Westland P.9 Whirlwind (1 Viewer)

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To return to the subject of the thread.... I recall that the Napier Dagger was a contender for a Peregrine alternative as well as the Taurus. The MKVIII was a close match and it's weight of 100kg more dry matching the installed weight (ie with radiators, cooling fluid etc.) of the Peregrine. What do folk think of the merits of a Dagger Whirlwind? From what I can find about service use of the Dagger, it needed more maintenance and pilot training and served effectively in the well trained Auxiliary Air Force squadron Hectors but less well in wartime recruited Hereford squadrons.
 
(I do apologize for maintaining the thread off topic)
The Pacific war did not start until December 1941; the first Squadrons, with Spitfires, arrived in Australia in June 1942, which, considering that they had to go by sea, is not bad.

Thanks for clarification of the arrival date of the 1st Spitfires in Australia; it seems it took RAAF some 8 months to conduct 1st combat sorties (Feb 1943)?

So a country, with the size of population of Germany, was able to do things faster than the U.K., (less than 1/4 its size, and with one of its main factories destroyed by bombing.)What a surprise.

If I've decyphered the 1st part right, the said country is the UK, the same country that out-produced 3 main Axis forces (in numbers of planes) for a better part of the war, 1941 included?

Also, you cannot deploy what you do not have; the Spitfire I II could not be tropicalised, and the III IV did not fulfil their promise. The first Vb arrived in mid-June 1941, and the first tropicalised Vb was delivered 13-12-41, with the Vc (with a completely redesigned wing)around that date as well.[/

Quoting a source about incapability of Spit I/II to be tropicalised, followed by quoting a source about Mk III not fulfilling it's promises would've be okay. Spits Vc arriving in CBI in Sept 1943 don't seem like something done in haste, too.

I never said any such thing, but criticising, without knowing the facts, is pointless.

Your implication was that they were more interested in saving money, which is way wide of the mark.

I will not reply on this.

So, now you're criticising them for not sending Hurricanes to the Pacific, while, a short time ago, you were criticising them for building more Hurricanes.

Nothing wrong with that - if brass thinks they have abundant number of fighters, how come they're not having a vast numerical advantage over it's enemies? If Hurricane was such a good fighter from late 1941 on, how come Nates Oscars (let alone MC 202s and Zeroes) are racking it's kills so easy? Someone say it's about pilots with low time - who needs to provide trained manpower? Somebody else will say it's lack of early warning - were Japanese known for their radar stations, directing their fighters?

Finally, 'sending' and 'building' are not the same words, not even synonyms.

I think, too, that fighting, and dying, over France, is hardly "messing" with the Germans.

Finally, we boil it down to the trained manpower - the pilots in unnecessary jeopardy. Was it a bigger mistake to send them into hands of LW in 1941-42 over France Low countries, or to seat them into Hurricanes produced from 1942 on?

As I've shown, deliveries were being sent to the Pacific, and the Middle East, in 1942, and perhaps you can indicate how it would have been so easy to deliver aircraft to Egypt, with so much territory, in Northen Africa, in enemy hands?

Deliveries were surely made. Two or three wings worth of airplanes pilots, sent within 3 months in one destination, are not same thing as two or three squadrons sent at the same place during the same time, and that was how it happened.
As for sending the planes to Egipt, my take is that Axis tanks were not parked at the surface of Atlantic, nor the Indian ocean - that can confirm the Spitfires delivered to Australia.

I know that you are unaware of this, but the British government had promised the Australians that, should the Japanese threaten to invade, we would have completely withdrawn from the Mediterranean, and sent everything to their aid; doesn't exactly gel with an uncaring administration, does it?

I'm glad that you know about what I'm aware and what I'm not.
 
To return to the subject of the thread.... I recall that the Napier Dagger was a contender for a Peregrine alternative as well as the Taurus. The MKVIII was a close match and it's weight of 100kg more dry matching the installed weight (ie with radiators, cooling fluid etc.) of the Peregrine. What do folk think of the merits of a Dagger Whirlwind? From what I can find about service use of the Dagger, it needed more maintenance and pilot training and served effectively in the well trained Auxiliary Air Force squadron Hectors but less well in wartime recruited Hereford squadrons.

