Tactical Strikes of World War II

[mosquitoman]

No RAF tactical bombers?
Syscom, what roles do you think the Maryland, Battle, Hampden, Mossie, Ventura, Wellington, Blenheim, Mitchell and Hampden were?
Granted, the AAF had the 9th AF but we British had the 2nd TAF aswell.
Tactical bombing prevents transport to the front, it takes out factories and military HQs miles behind the front line preventing communication and is less of a knock out blow- more of a death by a thousand paper cuts bleeding the enemy dry.

[pbfoot]

I believe the same conditions apply today in 1991 the Brits used the same lo level missions to mess up Iraqs runways in the initial assault. The RAF is one of the premier lo level air forces and I have no qualms in stating its much better then the the USAF I justify this statement through personal experiences having worked at the NATO lo level range in Goose Bay for several years . This is a old quip but valid a USAF pilot after coming off the range stated "jeez thats dangerous flying that lo" to which the RAF pilot stated "yes its very dangerous you could've dropped your weapons right on top of us"

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by syscom3

A few -234's streaking along at a high speed with a single 1000 pounder is going to do nothing.

A squadron of them flying at middle altitudes with several thousand pounds of bombs each could do some damage.

And theres no evidence of these small raids of several planes hitting tiny targets did anything to shorten the war or help things out.

That Mosquito raid on the Gestapo HQ, while deservadly an excellenty planned and executed raid, did nothing. Although the people in the jail probably think it was the most importannt bombing raid in history.

What made the tactical bombing effective and helped the ground troops were mass raids plastering the sinews of war and wearing down the Germans from lack of loguistics.

And this post here, just proves to me and probably everyone else here that you have no clue about warfare (I highlighted the most important parts that prove this). I will leave it at that.

[plan_D]

According to syscom, these small tactical raids did nothing to shorten the war. The attacks on bridges, supply dumps, HQs, airfields and transport networks did nothing for the war effort. This explains a lot.

Beyond the famous Mosquito raids, the RAF used all their medium and light bombers with great effect in the tactical role. Groups of planes numbering less than twenty were often sent against airfields, and would put them out of action for days, weeks or even months.
We all recognise these raids weren't always successful. But, more often than not, the tactical raids would have a higher target destruction percentage than the massive strategic bomber raids.

I have to thank Tony, as his anecdote on the French bridge provided the best example of small, light bombers, carrying small payloads being more useful in certain circumstances.

While I have discovered the USAAF did generally use more bombers against a target than the RAF, it was still not in the region of 100 - 300 bombers on a single airfield. Glider's description of tactics explains the higher numbers of bombers used.

US 9th AF sorties:

22 October, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s raid Evreux. *Earlier I mentioned this in the 2nd TAF sorties, this was because 11 Group provided escort on this mission.

24 October, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s escorted by 403 and 421 Sqdn. are attacked by twenty (20) Bf 109s of I./JG 3. *I'm not aware of the target for the 9th AF B-26s as I'm getting the information from the 2nd TAF records.

29 November, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s raid Chievres airfield.

1 December, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s are escorted by 126 Airfield Spitfires on another raid. *126 Airfield is a Mobile HQ

It seems the US 9th AF generally sent seventy-two B-26s on a raid, which I assume to be airfields.

[Glider]

Syscom
Once again you seem to be playing your game of comming up with a statement / position whatever without any support and letting others go to a lot of trouble actually doing the research.
Can I ask what evidence you have to support your statement. e.g numbers of bombers used by the USAF in particular missions, periods of time these targets were knocked out of action. Comparing these to the smaller RAF raids on similar targets.
Your statment that these smaller missions were nothing but stunts, I take it you can support that statement.
Personally I always thought the knocking out of a Headquarters was always a prime target. Just knocking out its communications during a battle I always considered to be a significant achievement.
Destroying or even removing the ability for a stores depot to distribute its fuel and food was always a main aim of airpower, has been from WW1 to the modern day
I am happy to be proved wrong on the above, but await the proof from yourself with interest.
How

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by mosquitoman

No RAF tactical bombers?
Syscom, what roles do you think the Maryland, Battle, Hampden, Mossie, Ventura, Wellington, Blenheim, Mitchell and Hampden were?
Granted, the AAF had the 9th AF but we British had the 2nd TAF aswell.
Tactical bombing prevents transport to the front, it takes out factories and military HQs miles behind the front line preventing communication and is less of a knock out blow- more of a death by a thousand paper cuts bleeding the enemy dry.

Read my previous posts before you misquote me.

I said the RAF had similar medium groups like the 9th and 12 AF's and they attacked the same targets with the same numbers of aircraft.

[Glider]

May I suggest you follow your own advice.

PD's first posting listed a number of raids and all bar one was a small raid and most used B25, B26, Ventura and A20 bombers. This has been backed up by other postings.

PD's second posting listed a number of USAF raids all of with 72 planes.

