Did the US save Europe in WW2?

[syscom3]

It still boils down to this:



1) The UK (which I include its commonwealth countries) could not have been invaded by Germany OR Russia

2) Germany might have defeated Russia without being distracted by US material and forces.

3) Germany might have been defeated by Russia simply by attrition.

4) Either way, the UK speaks English and all of the rest of Europe speaks German or Russian.

5) The UK and its forces from around the world could not have defeated Germany through an invasion.

[bigZ]

Sounds like, long and short, none of the parties involved had the power to put a knockout punch on the others. Without the US intervetion, the war in Europe drags on. Britian has no continetal force, Russians and Germans go at it hammer and tongs until....what?

The thread has morphed from "Did the US save Europe?" to "What does the European War look like without American involvement?". That is a far more interesting question.

No Lend Lease, everybody fights with what they have.

I think we'd have to think along the lines of:

"Who has the best industrial base",
"Who has the largest manpower pool to draw from?",
"Who is going to adapt fast enough to take advantage of what they have?"

In truth, this is a hell of a difficult question. US involvement transformed the war in Europe. Taking it away, especially Lend Lease, makes what we know as history unrecognizable.

In truth, I really don't know where to start. Uboat War? Eastern Front? Africa? Night Bomber Offensive?

Agreed. I prefer this argument to the US saved your ar*e. Which I personally find distasteful as it direspects all those who fought and died from the combatant nations involved. Its especially bad form when it comes from people who who to the best of my knowledge didn't serve during that conflict.

[lesofprimus]

It still boils down to this:
1) The UK (which I include its commonwealth countries) could not have been invaded by Germany OR Russia
2) Germany might have defeated Russia without being distracted by US material and forces.
3) Germany might have been defeated by Russia simply by attrition.
4) Either way, the UK speaks English and all of the rest of Europe speaks German or Russian.
5) The UK and its forces from around the world could not have defeated Germany through an invasion.

I think I have to agree with u on all 5 points...

[Lucky13]

Russian or German, it doesn't matter. I think that they would have one H**L of job to stem all kinds of gerilla warfare within their borders...
Just look at Finnish Winter War...
"Soviet leader Josef Stalin had expected to conquer the whole country by the end of 1939, but Finnish resistance frustrated the Soviet forces, who outnumbered the Finns 4:1 in men, 100:1 in tanks and 30:1 in aircraft. Finland held out until March 1940, when the Moscow Peace Treaty was signed ceding about 10% of Finland's territory (excluding its population) and 20% of its industrial capacity to the Soviet Union."


Finland:
250,000 men
30 tanks
130 aircraft
26,662 dead
39,886 wounded
1,000 captured

Soviet Union:
1,000,000 men
3,000 tanks
3,800 aircraft
126,875 dead or missing
264,908 wounded
3,100 captured

And how much did the Russians gain from easy victory? Not very much as you can see in this map. Was it worth it? I don't think so.



The Partisans were some hard fighting people too and they gave just as much as they took. I think that we should think about this as well, they would have been kept busy....

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Sounds like, long and short, none of the parties involved had the power to put a knockout punch on the others. Without the US intervetion, the war in Europe drags on. Britian has no continetal force, Russians and Germans go at it hammer and tongs until....what?

The thread has morphed from "Did the US save Europe?" to "What does the European War look like without American involvement?". That is a far more interesting question.

I agree with you on that. As I stated no side had the power to destroy Germany at that time on there own but together they were unstoppable.

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

It still boils down to this:

1) The UK (which I include its commonwealth countries) could not have been invaded by Germany OR Russia

2) Germany might have defeated Russia without being distracted by US material and forces.

3) Germany might have been defeated by Russia simply by attrition.

4) Either way, the UK speaks English and all of the rest of Europe speaks German or Russian.

5) The UK and its forces from around the world could not have defeated Germany through an invasion.

Believe it or not syscom, the more I think about it, I actually agree with you.

[Emac44]