According to some sources the engines in the Hectors were Dagger IIIMs rated at 725HP at 2.25lbs of boost. The Engines in the Herefords were Dagger VIIIs rated at 995-1000hp at 6lbs boost and several hundred more RPM.
 
Thanks for clarification of the arrival date of the 1st Spitfires in Australia; it seems it took RAAF some 8 months to conduct 1st combat sorties (Feb 1943)?

Clarifying on spitfire deployment to australia, i would reccommend the following link plus the AWM archives, both of which contain a great deal of information on this issue. I cant locate the AWM links, but here is the link to the ADF serials site:

Welcome to ADF Serials


Spitfires were first shipped to Australia 27 sep '42, but were not handed over to the RAAF until the end of november. Modifications to make them suitable for tropical operations were needed (dont know what that entailed) and not all of the shipment arrived until mid to late october. The arrival of the spits to the SWPac TO was shrouded in great secrecy......at that time Allied aircraft of all types were being decimated by the japanese and great things were expected of the spits. the RAAF wanted to hit with maximum force and surprise, so they took their time in deploying the aircraft.

There were other limitations of the type that caused considerable concern at the time. There was an acute shortage of airfield space in the forward areas, and those that were availablle were all rough, dirt strips. Moreover at the time of their arrival, the threat of invasion was very real, so in effect all of australi was a war zone. The relatively fragile undercarriage and narrow tracks were a cause for concern....

On receival of this batch of 60 aircraft, the spitfires were first handed over to an OTU (no2 I think), before allocation to 1st Fighter Wing.

In the air fighting over Darwin, the Spitfire was unable to get the better of the Japanese Zeroes or Oscars that fought against them. Tese aircraft of the 5th and 48th Air divisions plus the aircraft of the 201st (I think....working from memory) Naval Air Wing were very experienced pilots, and in my opinion, the Australians simply used the wrong tactics against them. Spitfires in Europe had found the best tactics against aircraft like the Me109 was to get into a turning battle. this was absolutely the wrong thing to do against the japanese, and I think it took the CW and British forces somewhat longer to work this out than the American units, who were issued specific orders in october not to engage in that way with the Japanese.

Against other types the spits were quite successful, as were the hurricanes in the CBI, but the Spits also suffered heavy attrition from landing and t/o accidents and simply running out of fuel.


If I've decyphered the 1st part right, the said country is the UK, the same country that out-produced 3 main Axis forces (in numbers of planes) for a better part of the war, 1941 included?

Allies were on the strategic defensive at this time, but in some Tos, like western Europe, were more or less forced to go on to the attack, to reduce the pressure on their allies (Soviets in particular). Was an expensive excercise. Similar issues in the Far east...

Nothing wrong with that - if brass thinks they have abundant number of fighters, how come they're not having a vast numerical advantage over it's enemies? If Hurricane was such a good fighter from late 1941 on, how come Nates Oscars (let alone MC 202s and Zeroes) are racking it's kills so easy? Someone say it's about pilots with low time - who needs to provide trained manpower? Somebody else will say it's lack of early warning - were Japanese known for their radar stations, directing their fighters?
Dont think anyone said it was such a good fighter. However there is no evidence that it suffered a heavier attrition rate than anyone except perhaps in the CBI. The allies throughout 1940-41 were suffering heavy attrition for all types, in all TOs. Hurricanes, Spitfires, or any other allied type were not exempt from that problem.


Finally, 'sending' and 'building' are not the same words, not even synonyms.



Finally, we boil it down to the trained manpower - the pilots in unnecessary jeopardy. Was it a bigger mistake to send them into hands of LW in 1941-42 over France Low countries, or to seat them into Hurricanes produced from 1942 on?



