Worst aircraft of WW2?

[Juha]

Hello Elvis
Quote:” Also, you're saying that all B-239's sent to Finland were brand-new planes?”

Where I wrote that? Anyway, as Shortround wrote, most of the planes were new ones. USN had got 11 F2A-1s, of which 9 were delivered on USS Saratoga, to VF-3, or was it VF-2. Finns got these 11 and the 33 others were new ones.

All planes arrived to Trollhättan without sights. I don’t know, were Aldis sights installed at Trollhättan or in Finland. Revi 3Cs and Väisälä reflector sights were installed in Finland in early 41.

Juha

CORRECTION: All FAF B-239s were new, USN had ordered 54 F2A-1s, got 11, FAF got the rest, that is 43, plus one "proto" which was a modified plane from the Belgian order OR FAF got 38 de-navalised F2A-1s and 6 from Belgian order. This is a bit unclear, I have rather plenty material on B-239 but don't have time to go through it now, and the the sources I checked gave these 2 explanations.

On sights, from the photo on one B-239 damaged when landing at the end of ferry flight from Sweden, one can see that it had bead and ring sight. I have photos on B-239s soon after arrival but not time to dig them up, but it seems that during assembly in Sweden they got bead and ring sight, fairly soon after arrival to Finland they got Aldis telescopic sights, I have photo(s) that show that configuration, and during the early 41 they got reflector sight.

Juha

[parsifal]

Originally Posted by buffnut453

Thanks Proton45. I had forgotten about that reference. I don't think we need get overly excited about the level of precision in these numbers - I think we can fairly safely say that there were 55-60 Ki-43s and 108-120 Ki-27s. Irrespective, this is far more than Parsifal's "approx 25" fighters and my previous post refutes his claim that 25 Zeros did all the damage in the fight for air superiority over Malaya - they weren't even committed to operations over the Malay peninsula until mid-Jan 42.

The history of the Ki-27 units over Malaya is very, VERY sparsely documented. We know that they flew CAPs over the invasion convoys from Phu Quoc Island during the early stages of the campaign, and there are references to them performing airfield fighter defence in Thailand and in southern Malaya but there are few details beyond this. We know a number were used in Burma but that was much later in December after the airfields in northern Malaya had been abandoned by the RAF and taken over by the IJAAF. The activities of the Ki-27 units is one area where I wish further research was focussed - there are just too many aircraft available to assume they only did airfield defence, and I can't see any commander letting his fighters sit on the ground in the middle of a campaign.

Kind regards,
Mark

Hi Buffnut

I don’t think you can safely assume anything, because your assumptions and quotes appear to heavily rely on discredited information, which I pointed out to you previously, but which you are preferring to adhere to at this point

Far from being outnumbered, the Buffaloes in Malaya in those opening days enjoyed a superiority of about 1.3:1 over the opposition. And that includes the Zeroes which you say were not used over Malaya until after the 21st, but which Japanese records say were flying missions and engaging and shooting down Allied aircraft from the the first week of the campaign. I am looking for referenced source material, which i know that I have on this, but cant quite place right at this minute.

The 59th Sentai at Hankou was selected as the first unit to receive the new Nakajima Ki-43 Type 1 Fighter ‘Hayabusa’ (‘Oscar’). The unit returned to Japan during June-August 1941 to collect some 30 examples of the Ki-43-Ia, which were then flown to Hankou. During these ferry flights and in training flights, folds began appearing in the wings following sharp turns and several mid-air disintegrations occurred. Four or five aircraft out of 20 examined proved to have defects in the wing construction, and at once the Sentai’s ground personnel attempted to install reinforcement. Their efforts proved to be in vain, and the major part of the unit therefore returned to Tachikawa in October to convert to the –Ib model.

The second unit to re-equip with the Nakajima Ki-43 was the 64th Sentai. Pilots returned to the homeland in August. From the end of August, receiving their new aircraft at Fussa, near Tokyo. Major Tateo Kato, understood fully why the Ki-43 had been adopted, and at once stressed training in over-sea navigation and long distance flights. Consequently the 64th Sentai pilots were able to achieve ranges of 700 km, whilst those of the 59th Sentai, who had not trained in the same way, could manage only 600 km. However the 64th Sentai remained dissatisfied with the integrity of the wings, and subsequently flew to Tachikawa for to be properly strengthened, then flying back to Canton in November.