I have another scenerio. for the USSR. If the border disputes between USSR and Japan had increased to full scale war from 1938 to when Operation Barbarosa occured could Russia been abled to maintain a 2 front war stretching over half a world away in the Asian Theatre of War? And if Japan had not attacked the areas of the Pacific and Asain Countries including Pearl Harbour Philippines Malaya Siam Singapore Burma Dutch East Indies etc. What would have been the outcome in that area and how so for the British and Commonwealth being abled to employ more troops to Middle East and North Africa and possibley England to bolster the Empire Troops and Commonwealth Troops etc to fight Germany and Italy. 2 scenerios here. One Japan concentrates war against Russia in Manchuria and not invade other regions no Pearl Harbour Philippines Malaya etc. And more troops sent from Far Eastern Allied Command back the the ETO. How would those scenerios tie into this thread. Or if Japan just remained satisfied with China and Manchuria and not attacked Russia or Allied Countries in Asia and Pacific etc. This is like the origins of the thread to be a WHAT IF. Another scenerio I just thought up if the US had been involved in WW2 but the Allies had lost the Battle of the Atlantic against U Boats and huge convoys were attacked and destroyed knocking virtually US War Effort out to the scene to supply material and men to European Theatre. What I am saying this is one thread with too many variables. Could Europe been split between USSR and Nazi Germany quiet possible if we stick to the origins of this thread. But me being me. I am going to add my variables into the equation. What if Hitler had been assasinated in Munich during the Munich Conference would War in Europe had occured? And if Mussolini had decided not to ally Italy with Germany and remained neutral like Spain, What would have been the consquences in Europe and North Africa at that stage?

Virtually Gentlemen there is no answer correct or incorrect as you would have to consider all different types of scenerios and variables to the question placed forward

[Lucky13]

On February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German (and perhaps from family members as well) already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially made a request for additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his hair longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.

Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, sketching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to Hickam Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to discover that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and that there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor. Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff

If Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa as early as on February 3, 1940, about an attack on the USA, you ask yourself WHEN did they first start to talk about an attack? Could they have started even before the WWII started?

Hitler was caught out of town at the time of Pearl Harbor and had to get back to Berlin and summon the Reichstag to acclaim war. His great worry, and that of his foreign minister, was that the Americans might get their declaration of war in ahead of his own. As Joachim von Ribbentrop explained it, "A great power does not allow itself to be declared war upon; it declares war on others." He did not need to lose much sleep; the Roosevelt administration was quite willing to let the Germans take the lead. Just to make sure, however, that hostilities started immediately, Hitler had already issued orders to his navy, straining at the leash since October 1939, to begin sinking American ships forthwith, even before the formalities of declaring war. Now that Germany had a big navy on its side (Japan's), there was no need to wait even an hour....

[Lucky13]

The Memo

0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Memorandum for the Director

Subject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and
Recommendations for Action by the United States.

1. The United States today finds herself confronted
by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally
hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between
these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but
in all probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers,
and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected
to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their
prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been
successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe
is either under their military control or has been forced into
subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by
war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their
satellites.

2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof
from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence
to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every
method within their power to foster a continuation of American
indifference to the outcome of the struggle in Europe. Paradoxically,
every success of German and Italian arms has led to further
increases in United States sympathy for and material support of
the British Empire, until at the present time the United States
government stands committed to a policy of rendering every
support short of war the changes rapidly increasing that
the United States will become a full fledged ally of the British
Empire in the very near future. The final failure of German
and Italian diplomacy to keep the United States in the role of
a disinterested spectator has forced them to adopt the policy of
developing threats to U.S. security in other spheres of the world,
notably by the threat of revolutions in South and Central America
by Axis-dominated groups and by the stimulation of Japan to further
aggressions and threats in the Far East in the hope that by these
mean the Unites States would become so confused in thought
and fearful of her own immediate security as to cause her to
become so preoccupied in purely defensive preparations as to
virtually preclude U.S. aid to Great Britain in any form. As a
result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded
a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States
If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed
utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed,
and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three
totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States,
should she come to the assistance of England, or should she
attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and,
[2]
furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to
determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a
cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating
England. In other words, after England has been disposed of
her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed
with an attack on the United States. Due to geographic conditions,
neither Germany nor Italy are in a position to offer any
material aid to Japan. Japan, on the contrary, can be of much
help to both Germany and Italy by threatening and possibly even
attacking British dominions and supply routes from Australia,
India and the Dutch East Indies, thus materially weakening
Britain's position in opposition to the Axis powers in Europe.
In exchange for this service, Japan receives a free hand to seize
all of Asia that she can find it possible to grab, with the
added promise that Germany and Italy will do all in their power
to keep U.S. attention so attracted as to prevent the United
States from taking positive aggressive action against Japan.
Here again we have another example of the Axis-Japanese
diplomacy which is aimed at keeping American power immobilized,
and by threats and alarms to so confuse American thought as to
preclude prompt decisive action by the United States in either
sphere of action. It cannot be emphasized to strongly that
the last thing desired by either the Axis powers in Europe
or by Japan in the Far East is prompt, warlike action by the
United States in either theatre of operations.