Deliveries were surely made. Two or three wings worth of airplanes pilots, sent within 3 months in one destination, are not same thing as two or three squadrons sent at the same place during the same time, and that was how it happened.
As for sending the planes to Egipt, my take is that Axis tanks were not parked at the surface of Atlantic, nor the Indian ocean - that can confirm the Spitfires delivered to Australia.



I'm glad that you know about what I'm aware and what I'm not.[/QUOTE]
 
Thanks for clarification of the arrival date of the 1st Spitfires in Australia; it seems it took RAAF some 8 months to conduct 1st combat sorties (Feb 1943)?

Clarifying on spitfire deployment to australia, i would reccommend the following link plus the AWM archives, both of which contain a great deal of information on this issue. I cant locate the AWM links, but here is the link to the ADF serials site:

Welcome to ADF Serials


Spitfires were first shipped to Australia 27 sep '42, but were not handed over to the RAAF until the end of november. Modifications to make them suitable for tropical operations were needed (dont know what that entailed) and not all of the shipment arrived until mid to late october. The arrival of the spits to the SWPac TO was shrouded in great secrecy......at that time Allied aircraft of all types were being decimated by the japanese and great things were expected of the spits. the RAAF wanted to hit with maximum force and surprise, so they took their time in deploying the aircraft.

There were other limitations of the type that caused considerable concern at the time. There was an acute shortage of airfield space in the forward areas, and those that were availablle were all rough, dirt strips. Moreover at the time of their arrival, the threat of invasion was very real, so in effect all of australi was a war zone. The relatively fragile undercarriage and narrow tracks were a cause for concern....

On receival of this batch of 60 aircraft, the spitfires were first handed over to an OTU (no2 I think), before allocation to 1st Fighter Wing.

In the air fighting over Darwin, the Spitfire was unable to get the better of the Japanese Zeroes or Oscars that fought against them. Tese aircraft of the 5th and 48th Air divisions plus the aircraft of the 201st (I think....working from memory) Naval Air Wing were very experienced pilots, and in my opinion, the Australians simply used the wrong tactics against them. Spitfires in Europe had found the best tactics against aircraft like the Me109 was to get into a turning battle. this was absolutely the wrong thing to do against the japanese, and I think it took the CW and British forces somewhat longer to work this out than the American units, who were issued specific orders in october not to engage in that way with the Japanese.

Against other types the spits were quite successful, as were the hurricanes in the CBI, but the Spits also suffered heavy attrition from landing and t/o accidents and simply running out of fuel.


If I've decyphered the 1st part right, the said country is the UK, the same country that out-produced 3 main Axis forces (in numbers of planes) for a better part of the war, 1941 included?

Allies were on the strategic defensive at this time, but in some Tos, like western Europe, were more or less forced to go on to the attack, to reduce the pressure on their allies (Soviets in particular). Was an expensive excercise. Similar issues in the Far east...

Nothing wrong with that - if brass thinks they have abundant number of fighters, how come they're not having a vast numerical advantage over it's enemies? If Hurricane was such a good fighter from late 1941 on, how come Nates Oscars (let alone MC 202s and Zeroes) are racking it's kills so easy? Someone say it's about pilots with low time - who needs to provide trained manpower? Somebody else will say it's lack of early warning - were Japanese known for their radar stations, directing their fighters?

Dont think anyone said it was such a good fighter. However there is no evidence that it suffered a heavier attrition rate than anyone except perhaps in the CBI. The allies throughout 1940-41 were suffering heavy attrition for all types, in all TOs. Hurricanes, Spitfires, or any other allied type were not exempt from that problem.

Allied problems were multiple, and you have hit on some of them. But it simply is untrue that the Spits and hurricanes were suffering heavier attrition than other types at this time.


Finally, we boil it down to the trained manpower - the pilots in unnecessary jeopardy. Was it a bigger mistake to send them into hands of LW in 1941-42 over France Low countries, or to seat them into Hurricanes produced from 1942 on?


