The strategic bomber: was it a total failure?

[Gnomey]

They allied bombing of Germany was neither a success or failure as has been said. However certain parts of the campaign where particularly effective in helping the allies for example the transportation plan which according to some figures saw axis rail transport down to 1/3 of the level it was in 1943 by D-day. Another successful part was the oil plan which left Germany with very little fuel - down to about a 1/4 of what was needed (correct me if I am wrong). As a result of these the war was shortened and the number of men who had to defend the skies against the attacks was a significant number who could have been at the front either holding back the US and UK or the USSR.

All in all although neither a complete success or failure the bombing campaign had enough of a drain on Germany to remove vital manpower to protect the Reich as well as draining their oil and transportation capacity (greatly increased by the Russians capture of Ploesti in late 1944). In my opinion the expense was worth it for the damage done to the Germans in terms of manpower although the industrial effect was minimal thanks to Albert Speer and the ability of the Germans to quickly repair damage.

[mosquitoman]

Just think of all the 88mm guns being used as flak batteries when they could have been knocking out T-34s on the Eastern Front

[Glider]

I do not believe that Bomber Command took a third of our industrial capacity. We also produced vast numbers of ships and other military equipment. As for high technology I don't think so as the Navy had a lot of sophisticated equipment as did the Army.
It could be if we are talking about the precision tooling that would be required as the tolerances in building aircraft are very fine and we were short of machine tools, but that isn't quite the same.

Our tank production was very similar to that of the Germans, we just didn't design many decent ones. This wasn't the fault of production but design and Army requirements.

Had we not had Bomber Command the Germans would have had vast quantities of additional equipment in the front line and the cost in lives would have been much greater.

In the attacks on the German cities in 1943 we had little choice as we didn't have the technology to hit smaller targets and no other way of hitting back. It was important to the Morale of the people in the UK to know that we could respond. It was also important for the Germans to know that the war wasn't going one way. I am not saying that we would break their spirit but if your major cities are being hit on a regular basis you know that you are not likely to win in the long run.
Re navigation, you will remember that the Germans had some trouble hitting London which must have been the easiest target to find being only a short distance from the French Coast and with the Thames to lead you up to the middle of it, so it isn't surprising that we had difficulty hitting the targets in the early years of the war.
However from mid 1944 when we could be more targeted in our bombing there could have been a change in approach. Not that I am squeamish about what we did but because it would have had more of an impact on German production.

There is only one point that I agree with you and that is the use of resources. A couple of Lancaster squadrons in the Battle of the Atlantic would have made a huge difference with little impact on the bomber effort. That however doesn't mean that I believe that we shouldn't have carried out the bombing raids.

The Germans never hesitated to destroy totally unprotected cities, so I don't think that they are in a position to complain when we had the better planes to hit back with. I always thought the phrase, 'They sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind' to be very accurate.

[Erich]

remember the smashing of the oil fields and reserves/plants in 1944 which primarily broke the Reichs back. Stoutly defended they were and of course rebuilt at some stages they took the brunt of US and RAF bombing. Look how many German aircraft were sitting on the fields at wars end being empty of fuels for weeks to even months at a time which had not the bombing occurred the fighters would of been up in the day/night skies

[Glider]

Totally agree Erich

[Hop]

Saying Bomber Command absorbed 7-9% of the British war effort is a clear overestimation of the military industry and economic power of the UK.

Not really.

Britain produced and delivered about 12,500 heavy bombers by the end of 1944, not all went to BC of course, as many went to coastal, served overseas, etc.

That compares to about 45,000 fighters in the same period, which would have cost more than 12,500 heavies.

Britain produced about 14,000 medium bombers (inc Mosquitos), again many did not go to bomber command.

Britain also produced about 45,000 trainers, transports, liason aircraft, coastal aircraft, naval aircraft etc, which again are more expensive than the medium bombers.

In short, BC got considerably less than half of British aircraft production by cost. And Bomber Command had very few American aircraft, unlike the other commands, many of which had large numbers of US aircraft.

And then you have to add on tank production (and a tank typically cost somewhere between a fighter and bomber). Britain produced about 90,000 armoured fighting vehicles (which includes things other than tanks) during the first 5 years of war, along with over 1,500,000 tons of naval shipping, millions of tons of transport ships, etc.

As the first post in this thread said:

"In the UK alone over a million workers were tied up in bomber production / associated support industries."

