What was wrong with the F4F Wildcat?

[Clay_Allison]

Originally Posted by claidemore

What about bombers? And ships?

British Hurricanes had 8 or 12 rifle caliber mgs, and they mostly switched to 4 x 20mm cannon in the Pacific and Burma/India theatres.

We had P-38s in the theatre, I'd suggest they split up interceptor duty whenever possible (like Hurricanes going for the bombers as Spits fought the 109s). Remember I'm talking about the early pacific war, when the F4F was a vital part of the effort.

I think a battery of 30-06 (slightly more modern and powerful than the .303 anyway) would be enough to take out a "Nate" and effectively protect its' ships.

If the US wasn't the only world power of the war that was totally incapable of making a 20mm cannon work, I'd just suggest two of them but sense we couldn't figure out how to head space the H.S. cannon and didn't try to come up with an alternative, it's .30 or .50.

[Clay_Allison]

Originally Posted by renrich

Clay, the armament on the F4F3 which was in use in the early fighting in the Pacific was four fifty cals with 400 rounds each. The F4F3 had superior performance to later Wildcats until the FM2 came along once again with four guns.The six fifties with reduced ammo load came in the F4F4 only because the British insisted on six guns, either because their pilots were not considered as good at gunnery as the USN pilots or because they did not understand the vast difference between the 30 cal and 50 cal. The USN did not like the six gun battery and in fact a number of F4F4s had the four gun battery. The primary mission of the Navy fighter was to defend the fleet against enemy bombers, torpedo planes and recon planes. The USN and AAF did not consider the 30 cal as adequate for the mission of the fighter by 1941. The 50 cal performed admirably against IJN AC and especially well against the big four engined flying boats and also in strafing against patrol craft and light escort vessels.

I agree that the 4-gun armament was better than 6, but the plane was still overweight. I think it was a bit overarmored as well, there's something to be said for not getting shot up as much in the first place.

[claidemore]

Clay:
Yeah, there were P38s in the PTO, but they weren't on the carriers, so were limited in where they could be used, particularly early war. F4Fs were generally slugging it out alone.

When I mentioned ships, I was referring to the use of .50 cal for strafing enemy ships, something it is much better suited for than rifle caliber mgs. I understand that there were Japanese warships that were put out of action solely with .50 strafing fire.

While I agree that multiple .30 caliber mgs could do the job, (as they did in BOB), I don't see replacing .50s with .30s to gain a bit of performance as a good trade off.

To me, lightening the F4F's armor (or weapons) to increase it's performance, is basically trying to turn it into a Zero, or at least match the Zeros attributes.

If you match the opponent exactly, you each have a 50/50 chance of winning. The key to beating an opponent with different strengths is to capitalize on your own strengths, and with the F4F that strength was it's ruggedness and firepower.

[renrich]

The early F4F3 had little armor and no ss tanks and had a rate of climb well over 3000 fpm at SL. From memory, it weighed less than 6000 pounds.

[claidemore]

According to wiki, loaded weight was 7000 lbs for F4F-3. (empty weight for F4F-4 should be 5500 lbs?)
Cockpit armour was added early in the production run, not sure exactly when the ss tanks were added. Even without those the Wildcat still earned a reputation for absorbing punishment.

[JoeB]

The F4F-3's and 3A's in service in December 1941 had neither armor nor self sealing tanks. The Marine F4F's on Wake did combat that way, but had only a single air combat with Japanese fighters, a pair downing 3 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes but Zeroes downed one F4F and shot up the other so it couldn't be returned to service before the Japanese invasion. Navy F4F's were initially fitted with 3/8" mild steel, not armor, plates behind the pilot's seat before entering combat w/o self sealing tanks. In their only combat w/ Japanese fighters pre-Coral Sea, Feb 1 '42 raid in the Marshalls, one Type 96 Fighter was downed without loss though some F4F's were hit, including in one hit in the main fuel tank but there was no fire.

By the time of Coral Sea the carrier based F4F-3's had field-fitted armor and tank bladders, but there were pretty few victories and losses v fighters (perhaps 3 Zeroes and 2 Type 96's for around 5~6 F4F's). By Midway the -4 was standard on the carriers to fit more fighters per carrier (folding wings); the few Marine F4F-3's on Midway were the last to see fighter combat, losing 2 along with 13 F2A's in downing perhaps 2 Zeroes. So, the overwhelming majority of F4F kills and losses v Japanese fighters in 1942 involved F4F-4's, and there was, again, less 'wrong' with the actual results of the F4F-4 v Zeroes, approximate parity, than any other Allied fighter in 1942 v Zeroes.

