Spitfire mk VB/Seafire vs Zero

[HoHun]

Hi Joeb,

>They lost 10 F4U's in action in 3,170 total combat sorties, .32%. In same two months 36 F-51's were lost to AA and 4 to 'enemy action unk' in 9,688 'effective' sorties (FEAF Monthly Summary Dec 1950), .41%. It's higher but not dramatically so.

Thanks for the data! Food for thought there

>Another thing to remember though is that the F4U had a significantly higher loss rate to AA than the F6F in apples v apples carrier operations in 1945 as has been discussed before, it wasn't the best example of rugged radial plane.

I didn't follow all the details of the earlier discussion, but if we'd conclude that different aircraft types of generally similar layout and technology could have significantly different survivability, that would make our task of data analysis quite a bit harder ...

>Another set of stats to put air v liquid cooled in some context is a USN loss survey for Sept '44-Aug 45, single engine radial losses (not all fighters). Overall 501 a/c were hit and 193 of them lost. 23 of 37 hit in the engine were lost, of course air cooled in all cases ("WWII Fighter Conflict" by Price, p.59).

Ah, that's interesting - while liquid engines are not mentioned, the statistics seem to illustrate (my conclusion) that the majority of losses were caused by damage to vulnerable systems shared by liquid-cooled and air-cooled engines. With Price' table in front of you, would you say this conclusion is justified?

>On F4F 'pin cushion' tactic, that's mentioned in enough places, sourced back to quotes and reports of the time, to be more than an 'anecdote'.

The anecdotal nature is due to the pilots who did not survive flying in the sights of a Zero for a prolonged time did not come back to have the 7.7 mm holes counted. (It would be interesting to know the number of holes in the machines that made it back, though.)

>how much such a tactic explains of the substantial superiority in realworld

Flying straight and allowing yourself to be shot at? I'd be delighted to see the cause-and-effect relationship of that move to a general "substantial" combat superiority explained

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[HoHun]

Hi Renrich,

>The USN pilots were exposed to a lot more gunnery training, especially full deflection shooting, than probably any other flyers. Just like with wing shooting, though, some have the aptitude for it and many don't.

From Clay Tice and MF Kirby, who flew USAAF P-40 and P-400 (P-39) respectively early in the war, I heard that they gunnery training was almost non-existent, with one of the two mentioning that his only training consisted in strafing a raft anchored off-shore - while flying in close formation with the wing leader, wich almost precluded aimed fire.

If that's typical for USAAF training early in the war, the better combat results achieved by the US Navy with rigorous gunnery training would seem to come as no surprise ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[renrich]

Henning, I have quoted Lundstrom, "The First Team," on several occasions. You owe it to yourself to try to get a copy. I am positive you would get much out of it. He goes into much detail about the USN pilot and gunnery training. As far as I know, that book is the best researched and most authoritative one on that particular subject(USN fighters, first six months of the war) available. Example: he makes a real attempt to match the kills by both sides to the extent of naming the IJN and USN pilot. I never really understood the implications of full deflection shooting until I read his book(the second time.)

[HoHun]

Hi Renrich,

>Henning, I have quoted Lundstrom, "The First Team," on several occasions. You owe it to yourself to try to get a copy.

Is the exact title "First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway"? Seems it is out of print, but I'll keep my eyes peeled! (I just closed another gap in my collection when I purchased a copy of Brown's "Wings of the Navy" last Friday ...)

>I never really understood the implications of full deflection shooting until I read his book(the second time.)