I will concede that the 59th Sentai was equipped with Ki-43s, but you are distorting the facts by attempting to say these aircraft were available for operationjs over Malaya from the beginning. They were not, due to their range limitations, moreover none of the units were formally transferred from their initial base of operations until after the 21st. Despite any thing you have read, these aircraft were physically incapable of reaching Malaya until after that date. Their topscoring ace of the period, for example a captain Hideki (from memory ???) did not undertake his first mission over Malaya until the 21st....there may have been isolated participation before that date, but the overwhelming majority of the Sentai did not contribute to the offensive over Malaya until the latter part of December. Because of their lack of overwater training, and relative inexperience on the type (having only received the airworthy versions of the type in late October) it was not committed to much combat until later in the campaign. You need to consult the Japanese records to understand this...Allied records consistently misrepresent this.


Moreover, the 64th Sentai’s Oscars continued to experience technical difficulties that are synonymous with the introduction of a new type. As I said, there were seldom more than 25 Ki 43s available from 64th at any given time during these early campaigns….a similar number to the 25 Zeroes of the Yamada detachment. These few aircraft flew rings around the buffaloes that opposed them, and shot them out of the skies with ease.
In December the 59th Sentai flew its new Ki-43-Ibs to Kompong Trach in Indochina the day before the outbreak of the Pacific War. I attach a link to allow you the opportunity to determine just where they were. With an effective maximum range of 600km, and a base of operations effectively beyond that range, it should come as no surprise that the 59th could not get into battle until much later

Kampong Trach Region Map: Kampong Trach — Phumi Veal Taping | Cambodia Google Satellite Maps

The 64th Sentai moved to Duong Dong, Idu Phu Quoc, in December. I didn’t check Duong Dong airfield, but Phu Quoc is at least 150 km closer to Malaya than Kompok Trach. With an effective range of 700km, and 150 km advantage in airbase location, it should come as no surprise that it was solely the 64th that flew over Malaya up until the 21st December, when the first air units began redeployment. All references to relocation of fighter units from the 3rd Hikoshidan before that date should be treated as pure allied propaganda. They simply did not happen……

The Japanese deployments in Indochina were as follows:
The JAAF (3rd Air Division) was at the following places in Indochina:
Konpong Trach, Konpong Chong, Duong Dong, Sien Reap, Kurakar, Kukan, Phnom Penh.

The JNAF (22nd Air Flotilla) was at the following places in Indochina:
Saigon, Thu Dau Moi, Soc Trang.

I concede that I do not know where Kukan airfield is , but it was not used by the 59th in any case

[Elvis]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Elvis
Quote:” Also, you're saying that all B-239's sent to Finland were brand-new planes?”

Where I wrote that?

In the post you wrote.

Quote: "Hello Elvis
The B-239s were shipped to Bergen in Norway, then moved by rail to Trollhättan in Sweden, where they were assembled and test flown, then flown to Finland. Finns got them without USN equipment, ie without weapons; anyway Finns bought new ones from US, dials, sights etc...."

Originally Posted by Juha

CORRECTION:...USN had ordered 54 F2A-1s, got 11, FAF got the rest, that is 43, plus one "proto" which was a modified plane from the Belgian order OR FAF got 38 de-navalised F2A-1s and 6 from Belgian order. This is a bit unclear, I have rather plenty material on B-239 but don't have time to go through it now, and the the sources I checked gave these 2 explanations.

On sights, from the photo on one B-239 damaged when landing at the end of ferry flight from Sweden, one can see that it had bead and ring sight. I have photos on B-239s soon after arrival but not time to dig them up, but it seems that during assembly in Sweden they got bead and ring sight, fairly soon after arrival to Finland they got Aldis telescopic sights, I have photo(s) that show that configuration, and during the early 41 they got reflector sight.

Juha

Yep, that sounds better.
Thank you for checking into that.
I apologize for the misstatement earlier. I had remembered the numbers incorrectly.
When you stated that they got "new ones", that suggests (to me, anyway) that they went straight from Brewster's assembly line to Finland, and that's not totally true. Some went to the USN first. This makes those planes "used", even if only slightly so.
However, you make a good point. MOST of those planes were indeed, new and I failed to remember that fact.