Joe

[renrich]

According to Dean, empty weight of F4F3 was 5426 and F4F4 was 5778. That F4F3 must have had armor and ss tank as FM2 empty weight is given as 5448 in 1944. Just as Joe B states early F4F3s had no armor or ss tanks. The F4F3A had a different supercharger that F4F3 and was lacking in high altitude performance, I think. The USN had such a shortage of aircraft that for a short while some squadrons operated with 3s and 3As together. In fact some squadrons operated with Buffaloes and Wildcats together. Who would have thought the US would have been that unprepared?

[cherry blossom]

Originally Posted by renrich

During the Guadalcanal campaign the IJN suffered from the same disadvantages the LW did in BOB and the AAF did later in the ETO. The Wildcats were defending near their bases and the Zeros had to fly and fight hundreds of miles away from their bases.

I think that I have read that it was even worse for the IJN in that the Zeros had to (or chose to) retain their drop tanks for combat over Guadalcanal. Can one of you experts please either confirm or deny this.

[R Leonard]

Musings on Operation, Grumman F4F-3 and -4 from a USN pilot who fles the F4F-3 from 3-41 to 5-42 (VF-42) and F4F-4 from 5-42 to 8-43 (VF-3, VF-11), penned 21 September 1993.

1. Pre-flight Procedure - (From the standpoint of an aircraft carrier deck launch): Each item must be carried out as promptly as safety/accuracy permit because ship will turn into the wind with the intent of launching promptly to minimize the length of time on a steady course – a dangerous time under torpedo threat.

“Pilots man your planes” – on this order leave ready room and double time to assigned plane. Greet plane captain, get assurance ‘she’ is ready to go and climb in. PC helps getting settled in cockpit. Parachute already there – put buckles in place but don’t connect until airborne and assured the Wright brothers were indeed right.

Set controls, settings, switches to ready for prompt action on the word:

“Start engine” - Fire up, warm up, run up, check mags, etc. Give thumbs up if plane is OK for TO. Watch deck controlman for hand signals freeing plane from tie downs. Follow directions into take off spot. When turned over to launch officer, give him final thumbs up. On his signal, run engine up to TO power and, when he flags you away, release breaks and GO.

Quite a few things happening here and not much time; much teamwork - pilots, PC, deck handlers, and all coordinated with the movement of 30000 tons of ship. This was a good way to start the day/mission. F4F-3 was a steady solid machine, somewhat complex but not tricky. Rather fight in this machine than anything else available in the period. Better machines were coming, but oh, so, slowly.

2. Cockpit:

a. Comfort – like all Grummans there was plenty of room once inside the narrow opening. Well tailored to the average pilot, all controls and adjustments were reasonable. Never worry about heating, cockpit was a noisy, hot box. Oxygen- very up to date diluter, demand good for a machine that could go to 35000 feet (but took a long time to get there and almost never found business at that level). Seat – no special remarks, it was adjustable if you knew how to use your thigh muscles. Rudder pedals nicely adjustable for the shorties. Hand cranked landing gear a pain, but bearable, a simplicity bonus.

b. Instruments – A fair layout, though the magnetic compass was hard to see. Fuel gauge wildly inaccurate – had to rely on the clock to keep track of fuel state. Gun charging was all manual, a chore. Luckily, it was not often needed. Some folks did have fits with the guns until we learned the facts of feeding and care - avoid negative G!

c. Control – F4F-3/4 conformed well to USN standards of stability and control. Rudder control at take-off and low speeds deficient and caused incidents. Rudder trim changed with changes in speed – bad for gunnery until the pilot got wise and remembered what to do. Plane was fast but well behaved carrier landing machine – hard to slow down. With some experience, the average pilot looked good landing this plane. At high combat speeds, the F4F had excellent control and response. Too bad, there was not enough engine to fly that way and maintain altitude.

d. Vision – OK, superior except for directly aft and taxiing. In the latter, nose high stance could be helped by zigzag path.

e. Communications – Radio equipment was primitive, weak, complex. This was one of the great problems of this period of the fighting.

3. Engine:

a. It was nice, smooth running, but noisy. Heavy – had a big weight investment in 2 speed, 2 stage superchcharger which was under-used because 1942 fighters found full employment at moderate altitudes. There was not enough power for the heavy F4F-3/4.

b. Highly reliable and trouble free. Hard to start with the shotgun starter in humid conditions. Rugged, stood up to high demands. The Curtiss electric prop gave some reliability problems, not the engine’s fault.

c. Fuel consumption – also not engine’s fault – but there was not enough on board. So, F4F was short legged and short winded. Fuel gauge was a mess (see instruments). Aux tanks not experienced until Guadalcanal – the 2 x 58 gal. added range and endurance, but not much and hurt fighter performance; had to be dripped to fight, quantity not gauged.