3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads
to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now,
immediately to help Britain that is not already being done.
We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England,
nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to
increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the
defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will
undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little
that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England
continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the
Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible
early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling
intact into the hands of the Axis powers. The possibility of
such an event occurring would be materially lessened were we
actually allied in war with the British or at the very least
were taking active measures to relieve the pressure on Britain
in other spheres of action. To sum up: the threat to our security
in the Atlantic remains small so long as the British Fleet
remains dominant in that ocean and friendly to the United States.

4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance
with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security
of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the
power of Japan-Germany and Italy is to be directed against the
United States. A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy
through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal
with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very
serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted
or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez
Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis
powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual
elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean, thus
[3]
opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for
Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be
diverted if the British and American ( ) blockade of Europe
and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect.

5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is
little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve
the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively
nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening
U.S. material assistance to Great Britain.

6. An examination of Japan's present position as
opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows:

Advantages Disadvantages

1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men
of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war
on the Asiatic Continent.
2. A highly centralized strong 2. Domestic economy and food
capable government. supply severely straightened.

3. Rigid control of economy on 3. A serious lack of sources of
a war basis. raw materials for war. Notably
oil, iron and cotton.
4. A people inured to hardship 4. Totally cut off from supplies
and war. from Europe.
5. A powerful army. 5. Dependent upon distant overseas
routes for essential supplies.
6. A skillful navy about 2/3 6. Incapable of increasing
the strength of the U.S. Navy. manufacture and supply of war
materials without free access
to U.S. or European markets.
7. Some stocks of raw materials. 7. Major cities and industrial
centers extremely vulnerable
to air attack.
8. Weather until April rendering
direct sea operations in the
vicinity of Japan difficult.

[Lucky13]

7. In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong
defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present
in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There
are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly
in our favor, viz:

A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States.
B. Friendly and possibly allied government in control
of the Dutch East Indies.
C. British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and
are favorable to us.
D. Important Chinese armies are still in the field
in China against Japan.
E. A small U.S. Naval Force capable of seriously
threatening Japan's southern supply routes
[4]
already in the theatre of operations.
F. A considerable Dutch naval force is in the
Orient that would be of value if allied to U.S.

8. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the
conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by
the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any
help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that
Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy
could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept
fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.
A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable
arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective
in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating
our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike
at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely
strengthen Britain's position against Germany and Italy and, in
addition, such action would increase the confidence and support
of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.

9. It is not believed that in the present state of
political opinion the United States government is capable of
declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely
possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the
Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following
course of action is suggested:

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of
British bases in the Pacific, particularly
Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of
base facilities and acquisition of supplies
in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government
of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to
the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in
the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese
demands for undue economic concessions,
particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan,
in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed
by the British Empire.

10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an
overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully
prepared to accept the threat of war.

A. H. McCollum
CC-0p-16
0p-16-F
File
[5]
0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940
Summary
1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of
powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.

2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile
action against the United States in this area.

3. Japan's growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea
communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an
attack on the British lines of communication in the
Indian Ocean.

4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is
to remain effective.

5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are
capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify
her assistance to Germany and Italy.

6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate
Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity
by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.

7. In the absence of United States ability to take the
political offensive, additional naval force should be
sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland
and England that would serve as an effective check against
Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.
[6]
Comment by Captain Knox

It is unquestionably to out general interest
that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate
and probably cant do better. We ought to make it certain
that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably
need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements
to England. We should not precipitate anything in the
Orient that should hamper our ability to do this - so long as
probability continues.

If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious
in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic
is also protection to her and us in the Orient.

However, I concur in your courses of action
we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough
to care for both.
D.W.K.
Re your #6: - no reason for battleships not
visiting west coast in bunches.

[syscom3]

EMAC, I think a war between Japan and Russia would end up in a Japanese defeat, with little change in the situation in the east

The IJA was strictly light infantry. And its tanks and artillery found to be "wanting" in many ascpects.

[timshatz]

EMAC, I think a war between Japan and Russia would end up in a Japanese defeat, with little change in the situation in the east

The IJA was strictly light infantry. And its tanks and artillery found to be "wanting" in many ascpects.

Japanese and Russians did fight a war at Nomonhan in 1940. Japanese came out on the losing end, big time. Across the board. Japanese did not have the mechanized ability to fight an armoured force on open ground.

[Bernhart]

languages don't change whether your occupied by another country or not. russia takes over large part of europe for decades and poland still speaks polish, Germans still speak German, and so on...

[syscom3]

languages don't change whether your occupied by another country or not. russia takes over large part of europe for decades and poland still speaks polish, Germans still speak German, and so on...

Dont take it so literal.

[renrich]

I would like to hear from some of you what you think the consequences would have been if the US wasn't involved in WW2 and Nazi Germany had nuclear bombs in 1946-47.