I have a very good magazine article on the Buffalo's expderience in Finland, and it starts off with some history of Buff from its design and inception into the USN.
Unfortunately, I have recently moved and threw a lot of things out, including some old magazines.
I hope I still have that article, but if I do, its buried in a box somewhere.
Still, I will see if I can find it. If so, I'll check the article and see what it says, if anything, about the Belgian order.


Elvis

[buffnut453]

Hi Parsifal,

I really don’t want this discussion to be overly contentious – I welcome robust discussions and arguments but I must contest your assertion that my “assumptions and quotes appear to heavily rely on discredited information”. Since most of my research comes from original, contemporary sources or, where necessary, from Japanese researchers, which of my information is discredited and by whom? If you’re referring to Yasuho Izawa, who authored the definitive record of IJAAF fighter units, he is recognized as a pre-eminent historian of WWII Japanese military aviation. Several contemporary British and Japanese sources agree that there was a substantial build-up of IJAAF fighters on Phu Quoc and nearby on mainland Indochina prior to the invasion of Thailand and Malaya, and that these fighters were used to gain air superiority over northern Malaya and provide air cover for the invasion convoys.

To clarify the airfields situation, Duong Dong and Kukan were the 2 new airfields created on the western coast of Phu Quoc. These were the closest airfields to the Malaya coast and were an ideal location from which to launch fighter operations. You state “I will concede that the 59th Sentai was equipped with Ki-43s, but you are distorting the facts by attempting to say these aircraft were available for operations over Malaya from the beginning”. I am not distorting facts but reporting Japanese sources on this subject. A former Ki-43 pilot who participated in these actions stated that the 64th and 59th Sentais deployed to 2 airfields on Phu Quoc on 3 Dec 41 and were tasked to escort bombing missions, conduct fighter sweeps and strafe airfields. A Japanese Times and Advertiser article from Apr 42 described how, without consulting Tokyo or French authorities, the IJAAF built an airfield in fifteen days ‘on an island close to Kota Bharu’ which, when completed in late November 1941, played a ‘vitally important role in effecting a landing at Kota Bharu for the Japanese Air Units could operate freely from the newly acquired base’. This island was Phu Quoc. Colonel Tsuji saw the Phu Quoc airfields as, ‘A mighty mainspring in accomplishing perfect protection of our convoy of transports and air cover for the landing of our troops at Singora, Patani, and Kota Bharu’. Finally, I refer you again to my previous post and the reference to “aerial exterminating action” over northern Malaya which research was undertaken by a Japanese historian (who, coincidentally, was also a JASDF officer). All these sources—which, you will note, are Japanese not western—agree on the role of the Ki-43s (of both 64th and 59th Sentais) operating from Phu Quoc from the first week of Dec 41 onwards.

You also claim that, “None of the units were formally transferred from their initial base of operations until after the 21st. Despite any thing you have read, these aircraft were physically incapable of reaching Malaya until after that date” Why were the fighters “physically incapable” of reaching Malaya before 21 Dec but suddenly were capable after that date? This makes no sense to me. IJAAF fighters WERE in Malaya at least a week before the date you cite. Allied pilots encountered fixed-undercarriage fighters over northern Malaya on 9 Dec which patently cannot be Zeros. Some 40 fighters were observed by RAF recce aircraft at Kota Bahru airfield on 15 Dec and 44 fighters were observed at Sungei Patani on 19 Dec. Or are these contemporaneous reconnaissance reports part of the “allied propaganda” to which you referred?

One final point to ponder. You indicate that it was the Japanese fighter force that was outnumbered by Buffalos. At the time of the Japanese invasion, there were 18 Buffalos of 21 Sqn and 3 Buffalos of 243 Sqn in northern Malaya. The units in Singapore were tasked with air defence of the island, convoy patrolling and fleet air defence support. Thus we have 21 Buffalos against 150+ Japanese fighters. The IJAAF was able to concentrate it’s fighter force and dictate the tempo of the campaign because (a) they had sufficient numbers of aircraft to accomplish the roles assigned to them, and (b) Malaya lacked an adequate integrated air defence system. To put the situation in context, the RAF had 4 squadrons of fighters to defend a territory the size of England against an adversary that could (and did) choose the time and location of its attacks. In closing, you state that “These few aircraft flew rings around the buffaloes that opposed them, and shot them out of the skies with ease.” Here are the real Buffalo loss figures (derived from contemporary sources):