That's true, but should be seen in the context of a civilian workforce of over 22 million, meaning less than 5% of the total workforce were producing equipment for BC. And Britain committed a larger proportion of it's economy to the war effort than any of the other major war economies, nearly 55%.

In military terms, Britain had over 4 million men in the army, just over 1 million in the RAF, just under 1 million in the RN. The RAF as a whole had less than 20% of British manpower, BC had far less than half RAF manpower (remember the RAF were based all over the world, BC just in the UK)

Sir John Slessor and Prof Richard Overy both give figures of 7 - 9% of British war effort going to Bomber Command, the figures back that up.

[Hop]

According to Max Hastings (Bomber Command: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive 1939-45):
"It has been estimated that one-third of Britain's industrial capacity was committed to Bomber Command, along with the best of their high technology. Because of the vast resources consumed by Bomber Command, the British had to import vast quantities of war material (such as tanks, trucks, landing craft, etc.} from the United States."

JJ, are you sure this is from Max Hasting's book?

It appears to be a quote from Charles Lutton, in a review of Hasting's book. It's Lutton's quote, not Hasting's.

Lutton can be charitably described as a revisionist, less charitably as a holocaust denier.

The review was written for the Institute of Historical Review, which is one of, if not the largest, "revisionist" sites on the net.

As I pointed out above, in terms of manpower, in terms of civilian workers, BC got less than 10% of the British war effort, and Sir John Slessor and Richard Overy have both given figures of less than 10%.

The systematic and planned extermination of an entire national group seems to be an accurate description of Arthur Harris' bombing campaign: to liquidate as many German civilians as possible, city by city, focusing on those targets which would result in the most civilian deaths, regardless of military value.

I don't recognise that as a description of Harris's strategy at all. Harris was committed to his plan of destroying German industrial towns.

Max Hastings again:
"On 14 February 1942, the Air Ministry issued a directive authorizing unrestricted area bombing. Churchill's repulsive scientific adviser, Lord Cherwell, provided the final rationalization for the campaign, by claiming that the "dehousing" of the German workers and their families would doubtlessly "break the spirit of the people." The Chief of Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, reminded his Deputy on 15 February, "Ref. the new bombing directive: I suppose it is clear that the aiming-points are to be built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories ... This must be made quite clear if it is not already understood." Sir Arthur Harris, a fanatical proponent of area bombing, was appointed the new head of Bomber Command.
The first target of the new phase was the old North German town of Lübeck. It was not a place of any military or industrial importance to the Germans and so was lightly defended. But Harris had been "searching for an area target that they could find, strike, and utterly destroy." Lübeck was thus chosen because "above all it was an old, closely-packed medieval town that would burn far better than the spacious avenues of any modern metropolis ...
Lübeck, then, did not attract attention because it was important, but became important because it could be burned."

Again, this is not from Max Hastings, it's from Charles Lutton. The "repulsive" bit about Cherwell shows that, it's a favourite epithet for Cherwell from "revisionist" writers.

All you are quoting is not from Hastings, it's from a revisionist who seeks to portray the Germans as the victims and the allies as the monstrous aggressors.

Please, don't quote from such sources, or at least correctly attribute them. Claiming such stuff is from Hastings when it's actually from a man like Sutton damages your credibility.

As to the specific allegation about Lubeck, here is part of the RAF post raid assesment from Lubeck, dealing with damage to commercial and industrial property:

DRAGERWERK
This works, which is reported to be making oxygen apparatus for submarines and aircraft,
and service pattern repirators, has been very seriously damaged.
A large number of sheds and small factory buildings have been gutted by
fire and one or two damaged by H.E.
Part of the main building has been damaged proabably by blast.
There is a direct hit in the roadway running through the centre of the favtory.

/ EWERS & MINESNER
EWERS & MIESNER HARTGUSSWERK.

Tke greater part of this foundry has been destroyed by fire.
JAGER LUBECKER APPARATE & MOTORENBAU

Factory making engines and ancilliary equipment.
One building, possibly offices, has been gutted.

BLUNK & GLUTMANN.
This factory is engaged in tho production of tar products
and roof materials.
1 shed type building is gutted.

FR. EWRES & CO.
Canning and preserving factory.
The whole factory is gutted.

ERNST HOHMANN
Factory engaged in iron construction work, machinery and
repairs.
The greate part of the factory is destroyed or damaged
by fire.

CARL THIELE & SOHNE.
Enamel f'actory.
A number of factory buildings have been destroyed by fire
and blast.