Can I ask for your evidence to back up your statements, because all the evidence is against you.

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by plan_D

According to syscom, these small tactical raids did nothing to shorten the war. The attacks on bridges, supply dumps, HQs, airfields and transport networks did nothing for the war effort. This explains a lot.

The large raids were the effective ones, the small raids didnt do much.

Beyond the famous Mosquito raids, the RAF used all their medium and light bombers with great effect in the tactical role. Groups of planes numbering less than twenty were often sent against airfields, and would put them out of action for days, weeks or even months.
We all recognise these raids weren't always successful. But, more often than not, the tactical raids would have a higher target destruction percentage than the massive strategic bomber raids.

The massed strategic raids when they went after the transportation targets often blew the railyards to pieces. When they bombed the airfields, they would pput so many craters all over the place, the airfield was often out of action for a couple of days.

Your theory about a couple of well placed bombs on some targets like railyards and airfields that would knock them out as destroyed doesnt hold water as its simple to repair. Lots of holes = lots of dirt needing to be moved.

I have to thank Tony, as his anecdote on the French bridge provided the best example of small, light bombers, carrying small payloads being more useful in certain circumstances.

Hes correct. But sometimes you also want to hit the material piled up on the sides of the bridge. Thats where lots of bombs are needed.

And the fighter bombers did eventually have more success against the smaller bridges than any of the bombers, the -234 included.

While I have discovered the USAAF did generally use more bombers against a target than the RAF, it was still not in the region of 100 - 300 bombers on a single airfield. Glider's description of tactics explains the higher numbers of bombers used.

......

It seems the US 9th AF generally sent seventy-two B-26s on a raid, which I assume to be airfields.[/quote]

Agree'd, and I looked at some of my sources too, and that looks like the 1943 standard for airfield attacks.

Im still looking for middle and late 1944 tallys.

[syscom3]

Originally Posted by Glider

Syscom
Once again you seem to be playing your game of comming up with a statement / position whatever without any support and letting others go to a lot of trouble actually doing the research.
Can I ask what evidence you have to support your statement. e.g numbers of bombers used by the USAF in particular missions, periods of time these targets were knocked out of action. Comparing these to the smaller RAF raids on similar targets.
Your statment that these smaller missions were nothing but stunts, I take it you can support that statement.
Personally I always thought the knocking out of a Headquarters was always a prime target. Just knocking out its communications during a battle I always considered to be a significant achievement.
Destroying or even removing the ability for a stores depot to distribute its fuel and food was always a main aim of airpower, has been from WW1 to the modern day
I am happy to be proved wrong on the above, but await the proof from yourself with interest.
How

blah blah blah.

Ive been trying to say that that precision bombing did not exist in WW2. It happened in a few raids by very well trained crews but as a rule for everyone, those raids were very far and few between, and often didnt have any impact on the course of the war or battle.

It was the massed groups of bombers dropping lots of bombs plastering everything around the aiming point is what did damage and did effect the battles.

72 B26's hitting an airfield will do more lasting damage with hundreds of bombs hitting all over the place, than a few bombers could. And that goes for a lot of other targets too.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by plan_D

US 9th AF sorties:

22 October, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s raid Evreux. *Earlier I mentioned this in the 2nd TAF sorties, this was because 11 Group provided escort on this mission.

24 October, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s escorted by 403 and 421 Sqdn. are attacked by twenty (20) Bf 109s of I./JG 3. *I'm not aware of the target for the 9th AF B-26s as I'm getting the information from the 2nd TAF records.

29 November, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s raid Chievres airfield.

1 December, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s are escorted by 126 Airfield Spitfires on another raid. *126 Airfield is a Mobile HQ

It seems the US 9th AF generally sent seventy-two B-26s on a raid, which I assume to be airfields.

Where did you get the info on the raids. I would be interested in seeing more of that stuff. I have found info like that in books but it seems youve got more info than I have. Would be interesting to have it as well.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Originally Posted by syscom3

blah blah blah.

Do not blah blah blah him. Both pD and gnomey have given you substantial evidence that disproves you and proves you have no concept of how large scale wars are one. As he said you have not backed up your arguements with anything but the same old statements over and over again.

God forbid, think about the infantry grunts that died in small skirmishes against the German infantry because they died for no cause what so ever at all based off of your arguements. Think about it.

[lesofprimus]

Ive been trying to say that that precision bombing did not exist in WW2.

It happened in a few raids by very well trained crews

Ummm, sys, which is it??? Did it happen or not, cause I think ur in over ur head here pal... Small raids did change the course of the war, and in some instance killed as many of the enemy as did the large scale carpet bombing missions....

If the argument is which was more effective at grinding Germany to a halt, it would be the large 100+ bombing raids... But that is not whats at issue here.... U said basically that small unit bombing missions were useless, and its been proven not to be true....

U do know that many large bombing missions sometimes missed their marks by up to several miles???