Shot down by enemy fighters: 21
Shot down by other enemy action: 9
Destroyed on the ground: 30+ (only lists known airframes destroyed – actual figure likely to be higher)
Destroyed in Accidents: 49 (20 pre-war, 29 from 8 Dec onwards)

That leaves approx 40 airframes unaccounted for, most of which were abandoned either in northern Malaya, on Singapore or in the Dutch East Indies (the RAF tends to be quite punctilious about recording human casualties but less so about abandoned hunks of metal, hence we can be reasonably certain about the numbers of aircraft shot down compared to the total destroyed on the ground or abandoned).

Apart from vague references to things you remember reading, you have not cited a single source for your assertion that IJN Zeros were active over Malaya from the beginning of the campaign. Which aircraft did they shoot down? You continue to state that the main Japanese fighter force comprised 25 Zeros and roughly the same number of Ki-43s and yet there is ample evidence that far more fighters were available and were used – the additional 110 Ki-27s, for example. Despite ample contemporary evidence to the contrary (eg RAF photo recce reports identifying 60-80 fighters operating from airfields in northern Malaya from mid-Dec 41 onwards), you insist that IJAAF fighters were not deployed to Thailand or northern Malaya before 21 Dec. I’m not making this stuff up – I spent many years researching primary sources to come to my conclusions. I would welcome seeing the sources you are citing so we can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of what all Japanese air arms were doing in early Dec 41.

Kind regards,
Mark H

[proton45]

Originally Posted by buffnut453

Apart from vague references to things you remember reading, you have not cited a single source for your assertion that IJN Zeros were active over Malaya from the beginning of the campaign. Which aircraft did they shoot down? You continue to state that the main Japanese fighter force comprised 25 Zeros and roughly the same number of Ki-43s and yet there is ample evidence that far more fighters were available and were used – the additional 110 Ki-27s, for example. Despite ample contemporary evidence to the contrary (eg RAF photo recce reports identifying 60-80 fighters operating from airfields in northern Malaya from mid-Dec 41 onwards), you insist that IJAAF fighters were not deployed to Thailand or northern Malaya before 21 Dec. I’m not making this stuff up – I spent many years researching primary sources to come to my conclusions. I would welcome seeing the sources you are citing so we can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of what all Japanese air arms were doing in early Dec 41.

Kind regards,
Mark H

Not that you need help in this discussion...but i thought I would add to the information you supplied. Aside from the Pearl Harbor attacks, the only engagements that the A6M was involved in was the campaign on the Philippines. Zero's of the 3rd and Tainan Kokutais escorted bombers that attacked Clark and Iba air bases on December 8th. These fighters where based in Taiwan. By December 22nd the 3rd kokutai had moved from Takao airbase in Taiwan to Davao airbase on Mindanao. On December 28th, from their airbase on Davao, the 3rd Kokutai launched 7 A6m's with reconnaissance aeroplanes to the island of Tarakan on the northeast coast of Borneo...here is the first time that they encountered 9 Dutch Brewster Buffaloes.

[proton45]

Originally Posted by parsifal

Hi Buffnut

I don’t think you can safely assume anything, because your assumptions and quotes appear to heavily rely on discredited information, which I pointed out to you previously, but which you are preferring to adhere to at this point

Are you saying that my information is discredited? The numbers I quoted are from a reputable book...one of the authors (Christopher Shores) is even cited in an article you linked. http://www.warbirdforum.com/jaaf.htm The only thing Buffnut comes even close to "assuming" is the aerocraft numbers I quoted...

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by proton45

Are you saying that my information is discredited? The numbers I quoted are from a reputable book...one of the authors (Christopher Shores) is even cited in an article you linked. The only thing Buffnut comes even close to "assuming" is the aerocraft numbers I quoted...

I agree the ORBAT info is pretty clear in for example Bloody Shambles, and most of the JAAF info in that book is straight out of Vol 34 of Senshi Sosho, the Japanese official history volume covering JAAF ops in that theater and period (likewise relevant volume for JNAF info). So I agree with your and Buffnut's side of the argument there.