4. Climb to altitude: Deficient, poor power loading so no cure short of buying a new airplane.

5. Cruise: No complaints save hot, noisy cockpit, lying fuel gauge and no hands-off flying stability.

6. Combat:

a. Guns – 4 x .50 cal. with corresponding ammo tolerable; 6 x .50 cal. with less ammo a poorer battery
The .50 cal. Browning a good piece but needed care and understanding. In good hands it was a winner. Ammo for this gun was good and reliable. F4F-3 reflector sight was a poor installation – cleaner in the F4F-4, but still a big threat projecting into the pilot’s face on an arrested or forced landing.

b. Bombs or rockets not used. Strafing quite impressive – had a good session on a Jap destroyer on 4 May 42. Ran him aground.

c. Great freedom diving and turning, no fear of high G structural effects. Climb was poor – already noted above. Engine was willing and put out without overheat or complaint, just not enough power. Hard pulling and fast turning saved many lives. You can develop an affection for a machine like that.

d. Part of c above comes from Grumman’s Iron Works way of putting the machine together. When perforated or bashed it still could fly and fight. No armor seat, plates on bulkheads ahead and behind. Main tank self-sealing fuel protection – it worked. Aux tanks inerted with CO2 when empty – no known failure of that system.

e. Evaluation – When aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the F4F-3/4 a knowledgeable pilot could earn his keep. Do not dog fight, keep speed up, watch fuel state, and you can tally, come home, and repeat. Enemy flashy maneuverability was worrisome, but don’t play their game. Against their dive and torpedo planes, the F4F-3/4 turned into a flying dragon. Problem was to create an engagement – largely the doing of a good fighter director and functioning communications. When these clicked, there was joy in fighter town. Improvement was a goal slowly attained.

7. Landing: The F4F-3/4 behaved very well here, especially on the carrier. Ground loop tendency on field landings was a problem, not much harm except to the pilot’s ego. Time and experience were the usual remedies.

8. Bail out and ditching: I have no personal experience with these – yet (knock on wood). However I attended numerous events close up. F4F-3/4 seemed to have average bail-out score, tolerable. Until we got shoulder straps in the summer of 1942, all over-water flight suffered from the dread of fatality because the F4F landed fast, sank fast, and the pilot was usually knocked senseless by the gun sight or instrument panel. We flew in this state of peril from early 1941 through the summer of 1942 and it was uncomfortable. Once we had a good shoulder harness, our peril receded to that normally acceptable for our calling.

End

For what it’s worth, I thought it might be interesting. He mentions the ground loop problem and I sat down once with him and went over the issue. Not trusting my memory, somewhere around here I have the write up of the fruits of that conversation; I’ll try to find it.

I also note the phrase “Rather fight in this machine than anything else available in the period.” This from a pilot not only an F4F ace, but also one of the few experienced USN A6M pilots, having time in both the A6M2 and the A6M5; and the guy who, in the late summer – early fall of 1944, introduced the concept of using a Zero to train with USN fighter pilots head west.

Rich

[Amsel]

Great post! Hope you got more.

I know the USMC pilots loved their F4F's. Reliable with heavy armor in the cockpit and from the sturdy P&W in front.

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by cherry blossom

I think that I have read that it was even worse for the IJN in that the Zeros had to (or chose to) retain their drop tanks for combat over Guadalcanal.

In some cases Zeroes definitely dropped their tanks, as in early war operations when the tanks were seen on the ground by the Allies. In the early missions of Tainan Air Group from Rabaul to Guadalcanal they apparently didn't, not sure why, shortage? USN F6F's sometimes didn't drop their tanks in air combat either, in that case it was limited supply of them on a carrier.

On range it's true the Zeroes were flying at very long range on the early missions to Guadalcanal, from Vunakanau field at Rabaul almost 650 statue miles one way to Henderson Field. However later on they were flying from, or could divert to, Buin, around 345 statue miles, far for most 1942 fighters but not for a Zero (Model 32's, aka 'Hamps', could only reach Henderson from Buin, not from Rabaul). And some combats between F4F's and Zeroes were between carrier based ones, a few Japanese carrier strikes on Guadalcanal, or F4F's escorting attack a/c against Japanese convoys well north of Guadalcanal, yet the results didn't seem to change dramatically.