Well, what are the implications? Now you've roused my curiosity! :-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[renrich]

That is the correct title. There is a second volume entitled. "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign," that pretty much finishes the year 1942. He was supposed to be working on a third book which would be a continuation but it has not been published. The implications of full deflection shooting which he says was only taught in any detail by the USN of all the airforces were many. He also points out that some ETO pilots mastered deflection shooting on their own and used it to good effect. Full deflection shooting was mainly used against enemy bombers because it gave the defensive gunners almost impossible firing solutions. However once it was mastered it gave the pilot a lot of confidence in any type of firing run. It was time consuming to learn which is one reason it was not taught in detail by other air forces and it required a certain amount of visibility over the nose which most European and USAAF fighters did not have. In following his diagrams I had my wrists all twisted up trying to understand the maneuvers of a full deflection firing run(which means that at the moment of opening fire your nose is pointed at 90 degrees to the flight path of the target) He also goes into detail about the training of the USN pilot before and during the war as well as the IJN pilot. Both books are a good read, very detailed and authenticated. Some on this forum are familiar with the books. I wish that all the members who are biased toward the point of view that the ETO was the "only war" could read them.

[John Davies]

Slightly away from the main course of the discussion, but worth mentioning....

Welcome to the official web site for the Fleet Air Arm Museum

[renrich]

JD, if memory serves the RN in WW1 had one of the better fighters in the war, the Sopwith Triplane.

[John Davies]

Renrich yes, we did. And in WW1 we also had all sorts of interesting innovations coming in at an enormous rate. Like flying-off platforms on the turrets of capital ships, short flying-off platforms on lighters towed by destroyers (head into 15 knots of wind at about 30 knots giving a total of 45 and with an aircraft with a low stalling speed you just wind it up and go!), plus a great deal more besides.

Then after the war the RN was run by admirals who were mostly interested in developing new and better battleships, and naval aviation was put in the hands of the RAF, who for different reasons also saw it very much as a sideline, so as a result we went into WW2 with NO high-performance naval aircraft at all.

I can't help thinking you organised things better in the USA!

[John Davies]

Coming back to the inline vs radial debate, it’s surely important to remember that this was only ONE factor. It’s easy to concentrate on it, because it is tangible and obvious. But other factors, including intangible ones, may be more important. Precisely because they are intangible, and therefore hard to put numbers to, they may be ignored. But they could still be overwhelmingly important.

Training, tactics, good leadership, even high morale, can all make a huge difference to casualty rates. And above all adaptability and the ability to learn FAST, because tactics as taught in training sometimes proved to be either ineffective or even suicidal in real combat. This means not being hidebound, and being prepared to throw the rule-book away if it wasn’t working. Some leaders had the courage of their convictions, and did what worked, whether it was "authorised procedure" or not. Others did not, and stuck to the book.

For instance, in “Carrier Fighter”, Hanson describes the standard ground-attack with guns doctrine as they were taught. Approach in a shallow dive, pull out into a low firing pass, then pull up slightly and depart the area. As he says, against the very heavy light AA defences of many Japanese airfields, this would have been suicide, for two reasons. Firstly, Japanese light AA was very effective and aggressive. Secondly, it is hard to judge the pull-out with enough accuracy. When a high-performance monoplane pulls out, for a brief distance it will “mush”; i.e its attitude may be level or even slightly nose-up, but its trajectory will briefly continue downwards. Pull out too high and you make a lovely target; pull out too low and you mush into the ground. Either way you are probably dead.

So they developed a new technique, of taking their Corsairs in fast and very very low indeed, and this seemed to work. And don’t ever go back for a second pass. Typhoons in Northern France seem to have developed similar techniques. There were many accounts of them coming back with quite large bits of foliage embedded in the leading edges. That thick wing may have been draggy, but it was very strong!

By the way, I’ve seen a video clip of a Spitfire “mushing” into the ground at a display. It is very distressing to watch, so I will not give the URL.

Now of course there were attempts made to feed back the lessons of combat into operational training. Pilots were sometimes “rested” by being posted to an operational training unit to educate the next generation. But the system was not perfect.

For instance, I’ve read the autobiography of an FAA pilot who flew Swordfish under extremely demanding conditions, until he was basically burned out. (Hunting U-Boats off very small escort carriers in the north Atlantic winter, usually in appalling weather conditions, out of sight of the convoy, with primitive and unreliable homing aids). He was posted to head an OTU equipped with Barracudas, a very different type of aircraft indeed. As he was the first to admit, he did not do a very good job there.

