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Originally Posted by R Leonard The Kriegsmarine had no naval doctrine that included carriers. Great Britain, Japan, and
the US, the major players in the aircraft carrier business, had been operating pure aircraft
carriers since the 1920’s in case of the later two and, without looking it up, about 1918 for
Great Britain. By "pure carrier" I mean carriers whose airplanes are wheeled, are
recovered aboard ship by some sort of arrestor arrangement (however primitive in the early
years), and could also be operated from land bases. Further, the aircraft in use (again
except for the very early models) were specifically designed for carrier operations. The
navies of these three nations worked out the problems and challenges of carrier operations
in the 20’s and 30’s and became, each in their own way, the best in the business. The feeble
attempts of the Germans (and the Italians) to, first of all, develop aircraft carriers, much
less carrier aircraft, were, frankly, laughable in retrospect.
All you have to do is look at the main guns and their placement aboard Graf Zeppelin and
it’s obvious that the Kreigsmarine considered surface vessels as the major threat to their
carrier. Even pre-war, the RN, IJN, and USN could have told them that that was a waste
of time and effort; that the real threat to the ship was in the air. The USN went down that
road with Lexington class and their 8” turrets. By the mid 1930’s it was recognized that
those guns were so much dead weight. Note that as soon after the Japanese attacked Pearl
the 8-inchers were removed and replaced on Saratoga with 5-inch dual purpose and on
Lexington with temporary 1.1 in AAA mounts (Lexington was scheduled to receive 5-inch
mounts, but she was sunk at Coral Sea before that could happen).
Further, how many pilots, crew, and aircraft was Germany prepared to sacrifice to bring
their carrier into operational being? Carrier aviation, though somewhat safer today, and
"safer" is an extremely subjective term, in the 1930’s, 40’s and 50’s was an extremely
dangerous profession. Where were the Germans planning on training their folks to operate
their hybrid craft off carriers? In the Baltic? How nice for them, nice enclosed seas with,
compared to the reaches of the North Atlantic, nice calm waters. What’s going to happen
when a pilot who has trained in calm waters is suddenly faced with crappy North Atlantic
weather with the horizon a short 5 miles away and a flight deck that rises and falls 25 to 30
feet as he attempts to land. Did the Kreigsmarine have a plan for training LSOs to deal
with this problem as they coaxed the pilots aboard? Were there flight deck officers who
knew by feel just when to launch a plane so that it doesn’t just “thuup” into a wave? News
flash, the folks doing these jobs in the USN, RN, and IJN had had a lot of practice at this
and even they made mistakes. And what of the poor pilots? Do you suppose their training
included flying their craft to their extremes of range; fighting an action; making their way
back to where they think their carrier is going to be; if they’re lucky, finding it; and then
trying to land in the dark on a pitching deck with their engine running on fumes?
The development of carrier aviation in the "big three" over the years pushed operational
limits such as these. Leaders in carrier operations knew that conditions would never be
perfect and would probably be the worst imaginable. USN fleet exercises in the 1920s and
30’s often had admirals such as Reeves and King wondering if they’d ever see their planes
again as they were sent off on long missions to attack the make-believe "enemy." Even so,
non-combat aircraft losses combined with combat operational losses, i.e., aircraft lost
through accident not related to combat damage, but on combat missions, were high.
For example, in the USN, for the entire war, in the course of some 388,000 plus flights (of
which 147,000 plus were combat action sorties) there were 4,863 losses of carrier-based
aircraft. 1,877 were directly related to in combat losses, either in combat with enemy
aircraft or to enemy AAA; 1,001 were combat operational losses; and 1,985 were non-
combat related. 61.4% of losses did not result from holes being poked in aircraft or pilots.
What do you suppose the rates would be for a single operating aircraft carrier whose entire
crew and air group has maybe six months experience in carrier operations? What do you
suppose their losses would be like in just achieving that six months of operational training?
And for that matter, once in action, how do you suppose this aircraft carrier is supposed to
make up it’s losses when, to be effective and strike the enemy it must operated outside the
range of any land-base re-supply or support?
Making the comparison a little more manageable, looking again at the USN experience, in
calendar year 1942, for all carriers in action, in some 6775 flights, including 2559 action
sorties there were 155 combat losses, 63 combat related operational losses, and 66 non-
combat flight losses.