[plan_D]

"The large raids were the effective ones, the small raids didnt do much."

Why do you believe this? Have you got evidence to back this up?

"The massed strategic raids when they went after the transportation targets often blew the railyards to pieces. When they bombed the airfields, they would pput so many craters all over the place, the airfield was often out of action for a couple of days."

If a large percentage of the bombers hit the target it would completely destroy the marshalling yards, I cannot disagree. But this does not mean that a smaller raid would not destroy the exact same target. There certainly would be less craters around the target, but it doesn't mean there would be less on the target.

When heavy bombers attacked airfields they did manage to crater a very large area, if they went near the target. From 15,000 - 30,000 feet airfields are a hard target to hit precisely. But hitting the fields around the runway don't do anything, they don't need to be filled in and don't affect the managing of the airfield.
A smaller raid by tactical bombers attacking individual targets would provide a far greater hinderance to the enemy. Attacking the control tower, Sqdn. HQ buildings, hangars and cratering the runway is much more efficient.

"Your theory about a couple of well placed bombs on some targets like railyards and airfields that would knock them out as destroyed doesnt hold water as its simple to repair. Lots of holes = lots of dirt needing to be moved."

Lots of holes, not all on important areas. Hangars, buildings and planes are not easily repaired when collapsed, gutted and destroyed. My 'theory' is sound, as it was practised during World War II, and it's still practised to this day.

"Hes correct. But sometimes you also want to hit the material piled up on the sides of the bridge. Thats where lots of bombs are needed.

And the fighter bombers did eventually have more success against the smaller bridges than any of the bombers, the -234 included."

If you wish to hit the "material" around the bridge, a few more bombers could be used. While some attack the bridge itself, the other bombers attack around the bridge.

Fighter-Bombers became extremely useful in the tactical strikes. And these are just an addition to my evidence that you do not need a lot of heavy bombers to destroy large targets. Fighter-Bombers are even smaller than the B-25, B-26 or Mosquito and they did, sometimes, just a good of a job.

The Ar 234 was just as capable, if not more, than any other medium bomber of the war. I never said it's bombing accuracy was special. This whole discussion is about tactical bombers and their usage, "the -234 included."

"Agree'd, and I looked at some of my sources too, and that looks like the 1943 standard for airfield attacks.

Im still looking for middle and late 1944 tallys."

What exactly are your sources, syscom? Can you provide us with some US 9th AF raids in 1943?

" It was the massed groups of bombers dropping lots of bombs plastering everything around the aiming point is what did damage and did effect the battles."

So, the destruction of all those bridges, rail lines, locomotives, HQs, supply depots, railyards, power stations, rocket sites, roads, airfields and various other targets by small tactical bombers, or fighter bombers was a waste of time?

"72 B26's hitting an airfield will do more lasting damage with hundreds of bombs hitting all over the place, than a few bombers could. And that goes for a lot of other targets too."

They would do no more damage because most of the bombs would drop harmlessly on the grass around the airfield.

Since we can't expect to have syscom find some Ninth Air Force raids from 1944;

7 March, 1944, 401 Sqdn. escorted one-hundred and eight ( 108 ) B-26s to Creil Marshalling Yards.

15 March, 1944, 72 B-26s attack Aulnoy marshalling yards.

I assume that the Creil marshalling yards were splattered with bombs, and put out of action. Right syscom? What do your sources say?

Chris, my information comes from 2nd Tactical Air Force - Spartan to Normandy by Christopher Shores & Chris Thomas. It's a day by day account of the 2nd TAF. Not all raids are reported, by each day of operations lists claims and losses.

[syscom3]

Fighter bombers provided the direct support to the troops, with the FAC calling them in.

Multi engined bombers had pre briefed targets that were hit and in no way were the targets changed once they were in the air. Do you have evidence that the medium bombers of the RAF or AAF providing that service?

And so what if the strategic bombers occasionally missed by a few miles. Sometimes the medium bombers and fighter bombers missed by a couple hundred yards with the same result. A miss is as good as a mile.

Now tell me what small raids changed the course of the war or battle? Not the fighter bomber ones, but the medium bomber missions.

[Gnomey]

Supporting the troop isn't the only kind of tactical bombing. There is also the attacking of small infrastructure targets such as bridges, canals, tunnels etc to disrupt enemy supply lines.

There are no medium bomber raids that changed the course of the war in themselves (same with the heavy bomber raids) but as whole the damage the did helped to bring the German transport infrastucture (particularly the railways to a halt). As for battles look at the Normandy campaign, the transportation plan where the heavy and medium bombers went after all of the railway infrastructure. Trains dropped from 100% of capacity to around 30% or less by early June, dramatically hampering the German supply situation. The heavies went after the railyards whereas the medium bombers went on tactical raid on the bridges and tunnels (as have been mentioned in previous posts) as well as airfields. Without this you could say the Allies would of lost the Battle of the buildup, and probably lost the beachhead.