I suggest you study military strategy a little more before attampting this kind of judgement. Have a look at Lees conduct in the seven days battles, and you will work out the reasoning for the RAFs success, in spite of its losses in 1941. Despite fighting a series of battles that individually were heavier in losses for them, it was overall successful in the objectives of those battles, particaullrly the tactical battles over france and the low countries in 1941-2. without that sacxifice the LW would have been in much better shape to fight in 1943-4 than it actually was. RA would have had time to rectify the numerous problems that its suffered from.


And finally, once again, we find sweeping, yet unsubstantiated claims about Hurricane loss rates being much higher than other aircraft. Statements made without a shred of supporting evidence.....

Deliveries were surely made. Two or three wings worth of airplanes pilots, sent within 3 months in one destination, are not same thing as two or three squadrons sent at the same place during the same time, and that was how it happened.
As for sending the planes to Egipt, my take is that Axis tanks were not parked at the surface of Atlantic, nor the Indian ocean - that can confirm the Spitfires delivered to Australia.
Not at all sure what this means, but my guess is that you are tryiung to say why did they not send massive amounts of Spits overseas......well the main reason was logistical. Put simply, the Spit was a Highly specialised type made for one purpose really, and it did that very well. The hurricanes of 1941-2 were more durable, and more general purpose, plus they were not considered as essential to the main TO. Sending out two or three squadrons in 1941 to Egypt required an enormous effort in terms of shipping, something in very short supply. sending out specialised aircraft that cant do two or three things on the same airframe is a luxury unable to be afforded at that time, plus they were not considered necessary anyway, because the hurricanes and curiss aircraft were filling the roles quite adequately anyway.
 
Clarifying on spitfire deployment to australia, i would reccommend the following link plus the AWM archives, both of which contain a great deal of information on this issue. I cant locate the AWM links, but here is the link to the ADF serials site:

Welcome to ADF Serials


Spitfires were first shipped to Australia 27 sep '42, but were not handed over to the RAAF until the end of november. Modifications to make them suitable for tropical operations were needed (dont know what that entailed) and not all of the shipment arrived until mid to late october. The arrival of the spits to the SWPac TO was shrouded in great secrecy......at that time Allied aircraft of all types were being decimated by the japanese and great things were expected of the spits. the RAAF wanted to hit with maximum force and surprise, so they took their time in deploying the aircraft.

Thanks for the information. Hence it took 10 months to ship Spitfires from GB to down under.

There were other limitations of the type that caused considerable concern at the time. There was an acute shortage of airfield space in the forward areas, and those that were availablle were all rough, dirt strips. Moreover at the time of their arrival, the threat of invasion was very real, so in effect all of australi was a war zone. The relatively fragile undercarriage and narrow tracks were a cause for concern....

On receival of this batch of 60 aircraft, the spitfires were first handed over to an OTU (no2 I think), before allocation to 1st Fighter Wing.

Thanks again; think I wouldn't be off mark saying that both 109 Spit were managing to use less then ideal air strips, from Eastern front to elsewhere.

In the air fighting over Darwin, the Spitfire was unable to get the better of the Japanese Zeroes or Oscars that fought against them. Tese aircraft of the 5th and 48th Air divisions plus the aircraft of the 201st (I think....working from memory) Naval Air Wing were very experienced pilots, and in my opinion, the Australians simply used the wrong tactics against them. Spitfires in Europe had found the best tactics against aircraft like the Me109 was to get into a turning battle. this was absolutely the wrong thing to do against the japanese, and I think it took the CW and British forces somewhat longer to work this out than the American units, who were issued specific orders in october not to engage in that way with the Japanese.

Against other types the spits were quite successful, as were the hurricanes in the CBI, but the Spits also suffered heavy attrition from landing and t/o accidents and simply running out of fuel.

...

Allies were on the strategic defensive at this time, but in some Tos, like western Europe, were more or less forced to go on to the attack, to reduce the pressure on their allies (Soviets in particular). Was an expensive excercise. Similar issues in the Far east...