OTHER FACTORIES
The slaughter house, the HANSA brewery, a sawmill, and several unidentified factories
have been damaged or destroyed.

3. PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES
CENTRAL ELECTRIC STATION.
This has been destroyed by fire.
GASWORKS II.
A square building in the gasworks has been gutted.
TRAM DEPOT.
The tram depot in St. LORENZ SUD has been damaged.

4. COMMUNICATIONS
MAIN RAILWAY STATION
Part of the main railway station, proabably containing the administrative buildings, left
luggage ect. has been gutted, and the footbridge over the railway tracks damaged by fire.
It is likely that debris blocked the line temporarily.
GOODS YARD (ST. LORENZ).
Part of a goods shed is gutted.
/RAILWAY REPAIR SHOPS
RAILWAY REPAIR SHOPS (ST. JURGEN).
Two sheds are burnt out.
OTHER DAMAGE.
South of the slaughterhouse (st. Lorenz, Nord), a direct hit has caused part of the raailway
embankment to collapse over the line.
One or two near misses to railway tracks are noted, but it is unlikely that these will have
caused damage.

5, PORT FACILITIES.

The northern part of the port is not covered.
A large warehouse on the BEHN QUAY has been destroyed by fire over a length of 360
feet.
One warehouse on the KULENKAMP QUAY has been destroyed by fire and thwo thirds
of a second destroyed or damagws.
A number of small sheds and buildings fronting the basins
have been destroyed or damaged by fire.

[plan_D]

I would like to add quotes from Max Hastings from his book Armageddon : Chapter Firestorms: War in the Sky -

"What were the fruits of this huge effort, which absorbed a substantial part of the war-making powers of the United States, and consumed a proportion of Britain's industrial capacity equal to that devoted to the entire British Army?"

"It would be ludicrous to imply that the German people found the experience of being bombed acceptable, or to deny that Hitler's war production suffered not only from damage to plant, but also from absenteeism and chronic dislocation to the lives of the labour force"

"They embarked instead upon the policy of 'area bombing' - the systematic assault upon the cities of Germany with a mixture of high-explosive and incendiary bombs, designed to break the morale of the enemy's industrial workforce, as well as to destroy him means of production"

"When the Eigth Air Force began to do so, alongside Fifteenth Air Force flying from Italy, the results were remarkable. Petroleum available to Germany fell from 927,000 tons in March 1944 to 715,000 tons in May, and 472,000 tons in June. Luftwaffe supplies of aviation spirit declined from 180,000 tons in April to 50,000 tons in June, 10,000 tons in August. Germany needed 300,000 tons of fuel a month to fight the war, yet by September reserves fell to half that amount." - Refering to bomber offensive against oil targets.

"We should recognize, however, that it is far easier to pass such judgements amid the relative tranquillity of the twenty-first century than it seemed in 1945, when Hitler's nation was still doing its utmost to kill American and British people, together with the millions of Nazi captives, by every means within its power. Some Germans today brand the bombing of their cities a war crime. This seems an incautious choice of words. It is possible to deplore Harris's excesses without accepting that they should be judged in such emotive language. For all it's follies and bloody misjudgements, the strategic air offensive was a military operation designed to hasten the collapse of Germany's ability to make war. It stopped as soon as Hitler's people ceased to fight. Most of Germany's massacres, by contrast, were carried out against defenceless people who possessed not the slightest power to injure Hitler's empire."

[Glider]

Good Quote

[FLYBOYJ]

I think the bottom line is "The strategic bomber: was it a total failure?" Ask the Luftwaffe pilot in April of 1945 who couldn't fly because there was no fuel available........

[the lancaster kicks ass]

Originally Posted by jj

the lancaster kicks (civilian) ass:

also, jj, if you do come back, comments like that are un-nessisairy and uncalled for, that is in effect my name and so i find that extremely rude and insulting..........

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by the lancaster kicks ass

also, jj, if you do come back, comments like that are un-nessisairy and uncalled for, that is in effect my name and so i find that extremely rude and insulting..........

Good for you Lanc, What's that supposed to mean anyway?

[cheddar cheese]

You need to read JJ's post to get the whole picture.

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by cheddar cheese

You need to read JJ's post to get the whole picture.

I got it now -

[plan_D]

I don't know why but JJs comments directed at calling the bomber offensive a war crime and, basically, calling the Western Allied leaders war criminals made me picture him wearing a striped shirt, a beret and sitting in Starbucks at 10am reading poetry.