That's all.

i think that would be very difficult as the carrier would be facing the wind to launch and then needs ( at least i assume as much ) to be sailing with the wind to recover.

see Tomo's post below

Shouldn't the carrier be trying to sail into wind during both take off and landing phases - gives more wind speed for A/C wing for more lift?

Yes, Tomo that is correct. Always steaming into the wind for flight ops.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

USS Sara conducting flight ops, pre WW2. Note the barrier erected behind the 'pack' to prevent accidental collisions. It wasn't unusual for USN carriers to spot and ready their a/c for combat on the flight deck.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Apparently as I recall from Parshall and Tully that the big difference in a/c strike prep between USN and IJN was that the latter armed and fueled its a/c in the hangar and the former used both flight deck and hangar for that purpose. Otherwise once armed they seem to have operated similarly. here is a photo of A6Ms preparing to launch December 7, 1941. Note the A/C pack spotted behind the leader. So, a returning IJN a/c would be struck below asap upon landing while a USN a/c might or might not be struck below depending on circumstance.

 

[bobbysocks]

Shouldn't the carrier be trying to sail into wind during both take off and landing phases - gives more wind speed for A/C wing for more lift?

after looking at the picture and digging a little....they land from the rear of the carrier. that makes sense...i just never thought of it. for some reason i thought they took off and landed from the front of ther carrier. but as the picture above shows it would be hard to launch and recover at the same time unless you were doing 1 ac at a time...and then that would take forever.

 

[syscom3]

From what I gathered from Shattered Sword:

1) Even if the Japanese swept the seas of US ships, the IJN/IJA were still probably not going to be able to capture the island.

2) Even if they did, they couldnt do anything with it.

3) The loss of the four carriers evened the odds in a order of battle POV, between the USN and IJN.

4) The major losses for the IJN were its NCO ranks in the carriers (lost in the attacks or trying to save their ships). Those were the bread and butter of its navy to an even higher degree than the USN.

Other tidbits of mine:
5) The horrific performance (bravery not withstanding) of the VT squadrons led to the immediate end of the TBD.

6) Hawaii was never in danger of being invaded. Oahu was big enough to defend in depth using interior lines of communications. Not an easy nut to crack even with a large invading force.

7) Damage control is everything and the USN did it better and saved a lot of ships because of it.

8 ) The fickle finger of fate "FFF" is what did in the Akagi. One bomb landing right at the most vulnerable point of the deck with another wrecking the rudder. 20" either way, and the IJN has two ships to fight back with.

9) US submarine performance was again, horrible. At every level.

10) The loss was the equivelant to a kick in the groin, sucker punch in the gut and a slap in the face to the IJN. The easy part of the war was now over and the it was quite plain that the US was no pushover.