All okay, but the part about Hurris being succesful in CBI.
As for running out of fuel, it took for Spit VIII (the one with greater internal fuel) to arrive there at CBI some 18 monts after it's 1st deployment in ETO?

Dont think anyone said it was such a good fighter. However there is no evidence that it suffered a heavier attrition rate than anyone except perhaps in the CBI. The allies throughout 1940-41 were suffering heavy attrition for all types, in all TOs. Hurricanes, Spitfires, or any other allied type were not exempt from that problem.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but RAF in ETO was fielding overwhelming numbers of Spitfires vs. Hurricane.
Stalin was complaining: My allies keep sending me Hurricanes and Tomahawks, but rarely Spitfires and Airacobras.
I've posted about losses vs. IJN/IJA types in this thread; Hurricane was loosing 2:1 vs. a type more appropriate for Spanish civil war, than 1942.

I'd say UK/RAF/Allies have had a better horse to bet, than the Hurricane.

Allied problems were multiple, and you have hit on some of them. But it simply is untrue that the Spits and hurricanes were suffering heavier attrition than other types at this time.

No need to put the words in my mouth - I've never said anything about Spitfire suffering any heavy attrition, even less to say it fared worse than other types.
As for 'other types', there is a post by Ray Leonard ( http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...s-grumman-f4f-4-wildcat-1550-2.html#post85250 ) where he details about F4Fs losses victories, based by Lungstrom's book - basically, its 1:1 vs Zero, in 1942. (I do not claim F4F was holding a great advantage vs. Hurricane)

Finally, we boil it down to the trained manpower - the pilots in unnecessary jeopardy. Was it a bigger mistake to send them into hands of LW in 1941-42 over France Low countries, or to seat them into Hurricanes produced from 1942 on?


I suggest you study military strategy a little more before attampting this kind of judgement. Have a look at Lees conduct in the seven days battles, and you will work out the reasoning for the RAFs success, in spite of its losses in 1941. Despite fighting a series of battles that individually were heavier in losses for them, it was overall successful in the objectives of those battles, particaullrly the tactical battles over france and the low countries in 1941-2. without that sacxifice the LW would have been in much better shape to fight in 1943-4 than it actually was. RA would have had time to rectify the numerous problems that its suffered from.

There are victories and 'victories'. While it's normal for a war that people get killed, I wouldn't say a Soviet-style (or WWI-style) warfare was the greatest thing for RAF to undertake then there.

And finally, once again, we find sweeping, yet unsubstantiated claims about Hurricane loss rates being much higher than other aircraft. Statements made without a shred of supporting evidence.....

Covered above.

Not at all sure what this means, but my guess is that you are tryiung to say why did they not send massive amounts of Spits overseas......well the main reason was logistical. Put simply, the Spit was a Highly specialised type made for one purpose really, and it did that very well. The hurricanes of 1941-2 were more durable, and more general purpose, plus they were not considered as essential to the main TO. Sending out two or three squadrons in 1941 to Egypt required an enormous effort in terms of shipping, something in very short supply. sending out specialised aircraft that cant do two or three things on the same airframe is a luxury unable to be afforded at that time, plus they were not considered necessary anyway, because the hurricanes and curiss aircraft were filling the roles quite adequately anyway.

I do agree that it required shipping to send Spits overseas, but that goes for every plane sent - hardly an argument vs. sending ,Spits in particular, to down under on anywhere. Could you please provide some info about Spitfires in Egypt in 1941?
If you refer to the Hurricane's ability to carry bombs, how big were those, and how far away he was capable to carry a decent bomb load? What happens when the plots see enemy fighters - drop their bombs, hence suffering mission kill. Spit V in the same position stands chance to best enemy fighter, Hurri far less. The Hurri IID is as good fighter as it's IL2, so it's not a one air fame for 3 tasks.
 
