VVS Vs. RAF

[Udet]

Plan D:

*smoochie*

[plan_D]

Not in public, I'm ashamed of you.

[delcyros]

Does it seem to you that I sing a song for the all winning VVS? Did I ever told that they had no losses? Losses are one thing, but none of you is still factoring the combat sorties, which play a huge role.
Udet, I can agree with most what you said here.
I don´t care what some of the neocommunistic authors claim to have done. I just have the losses and records of both sides in front of me and I´m going to tell what happens. Most Luftwaffe losses in personal are on the eastern front, far more than any other single theatre of war. Are you going to dispute this? And what is this telling to you? Do you really think it´s all because the Lufwaffe rules the skies over Russia? Or because of the bad climatic circumstances (which would have even more impact on the bad prepared VVS)?
More Lufwaffe sorties have been flown on the eastern front, than in any other single theatre, also. (ok-if you count all together you closely match parity for the western powers with Africa, Balkan (well, should this go to the western?), Greek, Italy, France , Neatherlands, Norway, bob, Germany, Poland, Africa and so on)
Activity of the Luftwaffe was more focussed on the eastern front than on the western theatres. However, if you look closer to each year you see that this isn´t fact in 39,40 and 44.
I never denied any impact the strategic bombing campaign had (actaully they had well secondaries, like enforced defense), I stay to my statement that it was FAR LESS than expected (expected: crush the war economy=failed)and this is reasoned in the production numbers except for the oil bombing campaign (which effectively shortened the war).
And even here: Jule 44 was the month with the worsest production figures for high grade fuel. If this doesn´t match to the dropped bomb tonnage, than the later bombing was even less effective than the earlier one.
And the number still is 6 to one for the strategic bombing campaign (which is what we are discussing), 3 to one belongs, as you said, to the aerial bombardment, including tactical sorties. That´s something different.
And the Bi-2 is not that bad. It has some well contributions to pioneering technology. Why do you say it is worthless? The Gloster E-39/40, He-178 and DFS-194 are also a pioneering planes (none of them got into service) but I would never say they are a worthless design.
I may go so far with downgrading the role of RAF-impact on the war as I would say the following:
Fact is that the surviving of the SU was key factor for surviving of Britain and the help of the western allies was (in 1941/42) key factor for the surviving of the SU. The VVS binded effectively most of the Luftwaffe in the east, allowing the RAF and US forces to deploy forces in europe and carry the airwar to Germany.
Fact is that the strategic bombing campaign, compared to the tactical sorties of the VVS did reduced the Whermacht in a minor way, while the VVS not only destroyed tanks and equipment (which was also done by the RAF) but also the crews in them, the forces with experience and so on.
And look at the advances of the red army to Germany in 43/44, faster than the advance of the western forces or isn´t it?
I doubt that the Luftwaffe recognized the losses in the east correctly. And from mid 1944 on they could only achieve local air superiority against the VVS for a very short time (period 2.2.-16.2.45 for example). While it is true that they effectively flew against the VVS for a long timeframe and succeeded in repeated destruction of their units, they failed to ensure ruling the skies and they couldn´t prevent those desperate Il-2 to wreck havoc under the german ground forces.

[plan_D]

You've made a huge error in your judgement of the whole situation. The VVS destroyed mostly bombers on the Eastern front. Bombers do not stop other bombers from doing their mission. The VVS didn't tie up significant fighter formations, had those fighter formations been in the West, the West would still have bombed France and Germany.

The highest loss rate of the RAF and USAAF was in 1943 with an average of 5.5% loss per sortie.

You're trying to say that the Western Allied strategic bombing campaign had little or no effect on the German capability to wage war on the Eastern front. You couldn't be more wrong.

[delcyros]

The Luftwaffe moreso destroyed bombers in the west in ´43 than fighters.
And no, I´m not saying that the whole strategic bombing campaign was without effect. I will split it up for you:
primary target oil campaign: nearly reached
secondary: VERY WELL REACHED
primary target on production: failed
secondary: reached
primary target on enemy morale: failed
secondary: failed
The average loss rate of RAF and VVS (over the whole war) is about the same (see above).

[plan_D]

The primary task of bombing production plants was to hamper production. Think logically, every tank or shell destroyed in a bombing raid has to be re-built as well as rehousing the labourers and rebuilding any damage to the factory.

All takes time and resources. It was far from a failure. Look at the percentages of Bomber Command strikes too, 20% were against cities! A mere 20%!