Statistically, one can take the numbers of carriers in action per month during the period
and come up with a composite carrier’s operating numbers: Flights: 2755; action sorties
1043; combat losses: 61; combat operational losses: 26; non-combat related losses: 28; for
a total of 115 aircraft lost in a 12 month period. For 1942, that means a US carrier, had it
been in action for all 12 months, be it Lexington class, Yorktown class, Ranger or Wasp
could have experienced aircraft losses in excess of an entire air group. The USN had the
means and flexibility to make up such losses with new planes and pilots. How do you
suppose a single German aircraft carrier could continue to operate with those kind of
losses? What would be their plan for such replenishment? Where would the additional
trained carrier pilots come from? Was the German navy aware that the majority of aircraft
losses would be from flight deck crack-ups, launch failures, and pilots simply getting lost
and never seen again? Somehow, I just don’t think so.
The Germans had no tactical doctrine for carrier operations, whereas the RN, IJN, and
USN had had twenty years to develop, refine, and hone the same. While actual combat led
to the out and out abandonment of some cherished carrier operations doctrinal theories (the
concept of deferred departure comes to mind), development and adoption of new doctrines
(compare the USF-74 of 1941 to USF-74 of 1943 and 1944) went along rather quickly, at
least in the USN, largely pushed by squadron commanders and pilots who had seen what
had worked and what hadn’t and were in a position to do something about it by virtue if
being responsible for the Fleet doctrine re-writes.
Germany had no plan that I’m aware of for underway replenishment of flight stores or
aircraft. They had no sufficient inventory of replacement aircraft. They were apparently
not really aware, or at least refused to recognize, of all the pitfalls in developing a carrier
arm. This especially obvious in their building/conversion programs; they simply didn’t plan
for enough carriers, nor screening vessels. One or two carriers, committed piecemeal, won’t
do it. They’d be attacked and sunk, either together or in detail.
Much of the sort of thinking about how successful a Kreigsmarine carrier would be IMO
goes along with the “what-if” scenarios where the guys who never did XYZ suddenly have
perfect knowledge and are able to pull off XYZ event while the other side is securely tied to
their historic ABC position.
Doesn’t work that way. If Graf Zeppelin had ever ventured out into the Atlantic it would
have lasted less time than Bismarck. An untried, unrealistically trained, understrengthed,
and hybrid aircraft equipped air group, with no operational doctrine, flying off an equally
untried aircraft carrier, and undoubtedly insufficiently screened (look at Kriegsmarine
destroyer losses), facing two, three, or even four RN carriers with air groups having all the
advantages the Germans would not. If they don’t come out until 1942 maybe even a couple
of USN carriers would get into the act as well. Remember all the US CV’s were built on the
east coast and did their pre-commissioning and shake down cruises in the Atlantic. They
would have the same advantages as the RN (exception being that USN air groups might
tend to have a higher percentage of nuggets, but their leadership in squadrons were
generally combat experienced or naval aviators with 8 to 10 years experience behind them.
This is a no-brainer and in short order . . . score Allies 1 Axis 0.
I’ll be the first to admit I don’t know much about WWII in Europe, not something in which
I’ve ever had a heck of a lot of interest, but I do know carrier operations in WWII and what
worked and what didn’t and why.
I think folks tend to give the German’s far too much credit or benefit of the doubt. In this
case, I’m sorry, but for all their technology, know-how, and all their supposed skill, it would
make absolutely no difference what-so-ever. Here is a ship type they have never before
operated. Here’s a ship that is already a less than optimal design, carrying an
insufficiently sized air group. Here are planes that are, perhaps somewhat hastily,
modified from land-based types to operate in a carrier-based environment. Here is a
command structure where the Kreigsmarine commands the ship and the planes are
commanded and flown by the Luftwaffe. (The RN experience of the FAA being part and
parcel of the RAF for so many years was ample evidence that that particular arrangement
is a logistical disaster looking for a place to happen. Looks like the Germans didn’t get that
message.) And here’s an operating environment that is totally alien to anything done
before by the Luftwaffe. Do you really think the good Reich’s Air Marshal is going to send
his best and brightest? I suspect he already saw the writing on the wall and did as little as
possible to encourage the project.
