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Originally Posted by Soren Bill doesn't believe this fact to be true however.. |
Correct with respect to attacking LW fighters attacking bombers. They (51's met them at same altitude and/or frequently climbing to meet LW formations which had successfully climbed ahead of the bomber stream to meet the attack.
For the LW formations which had not enough time to respond - and many examples exist for the Fall/Winter or when the 8th sent out a wing to Free Lance and run 50 miles out in front, then obviously it was Dive, kill and come back, if possible - otherwise in two's and four's come back on the deck and shoot hell out of airfields, trains barges, trucks, cows, troops and stray students plugging along w/o a clue.
Having said that, Soren, the standard tactic of 8th FC was to 'loose' a flight or a section of 8 to make an attack while the other remaining fighters (4 to 8 depending on aborts) in that squadron, would stay so that the bombers still had an escort.
When a very large formation of LW fighters was encountered (high or Low) it was frequently All Hands and not only would two or all three of the escorting squadrons attempt to attack (if all three could see and be in a position of attack) and call for help for another nearby group to help. This occurred multiple times in the war but not really all that frequently.
I am aware of two big airbattles in which the 355th was engaged in which another group joined in.
One was 24 April, 1944 when the 357FG and 355FG joined to repulse (unsuccessfully) many squadrons of JG3, JG27, ZG26, JG26 between Regensburg and Munich. Erich would have the numbers but the estimates were 200-250 fighters attacking the Munich area B-17s raid.
As I recall the two groups shot down 44 (awards, claims were nearly 50 (for total loss of 7 all causes), and as a result, one wing of B-17s was later caught unescorted and 7-10 (can't remember how many) were shot down by a force of 30 JG26 fighters between Munich and 40 miles west.
In this example the 358FS of the 355th did NOT engage, and only 5 flights of the combined 354 and 357 Squadrons were in the fight. The bombers lost at least 25 total from flak and fighters, probably more, but I don't have the source in front of me. This was a great example of the LW putting max force in a small area, overwhelming the fighter support.
The 355th were awarded 20 for the loss of three in the air and one to flak on the way home.
Erich is very aware of the other 355FG example in Frankfurt region of Novemner 26. In this fight the 339th FG was in that same area of strung out B-24 wings and the LW put nearly (what Erich? 150-200?) fighters into a two bomber wing volume. The 355th put 1 flights of 2SF, 3 Flights of 354FS, 3 flights of 357FS and 2 Flights of 358 FS - not quite 36 fMustangs to try to protect the bombers - I don't know how many effectives engaged from the 339th.
Combined the 355th and 2SF shot down 26 for no losses in the fight - but lost two to a mid air coming home asfter the fight was over. The 339th bagged 29. The LW bagged 20+ B-24s before either Group could intercept.
Let me give you a clue? Do you think either of these were a 'climbing attack with inferior numbers by the Luftwaffe?"
These two examples are about as good as it gets to describe what really happened in most defenses of LW attacks when they had a chance to form (always in Jan-May 1944), frequently in June-Jan 1945, rare Feb-April 1945.
In the latter period all the 8th and 9th AF plus RAF and RAF Tac had the legs to go all over Germany and simply disrupt everything - so the LW didn't get big gaggles up high and in front - in dramatic contrast to 12 months earlier.
Regards,
Bill