For myself, I’d rather have flown an inline-engined aircraft in a squadron that was well led and used effective tactics, than a radial engined aircraft in a squadron which was not.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by renrich

That is the correct title. There is a second volume entitled. "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign," that pretty much finishes the year 1942. He was supposed to be working on a third book which would be a continuation but it has not been published. The implications of full deflection shooting which he says was only taught in any detail by the USN of all the airforces were many. He also points out that some ETO pilots mastered deflection shooting on their own and used it to good effect. Full deflection shooting was mainly used against enemy bombers because it gave the defensive gunners almost impossible firing solutions. However once it was mastered it gave the pilot a lot of confidence in any type of firing run. It was time consuming to learn which is one reason it was not taught in detail by other air forces and it required a certain amount of visibility over the nose which most European and USAAF fighters did not have. In following his diagrams I had my wrists all twisted up trying to understand the maneuvers of a full deflection firing run(which means that at the moment of opening fire your nose is pointed at 90 degrees to the flight path of the target) He also goes into detail about the training of the USN pilot before and during the war as well as the IJN pilot. Both books are a good read, very detailed and authenticated. Some on this forum are familiar with the books. I wish that all the members who are biased toward the point of view that the ETO was the "only war" could read them.

Rich - the USN probably was better organized for aerial gunnery training pre-WWII. Having said that the USAAF realized that they needed to start doing so and formed the first training propgrams in June 1941.

The initial training ranged from shooting skeet to movie projections - both distinctly lacking in stick and rudder co-ordination. It wasn't until early 1942 that Advanced training on tow targets for both fighter pilots and gunners were a standard part of the training and only in mid 1942 did the USAAF integrate RAF training into Operational theatres - especially for 8th AF.

Nobody graduated from Advanced as a Fighter pilot by mid 1943 w/o passing the aerial Gunnery program. IIRC correctly ~10% was the minimum passing grade for the high deflection tests.

In early 1944 the frangible bullet technology for ballistics and safety made it feasible to shoot at modified 'real a/c' starting with the A-20 and then by August 1944 - the TP-63 - but the K-14 was also being installed along with computing gunsights in the B-29 and those technologies were almost good enough to replace the actual airplane as a target in gunnery practice up to about a 45 degree deflection shot.

[HoHun]

Hi Renrich,

>Full deflection shooting was mainly used against enemy bombers because it gave the defensive gunners almost impossible firing solutions.

Hm, what exactly does he mean by "full deflection shooting"? It could apply to temporary firing solutions or to tracking shots, or (obviously to both.

I'd tend to think that the US Navy thought of tracking shots because they were emphasized at the time, and virtually required against bombers, but temporary firing solutions (Shaw calls them snapshots, I believe) are of great value in fighter-vs.-fighter combat, especially if using a highly effective battery of four or six 12.7 mm machine guns against an unprotected target like the A6M. (Though high-deflection shots tend to attack from angles not usually protected by armour anyway.)

Of course, gunnery training has a huge impact on combat success, and a pilot trained for "full deflection" tracking shots would probably be able to apply his skills to snapshot situations, too. However, it would be interesting to know if there was a doctrine covering snapshots, too.

>I wish that all the members who are biased toward the point of view that the ETO was the "only war" could read them.

I never thought the war in Europe was the "only war", just the "only war that counted" Only joking, of course, but I believe "Europe first" was probably the correct historical decision.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[HoHun]

Hi John,

>For instance, in “Carrier Fighter”, Hanson describes the standard ground-attack with guns doctrine as they were taught. Approach in a shallow dive, pull out into a low firing pass, then pull up slightly and depart the area.

Highly interesting - in "They gave me a Seafire", Mike Crosley describes how his squadron thought up a coordinated attack scheme that would have all of the Seafires of the formation over the target at the same time, coming from different directions and making exactly one firing pass. I think they had no losses to flak when applying these tactics over Japan, though he cautiously advises that one or two of their losses to unknown causes might qualify.

