well, I think the truth is finally surfacing!!
The numbers tell the story: The surge in Iraq is working | Philadelphia Inquirer | 10/12/2007
Posted on Fri, Oct. 12, 2007
The numbers tell the story: The surge in Iraq is working
The surge is working. The data coming out of Iraq for the month that ended in September are the most encouraging news since the winter of 2004.
After Gen. David Petraeus took over as commander in Iraq, he began implementing the Baghdad Security Plan (the "surge") in February. The idea was to commit an extra 30,000 U.S. troops in an effort to establish security, first in Baghdad, and then radiating outward to the rest of central Iraq. The surge called for a gradual buildup of troops, with the full mobilization not fielded until June. Here are the results so far:
In May, the United States suffered 120 hostile deaths. Each month since, that number has fallen, to 93 in June, 56 in August, and then 43 in September. (Total U.S. military deaths, which include non-hostile deaths, have also fallen, from 126 in May to 66 in September.)
Within these numbers is more encouragement: Fatalities from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have also dropped dramatically, from 88 in May, to 44 in July, to 27 in September. IEDs have been the insurgents' most effective weapon against coalition forces. But Petraeus has not just rolled the new troops out into the field, he has changed the approach from one of clearing and holding territory to clearing and protecting populations.
The new tactics also are crippling the enemy. USA Today reports that 4,882 militants have been killed by coalition forces this year, up 25 percent from the total of insurgents killed during all of 2006. But the surge seems to be creating a pacifying effect: The number of enemy killed in action increased each month from March until June, when 634 were killed. Since then, the number has fallen each month; in September, just under 300 were killed. A reasonable explanation might be that the enemy is beginning to melt away in the face of strong opposition.
The final piece of hopeful data comes from the numbers of dead Iraqis. A year ago, what looked like a civil war was at its height: 3,389 Iraqi civilians were killed in September 2006, along with 150 members of the Iraqi security forces. When the surge began in February, 2,864 civilians and 150 Iraqi security officers were killed. Among these two cohorts, the effects of the surge have not been steady. From month to month they have risen and fallen - in May 198 Iraqi security personnel were killed along with 1,782 civilians - but the general trend has been one of steep decline. Again, September was an encouraging month: 746 civilians and 96 members of the Iraqi security forces died.
These numbers are signs of a growing tactical victory for coalition forces. The question is whether this tactical victory will lead to a strategic victory.
The surge was promoted by the Bush administration as both a means and an end. That was (another) mistake. A successful surge was never going to stabilize the political sphere of Iraq or implant liberalism in its culture. The best-case scenario was that the surge would provide enough security to give Americans and Iraqis a mulligan and enough breathing space to make another attempt at building a viable liberal state. Circumstances may change, but as a tactical military matter, Petraeus seems to be on his way to achieving this goal.
Which leaves us again with the larger concern of how best to achieve a strategic victory. President Bush has spoken often about "victory" but has never described what it would look like, other than vaguely asserting that it would be founded on democracy. Would "victory" be an Iraqi democracy that looked like Israel? If so, we had better strap in for a long wait. But what if Iraqi democracy produced a regime like Iran's? Wouldn't a less democratic, but more liberal, regime, like Kuwait's, be preferable?
As the dominant power, the United States has the great advantage of situational adaptability. We always have more moves available to us on the board than our opponents, more outcomes that can work to our strategic advantage. It is still unclear what strategic victory would look like in Iraq. It could look like Pakistan, with a Western-friendly strongman. It could look like a peaceful tripartite division along tribal lines. It's possible that victory in Iraq might even look like Afghanistan, with American forces providing the long-term security for a fledgling democracy, as long as the continuing cost in American blood is relatively small.
Each of these outcomes - and others - could qualify as victory for America and defeat for our Islamist enemies. None of them is certain, but for the first time in a long time, some of them, at least, seem possible. Let's hope we don't lose Iraq twice in the same war.
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