However, comparison of Japanese and Allied info as in BS vol I. gives the outcomes of combats case by case; I don't see a reason to generalize based on total losses, or even to generalize based on total order of battle strengths. Overall numbers of course tend to affect the final outcome, one side may run out of planes, the other may have plenty left: no more air fighting! . But ORBAT numbers don't necessarily affect the numerical odds in particular combats or the average combat. One side with 100 planes other with 50 does not mean one side outnumbered the other 2:1 in the typical combat, that's a lot more complicated function of how each side organized itself, what missions it was trying to perform, etc.

So, looking at invidual combat as reported in BS Vol 1., Parsifal is actually at least partly right. The first combat which saw Buffalo's meet Type 1's was Dec 21 1941, according to that book, even though the 59th and 64th Sentai's were operational in the theater before that. And I've given before the results I counted up from that book for Buffalo's, including all the early campaigns for RAF not just Malaya, and including KNIL. I counted 44 Buffalo's downed by Japanese fighters, 12.5 by Zeroes (indeed later in the campaign), 16 by Type 1's, 15.5 by Type 97's, 2 (Dutch) by Type 0 Observation Seaplanes acting as fighters. In return the book gives 4 Zeroes, 4.5 Type 1's, 1.8 Type 97's and no Type 0 Obs downed by Buffaloes in those same battles. The fractions are prorating by me where more than one type was present on each side; I ignore combats where Shores et al don't report results from each side (but that's only a few combats). But let's be clear, this is info from Shores et al. that anyone can go check, not some proprietary info of mine.

I know from reading parts of SS Vol 34 that the JAAF accounts are sometimes vague (in contrast the original JNAF records are on the web now, there's no doubt about the completeness of those). But look at the context: by same source and counting method the Hurricane did no better than the Buffalo in the same period v Zero or Type 1; it did do better v the Type 97 but still less than a 1:1 kill ratio. And I recently counted up Hurricane v Type 1 results for late 1942 (when air combat involving Hurricanes resumed)-end of 1943 in "Air War for Burma" by the same authors the same way, and was surprised to find that even in that later period the Hurricane's kill ratio v the Type 1 hardly improved from the early 1942 campaign, about 1:4.5 in the later period v 1:5 in the earlier period. Those JAAF units were simply more effective (and various new Allied units always faced the same more and more experienced 64th Sentai, the most dangerous unit). That's the only reasonable conclusion IMO. Neither the Buffalo as an airplance nor the special handicaps in early war for the RAF/CW units seems to have been the dominant factor in *fighter-fighter kill ratio* problem of the RAF in the Far East through 1943 (which of course also included Spitfire units in Australia v Zeroes in 1943). Again, the overall outcome of air campaigns was surely affected by numbers, overrunning of enemy a/f's etc. The RAF could continue for months on end at short end of a kill ratio v Type 1's in Burma late 1942- end of '43, with plenty of replacement a/c, bases secure, and losses of pilots considerably less than those of a/c. But kill ratio is still a useful measure of a fighter unit's effectiveness, IMO. Overall numerical superiority or your own ground forces seizing enemy airfields are always good things, but it's always better if you're also more effective in air combat as measured by kill ratio.

To review my position on this particular thread, the Buffalo was quite unsuccessful against Japanese fighters, that's no myth. But, since many other Allied types also were in 1942, and some were even in 1943, I don't think the Buffalo can be singled out.

Joe

[buffnut453]

Joe,

Thank you for a balanced contribution to the discussion. I entirely agree that total numbers available cannot be equated to the numbers of combatants meeting in specific combats but that, too, raises issues. Such a tactical level of examination elevates other factors, aside from mere aircraft performance, to importance in the discussion - weather, relative positions of the opposing units, unit leadership and coherence. For example, it is possible for a formation of relatively few aircraft to defeat a larger formation if the conditions are right (attacking from up-sun or from a blind spot). In such discussions, aircraft performance is but one parameter within a complex range of variables that often cannot be measured empirically, hence the complexity of examining fighter engagement. For example, in the case of the 22 Dec engagement over Kuala Lumpur, the only massed engagement between Buffalos and Ki-43s during the entire campaign, the Buffalos were climbing up into the fight while the Ki-43s had the height advantage.

