VVS Vs. RAF

[plan_D]

The Luftwaffe were never developing night offensive technology, it was always to counter the British offensive campaign. The Soviet Union would have to do the same as the Germans as the British would block, jam and scramble any Soviet radar.

The night interceptions by the PVO were lucky if anything, as I say the Luftwaffe did not have effective offensive night capabilities. There's a big difference between intercepting blind He-111 with Bf-110 escort with your RADAR intact and intcepting Lancasters with NF Mosquitos with blocked RADAR.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The German night fighter program was quite succesfull actually.

[plan_D]

It wasn't an offensive element, is what I was saying. It was purely on the defensive against the British night offensive campaign.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

That I can agree with then.

[the lancaster kicks ass]

and as has been said, they never actually led the way with electonic warfare, anything they did was to counter what we did first...........

[arras]

Glider >> I did not say there were no mobile radars used, even Japanese had some mobile radar technology at the end of war. I sat none of the countries put in to wide use powerful enough mobile radar platform. By powerful I mean range and ability to measure height.

DerAdlerIstGelandet >> as you sad, that was just project. Was it ever used in combat?

Here is for example site about Japanese Radar Equipment in WWII:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/radar.htm

It is at exelent page about Imperial Japanese Navy:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm ...recomending.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Arras no it was never used in combat. I was just posting it showing that the idea for a AWACS type plane was in the works. The United States actually tookt he idea and used it for there AWACS.

[oehtam]

Originally Posted by Udet

Plan D:

Hold your fire!

You do not have to go there (comparing aircraft for each role).

The La-7 was a very capable plane: rugged, manouverable and well armed.

The point here is as follows:

Delcyros and many others trying to credit the VVS with a quality and organization it simply never enjoyed fail to detect the core of the issue.

Go back to basics, do not go outside the nucleus analyzing specifications of planes, sorties, etc.

We know it, they know it: the losses of the VVS during 1941 were far beyond description: both on the ground and in the air they were skinned alive.

Take into consideration soviet pilots had gained combat experience during the Spanish civil war. Did it show in the skies of their country in 1941?

There was a "gap" however, the winter of 1941, during the red army´s counteroffensive around Moscow: miserable weather simply grounded a Luftwaffe that had sustained low casualties in the previous months of Barbarossa.

(Yes, even flying the ancient Ishaks and Chaikas and modern Mig-3s some remarkable soviet pilots scored kills against bombers and even against Bf 109s; cases were few though.)

Funnily, many historians credit the VVS with having achieved remarkable deeds during such winter. I´d ask them, did soviet pilots arriving east the USSR to join the offensive had any special capabilities and equipment for flying in such weather conditions in 1941? Is "NO" the most likely of the answers?

However, when winter was over, the Luftwaffe retook the role it had played the previous year: Operation Blue in 1942 saw the German pilots continuing the slaughter of the VVS. By mid 1942 more than 85 percent of the VVS units located in the western area of the soviet union littered vast areas of land. A massive cementery of planes and pilots.

And no, i am not mocking soviet pilots nor diminishing their bravery and courage and hate. As I said before, bravery is not an issue in my comments for i am god damned sure they all had guts.

The ultra famous battle of Stalingrad had the same kind of outcome in the air. Extremely high losses for the stubborn and brave VVS bomber formations launched to attack German positions across the Don bend and over the city itself.

Another ultra famous battle, Kursk, the cauldron of July 1943, saw the VVS losing to German fighters only about 370 combat planes in the very first day of the battle, add those lost to Flak and accidents.

I will make the long story short. Conclusions. The core of the deal.

I have the soviet version of the airwarfare against the Luftwaffe. In russian so i do not have to rely on translations that might contain unaccuracies. They do not provide that much info that could help us readers in changing our view. Other than several furious remarks saying of the "burgeois" lies and distortions they amazingly failed to provide the evidence that would prove their case.

If they have the evidence, why not to immediately release it and shut the mouths of those they calle liars and distorters?

They claim that by 1943 the Luftwaffe "had been effectively destroyed". By mid 1943, they say, the Luftwaffe "had ceased to be an effective force due to enormous losses inflicted by the VVS".

Facts and statistics easily shatter such claim. The losses during the first day of action at Kursk and the inability of the VVS to gain air superiority in the Kuban area -where German numerical superiority was slight- both in 1943 are of help proving they do not have a case to defend.

It takes more than 1 and half year to raise a professional and highly skilled and organized army out of the ashes of your slaughtered air force.

Why 1 and a half year? From june 22, 1941 to, say, late 1942 -Stalingrad victory- they mildly admit "they learned bitter lessons".

By mid 1943 they claim the VVS was "an entirely different force".

The VVS never ceased to launch formation after formation of fighters and bombers to attack the Germans suffering breath taking losses.

They never really had the chance to cadre "battle seasoned" squadrons in significant numbers due to the enormous losses suffered.