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Thanks for the information. Hence it took 10 months to ship Spitfires from GB to down under.
Only if you say that, the moment Pearl Harbour was attacked, everyone knew that Australia was in danger, which is manifestly untrue. Three Squadrons left the U.K. at the beginning of June, and took three months, by sea, to arrive; they arrived without aircraft, because they'd been "borrowed," at Capetown, and sent up the the Med, so the Australians had to wait for a second delivery to arrive. They became operational at the end of November, and scored their first success on February 6th.
As for running out of fuel, it took for Spit VIII (the one with greater internal fuel) to arrive there at CBI some 18 monts after it's 1st deployment in ETO?
The VIII was never deployed in Europe (unless you count the invasion of Italy,) and did not enter service (first in the Med) until Spring 1943, with Australia getting their first on January 6th., 1944; April 1943 - January 1944 does not = 18 months, or didn't when I went to school.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but RAF in ETO was fielding overwhelming numbers of Spitfires vs. Hurricane.
Stalin was complaining: My allies keep sending me Hurricanes and Tomahawks, but rarely Spitfires and Airacobras.
When you're trying to draw the enemy into combat, you don't stake out a sacrificial lamb for him to kill. Leigh-Mallory could never see the folly of sending fighter pilots to their deaths, in the useless "Rhubarbs." It took the likes of Johnson to get it stopped.
Stalin was always complaining, but, when Rolls-Royce representatives went to see how their engines were coping, they found them tipped out into the mud, and the Russians using the crates to live in.
I'd say UK/RAF/Allies have had a better horse to bet, than the Hurricane.
In 1941/42, name it.
Finally, we boil it down to the trained manpower - the pilots in unnecessary jeopardy. Was it a bigger mistake to send them into hands of LW in 1941-42 over France Low countries, or to seat them into Hurricanes produced from 1942 on?
In hindsight, yes, but, at the time, what choice did they have, leave the whole battlefield to the enemy?
Could you please provide some info about Spitfires in Egypt in 1941?
We already have; they had to be tropicalised
If you refer to the Hurricane's ability to carry bombs, how big were those, and how far away he was capable to carry a decent bomb load? What happens when the plots see enemy fighters - drop their bombs, hence suffering mission kill.
Even Luftwaffe bombers were known to jettison their loads when attacked, so that argument leads nowhere. Hurricanes could carry 2 x 250lb bombs under the wings, with 1 x 500lb under the fuselage; I have no idea of the range, but the armies were quite close enough in the desert, and over the Imphal ridge, for range not to matter very much.
You know, this hijacking of the Whirlwind thread should really stop.
 
Only if you say that, the moment Pearl Harbour was attacked, everyone knew that Australia was in danger, which is manifestly untrue.

I agree with that. OTOH, British forces have experienced the swift loss of Malaya Singapore, but it was not until September 1943 for Spits to fly 1st combat sorties in CBI.

Three Squadrons left the U.K. at the beginning of June, and took three months, by sea, to arrive; they arrived without aircraft, because they'd been "borrowed," at Capetown, and sent up the the Med, so the Australians had to wait for a second delivery to arrive. They became operational at the end of November, and scored their first success on February 6th.

I see - after the 1st 'delivery', it was 3 additional months for another shipment to be sent. Something to applaud?

The VIII was never deployed in Europe (unless you count the invasion of Italy,) and did not enter service (first in the Med) until Spring 1943, with Australia getting their first on January 6th., 1944; April 1943 - January 1944 does not = 18 months, or didn't when I went to school.

I stand corrected.

When you're trying to draw the enemy into combat, you don't stake out a sacrificial lamb for him to kill. Leigh-Mallory could never see the folly of sending fighter pilots to their deaths, in the useless "Rhubarbs." It took the likes of Johnson to get it stopped.
Stalin was always complaining, but, when Rolls-Royce representatives went to see how their engines were coping, they found them tipped out into the mud, and the Russians using the crates to live in.

Seems we agree about useless 'Rhubarbs'.

[about RAF/Allies having a better bet than Hurricane]
In 1941/42, name it.

Spitfire.

In hindsight, yes, but, at the time, what choice did they have, leave the whole battlefield to the enemy?

Johnson got it right, so I'll take his words for it.