By the way, Crosley's "They gave me a Seafire" (about his war years in the Fleet Air Arm) and especially his "Up in Harm's Way" (he became test pilot after the war, flying a broad range of military and civilian aircraft - and he invented the head-up display) rank high on my list of favourite books. Judging from your area of interest, I'd say you would really enjoy these, too :-)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[renrich]

Henning, I said what I said about the members here with respect, not being critical. There is more emphasis on the ETO because many members are from Europe and there are few if any from Japan. Bill, thanks for your insight on gunnery training. As a matter of fact one of my uncles was an IP flying P39s, ugh, and P47s and he talked to me about gunnery training and the emphasis on it during the war. Interestingly his unit did their gunnery training on the Gulf Coast near Corpus. When one thinks about it I guess over the Gulf is a safe place to shoot live rds at a sleeve. He also told me that they often were jumped by F4Us while in gunnery training and his P47s stood no chance in the hassles. They could not get the Corsairs to go up real high with them. JD, I recently read a book by a Brit about the Battle of the Atlantic and he went into some detail about the difficulties the FAA had prewar as well as during the war getting good equipment. The sad thing is that, as you intimated, the RN was at the forefront of aviation combined with naval power when WW1 ended. As I remember the RN tried to utilise AC off of the Engadine during Jutland for scouting or maybe even bombing. However when the RAF took over all flying, against the strong advice of David Beatty, the FAA languished as well as Coastal Command. When WW2 began, the USN and IJN were light years ahead of the RN in most ares of naval aviation. Of course the US Army tried the same tactics of getting control of naval aviation but thoughtful heads prevailed. Even during WW2 Coastal Command and the FAA were treated like red headed step children and could not get the AC needed. An instance was the difficulty that Coastal Command had in getting VLR bombers for anti sub work. Bomber Harris said that it would detract from his bombing if a squadron or two were diverted to anti sub work. As you know the VLR patrol planes were really the antidote for the u-boat threat.

[HoHun]

Hi Renrich,

>Henning, I said what I said about the members here with respect, not being critical.

Well understood - I just couldn't resist trying to be funny

>However when the RAF took over all flying, against the strong advice of David Beatty, the FAA languished as well as Coastal Command.

Hm, I've just browsed into Brown's "Wings of the Navy", and he actually attributes a lack of boldness (or vision) on part of the institutions that drafted the specifications for naval aircraft for the poor state of the art in WW2. I'm not sure that this means he blames the RAF - it's my impression that the specifications were prepared by the Royal Navy, but I'll admit that I'm not really sure of that.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by HoHun

>On F4F 'pin cushion' tactic, that's mentioned in enough places, sourced back to quotes and reports of the time, to be more than an 'anecdote'.

The anecdotal nature is due to the pilots who did not survive flying in the sights of a Zero for a prolonged time did not come back to have the 7.7 mm holes counted. (It would be interesting to know the number of holes in the machines that made it back, though.)

>how much such a tactic explains of the substantial superiority in realworld

Flying straight and allowing yourself to be shot at? I'd be delighted to see the cause-and-effect relationship of that move to a general "substantial" combat superiority explained

I think it should be obvious, the tactic wasn't 'to fly straight and allow yourself to be shot at' but that assuming a Japanese fighter got behind you don't try to turn, exposing the cockpit (and other vital parts) to deflection shots. If energy to dive do that, otherwise skid and bob up and down but again don't turn. By early 1944 the 5th AF's tactics manual had a similar admonition for P-40's out of energy with 'Zero' on tail, but the USN/USMC apparently reached the conclusion earlier. And there weren't necessarily a lot of unknown cause loss disappearances of F4F's in the Guadacanal campaign (as Renrich suggested it might be useful to actually read about it, to try to understand some of these issues). It's beyond what I would call anecdotal.

Joe