There is also a tendency to confuse the counting method (ie interchanging total ORBAT count with aircraft that are operationally available for use). For example, several sources declare that 21 Sqn had only 4 Buffalos remaining after the initial IJAAF onslaught on 8 Dec 41 and yet it seems clear that this was probably the number of aircraft operationally available from a total of 8-11 airframes (depending on the date). This brings in the additional factor of availability, maintainability into the equation and the logistics train to support the front-line squadrons.

As for the first Ki-43/Buffalo engagements taking place on 21 Dec, I read some of the early 21 Sqn engagements on 8/9 Dec as involving Ki-43s which would place the first combat between the types much earlier in the campaign. Your info on which aircraft claimed Buffalo kills is also quite illuminating, although it would be interesting to examine a smaller subset of the campaign, for example Dec 41, since the genesis of this discussion was the question of which aircraft gained air superiority over Malaya.

Despite the above, I fully concur with your closing remarks. Why does the Buffalo get such a slating when no other Allied aircraft types did any better against the Japanese air arms? The Buffalo performed poorly against superior opposition (IJAAF and IJNAF) and so is castigated as "the world's worst aircraft" yet when it performed well in the hands of the Finns it is still criticized because it was flying against weak opposition. Why are these criteria applied to other aircraft - the Zero performed well against inferior opposition but didn't do so well against Hellcats and Corsairs so does that make the Zero a bad aircraft? The main problem seems to be the "accepted wisdom" that the Buffalo was hopeless and so the myth perpetuates, even to the extent where people make things up (eg earlier in this thread there's a comment about the Buffalo not being able to sustain combat damage - tell that to Harry Griffiths of 453 Sqn whose Buffalo sustained more than 70 hits but still brought him home).

Kind regards,
Mark H

[proton45]

Good information...

[Shortround6]

The Buffalo may have been unfairly criticized for it's combat performance but the Facts may be that no one saw it capable of doing any better.
The wing structure, while inovative in some ways, was less than ideal for a combat plane.

The wing was one piece (no left anf right) with the landing gear in it so the only way to repace the wing was to hoist the fuselage into the air with a crane. (OK. Lots of jacks and cribbing?)

The fuel tanks being intergral with the wing spars was certainly inovative but ment that they were almost impossiable to install selfsealing materials inside of and very difficult to repair without replacing the wing. see problem above.

The U.S. Navy's "solution" of adding extra protected fuel tanks to the Buffalo and then not filling one of the existing ones to get the same capacity sure points to something.

The Buffalo's small wing, for an American fighter, means there is only so much weight that can be added before the wing loading gets out of hand. Handling was already being criticized on the later models. While a more powerfull engine might have helped straight line speed and climb but unless it wasn't much heavier than the existing engine there were going to be problems.

Existing landing gear was already a problem.

Armament may have been borderline. While more might not be necessary, four .50s were about as light as the Americans were willing to go.

While it did do better in combat than popular legend it just didn't offer much in the way of improvement down the road.

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by Shortround6

The wing was one piece (no left anf right) with the landing gear in it so the only way to repace the wing was to hoist the fuselage into the air with a crane. (OK. Lots of jacks and cribbing?)

The zero wing was built in the same manner.

[Shortround6]

True but the Buffalo being a midwing aircraft didn't make the job any easier. Lower fuselage was built in with the wing so you did need more ground clearance before the wing could be slid out.

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by Shortround6

True but the Buffalo being a midwing aircraft didn't make the job any easier. Lower fuselage was built in with the wing so you did need more ground clearance before the wing could be slid out.

Having removed a few wings in this manner I don't think it would make that much of a difference, the determining factor would be how accessible the attach points would be on both aircraft and what type of support equipment is available to facilitate removal.

[Shortround6]

You certainly have more experience than I do but considering that most U.S. fighters din't have this repair problem why stick with one that did considering it (the Buffalo) offered no real advantages to compensate?

[FLYBOYJ]

Originally Posted by Shortround6

You certainly have more experience than I do but considering that most U.S. fighters din't have this repair problem why stick with one that did considering it (the Buffalo) offered no real advantages to compensate?

And there you have a point - a matter of maintainability.

But some aircraft that offered a "single piece" wing did have some advantages with regards to strength and repairs, but again if the rest of the aircraft is substandard, the point is mute.

In the end, with all the evidence shown here, its clear that the Buffalo doesn't deserve to to be labeled as "the worse" aircraft of WW2. IMO it shouldn't even be on the top 5.