[FLYBOYJ]

Also think about the tooling used to build tanks and planes, etc. Tooling takes a lot of time to build and inspect. Destroy the tooling, destroy the product!

[delcyros]

Well, This is what I am agreeing in.
And if you take the strategic war for this goal it worked. However, if you look into the memos of leading UK/US airforce generals you will see that the purpose was:
(1) engage the enemy civil morale in a way that the germans are forced to lay down the arms (impossible with conventional weapons)
(2) crush the enemys production (not just delay its increase in output)
(3) destroy communication ways and transportation systems
and later:
(4) crush the enemys oil production

I have read many books (german as well as english) stating that the strategic bombing campaign has achieved all these goals. And I am going to disagree in this.
And while it is completely true that tooling devices are needed you are still not factoring that the Luftwaffe was never short on planes in 44/45 or engines. It was (a) experienced pilots
-and we have seen that more personall losses of crewman are on the east than on the west
and (b) fuel shortage
-which only played a role at the Luftwaffe for the grounding of the He-177 and most bomber units. Later (turn 44/45) it played a role for the training capabilities of fighter pilots and not until early 45 for piston engined fighter (jet driven planes suffered not that much since they could take lower grade fuel also).
The general shortage of fuel moreso hampered all ground activties, esspeccially the tanks. However in this timeframe the end was very, very close.

[FLYBOYJ]

Agreed, but by this time 44/45 wasn't German arms production (example aircraft manufacturing) dispersed at many locations? I think German war production planners were smart enough not only to spread out their prodcution facilities, but to build several sets of production tooling and disperse them as well.

[Glider]

I think it should be remembered that its quite hard to destroy the tooling itself. The ball bearing raids on Germany proved that as did the German raids on Russian factories. The buildings can be knocked down but the tooling is far more difficult to destroy.
The campaign against the towns certainly hurt the Germans and made them realise that they were unlikely to win the war but that isn't the same as destroying their will to resist. In that we failed completely. The bombing of the oil production facilities did a lot of damage and its a shame that the British didn't join in what was largely US assult. By 1944 we had the ability to hit quite small targets and a combined approach could well have succeded in significantly reducing the fighting ability of all german forces.

[Glider]

Udet, I forgot to say that I thought your posting of 4,36 was excellent. There is one thing that you may want to add. The Pre war Russian airforce was a well trained and (for its time) reasionably equipped airforce. They learnt a lot of lessons in Spain and beat the Japenese airforce in Manchuria, which was no small achievement. However in the Stalin purges just before the war almost every officer of any quality was killed, jailed or removed from command. This must have had an effect on the performance of their airforce in the first 12-18 months of the conflict against the Germans.
How much we will never know, as its one of those great unknowns. However it meant they didn't start with a well led force and as you rightly said didn't get the chance to recover unitl much later.

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by Glider

I think it should be remembered that its quite hard to destroy the tooling itself.

NO - Have you ever seen aircraft production tooling? Its big, bulky, usually made from hardened steel with a lot of details that bolt on. If you could find it, its a sitting duck! The bigger tooling is usually sitting in the middle of a production factory. You need well made tools to make aligned fuselages, wings, etc. This is the Achilles heel of war production. Destroy the tooling, you destroy the product!

[Glider]

FJ, Yes i have seen tooling of this nature also the tooling for APC's. It is big, bulky, and pretty solid lumps of meal. What I am saying is the to destroy the tooling, you need to hit it. Knocking the building down around it won't do the job.

[plan_D]

Still, logic evades you. By destroying a factory you destroy the what is being built there, that has to be built again. It takes time and resources to relocate, rebuild and in some cases, retool a factory.

Had the bombing never occured then the production levels would have risen far beyond the amount that we read of today.

The only thing I see in your argument that I agree with is that the strategic bombing did not collapse the Germans will to resist. They reduced the capability of the German war machine with each raid. The lack of oil and aviation spirits affected the Luftwaffe much greater than you seem to believe.



A nice little fact for you, Glider, Bomber Command did get involved with the bombing of oil installations. In fact, in November 1944, Bomber Command dropped more tonnage on oil installations than the US 8th AF.
With hindsight we can see that in 1944 the end was nigh but how much longer could it have dragged on if the Germans would have kept the oil to keep their Panzer formations mobile? Many a tank left behind because they lacked the fuel. Many the plane grounded because they lacked the fuel...

[lesofprimus]

Heres some shots of the effects of a large scale bombing campaign... Not much left..... Think u could find tooling machinery in there????