[about Spits in Egypt in 1941]
We already have; they had to be tropicalised

That's pretty weak answer.

Even Luftwaffe bombers were known to jettison their loads when attacked, so that argument leads nowhere. Hurricanes could carry 2 x 250lb bombs under the wings, with 1 x 500lb under the fuselage; I have no idea of the range, but the armies were quite close enough in the desert, and over the Imphal ridge, for range not to matter very much.

Even a fighter that carries bombs needs air superiority, or parity at least, to accomplish the bombing raid. Placement of one's own airstrip near to the front line doesn't seem like a good idea, if one is up against an enemy that posseses bigger assets, since the airfield can be attacked even with fighter planes.
A bombing party that needs 1 trained pilot per 1000 lbs of bombs doesn't stand up well in comparison vs. a bombing party that needs 1 pilot for each 3000lbs of bombs carried (= proper bombers). A proper bomber can be flown from airstrips further away from battlefield; a converted fighter hardly can.
Last, but not least: where were Hurribomber's pilots leaving their radiators, while taking off with under-fuselage bomb?

You know, this hijacking of the Whirlwind thread should really stop.

Agreed.
 
Yul asked and now I'm ordering: Get back on topic before this gets ugly. If you want to argue the merits of Hurricane deliveries to the rest of the world, please start another thread.
 
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed to deal with Germany first, so the air forces concentrated on Europe

Expecting of Stalin to turn vs. Japan in 1941-44 is non-starter anyway.
USAAC is deploying many units into SWP, from early 1942 (to say nothing about USN USMC).
The true will of the UK to go all-out vs. Germany is in collision with a declaration claiming UK will leave Med in case of a threat vs. Australia. Hurricanes are arriving into CBI, from January 1942.
So, while there really was a 'Germany first' grand strategy agreed, that hardly meant it was in 100% effect, along with an inability of one of members to do something else anyway.

Two months, actually; I said that they became operational at the end of November, while the RAAF took delivery of them on the 8th. (meaning, of course, that they arrived in port before that date.) It would be interesting to see how you could get a second delivery of Spitfires dismantled, crated up, organise a convoy, and sufficient escorts (with the originals still on their way to Australia) in much less than the 2 months that it actually took (to arrive two months after the first convoy, the second must have been already on its way.)

Then we have a situation of left hand not knowing what right hand is doing - Spits allocated for Australia are sent to the NA (a month after they've left UK). Was that with the blessing from RAF/whomever? If it was, when were Aussies informed, plus, was the another batch being made ready for shipment as soon as the decision was taken to re-route the planes?

Which couldn't carry bombs, remember?

1st, it could, remeber?
2nd, my remark about a 'better bet' was directed for parsifal's comment (not yours):

The allies throughout 1940-41 were suffering heavy attrition for all types, in all TOs. Hurricanes, Spitfires, or any other allied type were not exempt from that problem.

That's because I don't like having to repeat myself; Marks I II couldn't carry the extra fuel oil needed to get into Egypt (or Malta,) and the only Spitfires with large oil tanks were the tropicalised Vb Vc, which also needed the filters to cope with the sand.

So, despite arriving in Egypt by the sea, they needed increased fuel oil to arrive there?
Again, I was asking parsifal about the particularies of sening the Spits in 1941, in Egypt

[about planes needing air superiority, or at least parity in air to make a succesful bombing raid]
No, it doesn't; it needs a determined, skillful (and, at times, lucky) pilot

The RAF bomber crews tried that in 1939-40, LW tried that in BoB, B-17s tried that in 1942-43, VVS in 1941-42. We all know how that ended.
Now, there was instances when bombers 'got through', but relying on it every time is not something good for one's health in the war time.

A bomb on a desert airfield just makes a (refillable) hole in acres of sand; even the Luftwaffe, with all their resources in 1940, only put one U.K. airfield completely out of action for one day

A bomb on a French airport (or a strafing run by a well-performing fighter unit) ruins a day for all those Amiots, LeOs, Potez etc - who cares about dirt or grass? .
Fighter Command airports were not at the front line, and Luftwaffe was barely having parity in fighters in BoB. RAF was outnumbered in CBI in 1942.
RAF had radars in BoB, but close to none in CBI in 1942, so the attack on the airport can easily pay off.