A different thing happened in the German case: in previous campaigns they had suffered losses that always remained moderate (even during the Battle of Britain). The Luftwaffe had a growing number of battle experienced pilots after every campaign in the west, balkans, mediterranean and africa, because their losses never came nowhere near the insanity of VVS losses during 1941 and 1942 and, yes, 1943 at the hands of the Luftwaffe.

The soviet guys did not enjoy such luxury.

Now add the brutal nature of the soviet regime: a fearsome, powerful and professional army IN YOUR SOIL smashing all soviet armies, until Stalingrad. The absolutely unthinkable will be done to attempt stopping it.

Add that by 1943 the western allies had landed in North Africa and Italia: the soviet regime demanded the opening of new fronts that would relieve them from pressure WITHIN THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

D-day, the allies storm Normandy: Stalin, a skilled politician, had his own political agenda and he did not want his western allies -which he did not trust- to advance faster and further into Europe than his red army could. More pressure to both soviet aircraft producers and pilots. Proper training? Was not their concern.

If there were not Luftwaffe planes to fight, the Yaks did not stay in the air photographing migrating birds: they too were sent out in the ground attack mode as much as the IL-2s. Being slightly armored they were weak and took enormous losses from German ground fire.

So the elements, basics, are:

(1) 1941-late 1942/early 1943. The period when all that mattered was to stop or slow the advancing Wehrmacht: sent them out, all to the fight: enormous losses. Not enough time to train and to organize pilots and units properly.

Units involved suffered so terribly, no significant numbers of battle-experienced pilots to train the new arrivals were left. A Pokryshkin as teacher was the luxury of only a few pilots. Even his unit took important losses; they were not the "super-heros" of the air, as it would be in an American comic book of the Hall of Justice.

(2) Mid 1943-1944-1945. The period when the western allies begin landing in north africa, sicily, italia; then Normandy came to clear the atmosphere as to the unavoidable outcome of the war. Political agenda enters the scenario. To advance faster than the western guys, faster and further: not enough time to properly train and organize the military air force.

That they improved is true. That one or two of their fighters were totally capable by the last year of the war is totally true. That they broke the Luftwaffe all by themselves -date does not matter- is totally untrue.

How stupid!

[evangilder]

You quote all of that to post 2 words?! And that in a thread that hasn't seen a posting in over a year.

If you have an argument to make, then make it. Otherwise keep reading and familiarize yourself with the site before spouting off.

[FLYBOYJ]

Noobs!

[Gnomey]

And it's quoting Udet at that...

[the lancaster kicks ass]

is that les i hear coming?

[Cojimar 1945]

The Soviets did not have to face the full might of the luftwaffe particularly during the later part of the war when German fighters were defending the homeland from bombers. I will try to find some stats on German losses by theatre.

[exec228]

different doctrines folks.
most action of ww2 was undertaken on the ground (and oceans).
soviet doctrine sacrificed VVS to ground support, and Red Army scored sensible results. VVS not was engaged too much against enemy AFs, unless ground OPs required that.
so LW hunters enjoyed scores, Wehrmacht enjoyed loses, Red Army enjoyed (hard and bloody, but decisive) victories and VVS heavily suffered from hunters in favour of army success.
in case of SU vs UK opposition (with another geographical situation), doctrine will be quite different.
i'm almost sure in it, because national socialism and international socialism are somehow similar and could invent similar decisions.

at least TB-7(Pe- for heavy bombing, MiG-3 for altitude fights, Pe-3 for long ranges were ready-to-use projects (though required some refining). Pe-8 gave it's AM-35A in favour of massive production of AM-38 for Il-2. MiG-3 was powered with AM-35A too. anyways, Pe-8 etalon 1943 received M-82 engines, and MiG-3 received 2xShVAK in late 1941, Pe-3 much actively provided far-sea air cover. but both AM-35A users fade out because they were outside of doctrines of eastern front.

as for airborne radar, it was symmetrical: LW did not have strong night bombing power, SU had relaxed experiments with airborne radars. had LW strong force, SU would develop airborne radars more actively. so far, gneis-1 airborne radar was ready in early 1941, and gneis-2 in late 1941. gneis-2 was installed to pe-2. the problem was a carrier: in 1943 SU understood that A-20 was more convenient for radar than pe-2/3.

p.s.about rus-1 redut-n: detection ranges was 120-250km, and during Leningrad siege radar stations alarmed 642 air warnings which broken several major raids to city and port. some radars imho were used at frontlines too.

[lape2002]

Originally Posted by Soren

This highly indicates that you were emplying the La-7 was as good as the Spit XIV:


In any case it doesnt matter, as you just said it yourself that the Spit XIV was better.



The 109 was better than the La-7, as the 'Real' history and aerodynamics testify.





Russian-dream-story



The Spit XIV was better than the La-7 below 5000ft aswell.

Fhew! This man has to be the most peculiar germanophiliac I've ever met! Hey, Germany lost the war in 1945, try to move on ok...