And mainly, we're compared the results of Zero v F4F in 1942 to performance of other Allied fighters facing Zeroes in the same period. In many of those other cases the Zeroes were also flying from far away, as Formosa to Philippines, northern DEI to Java, Timor to Darwin: 500+ mile one way missions where Zeroes were more successful against other Allied types than against F4F's.

Also the other side of coin of campaigns were the Zero and Allied bases were close was that in latter case the Allied fighters could apply direct pressure against the Zero bases, destroying a/c on the ground and possibly catching them taking off: the RAAF and USAAF P-40/P-39 units in New Guinea in '42 operating from Port Moresby against Zeroes based at Lae, within their short range, were able to do this on occasion.

Joe

[renrich]

Rich, that was a good post and really enjoyed. Much of it was reflected in Lundstrom, "The First Team." Interesting to hear the pilot relate effectiveness of 50 BMGs on DDs. That was also reflected in Lundstrom and was debunked by some "experts" on this forum during a discussion on AC armament. Sometimes all pilots were not really adept at identifying ships so the "DD" might have been a lesser ship, but the 50 cal can do a lot. One point which has nothing to do with the F4F but does illustrate problems of preparedness is that, before Midway, the pilots had no survival apparatus so they often trooped to the galley for meat cleavers or butcher knives for survival knives. One point that us "armchair pilots" often don't understand is that the range of AC we read about online or in books is often "yardstick" range which is only good(sometimes) for comparison. It is basically the number of miles an AC can cover at best cruise with full tanks, internal or external. For instance, the F4U4 is often given a range of 1005 miles(that is on internal fuel and where does the five come from?) That means it has a combat radius of around 500 miles, right? Wrong! That 1005 miles does not take into account, warm up, take off, climb out, cruise to target, combat for a few minutes, cruise back and reserve. Around 75% of the yardstick range is more accurate for a combat mission and that varies a lot according to land based, carrier based and other factors, so the combat radius of an F4U4 might be 350 to 375 miles. Lundstrom said that the A6M had a combat radius of around 300 miles from a carrier to 500 miles from a landbase. The Wildcat could get about 175 miles from a carrier. Another factor to remember is that a 150 gallon drop tank would not give you the extra range you would expect because of increased drag and weight especially during climb out. I have heard that a 150 gallon tank would only give about 75 gallons extra range. Don't know if that is true and suspect it depends on the shape of the tank. Some of the early drop tanks were shaped like bathtubs.

[Amsel]

I have seen stories from pilots on different occasions use .50 fire to deter ships. The strafing runs kill crew, blow up ordnance, damage weapons, and start fires. strafing the bridge can be an effective way to deter ships for a vital minute or two as seen in the Battle off Samar with Wildcats strafing 'ships of the line'.

[Captain Dunsel]

Good points, Renrich.

I wonder how many of those experts would, if they were told their car got 25 MPG (average) and had a 20 gallon tank, expect that they could wait until the odometer said 495 miles had elapsed before they'd start looking for a gas station?

CD

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by renrich

Rich, that was a good post and really enjoyed. Much of it was reflected in Lundstrom, "The First Team." Interesting to hear the pilot relate effectiveness of 50 BMGs on DDs. That was also reflected in Lundstrom and was debunked by some "experts" on this forum during a discussion on AC armament. Sometimes all pilots were not really adept at identifying ships so the "DD" might have been a lesser ship, but the 50 cal can do a lot.

In the particular case mentioned above, during the strike on Tulagi May 4 1942, one of the targets of strafing was a real DD, Yuzuki, whose physical damage is variously described as heavy (in Lundstrom) or light (some Japanese sources) but the CO was killed along with 9 others by all accounts. The ship didn't run aground and survived. Her sister Kikuzuki was struck by a TBD's torpedo and beached (mostly picked away by scrap scavengers over the decades but some of it is still visible today), and strafing by F4F's also caused the smaller vessel Tama Maru (confusion exists as to its exact type) to be beached, sank later, wreck is within recreational diving depth.

Another well documented case of highly effective F4F strafing was by a mixed formation of VF-9 and -41 v the French 2nd Light Sdn as it sortied from Casablanca Nov 8 1942. The French DD's and super-DD's were outgunned already by the US surface force but the strafing caused heavy casualties among command, fire control and communications personnel on several of the ships, greatly reducing their effectiveness thereafter; the steering gear on one was also disabled temporarily. They downed one F4F in return.

Both the Japanese and French increased protective plating on the bridges of their DD's as a direct result of such incidents.

Joe