How many single-seat aircraft could carry a 3,000lb bomb-load?

Plenty of them, but I did not say 'single-seat aircraft' when saying a' proper bomber'.

Last, but not least: where were Hurribomber's pilots leaving their radiators, while taking off with under-fuselage bomb?
Behind the bomb, but, admittedly, they usually kept to the wing bombs.

That way the UC can't be retracted, even if we remove the inboard wheel covers in order to make space for a bomb:
http://www.albentley-drawings.com/images/Hurricane%20GA1.jpg
 
No worries. I thought that was the case. :)

Its just I can see things starting to o downhill. You guys are making a good discussion but it really shouldn't be in this thread.
 
Hi
Now i did see a sketch around about the late 70's of something, i will try to see if I can find it over the weekend.
cheers
Jerry
The Welkin was designed to Specification 4/40, issued in July 1940, which called for a pressurised high altitude fighter, armed with 6 x 20mm cannon, able to reach 450 mph at 25,000 ft and was preferably to be powered by Rolls-Royce RM.65Ms (later Merlin 60s) using two-stage, two-speed superchargers [Interesting to note that R-R was already developing the Merlin with this supercharger]. At first the P-14 closely resembled the Whirlwind, including using some parts, but the idea of using any Whirlwind parts was rejected and the P 14 which became the Welkin only bore a family resemblance. Design go-ahead was given on 19 January 1941 and the first prototype first flew 1 November 1942. (4+ Publication, Westland Welkin F.Mk I, N.F Mk. II, (2005) p. 1.)
 
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To return to the subject of the thread.... I recall that the Napier Dagger was a contender for a Peregrine alternative as well as the Taurus. The MKVIII was a close match and it's weight of 100kg more dry matching the installed weight (ie with radiators, cooling fluid etc.) of the Peregrine. What do folk think of the merits of a Dagger Whirlwind? From what I can find about service use of the Dagger, it needed more maintenance and pilot training and served effectively in the well trained Auxiliary Air Force squadron Hectors but less well in wartime recruited Hereford squadrons.

As far as I can see the Dagger was never considered by the Air Ministry when framing Specification F37/35 which led to development of the Whirwind: there was some thought given to redeveloping Rolls-Royce engines to incorporate a 'moteur-cannon', but this was rejected very quickly. The Dagger was fitted to the Martin-Baker MB 2, but only because it was offered to M-B by Napier, not because the Air Ministry wanted the engine to be used in a fighter.
 
I too doubt of the Air Ministry suggested Daggers but it has been mentioned somewhere that it was considered by Petter when looking for Peregrine alternatives. It was a production engine that gave similar power and would free up the inner wing radiators etc. for further fuel tankage. On 100 octane and reasonable boost 1,000bhp would not be unreachable.

On a WI basis I could see an armoured cockpit where the cannons now are and twin 40mm cannon and ammunition in place of the pilot to balance the CofG to give an aircooled ground attack version with 2,000 bhp in 1941.
 
I would say that before the war that the Exe may have been a better air cooled alternative. Certainly heavier than a Dagger (I think), but also more power potential. The Exe was 180lb heavier, but was 5l (320ci) larger in capacity and had a power rating of 1150hp.
 
The Exe was barely more than a project while the Dagger was in production. Yes it was noisier (less so with projected ejector exhausts) but the cooling issues were ones manageable with pilot training and better pilot notes. Mind you, groundcrews (RAuxAF and Irish) hated maintaining them. It was a doable project in a feasible time frame. If the Whirwind had gone Napier from the beginning RR could have made more Merlins and Fairey could have their preferred twin engined Battle: even with Defiant turrets and Defiants as conventional fighters. Win win all round; with 20/20 hindsight.
 

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