To expect either the Kreigsmarine or the Luftwaffe to absorb the lessons of a generation of
institutional knowledge in carrier operations as acquired, the hard way, by the RN, USN
and IJN, to, in a blinding flash of insight, foresee all the potential problems, I think, is
asking a bit too much, even for the Germans. Not that the RN or USN were likely to
provide them any short cuts. And do you really think they’d really, I mean, really, listen to
the advise from the Japanese . . . remember this is Nazi Germany here.
And folks can talk until you’re blue in the face about how good the Me 109Ts, Fi 167s and
the Ju 87Cs were, but, I’m sorry, the 87’s and the 167s would be hopelessly outclassed and
the 109s would be in for the fight of their lives. By the time GZ could have put to sea it
would probably be late 1942. RN carriers were already carrying F4Fs. The Seafires were
coming on line, but suffered throughout the war with severe structural problems resultant
from the repeated bruising of carrier landings (see Brown, The Forgotten Fleet). Gee, do
you suppose the Me 109T might suffer the same problem? Not to mention it’s overall unsat
ergonomics in terms of carrier operations. Its one thing for the German’s to reinforce a
design and test it a couple of times; repeated violent exposures are another matter all
together. Just how many landings do you think these hybrid aircraft would be able to
withstand? Sure would be embarrassing to have them start pulling apart when operating
under at-sea combat conditions and not from their nice safe test site landing field.
And what about the GZ air group? Some 40 airplanes comprised of, roughly, 10 109s, 13
87s, and 20 167s. The performance statistics for the 109s, on paper, weren’t too bad, but
the 87s and the 167s look like a top end of somewhat more than 175 knots … sitting ducks
for FM-2s. And only 10 (!!) fighters … oh, please! Let’s see, that’s 5 to protect the ship and
5 to escort strikes … oh, boy, that will work real good won’t it? I can tell you, anybody in
World War II who thought they could adequately defend a carrier with only five fighters or
adequately escort a strike with five fighters was dreaming or desperate. The USN and the
RN put more fighters that that on their CVEs! And the first time you lose one of these
109Ts, be it a combat or not-combat loss, you’ve cut your fighter strength by 10%; that’s
what we call ‘decimate’. Lose another and you’re down 20%, the traditional cut off for unit
capability. How long do you think that could go on? This during a period when fighters on
USN fleet carriers were going from 18 to 28 to 36 as a regular complement.
And what about pilot training? Sure, fighter pilots can fly fighters and dive bomber pilots
can dive bomb, and torpedo plane pilots can drop torpedoes or even glide bomb, but how do
they get where they need to go and, more importantly how do they get back? I strongly
suspect, largely because they never had to, the Germans never thought that one through,
either. Navigation over water was, in those days, pretty much a matter of a plotting board,
a compass, a clock, and knowledge of how fast the plane is flying. The FAA, for a long time,
held that even fighters had to be two-seaters so that that one fellow could handle the
navigation while the other fellow drove the plane. In USN practice, individual pilots did
their own navigation; of course, some were better than others. And what was to be the
German doctrine? Were individual pilots responsible for their own navigation? Were the
fighter pilots to use one of the 87C or 167 pilots as a guide? What if he gets shot down?
What was to be their scout doctrine? How many of the, oh, so few, 167s would be delegated
for scouting as opposed to strikes? And how were they to find their point option (the place
where the carrier is supposed to be when a mission is over)? Had they worked all that out?
What if the carrier wasn’t where they thought it would be? Did they have a standardized
search pattern? Did they have a homing signal system? There’s no railroad tracks or roads
to follow. There’s no “just head east until you see land” method … there’d be no land, just
miles and miles of an empty ocean.
Finally, in the real world, in their only encounter with Luftwaffe fighters, FM pilots (FM’s
being a slightly souped up F4F) from HMS Searcher’s 882 squadron were credited with 4
Me 109s to one loss (26 March 1945). The FMs were dealing with German fighters that
were attacking strike planes they were escorting … i.e, they were on the receiving end of an
attack, a decided disadvantage in the fighter world, yet, they seemed to do alright anyway.
Lambs to the slaughter. The Germans may have dreamed of the GZ doing well as a convoy
killer, but the reality would have been that as soon as she had set to sea, the RN carriers
would be all over her. If she comes out any time in 1942 or later, then it would be the RN
and the USN finishing her off in short order.
Regards,
Rich |
To those in that club. 
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